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I. INTRODUCTION
Both Israel and the United States are multi-ethnic societies with a large
percentage of linguistic minorities. Hebrew and Arabic are the two official
languages of Israel whereas the United States lacks an official language at the
J.S.D. Candidate, New York University School of Law; LL.M., New York University School
of Law, 1997; LL.B., The Hebrew University of Jerusalem School of Law, 1993. The author would like to
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federal level. There are legal, cultural, sociological, and political differences
between the two countries. Yet, when it comes to the individual and collective
use of minority languages vis-i-vis the government - i.e., in communications
with the government, in public notices (street signs and the like), in official
government publications for public distribution, in the legislature, thejudiciary,
and the administrative agencies - both countries show a distinct preference to
the majority language, and for the most part, make exclusive use of that
language.
By 1999, half of the states in the United States have enacted official
English legislation, and currently "English-Only" initiatives are under
congressional review. In the United States, English has great supremacy over
other languages and a privileged and dominant position. In Israel, the status of
Arabic as an official language does not accord Arabs equal language rights to
those of Hebrew-speaking Jews. The status of Arabic as official is a historical
anomaly, rather than a vigorously enforced protection. Therefore, Hebrew
enjoys a superior status to Arabic. A similar trend to the "English-Only"
movement in the United States is the call for the abolition of Arabic as an
official language in Israel.
This article questions the desirability of the move toward official
monolingualism in both Israel and the United States, criticizes the de facto
"official" status of English in the United States and further discusses the
superior status of Hebrew in Israel. The article's main argument is that
adopting one official language is objectionable. Declaring a language "official"
may constitute a mere symbolic statement regarding the role of the language;
but it is often used in order to protect the dominant status of that language and
to outlaw all public uses of other languages. Thus, official monolingualism
could serve to formally exclude the use of other languages; serve as a pretext
for discrimination on the grounds of national origin, ethnicity, and race; and
deprive linguistic minorities of equal rights. In an officially monolingual state,
linguistic minorities are forced to learn the dominant language and are
disadvantaged in accessing public employment, benefits, and state services.
Part 11 of this article concerns the nature of language diversity and
language policy in Israel and the United States. It also examines the tension
between the concept of Israel as a Jewish, Hebrew-speaking country and the
existence of a large Arabic minority within it. Part III examines the history and
the current legal status of Hebrew, Arabic and English in Israel and contrasts
it with the status of English and that of minority languages in the United States.
In Parts II and III the term "official language(s)" demonstrates a language
declared in a constitutional provision or by a statute as the official language of
the country or state. Part IV examines the complexity and the various other
meanings of an "official language" and attempts to define the term more
accurately. This part considers the implications of having and maintaining an
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official language. For example, it discusses linguistic requirements and
practices in the field of education, an area in which official monolingualism
would cause the most harm. Furthermore, it analyzes "Hebrew-Only" trends
in Israel in light of the "English-Only" movement in the United States and
provides a critique of official monolingualism. It examines the de facto and the
de jure status of languages in both countries and disputes the assumption that
the status of a language is determined by its "official" designation.
Part V of the article provides a definition of "linguistic minorities" and
offers a view of language rights as basic constitutional and human rights. It
discusses leading court decisions pertaining to language rights in both
countries. It contrasts the United States Constitution with the informal Israeli
Constitution and Bill of Rights in terms of the extent to which these instruments
provide protections for linguistic minorities.
In conclusion, the article proposes to accord language rights to linguistic
minorities as a group by virtue of basic principles of equality, pluralism, and
tolerance and by viewing language rights as fundamental, notwithstanding the
official or unofficial status of a language.
II. THE NATURE AND HISTORY OF LANGUAGE DIVERSITY IN ISRAEL
AND THE UNITED STATES
The United Nations' General Assembly Resolution on the future
Government of Palestine of 1947 stated that the British Mandate in Israel would
end and that a Plan of Partition should be implemented by dividing Israel into
two states: one Jewish and the other Arabic. Following this resolution, the
Jews in Israel established a transitional government and a small parliament. On
May 14, 1948, the official date on which the British Mandate ended, the
Jewish-Israeli Parliament and Government declared the foundation of an Israeli
state. This later became known as the "Declaration of Independence." The
declaration fully corresponded with the part of the United Nations' Resolution
regarding the foundation of an Arabic state, but, like the United States
Declaration of Independence, did not contain any statement regarding the
borders of the state. The Arab state was never founded. Soon after the
declaration, the Arabs in Israel and the surrounding Arabic states declared a war
against Israel and denied the Jewish-Zionist entity's right to establish a state.
The 1948 war ended in victory for Israel, which occupied a larger territory than
that designated by the United Nations resolution. This area included the
territory of the former Palestine, which was originally to have been divided
according to the United Nations resolution. Many Arabs, who lived in Palestine
before the war, fled to the surrounding Arab states and became refugees. The
ones who stayed in Israel during and after the war automatically became
citizens of Israel.
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The first Israeli legislation declared the incorporation of the statutes from
the Mandatory period into Israeli law. Thus, from the date of Israel's initiation,
and according to the incorporated British legislation, it has been an officially
bilingual country. Hebrew and Arabic are its two formal languages.
The United States is a multi-lingual country with a monolingual - English
- majority and no official language. In the United States, the founders assumed
that the de facto "official" language would be English because that was the
tongue of the first settlers and of the settler majority. Newcomers automatically
accepted the situation. Therefore, there was no need for a constitutional
mandate to give English special recognition.' Yet, when we examine the
history of language diversity in the United States, from the outset, the United
States has been characterized by a multiplicity of language groups. Further, this
linguistic diversity originally reflected the vying for supremacy in North
America among different colonial powers and that later linguistic diversity
persisted largely because of continued immigration to America.2
Israelis a young country confronting the challenges of nation-building and
the constant threat of war. The United States, by comparison, is a well-
established, long-standing, and stable democracy at peace. However, important
similarities between the two countries exist. In both countries there is a
growing concern regarding the relationship between language policy and
national identity. Both Israel and the United States are countries established on
the basis of immigration. Notwithstanding this original intent, both countries
have many restrictions on accepting immigrants. In the United States most
restrictions are applied equally to immigrants from all national and ethnic
origins and religions. In Israel there is a clear distinction between Jewish
immigrants and non-Jewish immigrants. Moreover, the language rights of
minorities in Israel apply to a population that has (or should have) equal legal
rights; the Israeli Arabs are citizens of Israel, while in the United States, the
debate over language policy is shaped by the fact that a large number of
linguistic minorities are illegal immigrants or permanent residents. In Israel,
the factors of immigration, legality and non-citizenship are irrelevant to
language policy.
Both Israel and the United States have a large percentage of linguistic
minorities. The largest linguistic minorities in Israel are Jewish Russians,
Jewish Ethiopians, and Arabs. Israel's total population is five and one-half
million, nineteen percent of which are Israeli Arab citizens, i.e., the Arab
minority amounts to approximately one fifth of Israel's population. This
1. ALBERT P. BLAUSTIN & DANA BLAUSTEIN EPSTEIN, RESOLVING LANGUAGE CONFLICTS: A
STUDY OF THE WORLD'S CONSTITUTIONS 1 (1986).
2. See E. GLYN LEWIS, BILINGUALISM AND BILNGUAL EDUCATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 130-
143 (1980).
minority is comprised mainly of Muslims, Christians and Druze.3 In the United
States, nearly fourteen percent of persons aged five years or over speak a
"language other than English at home. Of these persons, over one half are
Latinos.4 The United States has become the world's fifth largest Spanish-
speaking nation.' In thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia, Spanish is
the most common language spoken other than English.6 More than half of all
non-English language speakers reside in California, New York and Florida.7
Thus, a large percentage of the linguistic minorities in the United States live in
English-speaking cities. In Israel, however, most Arabs are segregated in their
own towns and villages, where they speak solely Arabic and aspects of cultural
life are carried on in Arabic. Furthermore, in the United States, a large
percentage of linguistic minorities are not proficient in English. In contrast,
Israeli Arabs are proficient in Hebrew. Yet most of them use Arabic at home,
in schools and in their neighborhoods. In the United States, exclusion often is
defined on the basis of inability to speak English, but the Israeli experience
reveals that even Arabs who speak Hebrew can be deprived of language rights.
This is due to the fact that while the United States treats most racial, national,
and ethnic minorities equally, Israel shows a clear preference for Jews over
other nationals or ethnic minorities
There are two interconnected principles unique to Israel, affecting
language policy in Israel, and contributing to the inferior status of Arabic. The
first is the concept of Israel as a Jewish state;9 the second is the concept of
3. See Ori Stendel, THE ARABS IN ISRAEL 40 (1996). See also Ori Stendel, THE MINORITIES IN
ISRAEL: TRENDS N THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARAB AND DRUZE CoMMuNrEs 1948-1973 (1973).
4. United States Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Population Division, Education and
Social Stratification Branch, 1990 Census Special Tabulation, Table A: Language Spoken at Home and
Ability to Speak English Ranked for Persons 5 Years and Over for United States, Regions, and States (1990)
[hereinafter The 1990 Census]. See also Thomas H. Lee, Note, A Purposeful Approach to Products Liability
Warnings and Non-English-Speaking Customers, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1107, 1109 n.7 (1994); Stephanie L.
Kralik, Civil-Rights - The Scope of Title VII Protection for Employees Challenging English-Only Rules, 67
TEMP. L. REv. 393, 393 nn.2-3 (1994).
5. Blaustein, supra note 1, at 1.
6. See The 1990 Census, supra note 4.
7. United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, 1980 Census of Population and
Housing, doc. PHC80-SI-l, at 14 (Mar. 1982).
8. In this respect it is important to note that my concern here is with linguistic minorities, as
opposed to religious or national origin minorities, although there is usually an obvious overlap between
language and nationality.
9. The tenet that Israel is a Jewish state should not be confused with preservation of Judaism as
a religion. There is only a partial overlap between the principle of Israel as a Jewish state and the status of
the Jewish religion in Israel. The uniqueness of Judaism is that it has a dual meaning: nationality and
religion. The greater part of the Israeli population is secular and non-observant, as were the founders of the
state, for the greater part, whereas the religious Jews are a minority. Thus, this principle has to do with the
preservation of Israel's national identity. One could claim that this distinction is not completely accurate
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Israel as a Hebrew-speaking country.
The essence of Israel, in the eyes of its founders, was its status as a Jewish
country and Hebrew, as the language of the state, is essential to the country's
identity as a Jewish state. Israel's Declaration of Independence states the
foundation of"A Jewish State in the Land of Israel." The importance of Israel
being a Jewish state has been asserted in many Israeli Supreme Court
decisions." Additionally, the principle of Israel as a Jewish state can be found
in numerous Israeli statutes. First and foremost, the statutory concept of Israel
as a Jewish country is demonstrated by the "Law of Return" of 1950. This law
provides every Jew with the automatic right to immigrate and settle in Israel.
The Nationality Law of 1952 further provides automatic citizenship to every
Jewish immigrant. Israel views Jews all over the world as potential citizens.
Non-Jews do not have similar rights. Thus, in areas other than language rights,
there is both overt and covert discrimination against the Arab minority."
Furthermore, section 7(a) of the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) Act of 1985
provides that "Israel is the state of the Jewish people" and that whoever denies
that principle is not eligible to participate in parliamentary elections. This Act
was used as a basis to deny the right of participation in the parliamentary
elections vis-a-vis a few political parties that "endangered the preservation of
Israel as a Jewish country.'
12
because, unlike the United States Constitution, Israeli law does not require the separation ofreligion and state,
and some statutes are based on Jewish-Hebrew law. However, the existence of such statutes is due in part
to the disproportionate political power of religious parliamentary parties in the Israeli Knesset and their
significance should be attributed to the preservation of the Jewish tradition and nationality, rather than the
Jewish religion as such.
10. See, e.g., H.C. 1165, Yardor v. The Election Committee for the Sixth Knesset, 19(3) P.D. 365,
386 (stating that Israel being a Jewish state is a basic constitutional fact "which heaven forbid should any
authority of the State - be it an administrative authority, a judicial authority or a quasi-judicial authority -
deny it in exercising any of its powers").
11. This terminology was employed by David Kretzmer, who defined "overt discrimination" as
statutes that expressly distinguish between the rights of Jews and Arabs, and "covert discrimination" as
statutes not using the explicit criteria of Jews or Arabs but in fact imply discrimination between the two. See
DAvID KRETZMER, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE ARABS IN ISRAEL 84-85 (1990). Examples of overt
discrimination are the Nationality Law and the Law of Return, both using the criterion "Jew" as a condition
for a right or a privilege (the right to settle in Israel provided to Jews by the Law of Return, and the right of
Jews to acquire Israeli citizenship under the Nationality Law). Covert discrimination is exemplified by the
policy to exempt Arabs from military service, which, among other things, is a source of various benefits (it
should be noted however, that the exemption stems from the unique position of Arabs vis-A-vis the
surrounding Arab countries). Id at 89-107. Israeli Arabs are further discriminated against by unequal
allocation of resources, e.g., in the field of education. Id at 115-127. See also Stendel, The Arabs in Israel,
supra note 3, at 191.
12. See AMNON RUBINSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 164-5, 197 (4th ed.
1991) (Hebrew).
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There is a close connection between Israel being a Jewish state and the
superiority and importance of the Hebrew language. As the Supreme Court
stated in the case of Reem Engineers:3
[L]anguage is not just a means for individual speech. It is a means
for national speech. It is a cultural asset. It is an asset of the nation
... language exemplifies national unity ... it is a symbol ... this is
doubly true regarding the Hebrew language. The revival of the state
of Israel was accompanied by the revival of the Hebrew language...
without the Hebrew language Israel would lose its soul. The struggle
for national independence was part of the struggle for reviving the
Hebrew language ... The preservation, development and growth of
Hebrew are a major value of the state of Israel ... Hebrew is one of
the most important cultural assets of the Israeli society ... Hebrew is
the spoken language of the Israeli people.
Hebrew was essentially a dead language, the language of the Bible and of
subsequent religious and secular literature. Hebrew was revived and
modernized as a spoken language after centuries of exile, during which it was
not the spoken language for the vast majority of the Jewish Diaspora. Only in
the last century and only in Israel has Hebrew fully regained its status as a
native tongue. 4 The Hebrew language in Israel has a traditional, ideological,
and national significance. The concept of the Hebrew language in Israel is
based upon national pride. It was a major component of the Jewish identity,
culture, religion, history and tradition for thousands of years and became a
symbol of the independence of Jews in Israel.
Israel is comprised of generations of immigrant Jews from all over the
world, mostly from Europe and the Arab countries. Traditionally, a feature of
the immigration process, especially on the part of young immigrants and of
those who left their countries of origins under less than favorable
circumstances, was a reluctance to preserve their former way of life. These
immigrants usually maintained a traditionally Jewish way of life when living
in their countries of origin. Thus, when immigrating to Israel, these Jews wish
to become rapidly assimilated into the Israeli society. A major part of this
13. C.A. 105/92, Reem Engineers v. The Municipality of Nazareth, 40 (5) P.D. 189, 203, 208.
14. See Jacob M. Landau, Hebrew and Arabic in the State of Israel: Political Aspects of the
Language Issue, 67 INT'L J. OFTHE SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE 117,118 (1987). See also Jacob M. Landau,
THE ARAB MINoRITY IN ISRAEL, 1967-1991: POLITcAL ASPECTS 84-97 (1993). For studies on the
revitalization of Hebrew see Benjamin Harshav, LANGUAGE IN TIME OF REVOLUTION (1993); Haim Blanc,
The Israeli Koine as an Emerging National Standard, in LANGUAGE PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPING NATIONS
237 (J. A. Fishman, C. A. Ferguson & J. Das Gupta, eds., 1968); Moshe Nahir, Language Planning and
Language Acquisition: The "Great Leap" in the Hebrew Revival, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF
BILINGUALISM AND BILINGUAL EDUCATION 275 (Christina Bratt Paulston ed., 1988).
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assimilation is learning and speaking Hebrew. In the last decade there were
major immigration waves of Jews from Russia and Ethiopia. These linguistic
minorities, as others before them, quickly learned Hebrew and their linguistic
problem was only a transitional one." They are part of the Jewish culture,
nationality and religion. The only reason for their being a "temporary minority"
is the fact that they emigrated from other countries. Hence, they should not be
viewed as ethnic-linguistic minorities whose language rights need to be
addressed.
The status of the Arabic Israeli minority, on the other hand, calls for a
different approach than that which applies to Jewish immigrants. There is a
political, national and ideological tension between the Israeli Arabs and Jews.
Unlike the Palestinians, most Israeli Arabs do not view Israel as an enemy, nor
are they viewed by it as such. Although many of them define themselves as
"Palestinians" and tend to identify with the Palestinians in the occupied
territories and with the surrounding Arab countries, they regard themselves as
citizens of Israel. 6 Still, many political and ideological tensions persist. Israeli
Arabs are segregated from the Jewish society and rarely become assimilated in
the Israeli Jewish society. 7 These Arabs originally lived on what later became
Israeli territory, and stayed on despite its foundation, rather than because of it.
They are Israeli citizens and they preserve their own tradition and language.
Thus, these Arabs did not actively strive to become part of the state of Israel,
15. See Eliezer Ben-Rafael, LANGUAGE, IDENTITY AND SOCIAL DivisioN: THE CASE OF ISRAEL 76
(1994).
16. For a discussion of the problem of the Palestinians in the occupied territories and the tensions
between Israel and the Palestinians, see generally JOHN QUIGLEY, PALESTINE AND ISRAEL: A CHALLENGE
TO JUSTICE (1990).
17. The virtual segregation between Jews and Arabs in Israel is well demonstrated by C.A. 2991/9 1,
X v. Y, 92 Takdin-Elion (1992) (not published): The case involved a custody dispute between divorced
parents of a 13-year-old Arab-Moslem child whose mother was Jewish and converted to Islam after her
marriage. Before the proceedings, the father had moved with the child from a Jewish city to an Arabic village
and sent the child to an Arabic school. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's ruling to accord the
father custody over the child and stated that the natural place for the child, as a Moslem, was with the people
of "his nationality and religion." However, and in contradiction to its own rationale, the court held that the
child should attend a Jewish-Hebrew school in order to preserve his connection to Jewish society and culture.
Moreover, the court ordered the father to move within three months to a Jewish city near the school. The
main reason for giving the father custody over the child was to preserve the continuity in the boy's life, as
the boy had been living with him for the six years before the litigation, and not to "harm his relationship with
his father and his tradition," as the court stated. However, by forcing the father to move to a Jewish city and
send the boy to a Jewish school, the court's ruling in fact eliminated the possibility of preserving the Arabic-
Moslem religion, tradition, and culture. The fact that the court did not consider a combination of living in
an Arabic village and, at the same time, studying in aJewish-Hebrew school or vise-versa, reflects the court's
view that social-cultural and educational integration between Jews and Arabs is impossible: one must reside
and conduct all matters of daily life either in a totally Jewish community or in a totally Arabic one. The
Supreme Court's decision reflects the reality of actual segregation in Israel today.
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unlike most of the minorities in the United States. Indeed, those groups in the
United States that did not evolve as a result of voluntary immigration, i.e.,
Native Americans, Mexicans after conquest, and Puerto Ricans after conquest,'8
present knotty problems. At least Native Americans have received special
treatment with respect to language policy. 9
The national identity issues and political-ideological views are factors in
the debate regarding the use of English and the rights of linguistic minorities in
the United States as well. As Shirley Brice Heath observes:
Ideological or political views about the status of a particular
language may arise in response to issues that have no direct or
necessary relation to language. Within these motivations, language
may be considered a tool or a symbol, and politicians may not
concern themselves with changing the language itself, but rather with
promoting it for status achievement and extension to speakers of
other languages. For example, within the United States, ideological
adherence to English has been supported by the ideal of a 'perfect
union,' a coming together of diverse peoples in a creative force.
Individuals, groups and the national government have promoted the
idea at different times throughout our history that speaking the same
language would ensure uniformity of other behavioral traits, such as
morality, patriotism, and logical thinking.0
Ill. THE LEGAL STATUS OF LANGUAGES IN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES
A. The Status of English and the Absence of an Official Language in the
United States
The Constitution of the United States contains no reference to an official
or national language. The legacy of the colonial and revolutionary periods
18. As to the special status of languages in Puerto Rico, which is now officially bilingual, and the
current debate over Puerto Rico's statehood and its implications for language rights, see Lisa Napoli, The
Legal Recognition of The National ldentity ofa ColonizedPeople: The Case of Puerto Rico, 18 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 159, 182-185 (1998).
19. See Native American Languages Act, 25 U.S.C.A § 2901 (1990) (P.L. 101-477) (providing
federal protection for linguistic rights of Native Americans and establishing the right of Native Americans
to preserve, practice, and develop their indigenous languages). See also Scott Ellis Ferrin, Reasserting
Language Rights of Native American Sotuents in the Face of Proposition 227 and Other Language-Based
Referenda, 28 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 1 (1999) (arguing that "English-Only" referenda are in conflict with the
Native American Languages Act and must include exceptions for Native American Students).
20. Shirley Brice Heath, English in Our Language Heritage, in LANGUAGE IN THE USA 6, 45
(Charles A. Ferguson & Shirley B. Heath, eds., 1981).
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includes tolerance of diverse languages and the freedom to choose among
languages in different areas.2
Some early national leaders, such as John Adams, proposed to set up a
national language academy, and English as the official language. These efforts
were debated and rejected by the founding fathers. The idea of government
regulating American speech was deemed to be incompatible with the spirit of
freedom of speech in the United States. During the nation's first century, there
was a laissez-faire attitude governing language issues. For example, the
Articles of Confederation were printed in German, and at different times federal
documents appeared in French, German, Dutch, and Swedish. Bilingual
instruction was common throughout the nineteenth century in both private and
public schools.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, a stronger central government
reduced the importance of tongues other than English. It was not until the late
nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century that legal, social
and political forces strongly opposed maintenance of languages other than
English. Only then was a monolingual English tradition mandated in some
states and espoused as both natural and national. There was a fear that
language diversity would lead to political separation and a national split within
the United States. Massive immigration to the United States at the beginning
of this century and, as a result, the development and prominence of large ethnic-
linguistic minorities, led to negative stereotyping and aroused antipathy towards
newcomers. For the first time in American history, an ideological link was
forged between language and "Americanism." During the 1920s, legal and
social forces restricted the use and teaching of foreign languages. Since the
1960s, linguistic minorities have stressed the multilingual, multicultural nature
of the national society. These minorities insist on the necessity of bilingualism
in education, judicial matters, and the workplace. These efforts to revitalize the
bilingual tradition in the United States have brought forth questions regarding
the historical and current role of linguistic uniformity in national unity and the
place of English in the United States' language heritage. The possibility of a
linguistically-divided nation has been discussed with great fervor and
frequency. The solutions currently offered are similar to those made
periodically over the past two hundred years.22 Many bills and proposals to
amend the United States Constitution to declare English as its official language
have been consistently introduced over the years and have always been rejected.
Various forms of such bills are currently being considered in Congress.23 At the
21. Id. at 42.
22. Carol Schmid, Comment, Language Rights and the Legal Status of English-Only Laws in the
Public and Private Sector, 20 N.C. CENT. L.J. 65, 67-70 (1992); see also Heath, supra note 20, at 6-20.
23. See infra Part IV B for discussion of the various proposals.
state level, before 1984 only five states had "English-Only" legislation on their
books.24 By 1999 that number has risen to twenty-five.25
An additional reason for English not becoming an official language at the
federal level has to do with the protection of immigrant-minorities' rights under
the Constitution. Linguistic minorities are protected indirectly by the
Constitution for reasons of discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or national
origin. Finally, the vision of the United States as a pluralistic nation, with an
emphasis on freedom of speech, has contributed to the lack of an enactment of
an official English statute at the federal level.
B. Formal Bilingualism and the Status of Hebrew, Arabic, and English in
Israel
During the period of the British Mandate over Palestine, English, Arabic,
and Hebrew were the three official languages of Palestine. Two legal
provisions dealt with the status of official languages in Palestine. According
to Article 22 of the Mandate for Palestine, "English, Arabic and Hebrew shall
be the official languages of Palestine. Any statement or inscription in Arabic
on stamps or money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew and any statement
or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic." '26
Although this was the first legal provision dealing with official languages
in Palestine, the Supreme Court of Palestine, sitting as the High Court of
Justice, concluded in the case of Jamal Huseini v. The Government of
Palestine27 that it did not govern the legal status of the three official languages.
The Court determined that the official, domestic status of the three languages
did not stem from the mandate, and therefore, this provision was inoperative in
the internal law of Palestine. It had implications only in the field of
international law. The Court held that for a mandatory provision to have effect
in the internal law of Israel, it had to be incorporated into the Palestine Order
in Council.2"
Therefore, the only applicable legal provision that declared the official
languages and established their status was Article 82 of the Palestine Order-in-
Council, 1922, which states:
.24. See Yvonne A. Tamayo, "Official Language" Legislation: Literal Silencing/Silenciando la
Lengua, 13 HARV. BLACKLEITrER J. 107, 120 n.104 (1997).
25. See US. English: States with Official English Laws (last modified April 26, 1999)
<http://www.us-english.org/states.htm>. See infra Part IV B for discussion of these statutes and their
constitutionality.
26. United States Dept. of State, Mandate for Palestine, Article 22 (Washington, 1927).
27. H.C. 55/25, 24 October 1925, 1 Palestine Law Reports 50.
28. Avigdor Saltoun, Official Languages in Israel, 23 HAPRAKLiT 387 (1966/7) (Hebrew).
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All Ordinances, official notices and official forms of the Government
and all official notices of local authorities and municipalities in areas
to be prescribed by order of the High Commissioner shall be
published in English, Arabic and Hebrew. The three languages may
be used in debates and discussions in the Legislative Council, and,
subject to any regulations to be made from time to time, in the
Government offices and the Law Courts.29
The Article provides that, on the one hand, the Mandatory Government
and the Branches of Administration have the duly of using the three languages.
On the other hand, the population and the administration have the right to use
any of the three languages. A 1939 amendment established that in case of a
discrepancy in the text of an ordinance, official notice or official form in the
three languages, the English version should prevail.3 °
The official Gazette, official notices and forms were published in all three
official languages. Correspondence could be addressed to any governmental
depmtment in any of these languages. All railway and road notices had to
appear in the three languages. Areas with considerable Jewish population, i.e.,
not less than twenty percent, were designated as "tri-lingual areas." In these
areas, every official document of the courts was to be issued in the language of
the person to whom it was addressed. Written and oral pleadings could be
conducted in any of the three official languages. It was mandatory for the
notary public of a court in a tri-lingual area, and permissible in any other area,
to accept a declaration and register a document in any of the three languages.
In all other districts, Arabic alone or Arabic together with English could be used
as convenient, provided that the use of Hebrew was not prevented when
needed.3
According to the U.N. Plan of Partition of 1947, the Constituent Assembly
of each state, Arab and Jewish, was to draft a democratic constitution guaran-
teeing all persons "freedom of religion, language, speech and publication,
education, assembly and association."32 The United Nations resolution further
stipulated that the provisional government of each of the proposed States had
to make a declaration to the United Nations that would be recognized as part of
the fundamental law of the state and prevail over other laws. In the area of
religious and minority rights, the declaration would stipulate that "[n]o
discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the
29. R.H. Drayton, 3 LAWS OF PALEsTINE 2569, 2588 (rev. ed., 1934).
30. See Interpretation Ordinance 1945 § 34 [1939] Palestine Gazette (no. 898) (Supp. 2) 465;
[1945] Palestine Gazette (no. 1400) (Supp. 1) 48, 58.
31. Mala Tabory, Language Rights in Israel, 11 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 272,274
(1981).
32. U.N. General Assembly Resolutions, Plan of Partition of 1947, Vol. 1.
grounds of race, religion, language or sex." Each state was to ensure adequate
primary and secondary education for its Arab or Jewish minority respectively,
in its own language and cultural traditions. Furthermore, the right of each
community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members
in its own language, while conforming to educational requirements of a general
nature imposed by the state, would not be denied or impaired.
Finally, no restriction would be imposed upon any citizen of the state with
respect to the free use of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in
religion, in the press or publications of any kind, or at public meetings. The
declaration by the Jewish State was to contain an additional stipulation to the
effect that adequate facilities would be given to the Arabic-speaking citizens for
the use of their language, either orally or in writing, in the legislature, before
the courts and in the administration.
Under the terms of the Partition Resolution, Arabic and Hebrew would be
the official languages of the City of Jerusalem. As mentioned above, in the
aftermath of the 1948 War, the Plan of Partition was never implemented.
Nevertheless, the Plan demonstrates how the United Nations viewed the rights
of Arabs in the Israeli State. This view will later be compared with the rights
of the Arab minority as reflected in language policy in the independent state of
Israel, which was no longer formally subject to the United Nations' resolution.
When the British Mandate over Palestine ended and the independent State
of Israel was founded, English, Arabic and Hebrew were no longer the official
languages of the State of Israel as they were in the Mandatory period. The first
statute enacted by the Israeli Parliament was the "Law and Administration
Ordinance" of 1948. The ordinance regulated the transition from the mandatory
rule to the new Israeli independent rule. According to section I 1 of the Law
and Administration Ordinance, the law which existed in Palestine on May 14,
1948, i.e., all British legislation from the Mandatory period, shall remain in
force, insofar as there is nothing therein repugnant to this Ordinance or to the
other laws which may be enacted by or on behalf of the Provisional Council of
the State, and subject to such modifications as may result from the
establishment of the State and its authorities. 33
Thus, Israeli law integrated Article 82 of the Palestine Order-in-Council
of 1922 and it is still in effect. However, the absorption of Article 82 into the
Israeli Law, subject to the conclusion of Section 11, influericed the applicability
of the Article.34 By virtue of the section's conclusion, the status of the official
languages in Israel did in fact change. Only Arabic and Hebrew remained the
official languages of Israel, and the scope and nature of protection and use of
these two languages have been totally transformed since the Mandatory period.
33. Law and Admin. Ord. Si I, Official Gazette, No. 2 of the 12th lyar, 5708 (21st May, 1948).
34. Saltoun, supra note 28, at 389.
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1. The Legal Status of Hebrew
There is no doubt that Hebrew continues to be an official language in
Israel. Although there is no original Israeli statute regarding the official
languages in Israel, Hebrew maintains its official language status by virtue of
Article 82, because there is nothing in section eleven of the Law and
Administration Ordinance which could lead to a different conclusion.3
5
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Israel suggested that even without the
provision in Article 82, Hebrew would have been recognized as the official
language of Israel as a basic fact that stems from the mere initiation of the
state.36 Due to Israel's unique national identity, Hebrew has enjoyed superiority
over Arabic, although Arabic remains an official language as well. Certain
legal provisions explicitly give Hebrew a superior status to all other languages.
One of these provisions is Section 32 of the Interpretation Ordinance [New
Version], which provides that where a discrepancy exists between the Hebrew
text of any enactment or public notice and the official translation thereof into
a foreign language, the Hebrew text shall prevail. Other provisions exemplify
the preference for and superiority of Hebrew: the Nationality Law of 1952
provides that to acquire Israeli nationality by naturalization, a person must
possess some knowledge of the Hebrew language; the state seal is designed
only in Hebrew; according to the Chamber of Advocates Law of 1961, the
conditions for registration as a law clerk include proof of a "sufficient
knowledge of the Hebrew language."
Moreover, all post-independence legislation is drafted in Hebrew. Hebrew
is the language in which the laws and regulations are enacted; it is the language
in which speeches are made at the dais of the Knesset, the language of the
discussions in the committees of the Knesset and at its meetings. It is the
language of the government's publications for the general public and in which
the public addresses the government. Hebrew is the language in which the
deliberations of the courts are carried on, the language of instruction in the
(Jewish) schools, and the language of the public institutions." British
legislation from the Mandatory period, which is still in force, is translated into
Hebrew, and after its translation and formal publication, it constitutes the
35. See Rubinstein, supra note 12, at 88; Saltoun, supra note 28, at 389.
36. H.C. 1/65, Yardor v. The Election Committee for the Sixth Knesset, 19(3) P.D. 365, 385.
37. Haya Fisherman & Joshua A. Fishman, The "Official Languages" of Israel: Their Status in
Law and Police Attitudes and Knowledge Concerning Them, in MULTILINGUAL POLITICAL SYSTEMS:
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 497, 508 (Jean-Guy Savard & Richard Vigneault eds., 1975).
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binding version of the law. No plea that the Hebrew version deviates from the
original law will be entertained.38 All the above establishes the legal superiority
of Hebrew as the principal official language.
2. The Legal Status of English
Section 15(b) of the Law and Administration Ordinance repeals any
provision in the law requiring the use of English language.39 The reason
English had been an official language in the Mandatory period was the British
occupation of and mandate over Palestine. This period, a relatively short one,
gave no rise to an ingrained use of the English language. As soon as the British
mandate came to an end, a reason to maintain the formal status of English no
longer existed. Furthermore, unlike Arabic, the English language is not the
actively exercised primary language within any minority in Israel.
The Israeli Ministry of Justice translates Hebrew statutes into English, and
some transactions of the Knesset appear in English. The only instance in which
English retains its preferred status concerns mandatory legislation that has not
yet been replaced by a new Hebrew version. The English version of such
legislation takes precedence over the Arabic and Hebrew and is decisive in case
of discrepancy.4"
3. The Legal Status ofArabic
No legislation subsequent to Article 82 has altered the status of Arabic,
and therefore it remains Israel's second official language. Moreover, the pro-
vision repealing the required use of English does not mention Arabic, further
confirming the official status of Arabic.4' According to Article 82, a legal
obligation exists to publish all official orders and forms of the government and
38. Tabory, supra note 31, at 278.
39. This is the only original legal provision enacted by the state of Israel dealing directly with
official languages. A few Israeli commentators argue that section 15(b) did not entirely terminate the official
status of English by abolishing the requirement that the authorities use English, because it did not alter the
right of citizens to employ English in all Government offices and courts. See Tabory, Id. at 279; Saltoun,
supra note 28, at 391. However, although citizens have the right to employ English in certain circumstances,
it should be stressed that the duty to use English has been abolished and only the right to use it remains.
Because section 15 stipulates that it is no longer necessary to publish official notices and legislation in
English, it is clear that English no longer enjoys the status of an official language in Israel in any respect.
40. This, however, does not grant English the status of an official language. The court must turn
to the original English version only for the purpose of an accurate interpretation. Moreover, Hebrew version
statutes have already replaced most of the mandatory legislation and thefew British Ordinances that are still
in effect are in the process of being replaced.
41. See Elazar L. Globus, On the Status of the Arabic Language in the State ofIsrael, 7 HAPRAKLIT
328, 329 (1950) (Hebrew); Mahsan Sabri, The Legal Status of the Israeli Arabs, 3 EiYUNEI MISHPAT 568,
581 (1973/4) (Hebrew); Fisherman & Fishman, supra note 37.
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all official announcements of the local authorities and municipalities in Arabic
as well as in Hebrew. The only question left is whether the stipulation at the
end of Section 11 of the Law and Administration Ordinance affects the official
status of Arabic. In a District Court case, Jerusalem Municipality v. Kaha,42 the
judges expressed the opinion that it was no longer necessary to insist on the
publication of a certain municipal notice in Arabic based on Section 11, i.e.,
implicit in the establishment of the State of Israel was a decision that dual
publication was no longer necessary notwithstanding Arabic's status as an
official language. The Supreme Court rejected the appeal on grounds of
standing, but expressed doubt regarding whether an obligation to publish in
Arabic persisted in light of the concluding part of Section I1.4 In another case,
the Israeli Supreme Court decided that a police officer, taking down a statement
of an accused or a witness, was not required to write it in the original language.
Thus, a statement to the police made in Arabic was admissible although it was
written in Hebrew. The court added that if the person signed the statement
without expressing opposition, this did not infringe the rights of the citizen or
the equality of the official languages." In El Harawi, the Supreme Court
concluded that publishing statutes in Hebrew is sufficient, unless the plaintiff
has suffered a distortion of justice."5 Frequent violations of Section 82, i.e.,
traffic signs, signs in public institutions, and street and road signs written in
Hebrew and English but not in Arabic, further exemplify the lack of
implementation of Arabic as an official language.46 Even in areas populated by
a majority of Arab citizens, most street and road signs are in Hebrew and
English alone.47 Moreover, most government and public institutions use only
Hebrew and English, ignoring the official status of Arabic.48 Although the
statute requiring the usage of English was abolished and the requirement to use
Arabic has not been changed; in reality, there is a much greater use of English
in Israel, both officially and unofficially, than Arabic. In practice, no real
obligation to use Arabic in government offices exists, only permission to
do so.49
However, one should note that although Hebrew is in fact the main official
language of Israel, there are a few aspects in which Arabic maintains its status
42. C.A. (T.A.) 48/53, 10 Psakim Mehoziim (Law Reports of the Israeli District Courts).
43. C.A. 148/54, Kaha v. Jerusalem Municipality, 9 P.D. 1247, 1250.
44. C.A. 48/54, Isa Ali Irshifv. Attorney General, 8 P.D. 690, 691.
45. C.A. El Harawi v. The Ministry of the Interior, 19(3) P.D. 279.
46. See Fisherman & Fishman, supra note 37, at 514.
47. See D.K. (March 22, 1995).
48. See, e.g., Arabic is not being used in nearly all public hospitals. See D.K. (July 29, 1998).
Similarly, all correspondence and documents issued by Social Security Services are sent to Arab citizens in
Hebrew alone. See D.K. (June 24 1998).
49. See Fisherman & Fishman, supra note 37, at 528.
as a second official language; e.g., Hebrew laws and regulations must be
translated into Arabic. Nevertheless, it takes time until the translations are
available, and failure to fulfill the duty to translate laws and regulations into
Arabic does not affect their validity."0
The position no longer requiring the government to use Arabic in all
official publications is unacceptable. First, the official status of Arabic
obligates the state to employ Arabic in official publications and entitles citizens
to use that language in Government offices and courts. Second, Section 15(b)
of the Law and Administration Ordinance, repealing the use of English, did not
include Arabic, and if the conclusion of Section 11 to the same Ordinance
provided a basis not to publish in Arabic, there would have been no need to
specifically address English in Section 15(b).5 Third, the Supreme Court of
Israel has decided in other matters that Section 11 refers only to technical
modifications. A decision regarding the status of language used by a national
minority cannot be regarded as a technical change effected by the establishment
of Israel. 2 It is inconceivable that the Judiciary should infringe upon an area
where the legislature would not tread.53 However, because there is no statute
regarding the status of Arabic except for Article 82, the other provisions of that
Article can be applied. The Article enables the Government to relieve councils
of the obligation to publish official notices in Arabic and to limit the use of
Arabic in Government offices and in the courts. However, such implementation
contradicts the essence of an official language.
The foregoing court decisions dealt with limitations on the use of Arabic
and have granted inferior status to Arabic in Israel. However, no statute or
court decision to date has doubted the fact that Arabic is an official language.
On the contrary, ministers of the Government and members of the Knesset have
continuously stated the importance of Arabic as an official language in Israel.54
The Israeli Supreme Court has made similar statements.5"
50. See Directives of the Attorney General, Use of Arabic Language, no. 21.556 of May 1, 1971.
See also KRETZMER, supra note 11, at 166.
51. Tabory, supra note 31, at 282; Directives of the Attorney General, no. 21.556 7.
52. See Satoun, supra note 28, at 393.
53. Rubinstein, supra note 12, at 91.
54. Saltoun, supra note 28, at 395. For example, the Minister of the Treasury, Pinhas Sapir,
recognized Arabic as an official language in the name of the government when he replied from the platform
of the Knesset on February 16, 1966 to a complaint of an Arabic Knesset member regarding the use of Arabic
in public institutions. He stated, inter alia, that "the Arabic language is an official language having equal
rights to those of Hebrew." See D.K. (1966) 4726.
55. See, e.g., C.A. 105/92, Reem Engineers v. The Municipality of Nazareth, 40(5) P.D. 189, 209.
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C. Comparative Observations
The development of language diversity, the historical background and the
status of languages in the United States are, obviously, very different from
those found in Israel. Unlike Israel, the United States witnessed no
"development" that led to the institution of an official language. The issue of
English as the official language of the United States was raised at the federal
level, debated and rejected throughout history. Moreover, unlike Israel, which
gained independence after having been a colony, the colonials were the ones
who created the United States and have never left it. The founders of the
United States and its majority spoke English. Therefore, in the United States
there was never a shift from a colonialist regime that spoke one language, to an
independent regime, which spoke a different language than their former
colonizers.
The process by which English became the predominant language of the
United States was a natural one, and for that reason Congress never had to make
a legal declaration as to the country's formal language. Only the immigration
of linguistic minorities to the United States prompted debate regarding English
as an official language. In contrast, the minorities who immigrated to Israel
were Jews who aspired to speak Hebrew. In this respect, the Arabic minority's
status in Israel more closely resembles that of the Native Americans in the
United States; each population resided in its respective country before
independence and both were subject to the language introduced by the majority.
In both countries, the language of the majority became the dominant
language. If not .for the statute of official languages enacted by the British
colonizers that became automatically part of the Israeli law, Israel might never
have had official languages. All efforts to enact an original Israeli statute
regarding language status have failed, just as official English provisions have
in the United States at the federal level. Furthermore, the incorporation of
Article 82 into Israeli law was due to the Law and Administration Ordinance
that stated very generally that all the mandatory legislation shall remain in force
in the independent state of Israel under certain conditions. In addition, Israel's
Declaration of Independence did not address the legal status of languages. It
simply stated, inter alia, that "The State of Israel ... shall guarantee freedom of
religion, conscience, [and] language . When a member of Israel's
56. The legal status of Israel's Declaration of Independence has always been problematic. Most of
its parts are considered declarative in nature. The declaration does contain a few explicit legal provisions and
general binding legal principles, which are a kind of informal bill of rights. See Rubinstein, supra note 12,
at 38. One of these binding legal provisions is the provision regarding the freedom of language. Although
the general view is that the Declaration does not itself have the force of law and is not regarded as positive
law, the Declaration has a special status, with a profound effect on Israeli law in relation to the basic rights
of Israeli citizens, and has been widely used by the courts in the interpretation of laws. It manifests the vision
of the people and the credo of the state and provides guidance for the interpretation and implementation of
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transitional parliament suggested that the phrase "freedom of language" be
included in the Declaration of Independence, Israel's first Prime Minister,
David Ben-Gurion, said that the reason he did not oppose the inclusion of this
phrase was not because of the need to ensure. the equality of Arabic and
Hebrew. He asserted that it was because "the fact that Hebrew is the state 's
language should not deprive other citizens of using their language in Israel.
57
Thus, it seems that in 1948, the Israeli legislature and the founders of Israel
were not aware of the implications of Article 82. Only soon afterwards did
Israel realize that it had two official languages. Therefore, the Israeli
legislature never consciously or intentionally decided to establish Arabic as an
official language in Israel or to maintain equality between the two languages.
The fact that scholars have been debating the origin of the status of the official
languages in Israel and the extent to which Article 82 still applies, further
substantiates these conclusions. The observation from this point of view
reveals that behind the legal complexities, there are more similarities between
Israel and the United States than seem to emerge at first. In other words,
neither country has in fact committed itself to an official language policy - and
that, despite the de jure status of languages in Israel.
However, at the same time, differences exist between the development of
the status of languages in both countries. The English language in the United
States had supremacy over other languages from the very beginning. In
contrast, Israel was subject to a major and extreme change regarding the
dominant languages of its population: Arabic was the dominant language in the
1930s because more Arabs than Jews lived at that period in Palestine. During
the 1940s, a large number of Jews emigrated from Europe to Israel and changed
its demography. The legal status of languages was already established during
the British Mandate, and was incorporated into the Israeli law. Unlike the
United States, no debate ensued regarding the status of languages in the first
few decades following Israel's foundation. Thus, the differences between the
United States and Israel regarding the development of the status of languages
have also led to the differences in the current legal status of languages in both
countries.
all laws in force in Israel. See Shimon Shitreet, International Protection of Human Rights in Israeli Law,
in ISRAELI REPORTS TO THE XlI INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 307, 333 (Stephen
Goldstein ed., 1986); Haim H. Cohn, Comparative Law and International Protection of Human Rights, in
ISRAELI REPORTS TO THEXI INTRNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 263 (1982); Ori Stendel, THE
ARABS IN ISRAEL, supra note 3, at 189-91.
57. Rubinstein, supra note 12, at 88.
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IV. "OFFICIAL LANGUAGE:" IMPLICATIONS AND MOVEMENTS
Based on the foregoing overview of the de jure status of languages in
Israel and the United States, I shall now attempt to define in a more specific and
detailed manner the term "official language" - and a related term - "national
language" - in order to examine whether and to what extent such definition
corresponds to the de facto status of English in the United States, and of
Hebrew and Arabic in Israel. Subsequently, this will assist us in realizing the
implications of having or not having official languages.
In general, an official language is one used by the government and
promoted through the power of the state; it constitutes the major means of
communication between the state and its citizens." The official language is the
language of record; it is the language of the constitution, of legislation, the
language of parliament and the language of the courts. It is the normative
language of internal correspondence to and from the government, that of
judicial and administrative affairs, that which represents the government and
state to its citizens. Language has become a sign of nationalism; a struggle
between languages often accompanies a conflict between national movements. 59
The official language of a country is not necessarily the same as its national
language.6 ° For the most part, the national languages are also "permitted"
languages in the schools and in commerce, as well as the languages of the
ethnic home.6' National languages imply nationality membership. Official
languages imply governmental citizenship.62 The United Nations once defined
official language as "[a] language used in the business of government
(legislative, executive, administrative and judicial) and in the performance of
the various other functions of the state;" and national language as "the





58. Fisherman & Fishman, supra note 37, at 497. Following national and political changes, the
status of a language as official may also change; the official status of a language is not permanently fixed and
is exposed to fluctuation according to political circumstances. ld at 498. See generally, JOSHUA FISHMAN,
LANGUAGE AND NATIONALISM (1972).
59. Id at 498.
60. Thus, as Fisherman & Fishman observe, there are countries in which a number oflanguages are
used as official languages, e.g., Switzerland (which recognized three official languages: German, French, and
Italian), India (in which there are fourteen official languages), Belgium (where two official languages are
recognized, Dutch and French), and Israel (recognizing Arabic and Hebrew as official). However, it does not
follow that the official languages are national ones or vice-versa. Thus, for example, in Switzerland the
official languages are German, French, and Italian, while the national languages are German, French, Italian,
and Romansch. Id
61. Blaustein, supra note 1, at 2.
62. Fisherman & Fishman, supra note 37, at 498.
63. Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous. Populations, U.N. Doc.
This definition lacks a major component. For a language to be an official
language of the state there must be a constitutional provision or a statute
declaring it as such. However, a constitutional provision by itself is
insufficient, if not accompanied by the government's obligation to use and
implement the language. The following definition would thus be more
appropriate: An official language is a language that has a special status binding
the authorities and the government by virtue of the state's laws and which has
a priority over another language or languages that have no such status. It is not
enough to declare a language "official." The law must explicitly prescribe the
boundaries of the "formality" of a language by defining and fixing the limits of
its legal status.'
The United Nations, in one of its reports, depicted the process whereby
languages become official or national as follows:
During the historical process of nation building, a particular
language, usually that of the segment of the population which gains
supremacy and imposes itself socially, politically and militarily on
other segments in various regions and whose language dominates the
other languages or dialects in the country, becomes, because of these
extra-linguistic factors, the language of highest standing and,
ultimately, the official language. Official recognition is of great
importance to this and the other languages spoken in the country
because, whether or not it is provided for in the Constitution or other
basic law, such a selection means that this privileged linguistic
instrumeni will be used in the various activities of the State... At the
end of the colonial dependence ... the people of many countries...
faced the problem of having to decide which language would
henceforth be the official language of their new State. During this
process, what became the official language - either the single official
language or one of them - was often the language introduced by the
colonizers; in a few cases, a national language was chosen.6"
This is a general portrayal supposedly applicable to all countries. As to
Hebrew, the foregoing description is accurate, since Israel chose Hebrew, which
had been the national language, as one of the official languages. However, the
description of the development of an official language does not apply to Arabic,
as it is only de jure an official language and in practice it has an inferior status
to Hebrew. As for English in the United States, this description is accurate
except that English became a national language, rather than an official one.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/476/Add.6 [hereinafter UN. Report]; Text in Blaustein, supra note 1, at 2.
64. See Saltoun, supra note 28, at 387.
65. U.N. Report, supra note 63, at 9.
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There is no equality between Hebrew and Arabic in Israel, although both
are official languages. The major reason for that, I would suggest, is the
perception of an official language and the scope of its implementation. The
policies, court decisions and statutes discussed in the previous section indicate
the erosion of the status of Arabic as an official language. To declare Arabic
as the official language is one thing; to implement it by giving equal linguistic
rights to the Arabic minority is another. Arabic's status as an official language
of Israel is a vestige of British legislation. However, confusion ensues because
coexistent with the official language status is a lack of linguistic rights for the
Arab minority. As explained above, Israel incorporated Article 82, but the
status of languages has never been the subject of original Israeli legislation.
Original legislation could clarify the Israeli Legislature's intent, and if there is
intent to accord Hebrew priority over Arabic, as is the practice in Israel, the
legislature should state this explicitly in a statute. Such a preference should not
be inferred from the existing provisions regarding official languages.
A. The Implications of "Official Language"
It appears that a statutory declaration that two languages are official
languages necessitates total equality between them and a duty of the
government to provide various services in both. The Israeli example proves
that this assumption is far from being accurate." The supremacy accorded to
the Hebrew language is apparent in all aspects. If we set aside for a moment the
requirement for a statutory or constitutional provision establishing the
language's official status and go back to the United Nations' definitions, we can
throw interesting light on the relative status of English, Hebrew, and Arabic.
English in the United States and Hebrew in Israel would both be considered
official and national languages. In the United States, the English language is
the predominant and commonly the exclusive language in all branches of the
government. For example, the United States requires English proficiency as a
prerequisite to citizenship similar to the Israeli law requirement of Hebrew
66. The status of languages in Canada is another example for both the lack of equality between two
official languages and the lack of government implementation of their status as such. Under Article 16 of
the Canadian Constitution, the recognition of two official languages did not in fact guarantee a right to any
type of service in either official language. See Socidti des Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick v. Association
of Parents for Fairness in Education, (1986) S.C.R. 549. In Canada, official language status was interpreted
to be merely a "political" declaration which had to be further developed in other constitutional or legal
provisions. Moreover, even when the use of English and French in Canada is guaranteed by a statute, it is
still limited to certain categories of public services provided by the federal government and only a few
specific federal services are, in theory, available in both languages in the whole of the country. See FERNAND
DEVARENNES, LANGUAGE, MINORITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 174-75 (1996). Similarly, the recognition of
eleven official languages by the new South African Constitution is misleading, because official status does
not actually imply guaranteed access to administrative or public services in all of these languages. Id at 175.
proficiency.67 The existence of such a requirement is one example of the de
facto official status of English in the United States. Thus, despite the absence
of a federal law declaring English as the official language of the United States,
some federal laws, such as the above-mentioned provision requiring English
literacy, produce in effect this result.6"
In such a light, and if we accept the United Nations' definition of a
national language as the majority's language, Arabic in Israel would be
considered neither an official language nor a national language. Therefore, the
de jure status of the languages in both countries does not reflect their actual
status. For this reason, both formal recognition and equal treatment must be
implemented in order for a language to qualify as official and the mere statutory
provision regarding Arabic is in itself insufficient.
One of the most important implications of having an official language is
that the minorities whose language is not official must become bilingual or
multilingual. In addition to full access to government and administrative
agencies, many other reasons exist to learn the dominant language, such as
integration and participation in the social and cultural life of the majority.
Nevertheless, the effect of having an official language formally excludes by law
the use of minorities' languages in government branches. Thus, the minorities
must learn other languages in addition to their own and not as a matter of
choice. Minority linguistic groups who are forced to become bilingual or
multilingual because of their powerless linguistic status have less power than
those whose native tongue is the official language.69 This also demonstrates the
de facto formal status of English in the United States. English-speaking
Americans do not need to learn any of the languages spoken in the United
States apart from English. However, Native Americans, Latinos and other
minorities in the United States need to learn English in addition to their mother
tongues. It also illustrates the de facto unofficial status of Arabic in Israel.
Arabs are forced to learn Hebrew to function effectively in the state's
institutions and in society at large. Furthermore, by excluding the use of most
other languages, a linguistic majority can control a government and enjoy the
privileges, jobs, and services provided by the state in their own language.70
Individuals for whom the official language is not the primary vernacular find
themselves at a disadvantage in terms of access to jobs and services, education,
67. The first English language proficiency statutory requirement. See THOMAS ALEXANDER
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND PoucY 50 (3d ed. 1995). Today, § 312(a)(1) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C § 1423 (1997) requires proficiency in English for naturalization.
68. See Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural
Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REv. 269, 332 (1992).
69. Tove Skutnabb-Kangas, MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP REPORT: LANGUAGE, LITERACY AND
MINORmES 6 (1990) [hereinafter Minority Rights Group Report].
70. De Varennes, supra note 66, at 86.
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and in private business activities.71 Moreover, by adopting a one-language-for-
all policy, a state uses linguistic criteria to determine who will have access to
services provided by the government, such as public schooling or public
employment opportunities. It also creates a distinction, based upon language,
on the degree to which individuals will be able to enjoy and benefit from these
activities or services. Depending on the types of governmental service
involved, language proficiency requirements by the state may disadvantage a
non-native speaker depending on his or her level of fluency.72
By definition, official monolingualism means that in the majority of cases
linguistic minorities experience violations of their linguistic human rights.73
Moreover, bilingual government services should be provided in countries where
there is a large enough linguistic minority. 74 They are necessary to ensure that
minorities have full access to all resources and are able to participate in
government and administration. This is essential in a democratic and pluralistic
society. A state that fails to adequately support the bilingualism of its
minorities or at least provides some degree of official recognition to a minority
language is denying group identity and full human rights from minorities.75
Official monolingualism which excludes the use of other languages, or is
interpreted or implemented to prohibit public authorities from using other
languages, is exceptionable. In the United States, the declaration of English as
the official language of some states led to repressive and discriminatory
measures.76 Official language status should not entail exclusion of other
languages. While the state may freely designate a preferential language, and
thus recognize its legal obligation to respond in the official language (or
languages), such a designation should not allow public authorities to violate the
fundamental human rights of individuals. 77
Considering all of the above, we can conclude that of the three languages,
English, Arabic, and Hebrew, only Hebrew's status accords with the common
definitions of an official language in all of its aspects. Although English in the
United States has most of the characteristics of an official language, it cannot
be regarded as such because of the lack of a statutory or a constitutional
71. Id See also Juan F. Perea, English-Only Rules and the Right to Speak One's Primary
Language in the Workplace, 23 J. L. REFoRM 265, 290-91 (1990).
72. De Varennes, supra note 66, at 55.
73. See MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP REPORT, supra note 69, at 6.
74. For a discussion of which minorities deserve equal language rights and the question of a
numerical threshold, see infra Part V.
75. See MiNoRrrY RIGHTS GROUP REPORT, supra note 69, at 8.
76. Denying parole to non English-speaking prisoners in Arizona is one example. See De Varennes,
supra note 66, at 175. The Arizona "English-Only" statute was eventually struck down by the State's
Supreme Court, see infra Part V.
77. See De Varennes, id, at 175-76.
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provision. Arabic in Israel, which is formally an official language, has the
status of a non-official language.
B. "Hebrew-Only" Trends in Israel in Comparison to the "English-Only"
Movement in the United States
Both the United States and Israel originally had a national commitment to
tolerance of linguistic diversity. 8 In recent years, however, both countries have
experienced pressure to adopt a single language as the official one. 9
Over the years, many individual Knesset members suggested legislation
making Hebrew the only official language in Israel. In 1952, a member
introduced the "State's Language Law," the first of its kind." This bill
assumed that Article 82 of the Order-in-Council applied to Arabic, and
therefore necessitated repeal. The Knesset rejected this bill, which would have
abolished any legal requirement to use the Arabic language.8 In March of
1976, the Israeli Minister of Justice stated before the Knesset that the status of
the official languages was not regulated under legislation and that the
government intended to include a provision in a basic law to be presented to the
Knesset making Hebrew the official language of the state. 2 Another bill,
proposed in 1981, was "The Hebrew Language Law." The aim of this bill was
to encourage the Hebrew language without making it the only official
language. 3 This proposal would have imposed on the government the duty to
use only Hebrew in state sponsored press and media, in state institutions, in
international contracts, in Israel's consulates and embassies abroad, on sign
posts, in advertisements and so on." This bill was also rejected.
An important bill was brought before the Knesset on October 8, 1996.
This bill also provided that Hebrew should be the sole official language of
Israel. The bill further provided that ministers and Knesset members be
allowed to use only Hebrew in the Knesset. Proposed by a member of a right-
wing party, this bill was a reaction to a declaration by Arabic Knesset members
that they intended to use only Arabic when speaking in the Knesset. The
Knesset member who proposed this bill stated that its purpose was to strengthen
78. As to the United States, see supra, Part I and Part IliA. As to Israel, its Declaration of
Independence stipulates that the State of Israel shall guarantee, among other things, freedom of religion,
conscience, education, culture, and language. See supra, Part HIB.
79. See supra, Part Ill.
80. D.K.(1952) 2528; See also KREIzmER, supra note 11, at 165.
81. Id.
82. D.K. (1976) 2048.
83. KRETZMER, supra note 11, at 172.
84. D.K. (1981) 719; D.K. (1982) 758.
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Israel's identity as a Jewish country." The timing of the Arabic Knesset
members' declaration and the subsequent bill came as no surprise. Israel was
in the midst of extreme political tension between Arabs and Jews, and its
government (based on a right-wing coalition) was clearly seen to deploy a
consistent policy prejudicing minority rights and the pluralism of Israel.
Nonetheless, the chances of this bill becoming law were slim for two
reasons. First, as opposed to the Government, the composition of the Knesset
was one that would have probably not allowed such a bill to pass, as the
Knesset had rejected similar bills before it. Moreover, the political right may
have viewed the statement by the Arab members of the Knesset as a
provocation. However, the usage of Arabic in the Knesset is not only a long-
standing tradition, beginning with Ben Gurion's statement that the Arabs were
not to be denied the right to use Arabic in the Knessete6 and continuing to this
very day, but is also explicitly provided for by Article 82 of the Order-in-
Council. Article 82 provides that Hebrew and Arabic be used in debates and
discussions of the Legislature. Furthermore, although the actual language of
the proceedings in the Knesset has generally been Hebrew with simultaneous
translation available into Arabic, Arabic has also been used in speeches and has
been simultaneously rendered into Hebrew.87 Thus, Arabic has always had a
special status in the House. The latest bill of this sort went before the Knesset
in May 1998. Like previous bills, it proposed to abolish the official status of
Arabic, and the Knesset rejected it.88
During the past decade, the United States has been in the midst of
linguistic conflict. Various ethnic groups, dominantly, but not exclusively,
Spanish-speaking, are demanding linguistic rights. Others are finding it
necessary to assert that speaking English is essential to preserve national unity
and national strength and is key in shaping individual opportunities. In their
concern over government support for bilingual programs and services, some
proponents lobbied for a Constitutional Amendment making English the
nation's official language. 9 Although the proposed English language
amendment has been stalled repeatedly in Congress, proponents of "English-
Only" laws had considerable success at the state and local levels.9° The current
"English-Only" movement has produced state resolutions, statutes and
85. Allon Gideon, Proposed Bill: Hebrew-Only in the Knesset, HA'ARETZ DAILY NEWSPAPER
(Israel), October 10, 1996, at 7.
86. D.K. (1976) 2520.
87. See Tabory, supra note 31, at 284.
88. See Michael Noach, Own House in Order, THE JERUSALEM POST, June 5, 1998; Liat Collins,
MKs Decry Bill to Remove Arabic as Second Language, THE JERUSALEM POST, May 29, 1998.
89. Blaustein, supra note 1, at 2.
90. Michele Arington, Note, English Only Laws and Direct Legislation: The Battle in the States
over Language Minority Rights, 7 J.L. & POL. 325 (1991).
1999] Merin
constitutional amendments establishing English as the official language.
"English-Only" rules are intended to eliminate governmental services in
languages other than English. So far, official English legislation has been
enacted in half the states,9' and most states have considered "Official-English"
laws.92 "English-Only" laws were also enacted by initiative and referendum
and approved by the voters themselves and not by state legislatures.93 At the
federal level, official English bills were consistently introduced over the years
and Congress is currently considering various forms of such bills.' However,
the courts did not strike down official English State laws unless they were
extremely over-broad and restrictive, and it would seem that the United States
Constitution does not prohibit official English.9 Most official English laws
91. As of June, 1999, the following states enacted "English-Only" legislation: Alabama (1990);
Alaska(1998); Arkansas (1987); Califomia(1986); Colorado (1988); Florida(1988); Georgia(1996); Hawaii
(1978); Illinois (1969); Indiana (1984); Kentucky (1984); Louisiana (1811); Massachusetts (1975);
Mississippi (1987); Missouri (1998); Montana (1995); Nebraska (1920); New Hampshire (1995); North
Carolina (1987); North Dakota (1987); South Carolina (1987); South Dakota (1995); Tennessee (1984);
Virginia (1996); Wyoming (1996). See US. English: States with Official English Laws (last modified April
26, 1999) <http://www.us-english.org/states.htm>. Most of these laws state in a general and somewhat
symbolic manner that English is regarded as the official language of the state (except for Arizona's broad
"English-Only" Amendment, which was subsequently struck down). See infra, Part V. Many states also have
incidental provisions regarding the language of the judiciary and other government acts. See Leila Sadat
Wexler, Official English, Nationalism, andLinguistic Terror: A French Lesson, 71 WAsH. L. REV. 285,348
(1996). See also Perea, supra note 68, at 323.
92. See Martina Stewart, Recent Development: English-Only Laws, Informational Interests, and
the Meaning of the First Amendment in a Pluralistic Society, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 539, 541 n. 15
(1996). See also Jack Citrin et al., The "Official English "Movement and the Symbolic Politics of Language
in the United States, 43 W. POL. Q. 535, 539 (1990).
93. The process of direct legislation has been criticized especially when it has to do with minority
rights, See, e.g., Arington, supra note 90, at 343-51.
94. In 1997, the House of Representatives passed the English Empowerment Act of 1996, which
declares English the official language of the United States. The bill did not pass in the Senate, but a similar
proposal is currently pending in Congress. See Rachel F. Moran, Milo's Miracle, 29 CoNN. L. REV. 1079,
1104 (1997). Current "English-Only" bills that have been introduced before the 106th Congress include H.R.
50, The Declaration of Official Language Act (requires the government to function in English and specifically
bans bilingual ballots and bilingual education); H.R. 1005, The National Language Act (requires all
government business to be conducted in English. It repeals the federal bilingual ballot mandate, the Bilingual
Education Act and terminates the Office of Bilingual Education and Minority Languages Affairs); H.R.J. Res.
21, The English Language Amendment (a Constitutional Amendment to make English the official language
of the United States), and the English Empowerment Act, which was re-introduced before the 106th
Congress. See English First: List of Official English Bills in the 106th Congress (last modified Feb. 22,
1999) <http://www.englishfirst.orglefbills.htmn>.
95. See, e.g., Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309 (D. Ariz. 1990), aff'd Yniguez v. Arizonans
for Official English, 42 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 1994), affd on reh 'g, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc),
vacated as moot Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997). The Arizona State Supreme
Court eventually struck down the Constitutional "English-Only" Amendment as over-broad; this is the only
statute of its kind not to pass constitutional muster. See Armando Ruiz v. Jane Dee Hull, 957 P.2d 984 (Az.
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survive equal protection challenges because they are facially neutral: applying
to English and non-English speakers alike. In the absence of a showing of
intent to discriminate against non-English speakers, courts do not invalidate
rational legislation merely because of its disparate impact.'
The motivation for these trends is different in each of the two countries.
In the United States, the impetus has always been the fear that language
diversity would lead to a national split coupled with the fear of immigration
endangering national unity. The current "English-Only" movement is mostly
a reaction to the large wave of immigration,97 the perception that newcomers are
no longer learning English, and the concern that the majority of immigrants
seem to speak one "rival" language, i.e., Spanish. The perception that a
majority of the immigrants speak only Spanish and are unwilling to learn
English is contradicted by empirical evidence. A study by McCarthy and
Valdez confirms a classic three-generation pattern of language acquisition. The
first generation is primarily monolingual, the second generation is bilingual,
and the third generation prefers English. Thus, Spanish monolingualism
persists because of continued immigration, not because Spanish immigrants fail
to learn how to speak English.98
A concern for the primacy of the English language thus motivates the
proponents of "English-Only" laws.99 There is no material reason to declare
English the official language in the United States; it would probably not change
the actual status of English and serve only political goals of depriving various
rights of minority groups. In Israel, Hebrew is and has always been a privileged
official language in relation to Arabic. Unlike the United States, there is no
fear in Israel of a national split and the matters relating to immigration were
irrelevant to language rights. Therefore, it seems that the purpose of demanding
that Hebrew's status as the only official language in Israel and undermining the
status of Arabic are part of an inclination to deprive Arabs of their rights in
general, and not solely to accord Hebrew a new status. At the same time, there
are certain similarities between the trends in Israel and in the United States.
The purpose both of having Hebrew as the only official language in Israel and
of having English as an official language in the United States is to further
emphasize the superior standing of these languages and to prevent linguistic
minorities from claiming equal language rights. The fact that these attempts
have thus far failed in Israel and at the federal level in the United States also
1998). For discussion of these cases, see infra Part V.
96. See Arington, supra note 90, at 336.
97. Perea, supra note 68, at 344.
98. See Schmid, supra note 22, at 71; Perea, supra note 68, at 347; Arington, supra note 90, at 327.
99. Arington, supra note 90, at 327.
stems from the same rationales: the notion of pluralism, the significance of the
freedom of speech, and the protection of minorities' rights.
It seems that these latter principles have always outweighed the reasoning
behind the English/Hebrew-Only trends. One may hope that they will continue
to prevail, because these trends are dangerous in that they may deprive
linguistic minorities of equal language rights that they deserve." Moreover,
the main reason traditionally given by the supporters of official monolingualism
in both countries, that it would contribute to national unity, is empirically
wrong. The fact that the United States has never had English as its official
language and that Israel has always had both Hebrew and Arabic as official
languages, actually contributed to national unity in both countries. Depriving
minorities of their basic rights can lead to a national split. The assumption that
multilingualism divides a nation whereas one language unites it is wrong.
National unity can be built only upon respect for the languages and cultures of
all the people who make up the nation.'' As mentioned above, providing
language rights is not only important to minorities in its practical
implementation, it is also a symbol of pluralism and tolerance. 0 2
Furthermore, the national unity reasoning is actually a pretext for
discrimination. Supporters of official monolingualism do not want to prevent
a national split and the erosion of the status of the predominant language.
Language rights are a matter of politics and culture, and a demand for
monolingualism in a multi-ethnic society constitutes an intent to discriminate
on the grounds of national origin, ethnicity, and race. Language is a poor proxy
for political unity and community of language and culture does not necessarily
give rise to political unity any more than linguistic and cultural dissimilarity
prevents political unity. 3 Some have contended that monolingualism in one
country is domination of one language at the expense of others and is a
reflection of "linguicism," i.e., an ideology akin to racism. "Linguicism" is
defined as "[I]deologies, structures and practices which are used to legitimate,
effectuate and reproduce an unequal division of power and resources, both
100. See Drucilla Cornell & William W. Bratton, Deadweight Costs and Intrinsic Wrongs of
Nativism: Economics, Freedom, and Legal Suppression of Spanish, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 595 (1999)
(arguing that "English-Only" regulations violate the basic right of personality of non-English-speaking and
bilingual Americans, based on both an economic theory and a general theory of rights which is modeled in
Kantian moral and political theory; the authors conclude that language rights are weighed against state-
imposed norms of assimilation). See also Andre Sole, Official English: A Socratic Dialogue/Law and
Economics Analysis, 45 FLA. L. REV. 803 (1993).
101. MINoRrrY RIGHTS GROUP REPORT, supra note 69, at 8.
102. The view of language as a symbol is discussed in detail by Perea, see supra note 68, at 350.
103. Id at 35, citing William M. O'Barr, Boundaries, Strategies, and Power Relations: Political
Anthropology and Language, in LANGUAGE AND POLmcs, 405,411 (William M. O'Barr & Jean F. O'Barr
eds., 1976).
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material and non-material, between groups which are defined on the basis of
language. '"'° This concept replaces biologically based racism by a more
sophisticated form in connection to language, using the languages of different
groups as a defining criterion and as the basis for hierarchy. Moreover, it is the
fear of diversity and the view of the "different" as "opposite" that drives these
movements:
A pluralistic view of culture conceives of dissimilar value systems
and civilizations not in terms of opposition to one another, but simply
as expressions of different historical and linguistic environments. To
the monolinguistic mind, different cultural systems are perceived as
being in opposition to one another ... monolinguistic thinking
perceives other cultures as hierarchically inferior, and thus
subordinate to the superior system. °5
Moreover, an "English-Only" policy in the United States or a "Hebrew-Only"
policy in Israel is a preference based upon language, which favors those who
speak English or Hebrew respectively as a primary language. This creates a
situation where others do not receive the same privileges or advantage of using
their primary language. "English-Only" and "Hebrew-Only" policies are based
on an unreasonable language preference that constitute differential treatment,
favors individuals speaking English or Hebrew as their primary tongue, and
disadvantages those who do not.' 6
The demand for official monolingualism as a pretext for discrimination
and the extent to which the official status of a language is implemented are best
exemplified by exploring the practices in the field of education. This is also the
arena in which official monolingualism would cause the most harm.
C. Linguistic Requirements and Practices in the Field of Education
All languages have equal worth for those speaking them yet they are rarely
entitled to equal support or equal resources. One area where this is especially
true is education. Children belonging to the majority are educated in their
mother tongues and this is accepted as a natural human right. The same is not
true for all minorities. Majorities act as if minority mother tongues were
somehow inferior (cultural linguicism), and emphasize educational efforts
geared toward the learning of the majority language while neglecting or
assigning a much lower priority to measures geared toward the learning of
104. MINORrrY RIGHTS GRouP REPORT, supra note 69, at 8.
105. Jose Faur, MonolinguaismandJudaLmn 14CARDOZOL. REV., 1713, 1716-17 (1993).
106. See De Varennes, supra note 66, at 89.
minority mother tongues (institutional linguicism). °7 These precepts apply to
both the United States and Israel.
In Israel, the Compulsory Education Act of 1949, which also applies to
elementary schools in the Arab sector, does not specify any language of
instruction. Israeli Arab pupils study in their own separate schools in each of
their towns and neighborhoods. At the same time, Arab children have the right
to study in Jewish schools, and individual Arab students do so. According to
the State Education Law of 1953, the Ministry of Education "shall prescribe the
curriculum of every official educational institution, [and] the curriculum shall
be adapted to the special conditions thereof."' 8 Special curricula were drawn
up for Arab education institutions, emphasizing Arab culture, literature and
history, as well as the Arabic language. All curricula in the Arab schools use
Arabic as the language of instruction, with Hebrew and English as compulsory
foreign languages."°9 The goal is fluency in the Hebrew language, both in oral
and written form.
In contrast, Arabic is taught in many Jewish elementary schools but is only
optional in Jewish academic high schools and is studied by relatively few with
a generally low level of achievement. 0 There is a low level of interest in this
subject, and most students prefer studying English, which, unlike Arabic, is
compulsory from second or third grade until the end of high school."' It is
clear then that Israel views English as more important than Arabic as a second
language, despite the fact that Arabic is an official language in Israel and that
English no longer has such a status. The rationale for the emphasis on English
language studies in Israel, as in many other non-English speaking countries,
stems of course from its international status as a lingua franca. However, not
only do Arabs constitute a fifth of Israel's population, but Israel is also located
in the Middle East where Arabic is the predominant language. Furthermore, the
preference for English does not serve any domestic objective that has to do with
a specific minority. Incidentally, it also validates the inferior status of Arabic
as viewed by the Israeli authorities.
In 1976, the Knesset Education and Culture Committee recommended that
the Ministry of Education and Culture make the instruction of Arabic in
elementary and secondary schools compulsory. A similar recommendation was
brought before the Knesset in 1986, based on a committee report regarding the
107. MiNoRrrY RIGHTS GROUP REPORT, supra note 69, at 14-15.
108. State Education Law, 1953,7 L.S.I. 113.
109. Landau, Hebrew and Arabic in the State of Israel, supra note 14, at 124.
110. Id. Moreover, a large dose of Hebrew literature and Jewish history is compulsory in Arab
schools, while Arab history is studied only to a modest degree in Jewish schools and Arabic literature hardly
at all. Id. at 126-7. See also Immanuel Koplewitz, Arabic in Israel: The Sociolinguistic Situation of Israel's
Linguistic Minority, 98 INT'L J. SOc. LANGUAGE 29 (1992).
111. Tabory, supra note 31, at 294-96.
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status of Arabic studies in the Jewish schools."' To date, these recommenda-
tions have not been implemented. Arabic language study among Israeli Jews
should be compulsory not only because it is a formal language of the state, but
also because the knowledge of Arabic will advance the understanding of and
tolerance towards the Arab minority among Israeli Jews. Compulsory
education in both languages would reinforce the importance of the two
languages and cultures in Israel. In countries like Israel and the United States,
in which a number of languages are spoken, it is vital that the various languages
be used in the school system if linguistic minorities are to survive. This is
especially true at the primary level, since language is inextricably connected
with education." 3
As opposed to the United States, in Israel there are parallel and segregated
educational systems for Jews and Arabs conducted in Hebrew and Arabic,
respectively, and bilingual education exists only in a few selective and
experimental schools. Such a distinct separation between linguistic minorities
and the majority in the educational system does not exist in the United States.
This difference is mostly due to the sociological, political, and demographic
differences between the two countries. While Arabs comprise one fifth of
Israel's population which itself exists as an enclave in a region populated by
millions of Arabs, English is not only the predominant language of the United
States, but it is also the second most spoken language in the world. This basic
difference suggests dissimilar courses of action in each of the two countries.
While the study of Arabic should be compulsory in the Israeli Jewish schools,
in the United States, the English speaking majority should not be forced to learn
Spanish. Spanish is neither sufficiently pervasive nor central to domestic policy
in a measure that would merit such a requirement, nor does it enjoy the status
of an official language.
Minorities in both countries should, however, receive equal educational
opportunities. A few statutes provide some protection for language minorities
in education in the United States. The Bilingual Education Act' 4 recognized
the fact that minority language children were not receiving an adequate
education in schools that operated exclusively in English. One of the main
impediments to the implementation of the Act, similar to that of the Arabic
educational system in Israel, is that the resources and funding for bilingual
education have been inadequate for the growing non-English speaking
population. The Bilingual Education Act did not provide a right to bilingual
education; rather, it offered financial assistance for local bilingual programs
112. See D.K. (Jan. 29, 1986).
113. See Kathryn J. Zoglin, Recognizing a Human Right to Language in the United States, 9 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 15, 34 (1989).
114. 20 U.S.C. §§ 3281-3386 (1982).
designed to meet the needs of children with limited facility in English. The
question of whether the failure to provide educational assistance to non-English
speaking students violates the Constitution was never resolved."' Another
protection for linguistic minorities in the field of education is found in The
Equal Education Opportunities Act." 6 The Act, among other things, requires
school districts to take appropriate action to overcome language barriers that
impede equal participation by students in an instructional program. The current
debate in the United States over bilingual education stems from some of the
same arguments used by official English proponents and opponents. There is
strong opposition to bilingual education, exemplified by the recent anti-
bilingual education initiative in Arizona,"" and Proposition 227 - "English for
the Children" - in California." 8 Such measures would in effect end bilingual
education in these states and will likely lead to the adoption of similar
initiatives in other states.
In both the United States and Israel, a high standard of education is usually
not available in the language of the minority, at least to the same extent as in
the majority's language. The result is an unavoidable conflict between the
minority's wish to have their children speak their language and learn their
history and culture for reasons of communal identity and preservation of
115. See Schmid, supra note 22, at 85.
116. 20U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758(1982).
117. Since the Arizona legislature failed to pass a bill to end bilingual education, the matter is now
left for the voters, as a ballot initiative modeled on California's Proposition 227 (see infra note 114) was filed
in Arizona at the beginning of 1999, and is aimed at the year 2000 election. See Ruben Navarrette, Jr.,
Legislature's Lapse Leaves Bilingual Education to Voters, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 5, 1999.
118. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 300(1998). Proposition 227, which was approved by the voters on June
2, 1998, dismantles the state's special programs for students with limited English proficiency; these programs
are to be replaced with one-year "immersion classes" (i.e., placing English learners in an English-translation
class.). After that, children must be placed in classes in the regular program alongside native English
speakers; the law bans most existing forms of bilingual education and in effect ends bilingual education in
California. Some districts, such as San Francisco, refuse to implement the new law and continue bilingual
classes in which immigrant students are taught primarily in their native languages. See Thomas D. Elias,
Bilingual Classes Ban Gets A in California; Immigrants'Enthusiasm Belies Critics, WASH. TIMES, May 16,
1999, at C4. See also Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp.2d 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (upholding the
constitutionality of Proposition 227).
A thorough discussion of the debate surrounding the desirability of bilingual education in the United
States is beyond the scope of this article. See generally Rachel F. Moran, The Politics of Discretion:
Federal Intervention in Bilingual Education, 76 CAL. L. REv. 1249 (1988); Rachel F. Moran, Strange
Bedfellows: The Keyes Case and the Politics of Bilingual Education, in POWER DIVIDED: ESSAYS ON THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF FEDERALISM 89,94-104 (H. Scheiber & M. Feeley eds. 1989); Michael DiChiara,
Note, A Modern Day Myth: The Necessity of English as the Official Language, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.
J. 101, 119-125 (1997); Rosenbaunm, Educating Children of Immigrant Workers: Language Policies in
France and the U.S.A., 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 429 (1981); C.H. Rossell & M.J. Ross, The Social Science
Evidence on Bilingual Education, 15 J.L. & EDUC. 385 (1986).
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tradition, and the imperative need of Hebrew schooling (in Israel) and English
schooling (in the United States) in order to have equal opportunity and
participation. It is incumbent upon the United States and Israel to each provide
the opportunity for its minorities to achieve both goals. It can do so by
acknowledging the importance of these needs and by creating constitutional
rights of minorities to equal educational opportunities, through bilingual
education or other methods which would achieve this goal and be supported by
an equal allocation of financial resources.
V. LINGUISTIC MINoRITIES AND LANGUAGE RIGHTS AS
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS
We now turn to the question of whetherjustifications can be found for the
privileged status of Hebrew in Israel and of English in the United States and,
if not, to what extent and in what ways should minorities be placed on an equal
footing with the majority. The main question in this regard is the legal status
of language rights, i.e., should they be viewed as fundamental constitutional and
human rights. For the purpose of exploring this question, I will attempt to
define specifically whose rights come under discussion here.
The definition of linguistic minorities should be a broad one that includes
not only those groups whose mother tongues are not official languages in the
countries where they live, but all groups whose language has a status inferior
to that of another dominant language. This definition applies both to countries
that do not have an official language, such as the United States, and to countries
which may have a language that is official de jure, but should be viewed as a
language of a linguistic minority because of its inferior status de facto, such as
Arabic in Israel.
In 1984, the United Nations' Sub-Commission on the Protection of
Minorities and Prevention of Discrimination of the Commission on Human
Rights proposed to define "minorities" as follows:
A group of citizens of a state, endowed with ethnic, religious or lin-
guistic characteristics which differ from those of the majority of the
population, having a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated,
if only implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose aim is to
achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law.""
The Commission on Human Rights never accepted this definition or any
other proposed definitions that preceded it and the United Nations has yet to
accept any single definition of a minority. The inability to reach an acceptable
definition of "minority" and the lack of a formal definition demonstrate the
119. See Zoglin, supra note 113, at 28.
complexities that surround the rights of linguistic minorities. The United
Nations' proposal is too narrow since it is based solely on numbers without
taking power into account, and since it requires that the minority be citizens of
the state. The definition should also include non-citizens and the power of the
group and not numbers alone.
For the purpose of this analysis, I find useful the following definitions of
"majority" and "minority:"
The "majority" is "a social group that experiences social life from a
position of privilege, 'normal' status, or dominance relative to other
groups ... A 'majority' does not necessarily contain more than half of
the members of the society. According to this model, there is no
single 'majority,' since the meaning of this term will vary depending
on the social context." .
"Minority" is "a social group that, having been constructed by society
as different, experiences a relatively subordinate social identity and
social status, which often results in fewer opportunities for economic
and social advancement. It is usually true, but not essential, that a
'minority' group is comprised of fewer than half of the members of
the population."'
I use these definitions in conjunction with the foregoing definition of "lin-
guistic minority."
In general, Israel's policy neither recognizes the Arabs as a "minority" nor
confers rights on Arabs as a minority.' 2' Even though the Arabs in Israel have
a common culture, language, traditions, heritage, and economic and social
interests that differ from those of the majority, there are no specific statutes that
address their rights as a group. Israel's failure to recognize the Arabs as a
"minority" group in either the law or the government's policies is due to Israel's
emphasis on building its identity as a Jewish state.
22
One of the crucial questions in regard to language rights in Israel is
whether the Arab population has the opportunity to collectively exercise the
right to use its own language as prescribed in international human rights
instruments. Freedom of language is part of freedom of speech. While freedom
of speech is upheld as a basic human and constitutional right, the right to use
120. See Sylvia R. Lazos Vagras, Democracy and Inclusion: Reconceptualizing the Role of the
Judge in a Pluralist Polity, 58 MD. L. REV. 150, 153 (1999). For a different view, see De Varenne, supra
note 66, at 172 (arguing that a minority should be understood as an objective, numerical minority in a state,
i.e., less than fifty percent of its entire population).
121. Ian Lustick, ARABS IN THE JEWISH STATE: in ISRAEL'S CONTROL OF A NATIONAL MINORITY
68-82 (1980).
122. See KRETZMER, supra note 11, at 169.
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one's own language in exercising that right has often been overlooked. The
freedom of language, as part of the freedom of speech, should be regarded as
a broad and a fundamental constitutional right as well as a basic human right.
There are multitudinous meanings to language rights and ways in which
language use may be of sociopolitical relevance to linguistic minorities. 23 The
freedom of language should include, among other things, the right to state-
sponsored education in one's mother tongue; the right to participate in cultural
activities in a language easily understood; the right to publish and broadcast in
one's own language; the right to correspond with and be informed by the
government of any administrative procedures; and, within the judicial system,
holding trial proceedings in a language that the parties can understand.
Language rights are human rights and constitute a fundamental element of
the international idea of equality. However, there is no declaration of the right
to language in the international sphere. The principle of non-discrimination
based on language is set forth in Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, according to which "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as
race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status."'24 No mention is made in this general
provision of linguistic or other minorities as a group being entitled to collective
rights.' The first and most significant provision in a universal instrument,
which refers to the existence of linguistic groups per se, is Article 27 of the
123. Manfred W. Wenner provides a useful and comprehensive list oflanguage rights and categorizes
them as follows: I. Individual Use: (a) the right to use the language at home; (b) the right to use the language
"in the street"; the right to use the language for personal names (both first and family names); II. Individual
and Collective Use: (a) the right to use the language in personal communications (letters, telephone
conversations and the like); (b) the right to use the language in activities designed to perpetuate its use: (i.)
schools, (ii.) newspapers, journals, magazines, books, etc., (iii.) radio and television broadcasting, (iv.)
movies; (c) the right to use the language in private economic activities: (i.) business and manufacturing
enterprise between workers, (ii.) advertising (storefront, media, etc.), (iii.) record-keeping (orders, invoices,
inventories, and the like), (iv.) other communications (letterheads, etc.); (d) the right to use the language in
private associations in: (i.) clubs of all types (social, sport, cultural), (ii.) churches and religious
organizations; (e) the right to use the language in public meetings; 111. Individual and Collective uses vis-a-
vis the government: (a) in courts of law (with or without an interpreter supplied at government expense); (b)
in communications with the government, such as license forms, filing required affidavits, tax forms, and
applications for governmental services; (c) in public notices (street signs, public information signs, and the
like); (d) in campaigning and running for public office; (e) in government reports, documents, hearings,
transcripts, and other official publications for public distribution; (f) in the national legislature (in debates),
the national judiciary, and the national administrative agencies, bureaus, and departments. See Manfred W.
Wenner, The Politics of EqualityAmong European Linguistic Minorities, in COMPARATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS
184, 193 (Richard P. Claude ed., 1976).
124. Article 2 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights, 1999.
125. Mala Tabory, Language Rights as Human Rights, 10 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HuMAN RIGHTS,
.167, 175 (1980); KRETZMER, supra note 11, at 163-65.
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Article is the most
positive provision on the subject of language rights of minorities and it provides
that:
[I]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the
right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy
their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion or to use
their own language.26
Some regional arrangements also address language rights. The 1948
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man parallels the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. It includes the following non-discrimination
clause: "All persons are equal before the law and have the rights and duties
established in this Declaration, without distinction as to race, sex, language,
creed or any other factor." Hortatory and non-binding, this Declaration enjoys
lesser international legal status than the Universal Declaration because it is a
"customary, internal recommendation."' 27
Thus, international instruments provide very limited protection to
linguistic minorities as a group. Notwithstanding the limitations of inter-
national law, it seems that the implementation of some language provisions is
more suitable at the national level, where they can be adapted to the particular
linguistic circumstances of each country. Neither the United States
Constitution nor the unwritten Israeli Constitution give any language special
recognition. However, minorities' language rights are partially protected by
these Constitutions and by constitutional court decisions.
The original intention of the founders of Israel was to enact as soon as
possible a written constitution containing a Bill of Rights. The first Knesset
was indeed elected as a Constituent Assembly. Several draft constitutions were
laid before it, but the first Knesset decided, after lengthy and tedious
deliberations, not to enact a constitution at that stage but to enact a series of
"Basic Laws." These laws were eventually to be consolidated into a single
constitution, but they never were. Such basic laws have meanwhile been
enacted on almost all aspects of constitutional life. 2 ' In Israel, as in the United
126. Id at 182. See also De Varennes, supra note 66, at 134-57.
127. Id. at 205.
128. The reasons for the delay and hesitation in enacting some of these basic laws and gathering
them into a written constitution are mainly the political opposition of the Jewish religious parties in the
Knesset. They fear that a formal Bill of Rights would enable the courts to strike down some religion-based
statutes. For example, marriage, divorce, and other important aspects of family law are based on religious
Jewish law and consequently they discriminate against women and deprive them of equal protection. Under
current law, the courts cannot strike down these statutes.
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Kingdom, which also lacks a written constitution and Bill of Rights, opinions
vary as to the desirability of introducing a Bill of Rights into the legal system.'2 9
Generally, a Bill of Rights must be a written document that cannot be amended
by the regular legislative process, and has supreme legislative status. The latest
Israeli basic law that was enacted in 1992 and titled "Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Freedom," seems to correspond to these requirements. This statute
can be regarded as.a basic law on civil rights. It contains provisions for almost
all the human and civil rights traditionally guaranteed in constitutional
instruments. However, it does not explicitly include freedom of speech and the
principles of equality and non-discrimination. 3 ° Even before the enactment of
this statute and other basic laws, the legal situation in the field of human and
civil rights in Israel proved to be quite satisfactory due to protection of these
rights by the courts.
Throughout Israel's history, the Supreme Court had a prominent role in
establishing and developing basic principles and freedoms and has been
intensively involved in human rights issues. Most of these fundamental
freedoms were recognized, implemented and enforced by the Supreme Court,
sitting as High Court of Justice, notwithstanding the lack of any statutory
authority. Fundamental freedoms and liberties are recognized and implemented
by thejudiciary, whenever redress is required.' Condemnation of discrimina-
tion, freedom of expression, and the principle of equality are protected by case
law of the Supreme Court. According to this case law, unless given clear
statutory authority to do so, governmental bodies may not discriminate between
citizens on grounds such as national, racial, or ethnic origins.3 2 Despite the
129. One of the major arguments against a Bill of Rights is that entrenched clauses limit the
legislative supremacy of Parliament. See Shitret, supra note 56, at 338-39. Moreover, as has been proven
in Israel, the system of law could reach similar results irrespective of the existence of a written constitution.
On the other hand, it can be argued that a Bill of Rights ensures judicial review of legislation and may be used
to limit the powers of the majority, particularly where rights of the minority are concerned. In Israel it could
be used to protect the civil rights of the minority Arabic population and could be more effective in dealing
with discrimination. Id
130. This basic law invests the courts with the power to strike down any law enacted by the Knesset
that is not in accordance with it. Therefore, it has an explicit constitutional status. The term "human dignity"
is not defined in the basic law and may be employed in the future through court interpretation to include
many fundamental rights not expressly mentioned, such as language rights. "Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Freedom" is not entrenched and may be amended by simple majority; further, it grants immunity against
judicial review to all existing legislation. Only legislation that was enacted after the basic law itself was
enacted will be subject to judicial review on the grounds that such legislation violates a protected right. See
Introduction to the Law ofIsrael 52 (Amos Shapira & Keren C. De Witt-Arar, eds.,(1995)).
131. Cohn, supra note 56, at 267-69.
132. See Shapira & De Witt-Arar, supra note 130, at 50. See also Itzhak Zamir & Allen Sysblat,
PUBLIC LAW 1N ISRAEL (1996); Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, APPLE OF GOLD: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISRAEL AND
THE UNITED STATES (1993); Daphna Sharfman, LAVING WrHOUT A CONSTITUTION: CMIL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL
(1993).
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fact that the protections provided by Israeli law are more easily reversed than
similar protections under the United States Constitution, the informality of the
Israeli Constitution does not undermine the scope of protection that can be
provided by the Israeli courts regarding the rights of minorities in general. This
is specifically true for the rights of linguistic minorities.
In the case of Reem Engineers, '33 the Supreme Court of Israel dealt for the
first time with the issue of language rights from a constitutional perspective.
This decision provides new status for language rights of minorities with
important constitutional implications. The suit was brought by a contractor
who asked the municipality of Nazareth for a permit to publish a notice to Arab
citizens in Arabic about the construction of buildings in an Arabic
neighborhood. The municipality refused to issue the permit because, according
to one of its bylaws, advertisements on billboards should be written in Hebrew
or Hebrew and another language, as long as the Hebrew is at the top of the
advertisement and does not occupy less than two thirds of the notice's space.
The District Court held that the bylaw does not prohibit the use of Arabic and
that its requirement to add Hebrew does not infringe on any fundamental right.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the District Court's judgment and
struck down the provision. The court held that the bylaw's provision is
unreasonable and illustrates an unjustifiable constriction on the freedom of
speech, part of which is the freedom of language.
The court stated that freedom of speech has always been a basic principle
in Israeli law. 34 The court held as follows:
Speech is linked to language ... language is more than a means of
communication, it is equivalent to speech ... [tihe basic
constitutional concept is that thefreedom ofspeech encompasses the
freedom of language. There is no freedom of speech unless there is
freedom of language. This freedom may be at odds with other
interests or values, and a balance may be needed which would render
partial protection to this value ... as a relative, and not an absolute
right. 135
The court discussed the two conflicting interests in this case: freedom of
speech and language and the public interest in the Hebrew language. Regarding
the public interest in the Hebrew language, the court asserted the importance
of Hebrew as a national language, as the language of the majority of the citizens
in Israel, and as a means for national unity. Hebrew readers have an interest in
reading in their own language. In general, there is a public interest that every
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notice be understood by all.'36 Regarding the freedom of speech, this principle
received considerable prominence as a basic human right. The Court also found
it applicable to the freedom of language mentioned in the Declaration of
Independence."" The court balanced the relative weight of these two
conflicting interests. In doing so, the Court distinguished between state actions,
e.g., sign-posts regarding names of streets and regarding traffic, which must be
"in the official language;" and actions in which the state has a minimal role,
such as in the case of state billboards, on which every individual can
communicate. In the latter instance, freedom of language prevails, so the
contractor could write exclusively in Arabic.'38
The court also justified its decision by noting that there is an Arabic
minority living in Israel whose language is Arabic and that Arabic is the
language of its speech, religion, and culture.' The Arabic language is an
official language and the language of many of the country's citizens. It further
noted that pluralism and tolerance are inherent to the Israeli concept of
democracy. Finally, the court added that the strong status of Hebrew in Israel
today is not threatened and could not be jeopardized by awarding minorities the
freedom to express themselves in their own language. 4°
The court's decision was based upon freedom of speech and language and
not on Arabic being a formal language in Israel. Therefore, there was no need
to scrutinize the special status of Arabic as an official language, which was not
disputed. The court continued by saying that the status of Arabic as an official
language has always been recognized in Israel based on Article 82 and based
on the social reality that a large minority of Israel's citizens are Arabic
speakers.'
Because the decision was not based on Arabic being an official language,
the court's decision applies to any language. Other than in the obiter dictum of
the decision, the court does not address the issue of Arabic as an official
language with special status in Israel. The court accorded an important status
to language rights in general, but its decision did not accord Arabic any special
status. Presumably, the court would have reached the same decision had the
notice been written in any other language. The only apparent reason for the
court's mentioning the status of Arabic and Arabs in Israel, was because Arabic
was the "foreign language" in dispute. In fact, since the court dealt with the
136. Id. at 203, 208.
137. Id. at 201-202, 207.
138. Reem Engineers, 40(5) P.D. at 209.
139. The Israeli Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed this principle in C.A. 12/99, Jamel Mar'i v.
Farid Sabek (February 23, 1999, Justice M. Chcshin).
140. Reem Engineers, 40(5) P.D. at 210-212.
141. Id. at 214.
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language rights of Arabs, it could have struck down the bylaw by stating that
a requirement to publicize only in Hebrew, or primarily in Hebrew with less
space for another language, is unconstitutional due to the status of Arabic as an
equal official language. I would surmise that one of the reasons the court
avoided striking down the bylaw on the basis of Arabic's official status was to
emphasize the supremacy of Hebrew over Arabic and to avoid the need to
define the scope of protection given to Arabic as an official language.
The court implicitly viewed Hebrew as if it were the only official language
in Israel and its approach was that Arabic should be given the protection given
to any other language. A view of Arabic as an equal official language could
have led the court to explicitly declare, when it discussed state actions, that they
should be performed in both Arabic and Hebrew. Instead, the court used the
singular rather than the plural: "the official language," meaning clearly
Hebrew alone. Furthermore, the concurring Justice was of the opinion that all
official publications should be in Hebrew "as the language of the state. 142
Although the court did state the importance of Arabic and its status, it stressed
that it did not base its opinion on these factors. It would appear then that it is
one thing to claim that Arabic is an official language and quite another to
implement it.
Furthermore, viewing freedom of language as part of freedom of speech,
is not the exclusive or essential approach for the granting of freedom of
language and language rights. An alternative approach is viewing language as
an independent right. 4 1 Some consider language as a collective right, and not
as part of freedom of speech.144 Others view linguistic rights as linked to the
right to education and the principle of equality. 45
Nevertheless, this is the first court decision to grant freedom of language
a special and new constitutional status, never before accorded to language rights
in Israel. Yet the right accorded was individual, and there is no Israeli court
decision granting collective rights to linguistic minorities.
American law offers an impressive range of protections for the individual
but, like the Israeli law, it has its limitations with respect to the rights of
linguistic minorities. The constitutionality of language rights in the United
States has been addressed in connection with the First Amendment and the
Equal Protection Clause. The First Amendment prohibits the government from
abridging freedom of speech, expression, and association. The First
Amendment is implicated when the government restrains the private use of
142. Id. at216.
143. See, e.g., Leslie Green, 'Are Language Rights Fundamental?', 25 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 639
(1987).
144. See Wenner, supra note 123, at 184.
145. Perea, supra note 68.
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foreign languages. 46 The two cases that implicated the First Amendment are
directly related to the "English-Only" movement. In the matter of Asian
American Business Group v. City of Pomona,'47 the facts and the decision were
similar to those in the Israeli case discussed above. However, Asian American
is one decision of a District Court that has yet to be followed in other circuits.
In this case, the city restricted the size and language of business signs. The
1988 Ordinance provided that "on-premises signs of commercial or
manufacturing establishments which have advertising copy in foreign
alphabetical characters shall devote at least one-half of the sign area to
advertising copy in English alphabetical letters."' 48 In effect, this restricted the
use of foreign script, and specifically Chinese characters. The District Court
held the ordinance unconstitutional because it burdened the freedom of
expression, which is a fundamental interest: "Choice of language is a form of
expression as real as the textual message conveyed. It is an expression of
culture."' 149 The decision in Yniguez v. Mofford"5° was the first appellate
decision to strike down a state official English measure. The Ninth Circuit
relied on the First rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1988, Arizona
voters passed Proposition 106, which became Article XXVI of the Arizona
Constitution entitled "English as the Official Language." This measure
amended the state constitution, requiring the state, its political subdivisions, and
all government officials and employees during the performance of government
business, to speak in English only. Yniguez, a Latina employed by the state
Department of Administration to handle medical malpractice claims was
accustomed to speaking Spanish with claimants who had difficulty
communicating in English. She sought an injunction against the Article.
Writing for an en banc court, Judge Reinhardt struck down Proposition 106 as
violating the First Amendment. The court found the provision unconstitution-
ally over-broad because it burdened the right of public employees to speak on
matters of public concerns. The court held that Yniguez's speech was of public
concern because the public had a strong interest in receiving it. Judge
Reinhardt concluded that, because the Article restricted the speech rights of all
government employees and banned the dissemination of critical information to
non-English speaking Arizonians, the speech interests impaired by the Article
outweighed the government's interests in the Article's operation. 5' The United
146. Schmid, supra note 22, at 75.
147. Asian American Business Group v. City of Pomona, 716 F. Supp. 1328 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
148. Id. at 1329.
149. Id. at 1330; A similar approach can be found in Canadian court decisions, see, e.g., Ford v.
Quebec (Attorney General) (1988) D.L.R. 577, 604-05.




States Supreme Court refrained from reviewing the case on procedural grounds
and vacated it as moot, since Yniguez had resigned from state employment.152
However, another challenge to the law brought by ten bilingual individuals
(elected officials, state employees, and a public school teacher) who, like
Yniguez, spoke Spanish during the performance of their job, has met with
success. In April of 1998, after a decade-long battle over Arizona's Official
English Amendment, a unanimous Arizona State Supreme Court struck down
the "English-Only" Amendment as a violation of the First Amendment and the
Equal Protection Clause. The Court found this Amendment among the strictest
and the most sweeping of all states' "English-Only" laws. 3  Consequently,
Arizona public employees and officials may now speak languages other than
English. Nevertheless, a less restrictive "English-Only" ballot measure is
anticipated in the year 2000 election and is likely to pass.'54
The most obvious source of constitutional protection against government
152. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997). However, the Ninth Circuit's
analysis of the substantive issues involved still provides useful legal analysis which proponents of any official
language statute might face. See Lucy Chiu, Note, The Emerson English Language Empowerment Act: The
House's "Straw Man" Bill, 23 J. LEGIS. 231,242 (1997). But see Chris Boehler, Yniguez v. Arizonians for
Official English: The Struggle to Make English the Official Language, 34 Hous. L. REv. 1637 (1998)
(arguing that Article XXVII of the Arizona constitution was a proper exercise of state government power and
criticizing the Ninth Circuit's reasoning as erroneous, asserting that Article XXVIII applies to conduct and
not to the message it conveys and suggesting an alternative analysis of the provision as a time, place or
manner restriction). See also Michael W. Valente, Comment, One Nation Divisible by Language: An
Analysis of Official English Laws in the Wake of Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 8 SETON HALL
CoNsT. L.J. 205 (1997) (arguing for the constitutionality of official English laws). For further commentary
on the Ninth Circuit's decision see Jennifer A. Nemec, Yniguez v. Arizonansfor Official English: Free
Speech May have Lost the Battle, but in the End it will Win the War, 22 MD. J. INT'LL. &TRADE 117 (1998);
Vicki L. Osgood, No Habala Espanol: Yniguez v. Arizonansfor Official English, 18 WHrrER L. REV. 371
(1997); Yvonne A. Tamayo, supra note 24; Susan Kiyomi Serrano, Rethinking Race for Strict Scrutiny
Purposes: Yniguez and the Racialization of English Only, 19 HAwAII L. REV. 221 (1997).
153. See Armando Ruiz v. Jane Dee Hull, 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 67
U.S.L.W. 3436 (1999) (applying strict.scrutiny and holding that the measure had violated the First
Amendment by depriving elected officials and public employees of the ability to communicate with their
constituents and with the public. The court further held that the measure violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment since it impinges upon both the fundamental right to participate equally in the
political process and the right to petition the government for redress without materially advancing a legitimate
state interest; the Amendment's goal of promoting English as a common language did not require a
prohibition against the use of other languages by state and local governments, the court reasoned). This
decision offers both a more expansive reading of the First Amendment than that of the Ninth Circuit in
Yniguez and a parallel equal protection ground for invalidation. Pending a definitive federal court ruling,
however, the constitutionality ofrestrictive official English statutes remains an open question. See Cornell
& Bratton, supra note 100, at 616.
154. The Ruiz court stated that had the statute been more narrowly crafted, like official English
statutes in most other states, which are substantially less encompassing and less proscriptive than the Arizona
law, it would have passed constitutional muster. See id. Thus, the decision should be viewed as only a
temporary setback to states' "English-Only" measures.
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sponsored language-based discrimination is the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.'55 The Supreme Court has not resolved the question
of whether language-based classifications constitute a "suspect" category.
Language-based discrimination should be afforded strict scrutiny or at least
intermediate level scrutiny. 56 In general, the courts have rejected an equal
protection challenge by language minorities unless the law in question involved
a very close relationship between language and race, ethnicity, or national
origin. These forms of discrimination are suspect classes. Strict scrutiny will
also be employed if law infringed on rights considered fundamental.'57 In
Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, the Ninth Circuit did not reach the validity of
California's "English-Only" law under the Equal Protection Clause. First, the
court said that the California Constitution simply asserts that English is the
state's official language. It does not require that English be the only language
spoken. In addition, the Ninth Circuit held that even though an individual is
bilingual, his primary language remains an important link to his ethnic culture
and identity. Thus, the decision sheds no light on equal protection issues
arising out of "English-Only" legislation. 5 In both private employment" 9 and
public employment,"6 courts have refused to treat "English-Only" rules as
creating a suspect classification and have held that the rules do not result in
discrimination. The discriminatory intent requirement compounds the difficulty
of confronting discrimination against linguistic minorities under the Equal
Protection Clause. In Frontera, the court added that English is the national
language of the United States and that there is a national interest in having
English as a common language.' 6' The same approach is found in other cases
dealing with linguistic rights. 62 Courts seem to accord heightened protection
to minority language groups only when a fundamental right, such as the right
to vote, is also at stake. 163
155. Schmid, supra note 22, at 72.
156. See id at 74. See also Cornell & Bratton, supra note 100, at 691 (setting forward a theory of
rights that compels the law to accord suspect status to discrimination based on language). Cornell & Bratton
further suggest that official English be condemned based on a right to cultural and linguistic freedom under
the Thirteenth Amendment. Their argument builds on David A. J. Richards's interpretation of the Thirteenth
Amendment as including and forbidding all forms of moral slavery, and on his concept of suspect
classification (see David A. J. Richards, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 5, 355 (1998)). Id.
157. See, e.g., Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1983).
158. Alva Gutierrez v. Municipal Court of the Southeast Judicial District, County of Los Angeles,
838 F.2d 1031, 1039, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 1988); Zoglin, supra note 113, at 17.
159. See, e.g., Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980).
160. See, e.g., Frontera v. Sinell, 522 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1975).
161. Id. at 1220.
162. See, e.g., Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1983).
163. See Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1986).
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Thus, language rights are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment only
when the victims prove that the discrimination is based upon race, ethnicity, or
national origin.' Language minorities must establish a nexus between race,
national origin, or ethnicity and language in order to advance a successful claim
under the Equal Protection Clause.'65 Because language bears an extremely
close relationship to race, ethnicity, and national origin, state actors may use
language as a subterfuge for invidious discrimination. 66 Therefore, it is
necessary to distinguish between classifications that use language as a means
of promoting efficiency, and those that impermissibly use language to
differentiate people along ethnic or racial lines. 167 To date, neither access to
education nor cultural preservation for linguistic minorities received more than
rational basis scrutiny under United States constitutional doctrine.6 " The
United States courts do not consider language as a fundamental right. If the
United States Supreme Court viewed language rights as part of freedom of
speech, language rights would hence be fundamental. Thus, one could claim
that the Israeli Supreme Court has provided a higher constitutional recognition
and protection of language rights than is afforded by United States law. In
Israel language rights are considered part of freedom of speech which has
always been regarded as a fundamental constitutional right. On the other hand,
although language rights are not recognized by the United States Supreme
164. Language is not recognized as a prohibited ground of discrimination; despite efforts to include
language implicitly under another prohibited ground of discrimination such as race, national origin, or
ethnicity, there is obviously an imperfect match and some individuals will occasionally "escape" protection.
See De Varennes, supra note 66, at 113. It is interesting to note, in this context, that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission has interpreted the concept of national origin to encompass an individual's
language rights. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (a) (1996) ("The primary language of an individual is often an essential
national origin characteristic."). See Lisa L. Behm, Comment, Protecting Linguistic Minorities under Title
VII The Endfor Judicial Deference to the EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because ofNationalOrigin,
81 MARQ. L. REv. 569, 570 (1998). However, this definition is not binding upon the courts. See also Bill
Piatt, Toward Domestic Recognition of a Human Right to Language, 23 HOus. L. REV. 885, 901 (1986)
(arguing against the view of language as part of national origin not only because the two are not the same,
but also since such a link may perpetuate the fear of some monolingual individuals that the use of a language
other than English is "foreign").
165. Andrew P. Averbach, Note, Language Classifications and the Equal Protection Clause: When
Is Language a Pretext for Race or Ethnicity? 74 B.U.L. REV. 481, 484 (1994).
166. Seeid at483.
167. See, e.g., Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1986) (implementing an objective
test to determine whether a language classification uses language as a pretext for race, ethnicity or national
origin. According to the objective test, certain language classifications mandate strict judicial scrutiny
because their very terms single out particular language groups for special treatment; thus, classifications
imposing the same requirements on all people, regardless of their language and regardless of the intent of the
state decision maker, do not establish a sufficient nexus with race, ethnicity, or national origin to justify strict
scrutiny).
168. Zoglin,supra note 113, at23.
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Court as fundamental constitutional rights at the practical level, it seems that
linguistic minorities in the United States were afforded the same rights as those
in Israel, if not more.
The argument that language rights should be regarded as fundamental
human, civil, and constitutional rights brings us back to the definition of
linguistic minorities, and to the question: whose rights come under
consideration? The proposed definition was to view all groups whose language
has a status inferior to that of another dominant language as linguistic
minorities. However, one should not infer that all linguistic minorities deserve
equal rights. The view of language as a basic human and constitutional right
is the only means by which a state could provide adequate protection for
linguistic minorities. This view should be fully implemented as far as the
private usage of a language is considered, i.e., the right to freely use one's own
language. However, it does not follow that the status of the languages of all
linguistic minorities should be the same as that of the majority language vis-i-
vis the state. Unlike other fundamental ights, such as religion and race, the
prohibition of discrimination on the ground of language is not an absolute.
There is no obligation for a state to conduct all of its activities in any language
spoken by the inhabitants in its territory. Non-discrimination does not prohibit
every distinction involving a language, only those that are "unreasonable" when
one considers all relevant factors: those that relate to the state's interests and
goals, and those that relate to the individual's interests, rights and how the
individual is affected. 69 Thus, some minority languages do not warrant equal
status or similar status to that of the majority language and should not be
accorded "official" status or have characteristics of an official language. 7°
A "sliding scale" approach is an appropriate means in order to arrive at a
linguistic policy which does not discriminate based on language. 7' The
"sliding scale" formula takes into account factors such as: the number of
speakers of a language, their territorial concentration, the level of public
services being sought, the disadvantages, burdens or benefits a state's linguistic
practice imposes on individuals, and even a state's human and material
resources. 72 Such a model can provide a balanced and reasonable response to
169. See Varennes, supra note 66, at 126.
170. For example, no one would think that a single minority language child would warrant
construction of a school, and most would feel that the more children there are the more pressing is the
concern. See Green, supra note 143, at 666. Thus, although I argued that the definition of "minority" and
"linguistic minority" should not include a numerical threshold, when it comes to determining which language
minority should be accorded equality to the majority language in acts of government, the size of the group
should matter and be taken into account. There should be a sufficient number of speakers of a language in
order to impose any duties on a state. See De Varennes, supra note 66, at 129.
171. SeeDeVarennessupranote66, at 177.
172. d at 247.
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the presence of various numbers of speakers of minority or non-official
languages. When public authorities face a sufficiently high number of
individuals whose primary language is not that of the majority or the official
state language, it would be discriminatory not to provide a level of service
appropriate to the relative number of individuals involved. The major factor,
according to this model, is the percentage and geographical concentration of
individuals using a language distinct from that of the majority or the official
one. " There are thus minimum requirements that the public authorities must
respect. The sliding scale implies (beginning at the lower end of the scale and
moving to a progressively higher end), e.g., (i) making available official
documents and forms in the non-official language or in bilingual versions; (ii)
the acceptance by authorities of oral or written applications in the non-official
language, and response thereto in that language; (iii) being able to use the non-
official language as an internal and daily language of work within public
authorities.7 4
To provide a more precise guideline as to when a state must mandate
measures to avoid imposing an unreasonable burden or disadvantage upon too
many people, adding some kind of a numerical threshold may be of
assistance.'" However, because the variables in each country are so different,
it is difficult to establish clear numerical criteria, and different countries have
adopted dissimilar thresholds. 76 Such numerical thresholds would seem
appropriate and justifiable only in countries that have no official language
statute, like the United States at the federal level, and in the states that have
adopted official English legislation.' Numerical thresholds should not be
173. Id. at 177.
174. Id. at 178.
175. Id. at 179. See also Steven W. Bender, Consumer Protection for Latinos: Overcoming
Language Fraud and English-Only in the Marketplace, 45 AM. U.L. REV. 1027, 1058 n.176, 1069-70
(1996).
176. In India, for example, whenever a language is spoken by thirty percent or more of the
population, the state should be recognized as bilingual and the relevant minority language should be placed
on the same footing as the formal/majority language by public authorities; whenever the linguistic minority
constitutes fifteen to twenty percent of the population in a certain area, government notices, rules, laws and
the like should be reproduced in the language of the minority in that particular area. In Canada, where both
English and French are official languages, most bilingual federal government services are only available
where the population includes at least five percent of speakers of the official language minority. See De
Varennes, supra note 66, at 179.
177. As previously asserted, official monolingualism is objectionable. See supra Part IV. The
solution for the problems of linguistic minorities should be either official bilingualism or multilingualism
(which include the language of the majority and that of the largest minorities in a given country), or not
declaring any language as official. However, when faced with official monolingualism, adopting a sliding
scale with a numerical threshold is one of the ways to protect the rights of linguistic minorities in these states,
rights that are not available according to the current legal scheme.
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adopted when a country recognizes more than one language as official. The
declaration of two languages or more as official should be viewed as
encompassing in itself the assumption that there is a sufficient number of
speakers of all official languages to warrant equality between them in terms of
government services. The fact that Arabs constitute one fifth of Israel's
population justifies the maintenance of the status of Arabic as an official
language. Once Arabic has been accorded equal status to Hebrew, all
government services should be bilingual notwithstanding any numerical
threshold.'
In the United States, on the other hand, where there is no official
monolingualism at the federal level, numerical thresholds should be used to
decide where and to what degree the government should provide rights to
linguistic minorities. Thus, federal requirements in the United States to provide
public services in languages other than English should be encouraged and
expanded where a sufficiently large number of individuals who speak a
minority language exist. An example of such a requirement is that of state
agencies that administer "food stamp" programs to have bilingual staff and to
translate written materials in areas where there are a substantial number of low
income, non-English speaking families.' Similar policies, if applied in the
state level, would allow for such services to exist at a widespread level.
VI. CONCLUSION
The superiority of Hebrew over Arabic and the disparity between the two
languages exist due to the basic concept of Israel as a Hebrew-speaking, Jewish
country. The essence of Israel has to do with its Jewish identity and the reason
for its establishment as a nation was to provide the Jews with a safe haven.
These factors seem to contradict formal bilingualism. On the other hand, one
cannot ignore the existence of the large minority of Arabic-speaking citizens
within Israel's population who deserve equal rights. Providing equality would
not only implement the law that provides that both Arabic and Hebrew are the
official languages of Israel, but also would promote national unity and
integration and diminish some of the animosity Arabs hold toward Jews in
Israel. The status of Hebrew in Israel will not be threatened by providing
equality to Arabic, just as there is no danger to the status of English in the
United States.
Official monolingualism in both the United States and Israel is
objectionable. By adopting an official-monolingualism-statute, which in fact
178. Thus, for example, if Canada wishes to accord some governmental services in only one
language, as it in fact does, it should not have adopted a statute declaring two languages to be the official
languages of the state.
179. See De Varennes, supra note 66, at 180.
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will serve to exclude the use of most other languages in all government
branches, linguistic minorities in both countries will not be able to enjoy many
privileges. For example, they would not have access to jobs and services
provided by the state. These minorities would be disadvantaged and will
assume a heavier burden by not being able to use their primary language.
Those who are not fluent in the official language will not be permitted to
receive the same benefits and services that the state confers to the majority and
would be forced to learn the official-dominant language. Moreover, such a
demand for monolingualism could constitute an intent to discriminate on the
grounds of national origin, ethnicity, and race. Thus, the legal status in both
countries should not be changed.
English in the United States has, de facto, all the characteristics of an
official language apart from a constitutional provision. Making English official
at the federal level would only promote the political objectives of the opponents
of immigration and would elevate discrimination against linguistic minorities.
Arabic in Israel does not have the characteristics of an official language
because it does not enjoy equal status and respect in governmental proceedings.
Arabs in Israel are a distinct minority that constitutes one fifth of its population.
Coupled with the fact that Arabic and Hebrew are both official languages by
law, this fact certainly warrants equality between Arabic and Hebrew. It further
warrants full protection against discrimination with respect to language rights
of Arabs in Israel, state intervention, and promotion of their language.
Abolishing the status of Arabic as an official language in Israel is unacceptable.
If Israel wishes to change the status of Arabic and grant Hebrew priority, it
should do so by enacting an explicit statute that would change the languages'
status in Israel. Inequality between the two formal languages should not be
inferred from the existing provision regarding official languages.
Alternatively, Israel could drop official languages altogether, as has been
the practice in the United States. However, preserving Israel's commitment to
both official languages and strengthening the equality between them is
preferable. This is because dropping official languages in Israel would lead to
less protection for the Arabic-speaking minority than it has under the current
legal status. There is no linguistic minority in the United States with
characteristics similar to those of the Arabs in Israel. The political animosity
between Jews and Arabs in Israel; the treatment of Arabs as second class
citizens by the Jews in other areas of legal and social life; and the fact that
Arabs constitute a large minority within Israel's population, necessitate full
implementation of Arabic as an official language. The official status of Arabic
should bind the authorities and the government. The government should accord
full equality to the Arab linguistic minority regarding the use of Arabic in all
institutions of the state: legislative, executive, administrative, and judicial, and
in the performance of various other functions of the state. That would include,
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for example, changes in the educational system, i.e., making the study of Arabic
in Hebrew schools compulsory and equally allocating resources to both
educational systems.
The United States has proven that without having an official minority
language, or for that matter, any official language, it can provide equality in
some areas to linguistic minorities. Israel does not have a long-lasting tradition
of providing rights for minorities and its pluralism is limited due to, among
other things, the ongoing tensions between Arabs and Jews. Paradoxically, due
to the different paradigms of protection for linguistic minorities that have
developed in each country, the dangers that an "English-Only" statute at the
federal level in the United States would permit discrimination against linguistic
minorities, is similar to the danger of discrimination that would arise in Israel
if Arabic lost its official status. Not having official languages in Israel would
lead to similar consequences as enacting an "English-Only" statute in the
United States: Hebrew, de facto, would be the only language used and spoken
in all aspects of life in Israel, the segregation between Arabs and Jews would
increase, and Arabic would be used only individually and only in the Arabic
enclaves.
In both the United States and Israel, linguistic minorities should be
accorded language rights as a group by virtue of basic constitutional principles
of equality and by viewing language rights as fundamental. Yet, the right not
to be discriminated against on the ground of language is not absolute. Thus, the
degree to which a state should be bound to use a language other than that of the
majority for the conduct of its affairs depends on various factors, such as the
number of speakers of a minority language, their territorial concentration, and
the level of public services being sought. Countries where no official language
statute exists, like the United States, should adopt a sliding scale approach with
an appropriate numerical threshold. However, this model is inappropriate when
a state already has more than one official language, such as Israel. Thus, where
there is more than one official language, the official languages should be equal
in the conduct of all state affairs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Ethiopia has recently undertaken one of the most sweeping constitutional
reforms in contemporary Africa. The foremost issue on the constitutional
agenda, how to treat a patch-work of ethnic groups yet still maintain a viable
central government, concerns most other African states that may one day soon
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have to rewrite their own constitutions in the post-Cold War reality. Unlike
most of sub-Saharan Africa, Ethiopia has an ancient history which gives con-
stitutional reform special meaning. Like most of Africa, the outcome has
resulted more from the direct past than from ancient historical traditions. The
Ethiopian Government has at least paid lip-service to federalism and federal
structures. It has transplanted Western theories about federal structure in an
attempt to solve its nationalities question-how to govern multi-ethnic socie-
ties. But these theories have yet to produce a completely satisfactory answer
in the West. Even if they did produce a satisfactory answer, whether that
answer would apply to Africa and to Ethiopia in particular remains still unclear.
The current regime in Ethiopia has introduced Western theories in order
to define a modem state identity. In doing so, it has replaced the old indigenous
Ethiopian identity with a new identity. The new identity does conform to
Western ideas of the state; however, it is wholly artificial in Ethiopia. This
article will explore some of the Western theories which have influenced
constitutional debate in Ethiopia and will explore what lessons Ethiopia should
take away from these theories.
II. ETHIOPIAN IDENTITY
A. The End of Imperial Ethiopia
Ethiopia has one of the most ancient civilizations in the world. Yet, like
many ancient civilizations, Ethiopians never grew together in any homogeneous
fashion, but rather fostered diversity over the millennia. The "Ethiopian"
identity, for what it was, applied to a civilization, not to a tribe. In Ethiopia
today, the various peoples speak nearly ninety languages, but they share
millennia of interaction, common traditions, and a sense of civilization.'
Despite their differences, they are all recognizably Ethiopian, not in the sense
of sharing an ethnicity but in sharing a culture.2 In the modem world, where
ancient Ethiopia has had to interact with modem states, this hodge-podge has
needed to come together into a coherent country: Ethiopia has had to forge an
identity co-terminus with the state. This struggle has taken a good part of the
last century.
1. Teshome G. Wagaw, Education and Language Policy in a Divided Ethiopia: Reversing the
Quest of the Centuries and Pressing Toward the Uncharted Future, in ETHIOPIA IN BROADER PERSPECTIVE:
PAPERS OF THEXIIITH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF ETHIOPIAN STUDIES voI. 111, 391 (Katsyoshi Fuku,
Elisei Kurimoto, & Masayoshi Shigeta eds., 1997).
2. Menasse Haile, The Ethiopian Constitution: Its Impact Upon Unity, Human Rights and
Development, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1, 22 (1996).
3. Seifudein Hussein Adam, Systemic Factors and the Conflicts in the Horn ofAfrica, in ETHIOPIA
IN BROADER PERSPECTIVE: PAPERS OF THE XIIITH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF ETHIOPIAN STUDIES vol.
I1, 105 (Fukui et al. eds. 1997).
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The ancient empire confronted colonial powers, brought in westernizing
codes and theories, and finally met its death at the hands of a brutal communist
dictatorship. Although there had been previous conflicts between the different
tribes within Ethiopia, those conflicts never defined the groups as somehow
parts of separate civilizations. Indeed, intermarriage and inter-settlement
underscored the interdependence of the tribes and assured a fundamental
Ethiopian identity. Contact with the West unleashed the nationalities question,
and governments this century have tried to find different ways to suppress that
question.
B. A New Artificial Ethiopia
The rebels who overthrew the communist regime came primarily from an
ethnic group near the periphery; the Tigrayans. One of their primary concerns
in taking over the state was granting the various ethnic regions autonomy.
However, they, in effect, did not wish to relinquish the power they had newly
won in the central state. The federal state they proposed did not match the one
they put into practice. The issues which faced the new regime were much the
same as those which faced previous regimes, with the difference being that the
new regime professes to want to confront the issues in a more democratic
manner, thereby enabling Ethiopia to develop into a functional and modern
state in the global political system. The new regime must take into account
ethnic differences, if only because these have surfaced as important to
Ethiopians, but do so in a way that will preserve and strengthen the unity of
Ethiopia, allowing for decentralization and ethnic tolerance while developing
a distinct civil society for the entire state based in the central regime.4
The new regime, despite its announced intentions, has taken another
fragmentative path, creating artificial regions and strengthening ethnic divisions
while weakening the institution of the central government except to preserve the
current government's own physical power. Ethnic groups do not necessarily
constrict themselves to the regions proposed as the units into which the state
has been sub-divided. Yet granting power to specific allied ethnic groups
within each region furthers discrimination and leads to the ultimate breakdown
of the human rights that the new Ethiopian regime proudly professes.
III. THE MEANINGLESSNESS OF BOUNDARIES
State boundaries rarely correspond with ethnic boundaries. This fact is
especially true in Africa, where the boundaries reflect lines drawn almost
arbitrarily by European colonial powers. The Europeans never envisioned that
4. James C. N. Paul, Human Rights and the Structure ofSecurity Forces in Constitutional Orders:
The Case of Ethiopia, 3 WM. & MARY L. REV. 235, 242 (1994).
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these units would turn into viable independent states.' For these states to
become viable it is necessary for them to come to terms with their borders in
one way or another. One solution, that the Africans redraw their boundaries,
has been summarily discounted by virtually all outside academia. No matter
how illogical the existing borders are, there is no theoretical reason that the
states cannot find some way to work, given the right balance of constitutional
structures. Finding the right balance is key: multi-ethnic states are common-
place in Europe as well, yet the nationalities' question persists there with no
clear solution. Accounting for ethnicity and potential ethnic conflict remains
the central issue in contemporary African constitution-writing.6
A. Cross-claims with Somalis
The main struggle between distinct groups within Ethiopia over the
centuries has been religious rather than ethnic in nature. The bulk of Ethiopia's
population is Christian, but there is also an important Moslem minority. For
example, these religious issues defined the historic Amharic/Somali struggles
more than the ethnic issues.7 The Somalis living in the Ogaden region present
an additional problem to the Ethiopian state because they have more in common
with Somalia than with Ethiopia proper, and are more inclined to seek justice
in Somali tribal courts on both sides of the international boundary and trade
with Somalia more than with the rest of Ethiopia. Their existence has largely
remained peripheral to an Ethiopia content to let them get on with their own
traditional existence, and they do not represent a challenge to the historic state,
at least not until they get empowered to do so under an overly-decentralizing
and destabilizing constitution
On achieving independence in 1960, Somalia staked a claim on the
Somali-populated areas of Ethiopia. A claim that received some backing
throughout Africa. In the context of decolonization and independence
movements, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) responded with a
resolution, still in place, calling for the inviolability of colonial boundaries.
Despite the illogic of many of these boundaries, the OAU felt that such a
resolution was needed in order to affirm the rule of international law and to
reduce conflict between states. Ethiopia, however, had fixed its boundaries in
conjunction with the colonial powers in the last century, and had an inherent
interest in maintaining its own conquests, including those in the eastern Somali-
5. Jerome Wilson, Ethnic Groupsandthe Right to Self-determination, 11 CONN. J. INT'LL 433,
440-42 (1996).
6. Haile, supra note 2, at 3.
7. Adam, supra note 3, at 107.
8. Id. at 109.
populated areas. Therefore, it exerted great influence over the proceedings of
the OAU resolution.9 Nevertheless, Somalia continued to support a Somali
separatist movement, one of the many ethnic or pseudo-ethnic separatist groups
within Ethiopia which have grown in the last few decades.'0
B. The Fiction of Eritrea
One part of Ethiopia did secede after the overthrow of the Communist
regime was Eritrea, the former Italian colony along the Red Sea Coast. Islam
has figured as an important element in the Eritrean issue as well. Historically,
Eritrea has been as ethnically and culturally diverse as any other territory in
Africa. Not only did diversity exist within Eritrea, but the tribal boundaries
crossed the international ones. Two religions, Islam and Christianity, existed
alongside each other as they did in neighboring areas. However, in the second
half of the twentieth century the situation of Eritrea got recast as an ethnic one,
with the Eritreans forming a supposed people. The impetus for this came from
Moslem rebels who merely wanted independence from the Amharic - and
Christian-dominated mother state." Eritrea, however, exists as a historical
fiction, created by the Italians in the late nineteenth century. The prior struggle
between inhabitants of the region and the Ethiopian Imperial regime had never
existed on ethnic grounds but rather on religious ones, and even then only in a
portion of the population of Eritrea. With the creation of a fictitious Eritrea,
however, some sort of regional identity could finally be used to counterpose
against the Amharas. The struggle of the Eritrean people, then, is one of
extremely recent creation.'
2
A well thought-out constitution would still accord the individual
inhabitants of Eritrea their share of human rights, including the right to identify
with their region as an integral part of the greater state. Indeed, if handled well,
the creation of Eritrean identity could have been regional and non-ethnic in
nature and a positive building-block for Ethiopian identity. In reality, an
Eritrean people, historical fiction though it may be, was created this century and
finally accorded recognition as a distinct people under the new constitution,
because the Eritrean separatists had been the chief ally and supply conduit for
the Tigrayan nationalists in overthrowing the Marxists. 3 In return for their
9. Id. at 111.
10. Masahisa Kawabata, Changing politics in the Horn of Africa, in ETHIOPIA IN BROADER
PERSPECTIVE: PAPERS OF THE XIIITH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF ETHIOPIAN STUDIES vol. II, 126
(Fukui et al eds. 1997).
11. Adam, supra note 3, at 108, 109.
12. Id. at 112.
13. Haile, supra note 2, at 7.
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support of the victorious Tigrayan rebels, the Eritrean nationalists got what they
wanted: secession from Ethiopia.
IV. SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY
A. Ethiopia in Practice
Although many Africans have cheerfully pointed to Eritrea's independence
as a bloodless and amicable split (at least at the time of Eritrean independence
- a bloody border war ultimately erupted in 1998), they have overlooked the
meaning of the artificial ethnic struggle which underlies it, and indeed the threat
that such a split poses to the future integrity of Ethiopia as a state. Furthermore,
they ignore one other issue which undermines the democratic front put up by
the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea: that the separation was the product
of an agreement between two unelected provisional governments, those of
Ethiopia, dominated by the Tigrayan rebels, and of Eritrea, dominated by the
Eritrean rebels, their close allies. 4
The split with Eritrea actually underscores the undemocratic tendencies of
the victors in Ethiopia's civil wars. The new Eritrean Government makes no
secret that now that it has achieved independence through the sacred right of
self-determination and democracy, it does not want to organize itself along the
same lines. The regime in place in Eritrea has opted for a centralized and
intolerant system of rule.'" Meanwhile, the new regime in Ethiopia has begun
to impose itself upon the greater state, forcing its way while it still can. It has
put up its own fronts within various ethnic groups when it does not feel it can
sufficiently control the main ethno-political movements which dominate
Ethiopian politics.'6 And, of course, the primary way it has manifested its
intentions is through the constitutional system it put in place.
The Tigrayans form a distinct, but small, ethnic group from the northern
highlands. Tigray forms an integral part of Ethiopia, but the Tigrayans
themselves have historically resisted domination by the Amhara majority.
Through alliances with other ethnic groups and especially with the Eritreans,
the Tigrayans finally had the opportunity to put their own vision of the state in
place when they overthrew the dictatorship. 7
14. Adam, supra note 3, at 115.
15. Kawabata, supra note 10, at 127.
16. Theodore M. Vestal, Promises Unkept: Freedom of Association in the Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia, in ETHioPiA IN BROADER PERSPECTIVE: PAPERS OF THE XIIITH INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF ETIuOPAN STUDIES, vol. II, 178 (Fukui el. al. eds. 1997).
17. Alemante G. Selassie, Ethiopia: Problems and Prospects for Democracy, Institute of Bill of
Rights, Winds of Change: Perspectives on the World's Search for Stable Democracy, INST. OF BILL OF
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Although constitutions exist in part to delineate and limit the powers of
government, the new constitutional framework in Ethiopia fails to accomplish
this. Despite its seeming constitutionalism, the new regime maintains power,
which in turn means power remains in the hands of those ethnic groups,
primarily Tigrayans, who occupy power because of their position in
overthrowing the former Marxist regime. The presumed democracy now extant
in the country merely represents a new form of dictatorship based on
institutionalized tribalism rather than a civic society which can effectively
promote democratic structures, human rights, ethnic harmony, and state unity.'8
B. Western Theory Transposed
Due to settlement patterns over centuries of history when modern states
formed without regard to ethnicity, state boundaries did not come to reflect
ethnic demarcations in contemporary Europe either. However, as ethnic
movements of various sorts became important in the age of nationalism, modern
states had to consider how they would deal with the problem. Many countries
had the opportunity to consider constitutional reform, either because their states
were more recent creations or because of war and occupation. Many of these
issues which political theorists grappled with remain present. Therefore, to
properly consider current situations in any country - European, African, or
other - it helps to assess the broader theory behind attempts to deal with
similar problems.
Europe has had several multi-ethnic states and numerous constitutional
regimes which have tried to deal with these issues. The Austrian Empire was
perhaps the most notable due to its diversity and its ultimate spectacular failure.
Spain has been more successful at keeping itself together, but nevertheless has
found its question of nationalities to be the critical issue to dominate its
constitutional debate for over a century. Its current constitutional arrangement
- the Estado de las Autonomias - is much studied today as a successful mix
of regionalism and federalism with state supremacy. However, although the
Spanish Constitution has come to serve as a model for developing states, it has
not fully addressed the concerns of its minorities to the extent that the issue
continues to dominate Spanish constitutional debate. If the system is not right
for Spain, for which it was designed, then it is less likely to be successful in
culturally dissimilar African countries like Ethiopia or South Africa, which take
it as a model. The Africans can, however, study the debate in other countries
to learn lessons which might be applicable to them.
Spain is actually an apt example for Africa because it remained one of the
last large states in the West to develop economically, and its constitutional
18. Haile, supra note 2, at 5. Selassie, supra note 17 at 29.
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debates corresponded with its industrial development. Industrialization brought
Marxist thought into the mix, something which has also influenced Africa and
which mixes uneasily with the treatment of ethnicity thanks to Marxism's
traditional dismissal of ethnic issues.
The modern "nation" emerged as an important concept in Post-
Enlightenment Europe, yet the multiple and contradictory definitions that
historians, politicians, and the general population gave the word rendered it
practically meaningless. To some, the "nation" corresponded exactly to the
sovereign state; to others, the "nation" represented something more tribal in
nature. These latter tribalist groups also often felt that the "nation" should
correspond to the sovereign state, and that the existing states should be
dismantled to allow for this. Although African countries did not form in the
same way as European ones, post-colonial realities usually left one ethnic group
in a dominant position, facing opposition from movements dominated
themselves by specific ethnic groups.
To clarify, any study of this debate requires laying out definitions. The
most common, and therefore the most confusing, word was "nation."' 9 Some,
particularly groups which formed the majority and viewed the identity of the
central state as essentially that of their own group, considered "nation" as
synonymous with "state." Other large nationalities, such as the Germans,
considered themselves a nation even though they possessed no single state until
very late. Still other groups considered themselves nations even though they
had no independent state, while other members of their own community denied
their nationhood simply because they had no state. Still further, Marxism,
which came of age at the same time as nationalism, denied the importance of
ethnic demarcation as a primary element of identity, stressing the horizontal
cleavage of class over the vertical cleavage of ethnic group in human society.20
Karl Marx's strict economic interpretation caused him to overlook the cultural
and historical psyche of peoples. Therefore, he, too, confused the terms
"nation" and "state," viewing this element as a purely economic unit.2,
Certainly, Marx would have completely discounted the tribes of Africa as
worthy of preservation, and would have argued heavily in favor of some greater
state to modernize and civilize their society. Recognizing ethnic differences
within a constitution would have undermined this commonality.
But ethnic consciousness did exist, and it needed some definition. When
they wrought the "nation-states" of modern Europe, the relevant forces merely
19. On the difficulty in defining this messy term and why it is best left unused, see Louis SNYDER,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIONALISM 230-34, (1990).
20. WALKER CONNOR, THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN MARXIST-LENINIST THEORY AND STRATEGY
5-6, (1984).
21. Id. at 8.
Ehrlich
acted out human nature: the desires of men to associate with those who most
closely resemble themselves, especially in the face of real or perceived threat.
Ethnic identities, as demonstrated through language, culture, and custom, have
proven most fundamental in shaping the general world-view of individuals.
Despite modernization and democratization, nationalism persists and any
effective constitution in the modern world must therefore deal with the concept
- either through openly recognizing it or through organizing the state along
some sort of regionalist or federalist model which allows the forces of
nationalism to have an outlet other than against the stability of the state.
In Africa, as in Europe, ethnic groups channeled their efforts into four
distinct possibilities. Separatism and minority dominance of the state form the
two possibilities on either end of the spectrum, and the bulk of minority ethnic
movements have tried to take one of these two routes.2 In between those
possibilities exist seeking protection within a multi-ethnic framework for the
greater state and mere access to a non-ethnic state apparatus.23 These last two
are more difficult to accomplish, even in the European countries where these
theories developed. Furthermore, a regime like the current one in Ethiopia can
pay lip-service to one of these last possibilities, even within a written
constitution, while effectively operating under one of the first two paradigms.
V. REGIONALISM
A. Regionalist Theory from Spain
The term "regionalism," currently in vogue in several constitutional
structures, emerged from nineteenth-century Spain. The concept became the
cornerstone of a Catalan political party which acted on the general Spanish
political scene and sought to govern all of Spain from Madrid at the same time
as it wished to govern an autonomous Catalonia from Barcelona. The theorist
behind the party was Lluis Duran i Ventosa, who supplied the term
"regionalism" in order to distinguish clearly between types of "nationalist"
objectives: the mere promotion of culture and regional autonomy on one hand
and the micro-nationalist demand for ethnic self-determination on the other.
The only drawback, Duran admitted, was that its root implied geography, not
ethnicity, which he correctly feared would allow micro-nationalists a means to
question regionalism as a movement of ethnic identity.24 Indeed, in its
contemporary guise in the late twentieth-century, regionalism has taken on the
overtones of a mere administrative reform rather than a recognition of the
22. Adam, supra note 3.
23. Id. at I10.
24. LLuIs DURAN I VENTosA, Regionalisme i Federalisme, 1OF (1905).
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inherent rights of whatever ethnic group forms the majority of the population
within a given autonomous or semi-autonomous region.
Respecting historical accidents that established modern states, historic
regionalists stressed cooperation between all groups for the benefit of all
groups. When ethnic affiliation alone becomes the determining factor of a state
or region, then citizens of different groups are necessarily, by definition,
excluded. When dividing states into their respective historical regions, the
cultures of the groups which formed the majorities within the regions better be
promoted, but not at the expense of that region's minorities. In Duran's terms,
the importance of the greater state served as a "guarantee and union based on
mutual respect of the rights of every [group]."" These regions must, according
to this concept, remain federated within the state. Duran's federalism was the
"regime of convenience of political organisms bound in permanent union
without the loss of their respective personalities." '26 Once the groups within a
federation learn to trust each other and to cease thinking of others by ethnic
classification, then a firm federation could acquire unity and loyalty to a greater
state without abandoning particularism, such as in the United States, which had
the advantage of not being settled in the traditional tribal manner, but rather
found itself mixed from its outset as a haven for many peoples.
Another crucial distinction, realized early by the United States, is that
between "federation" and "confederation."27 As Duran explained, federalism
is the "union of nations [nationalities] for a common end," while confederation
consists of "separate states, that work together for common interests."2 The
federation remains one state, and thus represents a more effective way to
accomplish common government and establish true equality of nationalities
within one entity. Since confederate states are nominally independent, the
entire unit can function less effectively, and the former regional character
becomes synonymous with the state's. Regionalists, therefore, have rejected
this confederal solution as well. They have argued, as with completely
independent states, when the identity of a tribe or people equals that of a state,
then the citizens lose loyalty to any greater concept of state, and thus to any
concept of multi-ethnic government.
25. Id. at 102.
26. Id. at 13.
27. The thirteen original American states initially banded themselves together with the "Articles
of Confederation" in which each state maintained a large degree of independence. This became unworkable
if these states wished to operate effectively as a single unit, and thus the United States Constitution
established a federal structure. Duran, like many conservative thinkers, greatly admired the United States
Constitution.
28. 28 Duran, supra note 24, at 96.
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B. Regionalism Applied in Ethiopia
The contrast with how the term "regionalism" is now being employed in
Ethiopia bears this out to some degree. The regions which the current
Ethiopian regime has created are somewhat artificial, but are meant to represent
dominance by particular ethnic groups. In Ethiopia, this has fostered confusion
because the structure of Ethiopian society was one in which regional divisions
did not have accompanying ethnic demarcations of any great importance, but
which, through their existence, are fostering tension where it did not exist
before. This is not Duran's regionalism: the regional boundaries do not have
any historic basis and are being used to create ethnic conflict by a governing
regime that sees the division of Ethiopia as one means of dividing the country's
society to make it more governable by those who currently control the reins of
government.
The new Constitution in Ethiopia divided the country into fourteen regions
based on presumed ethnic demarcations, not on historic boundaries. Every
citizen, therefore, must assume some sort of ethnic identification - either the
majority one of the region or a minority within a region dominated by another
group. Regions themselves have ethnically-divided sub-divisions to account for
this. The regions and sub-regions have broad cultural and linguistic powers,
and ultimately the right to secede. 29 Rather than producing a more loyal
Ethiopian citizenry, this results in greater fragmentation. The so-called
"federal" government is nothing more than a collection of near-sovereign,
tribally-defined units which effectively undermine the unity of the Ethiopian
state.
30
Such a situation renders Ethiopia's federal government virtually extinct.
No real power remains in the center, but rather has passed fully to the ethnic
regions, and can pass still further to any other ethnic claimant which seeks to
fulfill the right to ethnic self-determination in the constitution. Constitutional
sovereignty rests not in the Ethiopian people, but in the nationalities.3 For the
concept of self-determination to work as a centripetal rather than centrifugal
force within a multi-ethnic state intent on preserving itself, the emphasis must
remain in individual rather than group rights.32 So many powers have been
devolved in the constitutional framework that virtually nothing remains in the
hands of the federal government. The powers that do remain with the federal
government can be scrutinized by the Federal Council, a body composed of
29. Wagaw, supra note 1, at 397.
30. Haile, supra note 2, at 4-5.
31. Id. at 20-22.
32. Paul H. Brietzke, Self-determination, or Jurisprudential Confusion: Exacerbating Political
Conflict, 14 WIS. INT'L L.J. 69, 72-89 (1995).
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representatives of the ethnic regions which has final interpretive constitutional
scrutiny.3" One of the tenets of American federalism - checks on power by the
various elements of government - does not exist in Ethiopia since the federal
government has no means to restrain the regions.3 4 The regions themselves,
acting through the Federal Council, determine their own powers, up to and
including secession.35 That the country has not already ruptured (beyond the
splitting off of Eritrea) represents not restraint on the part of tribal groups still
loyal to the concept of Ethiopian citizenship, but rather the immense power the
Tigrayan-dominated government maintains over all areas of Ethiopian society
for the benefit of the government and its cronies in particular, and not for the
benefit of Ethiopians in general.
The right to secede produces an open-ended chain of events, which can
lead to the dismantling from within the state as ethnic groups feel no need to
preserve a state they are not bound to, thus further fueling ethnic conflict.36 A
constitution which cedes powers and even territory without outside pressure
merely to satisfy a component group's claims to self-determination is
fundamentally suicidal.37 The state-structure enshrined in the Ethiopian
Constitution falls into this category in the long term since it has left no real
power in the center other than that held by the brute force of the current
government.
Furthermore, the federal government of Ethiopia has become associated
with a single tribe in particular. When a specific tribe lends its identity to a
federal regime, expressions of opposition naturally take the form of ethnic
conflict against the regime. Ethnic opposition, now with its own territorial base
in a federal system, manifests itself by expressing the interests of its own
constituents, regardless of what is in the best interests of the state as a whole.38
Each region sees itself for what it is: a distinct political entity. Ethnic
federalism foments rival nationalisms which are by definition incompatible.
39
This fragmented political system, rather than promoting harmony and
compromise between distinct groups, causes increasing conflict.
33. Haile, supra note 2, at 24-27.
34. Id. at 52.
35. Id. at 28-30.
36. INSTITUTE OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 17, at 39-40.
37. Brietzke, supra note 32, at 77.
38. Haile, supra note 2, at 12.
39. INSTITUTE OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 17, at 49.
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C. The Language Issue
No where is this fragmentation more apparent than in the issue of
language. The new constitutional framework in Ethiopia downplays Amharic,
the most widely-spoken language in Ethiopia and the one in which the country
has traditionally been governed. Because the main force within the current
regime originated as a Tigrayan rebel group, the desire to undermine Amharic
is, perhaps, not surprising. But preserving Amharic as the main language of the
country would not necessarily mean sanctioning domination by Amharas,
rather, it would provide stability to the entire state and make it governable."
Amharic could become the common language of government without infringing
on the rights of non-Amharic speakers.4 ' But, since non-Amharas will now
receive an increasingly diminished amount of formal education in Amharic,
they will effectively lose access to the state apparatus. This will in turn further
disconnect them from a sense of Ethiopian identity. The increasing use of
English in the schools, justified as an international language, also will not help
the situation.
Nationalist groups in the West at least admit to these tactics. In Catalonia,
the Catalan nationalist government has gone against the Spanish constitution
to decrease the amount of Spanish used in schools, and has even promoted
English in its place so that Catalan students can learn to function in the global
community. Between the world and Catalonia, Spain becomes irrelevant, with
language the most tangible symbol of this trend. Just as the Catalan
Government has tightened Catalan-language requirements in public services in
Catalonia, so groups in Ethiopia have enough latitude to exclude other groups
from active roles in what is, in reality, an extremely inter-mixed population.
The difference is in the constitutions of the two countries: Spain's does not
allow these actions but the Catalans succeed through political power plays;
Ethiopia's specifically provides for this sort of fragmentation.42
VI. REGIONAL STRUCTURES AND CIVIL SOCIETY
A. The Tigrayan Regime versus Civil Society
Some have questioned the motives behind writing the constitution in this
manner. One belief suggests that the Tigrayans who dominate the current
Ethiopian regime wrote the constitution in this way in order to give themselves
some sort of an escape should they not succeed in dominating Ethiopia over the
more numerous Amharas in the future. Their current political dominance
40. Wagaw, supra note 1, at 397-98.
41. Haile, supra note 2, at 36.
42. Wagaw, supra note 1, at 398.
1999]
64 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 6:51
serves as a means to undermine the Amharas even if the Amharas return to
power.43 In the very least, others suggest, the Tigrayans could only hope to
continue to dominate Ethiopia if they adopted a "divide-and-rule" tactic. More
sympathetic opinions have simply argued that any new government in 1991 had
to undo the damage of the previous Marxist regime and that only an ethnic-
liberative platform could inspire enough diverse people under the same banner.
Once successful at overthrowing the regime, however, it would have become
too difficult to turn back on promises of ethnic self-determination, lest the new
regime fall in turn before it could establish a democratic framework for
society."
The true test of the new regime will come when its ability to promote a
democratic society can receive a full evaluation: how it uses the decentralizing
process to put democratic principles into place and to bind Ethiopians to civil
society in such a way that they can continue to regard themselves as members
of an ethnic group and as adherents to a religion and as citizens of Ethiopia.45
However, the structure of civil society under the current regime does anything
but this. Instead, all civic activity takes place within the context of ethnic
organizations. Although these organizations are themselves further organized
within an Ethiopia-wide umbrella, they nonetheless effectively promote ethnic
division instead of state cohesion.46
B. Regional Structures which Support Civil Society
The South African example, under consideration simultaneously with the
Ethiopian Constitution, provides the opposite use in that it shows how regional
boundaries can be set up to mollify certain ethnic groups. It also shows that
when the state itself is fundamentally unitarist in concept, conflicts will arise
that will stir up unnecessary tension between tribes with distinct historical
identities. Specific tribes may have territorial dominance over specific regions,
but the regions themselves should have economic and historic viability for
individuals' loyalty to pass to both the region and the state. Failing this, the
regions become the source, not the solution, for ethnic conflict.47
43. Id. at 399-400.
44. Siegfried Pausewang, Democratic Dialogue and Local Tradition, in ETHIOPIA IN BROADER
PERSPECTIVE: PAPERS OFTHE XIIITH INTERNATIONALCONFERENCEOF ETHIOPIAN STUDIES vol. 1, 196 (Fukui
et al. eds 1997).
45. Id. at 202-03.
46. Vestal, supra note 16, at 176.
47. See David Welsh,, The Provincial Boundary Demarcation Process, in BIRTH OF A
CONSTITUTION 223-30 (Bertus de Villiers ed. 1994) and Lawrence Schlemmer, Regionalism in South Africa:
Opportunities Missed, in BIRTH OF A CoNsTrnoN 242-255 (Bertus de Villiers ed. 1994).
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Regionalist parties in Europe have generally been conservative, and as
such willing, in the name of order, to compromise on many issues in order to
allow for the greater functioning of the state. This has included compromise on
language issues, which have often produced the most divisive debates in multi-
ethnic states. As conservatives, they sought stability and honored the language
of the central government as a means of preserving the state: the introduction
of other (minority) languages by the political center would only have resulted
in mass confusion. They also rejected the notion of redrawing regional
boundaries in order to reflect language boundaries because of the mix of
different ethnic groups within the regions. Historically-determined regions
could allow for government in the predominant language of the region, but must
also recognize the Staatssprache (the "language of state"). Thus, the Czech
regionalists within the old Austrian Empire accepted German as this
Staatssprache, but in doing so in no way implied a "German character" but,
rather, an Austrian one, with German as the language of convenience.48
The Austrian Empire spent its last half-century of existence trying to
quench this situation. Germans formed the dominant group for historical
reasons despite making up less than a quarter of the population. Slavs were the
single largest racial group, but they were subdivided into several ethnic
divisions so that Germans and Magyars formed the largest two ethnic groups
within the Empire. Among the Empire's defenders were many important Slav
figures who argued for the preservation of Austria with a more federal
structure. This would allow different groups to express their identities while
maintaining a greater state structure, which would ensure prosperity and equal
rights.49 Conservatives and regionalists saw ethnic origin as only a part of an
individual's identity. More important was the unity of the state, which itself
should have no specific ethnicity, only freedom of identity for all groups and
individuals. Regionalists then saw themselves as regionalists of the state (e.g.
"Austro-slavs"), not separate "nations" entitled to self-government either inside
or outside their state.
Meanwhile, the rise of Czech industry produced anxiety in the Germans
- especially within Bohemia, where the German population had traditionally
controlled the only industries - but, the conservative government tried to
harmonize the interests of the two groups for Austria's maximum benefit. With
the failure in the economic sphere, all solutions had to take into account the
aspirations of nationalists in order to calm their intransigence, and here Austria
was bound to come to grief. The continued failure to reconcile the desires of
nationalists from German-speaking and other ethnic camps led to the break-up
48. Frantigek Palack, Osterreichs Staatsidee 31F (1866).
49. Frantilek Palack, Gedenkbldtter 152 (1874).
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of the Empire a quarter of a century later. This happened especially as the
common link for all of Austria's regions - the institution of the monarchy
was itself delegitimized by the growth of left-wing politics.5"
C. Variations on Marxism
An environment such as Austria produced some of the most cogent
attempts to rectify nationalist theory with the Marxism which was also salient
in Central Europe. The experiences of the Austro-Marxists made them believe
that ethnic identity was more important than Marx had believed. The Austrian
Socialist Otto Bauer described the natural conflict of interests between multi-
ethnic states (Natiohnalitatenstaaten) and nation-states (Nationalstaaten) as the
central struggle of Europe's entire question of nationalities." While Austria
retained its central monarchy and Imperial institutions, the Nationalitatenstaat
could survive, as radical groups pressed for their ethnic identities and the
overthrow of the Habsburg Monarchy, they sought to give the resultant creation
in Central Europe the character of one (for the Germans) or more (for the other
nationalists) Nationalstaaten.52
This clashed with standard Marxist theory, which, when confronted with
nationalism, tends to group it into two classes: progressive (liberative) and
counter-revolutionary (bourgeois capitalist means of defining state). Therefore,
Marxists have often felt that some nationalisms deserved to be aided as a means
to accomplish socialism, while others deserved to be fought.53 Yet Marx
himself showed scorn for the "geschichtlose" ("history-less") peoples which he
saw as backwards and in need of being attached to more progressive
"nations."54 Marx's associate Friedrich Engels argued further that the mix of
populations over geographic areas (and over history) made it impossible to
(re)create ethnically homogenous states. Gradually, ethnic identity would cease
to matter.55 In practice, the Soviet Union worked - despite its apparent federal
constitution - because the communist ideology, in reality, admitted no
divergence from the party line. Ethnic groups found themselves channeled into
manifesting support for the Soviet system, which remained federal in name and
propaganda only.56
50. The best overview of the period, focusing on a Conservative/Slavic coalition government, is
WILLLAM A. JENKS, AUSTRIA UNDER THE IRON RING, 1879-93 (1965).
51. Otto Bauer, Die Nationalititenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie 187 (2nd ed. 1924).
52. HANS KoHN, THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM: A STUDY OF ITS ORIGINS AND BACKGROUND 18
(1949).
53. Conner, supra note 20, at 7.
54. Id. at 9.
55. Id. at 12.
56. Haile, supra note 2, at 16-17.
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The Soviet Constitution admitted secession in theory, but the regime
imposed centralized order in practice. Ethiopia's current regime wavers. If it
wanted to leave secession in as a possible last resort to make ethnic groups feel
more secure within Ethiopia, it could have accomplished this through other
mechanisms. Instead, it copied Soviet constitutionalism without the intent to
force the preservation of the central state at all costs. 7 In any respect, though,
the Soviet system worked only for a time - nationalism outlasted even so
repressive a regime as the Soviet one. Before they became ostensibly
democratic, however, the Tigrayan rebels, who now dominate the Ethiopian
regime, were avowed Marxists and extolled the virtues of such a system. Some
of that optimism remains as a residual component of their thought.58 However,
should the Soviet-style federal system not work in Ethiopia as it has failed
everywhere else, then the Tigrayans, themselves a distinct minority, do indeed
have their own escape clause.
Classical Marxism tried to explain all history through economics, partially
because Marx himself failed to grasp the complexity of human nature.
Nationalism has proven more durable than he gave it credit for. Lenin accused
many socialists of taking it too seriously, arguing that it was the mere by-
product of - and discontent with - the human condition, and that therefore,
it really existed as a socio-revolutionary force. The ethnic group, Lenin
reasoned, was a false identity crafted by history and useful only if it furthered
the international revolution. 9 The Austrian Bauer, while continuing socialist
rhetoric, has nevertheless admitted a connection between micro-nationalism and
oppression. Micro-nationalism grew out of the same concern socialism had:
oppression by a certain conservative group. Even so, the existence of macro-
nationalism gave him empathy for the minorities struggling to combat it."
Marxism has, of course, poisoned the debate in Africa as well. Classic
European Marxists would have had less time for what they would have
considered the primitive tribes of Africa than they did for Europe's
geschichtlose peoples. However, this did not prevent the rise of African
socialism. The military regime in Ethiopia which replaced the Empire, based
its power on a Marxist-Leninist single-party state, which proved incapable of
satisfying its utopian promises or even of maintaining order in society.6' It
adopted a Marxist approach to the nationalities question, asserting on one hand
the "right to self-determination" and on the other a non-nationalist state. The
dictatorship released a quasi-constitution, the "Program of National Democratic
57. Id at 32-35.
58. Id. at 43-44.
59. Dov RONEN, THE QUEST FOR SELF-DETERMINATION, 10 (1979).
60. Bauer, supra note 51. at 165.
61. Kawabata, supra note 10, at 126.
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Revolution of Ethiopia," in 1976, which declared that "no nationality will
dominate another one since the history, culture, language, and religion of each
nationality will have equal recognition in accordance with the spirit of
socialism. The unity of Ethiopia's nationalities will be based on the common
struggle against feudalism, imperialism, bureaucratic capitalism, and all
reactionary forces." The document also guaranteed regional autonomy.62
This typically Marxist approach failed to see the staying power of
nationalism once that force was released. Indeed, none other than ethnic-based
movements overthrew the regime. Chief among these were the liberation fronts
from Tigray and Eritrea who both professed support for greater recognition of
minority rights.63 Both groups themselves had liberative Marxist backgrounds,
which they conveniently downplayed to gain Western support against the
Soviet-backed dictatorship.
D. The Inapplicability of the American Model
An American approach, though, would also not apply. To transplants, like
the entire population of the United States, a just state easily assumes
precedence in loyalty. Regions become mere administrative units designed to
increase liberty by removing centralized control. Most importantly, ethnic
settlement becomes secondary. In such a framework, dual-loyalty becomes
practical and possible, but only for those who accept the framework. Such a
system as American federalism could not work in Europe, nor will it work in
Africa without taking local needs into account. Successful federations such. as
the United States and Canada did not form based on ethnicity. Therefore, states
which have natural ethnic divisions cannot expect to adopt North American
federalism wholesale. While ethnicity cannot be the guiding determinant of a
federal structure, it cannot be ignored either."
Not least among the differences between the United States and African
states are the founding principles. American colonists looked to establish a
system to protect individual rights and to functionally federate states. These
states despite their differences, were essentially similar and homogenous in
population. Recent attempts at constitutions in Africa have sought instead to
stress group rights, even to the point of assigning groups' predominance within
regional administrative structures. Rather than seeking to federate a bunch of
colonies, African states are already extant within their boundaries - federation
in Africa and following the American model would require breaking the state
apart into components which would re-federate. Quite understandably, African
62. Wagaw, supra note 1, at 395.
63. Kawabata, supra note 10, at 126. See also Wagaw, supra note 1, at 396.
64. Haile, supra note 2, at 10.
Ehrlich
leaders are generally loathe to do this. As a result, African attempts at
federalism are bound to appear more unitarist.
E. The Application of the Spanish Model
It is here that the model of Spain becomes apt. Spain attempted
administrative reform at the beginning of the twentieth century. This reform
was thwarted by the liberal oligarchy that wished to preserve its hegemony.
The Republic in the 1930s formed along a left-wing and in some ways socialist
model which left little room for devolution in theory, but which in practice
needed the support of the peripheral ethnic groups - especially the Catalans
- and so had to grant autonomy within an otherwise unitarist state. The
authoritarian regime of General Francisco Franco re-centralized power, and a
newly-democratic Spain had to rethink the issue in the 1978 Constitution. The
result was the "Estado de las Autonomias," in which seventeen traditional
regions were formed and were permitted to seek varying degrees of autonomy
from the central government. Most of the regions concerned have no history
of self-government, which has angered the so-called "historic" regions of Spain
- Catalans have derided the system as "coffee for everyone," and have
declared that they did not want to see Catalonia become "another North
Dakota. 165 Without taxation powers, though, Catalonia in many ways has less
sovereignty than North Dakota.
Within the context of the Spanish state-structure today, self-government
does not necessarily mean independence. The Constitution of 1978 divided
Spain into seventeen autonomous communities, based roughly on historic
regions mostly to mollify the Catalan nationalists.66 The Constitution
technically "recognized" the regions rather than "constitute" them, thus,
acknowledging their right to autonomy. However, the Constitution also spoke
of the unity of the Spanish State, in the process denying any right to self-
determination in the traditional sense of sovereignty.67 The arrangement was
meant to allow each region or "nationality" autonomy and local self-
government within the Spanish state. As a trade-off, the principle of "self-
determination" was applied to the Spanish state in its entirety, - as a
democratic country, Spain was providing self-determination to all of its
peoples, especially in as far as it allowed regional self-government. Within the
65. LLUISARMET, ETAL., FEDERALISMO YESTADODELAS AUTONOMIAS 115 (1998), quoting Jordi
Pujol i Soley.
66. GREGoIUO PECES-BARBA MARTINEZ, LA ELABORACI6N DE LA CoNsTrrUCI6N DE 1978 22-23
(1988).
67. Luis SAnchez Agesta, Sisteraa Politico de la Constitucidn Espafiola de 1978 397-399 (1993).
See also Gonzilez Casanova, Notas Sobre Politica Autonomista en las Nuevas Cortes in LA IZQUmRDA Y LA
CONSTriUCIfN 66-68 (Peces Barba, et al. 1978).
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Spanish Constitution of 1978, the State was paramount and controlled the
distribution of power to the regions. According to the legal terms of the
Constitution, as explained by its framers, the "nationalities" of Spain form




In many was the system in South Africa resembles Spain more than the
United States. In Spain, as in South Africa, the central state constituted the
regions and gave the regions wide latitude to act - but only within the
structures of the central constitution.69 Although the constitution establishesIregions and gives them powers to act locally, much of the real power remains
in the center, where the constitution is enforced and interpreted, not to mention
the power of taxation.7" The Spanish Constitution of 1978 inspired the South
Africans in another way as well, because it marked a transition from
dictatorship to democracy, which had predicated the nationalities question as
its primary concern. Even with this insistence that it would take its regional
groups into account, Spain's constitution avoided slipping into federation,
something that enamored it to the forces dominant in the South African
transition.7'
The concerns of the Zulus - arguably South Africa's most historic ethnic
group - parallel Catalan concerns about their historic identity. The regions in
the new South Africa are somewhat historic (not exactly, but the regions in
Spain do not exactly correspond with history either) and delineate ethnic
groups. But South African regions also have a far greater ethnic base by
definition - in some ways, the unitarist tendencies of the main constitutional
framers sought to include these regions in order to control and contain ethnic
identity. As in Spain, however, there is a fundamental power-play between one
important ethnic group which sees itself as more historically self-governing,
and the central state. Reaction to Catalan demands in Spain has produced anti-
catalanism on the part of many. This has also led to other regions, that might
not think of gaining broad autonomic powers and might not otherwise have
68. Herrero Rodriguez de Miflon, SPEECH IN CONGRESS, FROM THE DL4PJO DE SESIONES DEL
CONGRESO (May 5, 1978), reprinted in CONSTITUcI6N ESPAIOLA: TRABAJOS PARLAMENTARIOS 639
(Fernando Sainz Moreno ed. 1980).
69. Villiers, The Constitutional Principles: Content and Significance, in BIRTH OF A
CONSTITUTION 45 (Bertus deVilliers ed. 1945).
70. Ronald L. Watts, Is the New Constitution Federal or Unitary?, in BIRTH OF A CONSTrrION
75-78 (Bertus deVilliers ed. 1945).
71. Daniel J. Elazar, Form of State: Federal, Unitary, or... , in BIRTH OF A CONSTITUTION 30-35
(Bertus deVilliers ed. 1945).
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supported such a provision, demanding broader powers to counter-act what is
seen as a special treatment for Catalonia. The Zulus risk producing similar
back-lash in South Africa. Yet, like the Catalans, the Zulus - or at least their
leaders - do not want to risk losing their privileged position at the bargaining
table with a central state with unitarist tendencies. 2
Some have suggested that the Indian Constitution could serve as an
example for Ethiopia instead. Yet India has a more homogeneous identity
manifested in the Hindu religion to which over eighty per cent of the population
subscribes and which is uniquely Indian. India itself faces perceived external
threats which outweigh the internal threats to its statehood - from China and
Pakistan in particular, which represent another more formidable threat than
Somalia or Sudan do to Ethiopia. And the Indian Constitution safeguards the
central government in ways that the Ethiopian one - intent as it is on the issue
of self-determination - fails to do. Fundamentally, therefore, the Indian
Constitution, like the South African one, is not as federal as it professes to be.73
Vii. CONCLUSION
Ethiopia makes a stark contrast to all traditional state theories. The
regions in the new constitution have no historic justification and purport to an
even greater extent to correspond to ethnic subdivisions within society.
However, those ethnic lines are often not clearly defined and so the new
constitution there is virtually attempting to create ethnic groups. This a recipe
for disaster. Ethiopia may not really require pseudo-ethnic regions to protect
the rights of its citizens, on the other hand, Ethiopia may not be properly set up
to allow a federal system along United States lines. The destruction of its ages-
old monarchy meant the loss of the one main unifying force. Nevertheless,
Ethiopia can continue to exist as a viable state if it finds the right degree of
administrative decentralization and stable central institutions. Ethiopia has
much to learn from Western - European and American - thought; Ethiopia
need not copy Western models.
72. For a case study on the Zulus see Wilson, supra note 5, at 442.45.
73. Haile, supra note 2, at 17-19.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the remarkable advances in medical science, the overall success in
organ transplantation has led to one major problem - a shortage of human
organs for transplantation. As a result, many patients have died while awaiting
organ transplantation surgery. Since 1968, the United States responded to this
problem by attempting to establish a uniform system with respect to cadaveric
organ donation. One aspect of cadaveric organ procurement in the United
States is requiring voluntary consent before organ procurement is authorized.
Other countries, however, have adopted or followed different methods of
procuring cadaveric organs for transplantation. This paper will not address the
allocation of procured organs, nor will it address organ procurement from living
donors. Instead, it will focus on the different methods of cadaveric organ
procurement in the United States and in some Asian countries. In addition, this
paper will evaluate the application and the relative success of each country's
method of organ procurement. Ethical implications of each method will also
be discussed.
Part II will chronicle the evolution of cadaveric organ procurement law in
the United States. In addition, this part will focus on the method of voluntary
consent and the ways in which consent is requested. Part III will review
Japan's new organ procurement law, which requires a more stringent form of
consent than the United States. Part IV will examine Singapore's presumed
consent law and will compare it to presumed consent laws of other countries.
In addition, Part IV will address the viability of adopting a similar law in the
United States. Part V will describe China's method of organ procurement,
which includes harvesting organs from many of its non-consenting executed
criminals. In addition, Part V will briefly discuss some of the views in the
United States regarding procurement of organs from its executed criminals.
Finally, Part VI will provide the reader with a brief summary of the various
methods of organ procurement. In conclusion, Part VI will suggest a path to
follow which will increase cadaveric organ supply in the United States.
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II. ORGAN PROCUREMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
Since 1968, advances in organ transplantation along with the need for
more human organs to save lives led the United States to pass laws and
regulations dealing specifically with cadaveric organ procurement. This part
will chronicle the evolution of those current laws. Part If(A) will provide the
foundation of uniformity among the states regarding cadaveric organ
procurement-the 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.' Part If(B) will discuss
the segment of the National Organ Transplant Act that banned the sale of
human organs.2 It will also describe the Uniform Determination of Death Act
and how that act enabled physicians to pronounce a person brain dead.3 Part
II(C) will address some of the problems associated with the 1968 Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act. Next, this part will describe how the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the Commissioners) sought to solve
those problems when they approved the 1987 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
(1987 UAGA).4 Although a number of states adopted the 1987 UAGA, many
problems continue to hinder cadaveric organ supply. Part II(D) will disclose
those current problems. Finally, Part 1I(E) will discuss the most recent attempt
to increase cadaveric organ supply - the 1998 DHHS Referral and Request
Regulation.5
A The 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
In 1968, the Commissioners approved the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
(1968 UAGA). 6 During this period, transplant surgery became an increasingly
viable option to save lives. By utilizing the advances in transplant surgery
techniques, the Commissioners clearly intended to increase the supply of organs
to help save lives.7 To facilitate this increase, the Commissioners were required
to harmonize various competing interests! Thus, the Commissioners were
1. UNiF. ANATOMICAL GIFr AcT (1968) §§ 1-7, 8A U.L.A. 63 (1993 & Supp. 1998).
2. THE NATIONAL ORGAN TRANSPLANT ACT, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 273, and 274(e) (West 1991).
3. UNIF. DETERmINATiON OF DEATH AT §§ 1-3, 12A U.L.A. 589 (1996).
4. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFr AcT (1987) §§ 1-15, 8A U.L.A. 19 (1993 & Supp. 1998).
5. PUBLIC HEALTh, 42 C.F.R. § 482.45 (1998).
6. Supra note 1, at § 1-7.
7. See id. Prefatory Note. "It is said that 6,000 to 10,000 lives could be saved each year by renal
transplants if a sufficient supply of kidneys were available."
8. See id. Those interests were: (1) the wishes of the deceased during his lifetime concerning the
disposition of his body; (2) the desires of the surviving spouse or next of kin; (3) the interest of the state in
determining by autopsy, the cause of death in cases involving crime or violence; (4) the need of autopsy to
determine the cause of death when private legal rights are dependent upon such cause; and (5) the need of
society for bodies, tissues and organs for medical education, research, therapy and transplantation.
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required to answer several legal questions to balance those competing interests.9
Many states already tried to answer those questions. When they passed their
own legislation, the Commissioners sought to eliminate the uncertainties that
existed when applying the law from state to state.'0 At one time, all fifty states
enacted their own versions of the 1968 UAGA."' Presently, only thirty states
and the District of Columbia have retained versions of the 1968 UAGA. 2
1. Who may make a gift?
The 1968 UAGA answered one of the questions about who is authorized
to make an anatomical gift. t" The 1968 UAGA answered that question by
authorizing any individual of sound mind over the age of eighteen to make an
anatomical gift. 4 Absent the decedent's intent, the 1968 UAGA also
authorized the decedent's next-of-kin to substitute their consent to make an
anatomical gift, provided there was no contrary indication by the decedent."
This theory is in accord with cases which hold that the testamentary wishes of
9. See id These questions included the following: (1) who may during his lifetime make a legally
effective gift of his body or a part thereof; (2) what is the right of the next of kin, either to set aside the
decedent's expressed wishes, or themselves to make the anatomical gifts from the dead body; (3) who may
legally become donees of anatomical gifts; (4) for what purposes may such gifts be made; (5) how may gifts
be made, can it be done by will, by writing, by a card carried on the person, or by telegraphic or recorded
telephonic communication; (6) how may a gift be revoked by the donor during his lifetime; (7) what are the
rights of survivors in the body after removal of donated parts; (8) what protection from legal liability should
be afforded to surgeons and others involved in carrying out anatomical gifts; (9) should such protection be
afforded regardless of the state in which the document of gift is executed; (10) what should the effect of an
anatomical gift be in case of conflict with laws concerning autopsies; (11) should the time of death be defined
by law in any way; [and] (12) should interest in preserving life by the physician in charge of a decedent
preclude him form participating in the transplant procedure by which donated tissues or organs are transferred
to a new host.
10. See id. For example, a valid anatomical gift in one state may not be valid in another.
11. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIF AcT (1987) Prefatory Note, 8A U.L.A. 19, 20 (1993 & Supp.
1998); see also Cate, Symposium, Human Organ Transplantation: The Role of Law, 20 IOWA J. CORP. L.
69, 71 (1994).
12. See UNIF. ANATOMiCALGIFrACT (1968) Table ofJurisdiction Wherein Acthas Been Adopted.
13. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT AT (1968) Prefatory Note.
14. Id. § 2(a).
15. Id. § 2(b). For cases holding that adecedent's next-of-kin possesses some kind of property right
forburial purposes, see Whaley v. Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6thCir. 1995) (holding that next-of-kin have
the right to possess the body for burial and prevent its mutilation); and Perry v. Saint Francis Hosp. &
Medical Center, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1551, 1563-64 (D. Kan. 1995) (holding that next-of-kin is the owner of
a quasi-property right over the decedent's body for the limited purposes of preserving and burying it). For
an in-depth analysis about how differentjurisdictions have handled the property right issue, see Annotation,
Validity and Effect of Testamentary Direction as to Disposition of Testator's Body, 7 A.L.R. 3D 747 (1996
& Supp. 1998).
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a decedent to be buried or cremated after death will be binding over contrary
wishes by the decedent's next-of-kin.' 6 The 1968 UAGA also established a
priority of persons who could substitute their consent in the place of their
decedent loved one. 7 An individual at the same or higher priority level of one
who actually gives consent, may nullify an otherwise valid anatomical gift."
2. Manner in which to make a gift.
One who wishes to make an anatomical gift must do so by executing either
a will or a document other than a will. 9 If the gift was made by a document
other than a will, the donor and the witnesses must sign the document." If the
decedent's intentions were unknown, the decedent's next-of-kin may substitute
their consent by "telegraph, recorded telephonic, or other recorded message."2
16. See Matter of Moyer's Estate, 577 P.2d 108, 109 (Utah 1978) (held that so long as decedent's
wishes are within the limits of reason and decency, the decedent's interests are binding after death); and
Dumouchelle v. Duke University, 317 S.E.2d 100 (N.C. 1984) (held that the right to the possession of a dead
body for the purpose of preservation and burial belongs, in the absence of any testamentary disposition, to
the surviving next-of-kin). For a complete analysis about how differentjurisdictions have handled this issue,
see Frank D. Wagner, Annotation, Enforcement of Preference Expressed by Decedent as to Disposition of
His Body after Death, 54 A.L.R. 3D 1037 (1973 & Supp. 1998); and 7 A.L.R. 3D 747, supra note 15; and
see generally, Will iam Boulier, Note, Sperm, Spleens, and other Valuables: The Need to Recognize Property
Rights in Human Body Parts, 23 HoFsTP L. REv. 693 (1995). For other views about how property interests
can or should affect cadaveric organ procurement, see Monique C. Gorsline & Rachelle L.K. Johnson, Note,
The United States System of Organ Donation, the International Solution, and the Cadaveric Organ Donor
Act: "And the Winner is... ,". 20 IOWA J. CORP. L. 5, 9-13 (1994); Chad D. Naylor, Note, The Role of the
Family in Cadaveric Organ Procurement, 65 IND. L.J. 167, 174-78 (1989); and Theodore Silver: The Case
for a Post-Mortem Organ Draft and a Proposed Model Organ Draft Act, 68 B.U. L. REV. 681, 687-94
(1988).
17. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1968) § 2(b). The order of priority is as follows: "(1) the
spouse, (2) an adult son or daughter, (3) either parent, (4) an adult brother or sister, (5) a guardian of the
person of the decedent at the time of his death, [and] (6) any other person authorized or under obligation to
dispose of the body."
18. Id.; see also Mansaw v. Midwest Organ Bank, No. 97-0271 -CV-W-6, 1998 WL 386327, at *8
(W.D. Mo. 1998) (where one of the parents who objects to an anatomical gift is silent and the other parent
voices her consent to such gift, the parent giving consent was presumed to have spoken for the other silent
parent).
19. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT (1968) § 4; see also Dumouchelle, 317 S.E.2d at 104 (held
that if a will is later declared invalid, the anatomical gift remains valid to the extent that it has been acted
upon in good faith).
20. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1968) § 4(b).
21. Id. § 4(e). This provision enables next-of-kin-who may be far away-to give their consent
to donate the decedent's organs in a quick manner. See id. § 4(e) at Comment.
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Once a proper gift has been made, the 1968 UAGA sets out the manner of
delivery to the donee.22
3. Revocation or amendment.
In order to carry out the ultimate desires of the donor, the 1968 UAGA
prescribed how a donor could amend or revoke an anatomical gift.23 If an
individual executed a signed statement, made an oral statement witnessed by
two persons, or made a statement during a terminal illness addressed to an
attending physician, the amendment or revocation of a gift would be enforced.24
Those statements must also be conveyed to the donee.25 In addition, revocation
or amendment is permitted if someone found a signed card or document
identifying the decedent's objection or amendment.26 If a gift was not delivered
to a donee, all copies of the document of gift must be destroyed before
revocation or amendment.27
4. Check-and-balance system.
The 1968 UAGA has also established a type of check-and-balance system,
meaning that the physician who pronounced death could not participate in the
organ procurement process. 28 Naturally, as with any proper check-and-balance
system, the physician who became a donee was unable "to participate in the
procedures for removing or transplanting a part." 29
5. Requirement of good faith.
Perhaps the strength of the 1968 UAGA lies in the provision that created
civil and criminal immunity for those who acted in good faith.3" Absent malice,
or the intent either "to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage," so long
as medical personnel honestly believed they were acting in accordance with the
1968 UAGA, the good-faith defense was available.3 Whether one acts in good
22. See id § 5. Delivery, however, is not required to validate a gift.
23. Id. § 6(a).
24. Id.
25. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1968) § 6(a).
26. Id. § 6(a)(4).
27. Id. § 6(b).
28. Id § 7(b). For determination of death discussion, see infra, Part 1(C).
29. Id. § 4(c).
30. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFT Acr (1968) § 7(c).
31. See Rahman v. Mayo Clinic, 578 N.W.2d 802, 805-06 (Minn. 1998); citing BLACK'S LAW
DICTONARY 623 (5th ed. 1979), construed in Perry, 886 F. Supp. at 1558, Lyon v. United States, 843 F.
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faith is a question of law.32 Physicians, hospitals, their employees, and other
organ procurement organizations frequently rely on good-faith immunity to
defend tort and contract claims brought by either the estate of a decedent or the
decedent's next-of-kin.33 A good-faith defense, however, is limited to only the
procurement process and cannot be extended to treatment of the donor prior to
death.34 Although the 1968 UAGA provided many answers to cadaveric organ
transplantation, some questions were left unresolved.
B. The National Organ Transplant Act and The Uniform Determination of
Death Act.
The 1968 UAGA failed to answer two questions: (1) would the sale of
human organs be permitted; and (2) how would the death of a potential donor
be determined?35 In 1984 the United States answered the first question in the
negative by passing the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA).36 Section
Supp. 531, 533 (D. Minn. 1994), Kelly-Nevils v. Detroit Receiving Hosp., 526 N.W.2d 15, 20 (Mich. App.
1995), Nicoletta v. Rochester Eye & Human Parts Bank, Inc., 519 N.Y.S.2d 928, 930 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
32. See Kelly-Nevils, 526 N.W.2d at417; see also Brown v. Delaware Valley Transplant Program,
615 A.2d 1379, 1383 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); and Nicholetta, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 931-32.
33. See Jacobsen v. Marin General Hosp., 963 F.Supp. 866, 871-72 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (because time
is of the essence in securing donated organs at the time of the donor's death, the court held that the hospital
was not liable for procuring organs after it had conducted a reasonable search for the decedent's next-of-kin);
Lyon, 843 F. Supp. at 534 (good faith defense was available to eye bank that acted on a routine notice from
a medical center that the decedent's eyes had been donated); Ramirez v. Health Partners of Southern Arizona,
No. 2 CA-CV 97-0083, 1998 WL 345103, at I (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that Arizona's version of the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act included a presumption that one acts in good faith when procuring cadaveric
organs); Kelly-Nevils, 526 N.W.2d at 19-20 (affirmative defense of good faith available when the hospital
relied on the consent of an individual who claimed to be the decedent's brother, and hospital need not conduct
an independent investigation to ascertain that the signatory is legally authorized to consent); see generally,
Rahman, 578 N.W.2d at 806; Nicoletta, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 928; Callsen v. Temple University Hosp., 652 A.2d
824 (Pa. 1995); Brown, 615 A.2d at 1383-84; Hinze v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., No. 9, No. 27253 T.R., 1990
WL 121138 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990); and Seamans v. Harris County Hosp., 934 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1996) (failed notification attempt was held not to be construed as bad faith).
34. See Williams v. Hoffmann, 223 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Wis. 1974) (good faith immunity did not
extend to treatment of potential donor while the patient was still alive).
35. See generally, UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT AcT (1968). For arguments supporting the sale of
organs, see Jason Altman, Organ Transplantations: The Need for an International Open Organ Market, 5
TouRo INT'L L. REv. 161 (1994); Lloyd R. Cohen, Article, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The
Virtues of a Futures Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1989); and Silver, supra note 16, at 693-728; but
see, Emanuel D. Thome, Book Review, When Private Parts are Made Public Goods: The Economics of Mar-
ket-Inalienability, 15 YALEJ. ONREG. 149, 164(1998) (arguing that banning a market on the sale of organs
"allows everyone access to its free value and, in effect, creates a man-made common property resource").
36. See National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 274(e) (West 1991). A significant reason
Congress passed NOTA was due "largely in response to a plan by H. Barry Jacobs, who established a
company in Virginia to broker human kidneys." See Cate, supra note 11, at 80.
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274e of NOTA provided that: "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to
knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable
consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate
commerce." 37 The term "valuable consideration" does not include reasonable
payments associated with the organ procurement process a.3  "Reasonable
payments" do not include risks of living donors, difficulties of procurement, or
increased costs of insurance resulting from organ donation.39  Nonetheless,
whether an individual donor can sell his or her organs is heavily debated.40
Another question left unresolved in the 1968 UAGA was "when could a
physician legally declare death so that cadaveric organ procurement could
begin?"" In 1980, the Commissioners approved the Uniform Determination of
Death Act to codify the preexisting common law requiring total failure of the
cardiopulmonary system.42 In addition, at the recommendation of the American
Medical Association, the Commissioners added whole brain death.4' The
Commissioners defined death as when "[a]n individual who has sustained either
(1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2)
irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain
stem."" Presently, forty-four states and the District of Columbia recognize
whole brain death.45
37. Id "Human organ" includes: "kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye,
bone, and skin or any subpart thereof," including organs from a fetus.
38. Id.
39. See Wilson v. Adkins, 941 S.W.2d 440 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997) (invalidating the contract where
sister offered to donate bone marrow for S101,500 for the risk, difficulties, and insurance consequences of
donation because it violated the National Organ Transplant Act).
40. See generally, Altman, supra note 35; Cohen, supra note 35; and Thorne, supra note 35.
41. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr AcT (1968) § 7(b). Although Section 7(b) provides that the
physician who determines death shall not participate in organ procurement, it does not address how the
physician is to determine death.
42. See UNiF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT §§ 1-3, 12A U.L.A. 589(1996).
43. See id. Recognition of brain death is very important to cadaveric organ procurement. See Cate,
supra note 11, at 75. "In order for organs to be viable for transplantation, both circulation and respiration
must be maintained in the host body."
44. UNiF. DETERMNATION OF DEATH ACT § 1, 12A U.L.A. 589(1996).
45. See Cate, supra note 11, at 75. While the United States relies on brain dead donors for organs
such as hearts, livers and pancreas, the pool ofthose pronounced brain dead-whose bodies contain medically
acceptable organs-is decreasing. The majority of this pool is derived from those who have been declared
brain dead due to either motor vehicle accidents-6 10/--or gunshot wounds to the head-16%. See Yoshio
Watanabe, Why do I StandAgainst the Movement for Cardiac Transplantation in Japan, 35 JAPAN HEART
J. 701, 705 (1994). Due to the increasingly stringent laws concerning drunk driving and seat belt use, the
United States has begun to enjoy fewer highway deaths. Id An additional reduction factor stems from the
auto-makers' production of safer vehicles. Id. This is good news for drivers, but conversely bad news for
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Legal brain death does not include "neocortical death" nor "persistent
vegetative state."46 Similar to the 1968 UAGA, the Uniform Determination of
Death Act granted civil and criminal immunity to persons acting in good faith
who were either authorized to determine death or who relied on another's
authorized determination of death.47
C. The 1987 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.
Despite the efforts to increase cadaveric organ donation, nineteen years
after the Commissioners approved the 1968 UAGA, "the issue of organ
procurement was brought back into the center stage of public policy concern." '
The advent of cyclosporine along with the improvements in surgical techniques
for transplanting organs helped to increase the demand for cadaveric organs.' 9
Also, a 1985 Hastings Center Report pointed out several key problems with the
1968 UAGA.5 The Commissioners tried to remedy those problems by
approving the 1987 UAGA. 5"
1. The differences between the 1968 and the 1987 UAGAs.
The 1987 UAGA differs significantly from the 1968 UAGA in several
those awaiting suitable organs. See also Carey Goldberg, A Not Entirely Happy Anniversary, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 1998, at AI4.
46. See id. Prefatory Note; see also People v. Setwa, 543 N.W.2d 321, 328 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)
(error for doctor to rely on higher brain death to determine that baby was born dead where evidence existed
supporting the inference of brain stem activity).
47. See UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH AcT, Prefatory Note.
48. ee UNIF. ANATOMICALGIFrACT (1987) Prefatory Note, 8A U.L.A. 29 (1993 & Supp. 1998).
49. See id. For the benefits of cyclosporine, see Borel & Z. L. Kis, The DiscoveryandDevelopment
ofCyclosporine (Sandimmune), 23 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 1867 (1991).
50. See UNIF. ANATOMICALGIFTACT (1987) Prefatory Note. Those key problems were as follows:
(1) failure of persons to sign written directives; (2) failure of police and emergency personnel to locate written
directives at accident sites; (3) uncertainty on the part of the public about circumstances and timing of organ
recovery; (4) failure on the part of medical personnel to recover organs on the basis of written directives; (5)
failure to systematically approach family members concerning donation; (6) inefficiency on the part of some
organ procurement agencies in obtaining referrals of donors; (7) high wastage rates on the part of some organ
procurement agencies in failing to place donated organs; (8) failure to communicate the pronouncement of
death to next of kin; and (9) failure to obtain adequate informed consent from family members. Id. Another
problem was that only one third of Americans surveyed in a 1985 Gallop Poll indicated that "they would be
very likely to donate their own organs." See Cate, supra note 11, at 71-72. The Gallop Poll survey disclosed
that 93% of the Americans surveyed knew about organ transplantation. Although 75% approved of the
concept of organ donation, only 27% indicated they would be very likely to donate their own organs.
Seventeen percent stated that they had actually completed donor cards, and of those people, about half did
not tell their family members their intentions to donate. Id
51. Id.
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ways. First, the 1987 UAGA simplified the manner in which one is required to
make a gift.52 Witnesses are not required on the document of a gift.53 This
change also permits states to distribute driver's licenses or identification cards
that can double as legally valid anatomical gifts.54 The 1987 UAGA also
imposes a duty on police, rescue workers, and hospital personnel to search for
the document."
The 1987 UAGA requires hospitals to designate personnel to inquire about
their patients' wishes to donate - "routine inquiry" - and who are also
required to request for an anatomical gift from next-of-kin - "required
request. 5 6 Moreover, failure to make an anatomical gift of one part is not a
presumption against making a gift of another part."1 Also, revocation or
amendment of an anatomical gift does not have to be communicated to a
donee.58 If a valid gift has not been revoked, consent is not required."' In
addition, the 1987 UAGA recognizes a limited presumption that an individual
consents to donate organs after death. Absent any knowledge that a decedent
or a decedent's next-of-kin has objected to organ donation, and if an authorized
request for a needed anatomical gift has been made, a medical examiner or
coroner may authorize procurement of the needed anatomical gift from the
decedent.60 Finally, the 1987 UAGA codified the National Organ Transplant
52. See id. § 2(b), Prefatory Note.
53. Id. § 2(b); compare with UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1968) § 4.
54. See id. § 2(c). Anatomical gifts remain valid despite the expiration of an individual's driver's
license.
55. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 5(c), Prefatory Note. For example, emergency
response personnel believing that an injured person is dead or near death, are required to search for
documentation indicating whether the injured person intended either to donate or to not donate his or her
organs. Id. § 5(c)(1). A similar duty exists for hospitals when they admit an injured patient. Id. § 5(c)(2).
56. Id. §§ 5(a)-(b).
57. Id. § 2().
58. Id. § 2(0; compare with UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1968) § 6(a).
59. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 2(h). Although consent was not required under the
1968 UAGA, this provision is set out more clearly in the 1987 UAGA; see generally, UNIF. ANATOMICAL
GIFr ACT (1968) § 6.
60. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) §§ 4(a)-(b), Prefatory Note. Most states that have
adopted this section have required a reasonable search for the decedent's next-of kin. See Cate, supra note
11, at 84. For case law addressing the validity and constitutionality of these types of presumptions, see
Brotherton v. Cleveland, MD., 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1990) (requiring predeprivation process before
coroner was authorized to take deceased's corneas); State v. Powell, 497 So.2d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 1986)
(recognizing reasonable relationship to state's objective to provide sight for the blind); and Tillman v. Detroit
Receiving Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 275 (Mich. App. 1984) (dismissing plaintiff's claim because a medical
examiner may retain body portions for investigation and plaintiff/next-of-kin did not have a property right
in decedent's body).
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Act when it prohibited the sale of organs.6' The 1987 UAGA did, however,
retain the good faith immunity defense.62
2. Most of the adopted versions of the 1987 UAGA are not exact replicas.
Presently, twenty-one states have adopted a version of the 1987 UAGA.63
Some of those adopting states have not, however, adopted the 1987 UAGA
word for word. Many states, for instance, omitted the routine inquiry section."
Other states either have failed to adopt or have changed the hospital's duty of
required consent.65  A few states have omitted the limited presumption
provision." Other states changed the definition of "good faith" to include gross
negligence.67 Some states have even reduced the age requirement to make a
61. See id. § 10; see alsosupraPartil(B). Other differences between the 1987 UAGA and the 1968
UAGA will not be addressed. For potential donees id § 6. For the requirements of hospitals to coordinate
and set up agreements with their local organ procurement organizations. Id. § 9.
62. See id § 1 (c). "A hospital, physician, surgeon, [coroner], [medical examiner], [local public
health officer], enucleator, technician, or other person, who acts in accordance with this [Act] or with the
applicable anatomical gift law of another state [or foreign country] or attempts in good faith to do so is not
liable for that act in a civil action or a criminal proceeding." Id. See also id. § 11 (d). Neither an individual
nor the individual's estate are liable for any injury or damage that may result from making an anatomical gift.
See id. § 11 (d).
63. See id. Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act has Been Adopted.
64. Those states and their respective statutes are as follows: Arizona, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 36-845(A); Arkansas, see ARK. CODEANN. § 20-17-605(a); Idaho, see IDAHO CODE § 39-3406; Iowa, see
generally, IOWACODEANN. §§ 142C. 1 to 142C. 16; Minnesota, see MINN. STAT.ANN. § 525.9214; Montana,
see MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-17-213(l); Nevada, see NEV. REV. STAT. § 451.577; New Mexico, see N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 24-6a-2; North Dakota, see N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.2-05; Oregon, see OR. REV. STAT. §
97.958; Rhode Island, see R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-18.6-5; Vermont, see VT. STAT. ANN. § 5241; Virginia, see
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-292.1; and Wisconsin, see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 157.06-5.
65. Those states and their respective statutes are as follows: Iowa, see generally, IOwA CODE ANN.
§ § 142C. I - 142C. 16; and Virginia, see VA. CODE ANN. §32.1-292.1. California's statute requires that either
the hospital or their local organ procurement organization make the routine inquiry and the required request.
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7184.
66. Those states that have omitted this provision are as follows: New Mexico, see generally, N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 24-6A-1 - 15; and Vermont, see generally, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 §§ 5238 -5247. Other
states either omitted this provision, or modified it by limiting procurement to eyes, comeas, or pituitary tissue.
Connecticut's statute permits qualified personnel to procure only pituitary tissue and corneas. See CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19(a)-281. Nevada's statute permits procurement of only eyes. See NEV. REV. STAT. §
451.583. And Washington's statute permits the procurement of only comeal tissue. See WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 68.50.630.
67. Virginia's and Washington's statutes substitute "gross negligence or wilful and wanton
conduct" as an exception to good faith. See VA. CODE ANN. §32.1-295(E); and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
68.50.510.
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valid anatomical gift.68 Two states have omitted the duty to search for a donor
card.69 Although many states have changed the 1987 UAGA to reflect their
local concerns, those states are trying to make positive steps toward increasing
the supply of cadaveric organs for transplantation.
D. Current Problems
For nearly thirty years, all fifty states have had some version of the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act on their books. Yet thousands of patients
continue to die each year while they wait for life saving organs.70 This subpart
will address many of the problems that are presently hindering cadaveric organ
procurement in the United States. First, medical personnel frequently refuse to
procure the decedent's organs without first obtaining consent from next-of-kin,
even when the decedent properly executed a valid anatomical gift.7' A second
problem is that hospital personnel sometimes fail to request consent from next-
of-kin, even when their state's required-request provision requires them to do
so.72 Third, although the 1987 UAGA imposes a duty on emergency and
hospital personnel to search for legal documents of gifts, many valid documents
of gift are not retrieved.73
Other problems are related to the would-be donor or the next-of-kin or
both. A fourth contributing problem is that despite the overwhelming public
support for organ donation, individuals have not executed anatomical gifts."4
A fifth unfortunate problem is that many next-of-kin refuse to consent to the
68. Washington's statute lowers the age of those who are able to make a gift to 16. See id. at
68.50.540. Other states lowering the age requirement are Iowa and New Mexico. See IOWA CODE ANN.§
142C.3-2; and N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-6A-2.
69. Those states are Iowa and New Mexico. See generally, IOWA CODE ANN.§§ 142C.1 to
142C. 16; and see generally, § N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-6A-1 -15.
70. See Organ and Eye Donation, Number of Transplants Performed Remained Flat in 1996 in
U.S., Europe, TRANSPLANT NEWS, Apr. 29, 1997, at 1. Available in LEXIS, News Library. Of the 70,000
patients waiting for organ donations in 1996, 3,926 died.
71. One author notes that "donor cards are legally binding in 48 states and health professionals who
act on them are immune from liability in every state." Cate, supra note 11, at 82. Reasons for this extra
consent requirement include the following: (1) fear of professional criticism and legal action; (2)
psychological unwillingness; and (3) resentment held by physicians about being told what they must do by
legislators and bureaucrats. See Cate, supra note I1, at 82; and Naylor, supra note 16, at 181-82.
72. See Cate, supra note 11, at 82.
73. See Andrew C. MacDonald, Feature, Organ Donation: The Time Has Come to Refocus the
Ethical Spotlight, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 177, 180 (1997).
74. Although 85% of Americans support organ donation, many "are reluctant to contemplate and
plan for their own death." Id. That is, many either procrastinate until it is too late or they exhibit an
unwillingness to think about their own mortality.
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procurement of their deceased loved ones' organs.75  Some of the reasons a
decedent's next of kin have refused to consent in the past are as follows:
(1) fear that death might be hastened by an eagerness to procure organs;
(2) objections that stem from being dismembered, such as aesthetic or
religious concerns;
(3) lack of education; and
(4) lack of satisfaction the decedent's next-of-kin may have over the
hospital's treatment and care of their loved one. 6
E. The 1998 DHHS Referral and Request Regulation.
In light of the current problems regarding the lack of supply of suitable
cadaveric organs, on December 15, 1997, Vice President Al Gore along with
the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) launched a national
initiative to increase organ donation by twenty percent." One element of the
national initiative was to propose a rule ensuring that next-of-kin are asked to
consent to the procurement of their loved ones' organs.78 As a result, the
DHHS passed a Referral and Request regulation in August of 1998."
The new regulation provides that hospitals wishing to receive Medicare
payments must refer their patients who died along with their patients whose
deaths are imminent to a local Organ Procurement Organization (OPO). °
Consequently, the OPO would provide personnel trained and experienced in
obtaining consent to consult with the patient's next-of-kin and request consent
to procure their loved one's organs."' This regulation, in essence, removes the
75. See MacDonald, supra note 73, at 180; and see Cohen, supra note 35, at 15, n.54.
76. See One in Five Families Regret Decisions to Donate, or Not Donate, According to a New
Study, TRANSPLANT NEWS, Mar. 31, 1998, at 1. Available in LEXIS, News Library; and Families Satisfied
With Hospital Care Donate Organs of Loved One More Often, TRANSPLANT NEWS, Feb. 13, 1998, at 1.
Available in LEXIS, News Library. For some of the more frequently cited problems, see lMacDonald, supra
note 73, at 180; see also Watanabe, supra note 45, at 705.
77. For all the elements of this initiative, see HHS Launching National Organ/Tissue Donor
Initiative; Goal is Increasing Donation Twenty Percent After HCFA Regulation Final, TRANSPLANT NEWS,
Dec. 17, 1997, at 1. Available in 1997 WL 8941217.
78. Id.
79. See Public Health, 42 C.F.R. § 482.45 (1998).
80. Id
81. See id This new regulation was modeled after a Pennsylvania law that increased donation rates
forty percent in three years. See Elizabeth Neus, Order: Report all Deaths to Organs Procurers, U.S.A.
TODAY, June, 18 1998, § News, at IA, available in LEXIS, News Library. This same type of regulation is
practiced in Spain-a country with the highest success rate of any cadaveric organ donation system. See
Richard H. Nicholson, The Good is Received the Giver is Forgot; Moral and Ethical Aspects of Organ
Donation is Deliberated in Several Court. Cases in Europe, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July 1994, at 5.
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duty of required request from hospitals and places it in the hands of those more
motivated to obtain consent8 2
In addition to the national initiative to increase the supply of cadaveric
organs, some experts have suggested other methods to increase the supply of
cadaveric organs for transplantation.83 In their search for answers, many have
looked abroad.8 The remainder of this paper will examine and describe how
some Asian countries have attempted to increase the supply ofcadaveric organs
in their own countries.
Ill. THE JAPANESE ORGAN DONATION LAW.
Before 1997, Japan was the only developed country where procurement
of cadaveric organs from brain-dead donors was not officially recognized. 5 As
a result, a large percentage of Japanese patients waiting for suitable organs have
died.8 6 Those who have received suitable organs have received them from
either live donors or another country's donors.8 Consequently, some people
82. For the actual duty imposed under the 1987 UAGA, see UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987)
§§ 5(a)-(b), 8A U.L.A. 19 (1993 & Supp. 1998). Forty-one states had previously enacted similar request
laws-some weaker than others. See Arthur L. Caplan, Professional Arrogance and Public
Misunderstanding; over Required Request Legislation on Organ and Tissue Donation, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Apr. 1988, at 34. Already, the new regulation has come under fire. See Stephanie Stapleton,
Physicians, States, Hospitals Challenge Transplant Rules, 41 AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 19, 1998, at 1, 35. An
American Hospital Association (AHA) spokesperson has argued that the regulation is "too broad a net for
too little a gain." See U.S.A. TODAY, supra note 81. The AHA fears that the new regulation could potentially
"preclude social workers, clergy, family members, physicians, nurses or others who aren't trained by organ
procurement organizations from seeking a family member's consent." See Chris Casteel, Istook Gets Birth
Control Stipulation into Spending Bill Teen Contraceptives Measure Seeks to Protect Parents' Right to
Know, SUNDAY OKLAHOMAN, July 19, 1998, § News, at 9. Representative Ernest Istook is attempting to
overturn the regulation because he believes family members should not be bothered at such an emotional
time. See Life Saving Gift, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 3,1998, § Editorial, at A06, available in LEXIS, News
Library.
83. For example, one expert has placed the duty on attorneys to help "investigate alternatives to
current transplant practices and, where necessary, participate in altering the existing legal structure to make
it possible for new procedures to be implemented." Cate, supra note !1, at 87-9. Cate also suggests that the
attorney-client relationship be used to provide clients accurate information, to counsel and act on behalf of
the client to "assure that a decision to donate is followed when medically appropriate; and to act to maintain
the integrity of the transplantation system." Id.
84. See generally, infra Part IV.
85. See Motshi Takao, Brain-death and Transplantation inJapan, 340 LANcET 1164,1164(1992).
86. For example, 30% of Japanese patients who were waiting for a liver transplant died in 1993.
See David Forster, Comment, When Body is Soul: The Proposed Japanese Bill on Organ Transplantations
from Brain-Dead Donors, 3 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 103, 109-11 (1994).
87. Of the patients remaining from supra note 86, about 13% received organs from living donors,
11% received their organs from overseas, and 40% remained on the waiting list. Id. Also, of all the kidneys
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have correctly argued that legal and public support of brain death was necessary
to increase Japan's supply of cadaveric organs.88
This part will review how Japan has tried to increase the supply of
cadaveric organs to meet increasing demands. Part III(A) will examine the
many social and religious beliefs that have traditionally rejected brain death and
the procurement of organs from those whose brains have indeed expired. Part
III(B) will introduce Japan's new law as the world's most stringent cadaveric
organ procurement law. In addition, this part will compare Japan's new law to
similar laws in the United States. Part III(C) will explain the success and
problems with Japan's new organ procurement law.
A. Japan's social and religious obstacles to brain death and cadaveric
organ procurement.
Until very recently, Japan's strongly held social and religious beliefs
against brain death and organ procurement were impenetrable barriers to the
formal recognition of organ procurement from those who were brain dead. For
example, although most Americans view the body and soul as separable, the
Japanese "view individuals as 'completely integrated mind-body units."'' 9 In
addition, the United States recognizes inherent individual rights in life and in
death. Japan, on the other hand, views the individual as "a social being who is
regarded as part of a collective reality," a collective to which the family also
belongs.9 Also, Japanese people view the belly as the master organ of the
body, not the brain.' Yet another social problem stems from the Japanese
demand for perfection-false positives, no matter how remote their possibility,
donated in 1989, 70% were donated from living relatives and the remaining 30% came from cardiac-dead
donors. See Takao, supra note 85, at 1164.
88. See Forster, supra note 86, at 109; and Takao, supra note 85, at 1164. For one Japanese
doctor's view that recognition of brain death is a bad idea in Japan, see Watanabe, supra note 45. Many of
Watanabe's problems are with the side effects ofcyclosporine and the medical problems associated with heart
surgery. Id. at 703-4. Watanabe stated that "[s]ustaining the life of a transplant patient is said to be a
tightrope walk between infection and rejection." Id Another problem this author has is that although Japan
averages about 7,000 people per year who have succumbed to brain death, the majority of those are over the
age of 60. See id. at 704. Consequently, there are not as many suitable organs as the proponents brain death
believe. Id. at 705.
89. See Forster, supra note 86, at 115-16.
90. Id. at 116-17. This communal identity is demonstrated by, for instance, "traditional birth and
funeral rituals."
91. Id. The decedent's body and organs equally belong to the family, who must give their approval
before organ procurement may begin.
92. See Haruko Akatsu, The Heart, the Gut, and Brain Death in Japan, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Mar./Apr. 1990, at 2. "For example, a Japanese Samurai warrior, when committing suicide plunged the sword
into his belly, not into his heart or his brain." Id
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are unacceptable.93 Many Japanese believe that it is unnatural to declare one
brain dead while that person's chest is still moving.'
Many of the social barriers can be further explained by the various
Japanese religions. Buddhists believe, for instance, that to be declared brain
dead while one's heart continues to beat is wrong and that "until the body is
wholly dead, there is no oneness at death." ' Also, in order to reach attainment,
a deceased must remain "in this world for forty-nine days ... "' Thus, many
fear that removing one's organs during this attainment period will disrespect the
spirit "who is still present."' Another religion practiced in Japan, Shintoism,
proscribes that one's spirit will be content so long as the individual did not die
a violent death." Taking one's organs while the heart is still beating constitutes
a violent death." Ancestor worship, which is a combined form of Shinto,
Confucian, and Buddhist beliefs, is yet another example of strong religious
beliefs against brain death and cadaveric organ procurement. Those who
practice Ancestor worship believe that after they die they enter a community of
spirits and then, thirty-two years after death, they become ancestors through a
series of rituals."°o During the thirty-two year ritual period, the decedent's
family commits to making their loved one's spirit happy and comfortable."'
Family members believe that procuring organs from their decedent loved one
is contrary to their obligation, as the spirit may become unhappy."0 2 Although
Ancestor worship appears to be declining in practice, the other religious beliefs
will preclude many Japanese from accepting brain death and cadaveric organ
transplant. 103
93. Id. Compounding these concerns are the public's mistrust of medical personnel due to poor
quality control and lack of accountability. See Leflar, infra note 131, at 69-70; see also infra Part III(C).
94. See Akatsu, supra note 92.
95. Forster, supra note 86, at 116, 118. The Buddhists feel that declaring one dead while one's
body contains living cells is contradictory to death. Id. at 118.
96. Id.
97. Id. Some commentators feel, however, that organ donation "supports True Offering, a gift of
compassion which has no feelings of regret or self-praise attached."
98. Id. Also, "injuring a corpse is taboo."
99. Id at 118-19. Although one may consent to organ donation, family members would rather
ignore one's living will than injure the corpse.
100. Id




B. Japan's stringent method of cadaveric organ procurement.
Despite the obstacles, on June 17, 1997, Japan passed its first law that
formally recognized brain death." 4 Under the new law, however, brain death
is only recognized by those "who have previously expressed a willingness to
donate their organs."'' The law was passed for the sole purpose of facilitating
organ procurement, rather than as a rigid declaration that brain death indicates
the end of human life.1°6
At first glance, the new organ transplant law appears similar to the United
States' laws with the overall theme of voluntary consent. 7 Also, Japan's new
law appears to clear the obstacles that, at one time, hindered its cadaveric organ
supply. A thorough examination of the new organ transplant law, however, re-
veals some substantial hurdles. First, the voluntary requirement of Japan's new
law is more stringent than the consent requirement in the United States.0
Would-be donors, for instance, not only consent to organ procurement, but they
also must consent to the pronouncement of brain death - all of which must be
in writing."19 This provision helps to explain that brain death will only be re-
cognized by consenting would-be donors. In addition to the individual donor's
consent, and in contrast to the 1968 and 1987 UGAGs, next-of-kin must give
their consent to organ procurement and the pronouncement of brain death." 0
A significant difference that helps make this new law one of the "most stringent
in the world,""' is that a would-be donor must be at least fifteen years old." 2
104. See Organ Transplant Law Not Really a Panacea, DAILY YOMIURI, June 18, 1997, at 6,
available in LEXIS, News Library, A-WLD File.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See generaly, UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT (1968) §§ 1-7, 8A U.L.A. 63 (1993 & Supp.
1998); and UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFr AcT (1987) §§ 1-15, 8A U.L.A. 19 (1993 & Supp. 1998).
108. Id.
109. Id.; see also Organ Transplant, MAMCHI DAILY NEws, Sept. 28, 1997, at 7, available in
LEXIS, News Library, A-WLD File.
110. Id. Experts fear that one objection from any of a would-be donor's next-of-kin would be
sufficient to preclude organ procurement.
111. See Ready, Set-No Go on Organ Transplants, DAILYYOMIuUM, Nov. 12, 1997, at 7, available
in LEXIS, News Library, A-WLD File.
112. Not even a child's parents may substitute their consent. Compare Japan's requirement with the
1968 and 1987 UAGAs, both of which authorize next-of-kin consent for minors. See UNW. ANATOMICAL
GIFT ACT (1968) §2, 8A U.L.A. 63 (1993 & Supp. 1998); and UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) §3, 8A
U.L.A. 19 (1993 & Supp. 1998).
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Also, at least two doctors not involved in the procurement process are to
confirm brain death.'1
C. Japan's new law's success andproblems.
Japan's stringent organ transplant law is defined by some as the "Organ
Transplant Prohibition Law.""' 4 Presently, the new law has enjoyed little
success and has endured much criticism. One of the problems that hinders the
new transplant law's success is the relatively few Japanese who have died
carrying donor cards."' Of the individuals who had donor cards, some did not
consent to the pronouncement of brain death, and one other filled out his card
improperly." 6 In one instance, stringent donor card interpretations led
authorities to deny procurement of the heart and liver of Japan's first donor card
carrying cadaver - a fifty-year-old male." 7 Because the man failed to check
one of the options on his donor card, doctors were precluded from procuring the
man's organs until after his heart stopped beating." 8
Another problem hindering cadaveric organ procurement is the fear in the
Japanese medical community of criminal prosecution against those who procure
organs from brain-dead cadavers.' This fear stems from a murder complaint
against a doctor, who in 1968, performed Japan's first and only heart
113. See MAINICHI DAILY NEws, Sept. 28, 1997, supra note 109.
114. For example, because of the age minimum, some children will be deprived of their chances to
undergo organ transplant operations. See id; and see 1997: An Annus Mirabilis for Science, DAILY
YOMIURI, Jan. 7, 1998, at 7, available in LEXIS, News Library, A-WLD File.
115. Although four million donor cards were distributed, only nine people died with organ donor
cards during the first six months of the new law's tenure. See Steep Hurdles Continue to Block Easy Organ
Transplants, JAPAN ECON.NEWSWUtE, Apr. 13, 1998, at 1. Available in LEXIS, News Library, A-WLD File.
"Of the nine, two opted for donation after heart stoppage, one gave no clear position, while the other six chose
to donate all their organs after brain-death. However, in all but one case, the donors died of causes that did
not result in brain death only." Id
116. Id.
117. See Card Error Blocked Heart, Liver Transplants, JAPAN ECON. NEWsWUtE, Jan. 6, 1998,
available in LEXIS, News Library, A-WLD File.
118. Id. Although he marked that he consented to donate his heart, liver, lung, pancreas and kidney,
he failed to mark the section asking whether to donate his organs before or after brain death. Once his heart
stopped beating, however, doctors were able to procure the man's kidney, cornea and portions of his skin.
Id. Another reason for the failure to procure his organs at brain death, was the man "became brain dead at
a hospital that was not designated as eligible to take and provide organs from brain-dead donors." Id
Another article implies that a would-be donor's family members must also sign the donor card. See
Transplant Refused After Donor Card Judged Invalid, DAILY YOMIURI, Jan. 7, 1998, at 2, available in
LEXIS, News Library, A-WLD File.
119. See JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIR, Apr. 13, 1998, supra note 115.
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transplant. 2 ' Since this incident, "eight transplant operations in which organs
from brain-dead donors were used have, come under the scrutiny of law
enforcement officials, with criminal complaints filed in each of the eight
cases."'
121
The lack of social acceptance of the new law presents a significant
problem. 22 Prior to the approval of the new Japanese organ transplant law, one
newspaper reported that a majority of the public wished to have their organs
donated after they were pronounced brain dead and that "they would approve
organ donations from brain-dead family members who previously gave their
consent ... ,123 After the new law went into effect, however, other newspapers
reported that social acceptance has declined. 24
Other social problems concerning this new law stem from the way
Japanese family members assist their loved ones while their loved ones are
treated in a hospital. 25 Because the Japanese family normally takes the pre-
dominant role of the nurse when their loved ones are in a hospital, Japanese
doctors are reluctant to ask family members for their consent to remove organs,
"especially when the brain-dead person is still breathing and warm.' 26 Also,
because there is no policy of informed consent in Japan, "patients and family
,,127
are kept outside of the medical decision-making process. In addition, strong
120. Id. Although a complaint was filed, the doctor was not prosecuted.
121. Id. In 1968, family members filed a murder complaint against a hospital in which doctors
procured the kidneys from a patient whose heart stopped beating. Other problems the article cites to are that
brain death accounts for only one percent of Japan's deaths, and only a small number of Japanese hospitals
are authorized to perform transplantation proceedings from brain-dead donors. Id.
122. See Organ Transplants Take Longer to Realize, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Apr. 13, 1998, at
1. Available in LEXIS, News Library, A-WLD File; and see Transplant Law a Month Old, but No
Operations Performed, NIKKE_ WKLY., Nov. 24, 1997, § Politics & Society, at 4, available in LEXIS, News
Library, A-WLD File; see also supra Part 1I(A).
123. The poll consisted of 1,256 computer randomly selected adults. See Poll: Public Support for
Organ Transplants Growing, MAINICIE DAILYNEWS, July 5, 1997, § Domestic, at 18, available in LEXIS,
News Library, A-WLD File. "Fifty-six percent expressed a willingness to donate their organs, 32% did not;
67% were willing to approve donations of organs of family members, while twenty-two said no." Of the
people who were willing to donate their own organs, 83% stated "they would approve transplants of organs
of family members who had previously given consent." In a similar poll conducted in 1991, "53% were
willing to donate their organs, while 43% were not." Id.
124. See JAPAN EcoN. NEWSWIRE, Apr. 13, 1998, supra note 122; see alsoNJCEI WKLY., Nov. 24,
1997, supra note 122.
125. See Forster, supra note 86, at 119-21.
126. Id.
127. See Forster, supra note 86, at 120; see also DAILY YOMIUJR, supra note 104.
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fears among the Japanese that a doctor might declare a patient brain dead when
that patient is still alive is another problem hindering the new law's success. 2
Despite Japan's attempt to increase its supply of cadaveric organs, many
legal questions must be answered and public scrutiny must be minimized before
its new law will achieve much success. 2 9 One of the questions that must be
addressed if Japan expects its citizens to consent to organ procurement of their
loved ones is informed consent. 3 ' Informed consent is not practiced the same
way in Japan as in the United States.' Rather, Japanese doctors practice more
of a paternalistic approach towards their patients.' Important medical
information that is necessary to make an informed decision is usually withheld
for the good of the patient.'
In light of all the problems, patients continue to go abroad for life-saving
organs. 34 Clearly, it will take some time to break through Japan's social and
128. See Forster, supra note 86, at 120-22; see also Akatsu, supra note 92.
129. "It is unclear, for instance, who should be brought in to confirm that a patient is brain dead, who
would actually donate a body from which organs would be removed, and the timing of transplants." DAILY
YOMIURI, Jan. 7, 1998, supra note 114. Other uncertainties include, "who will explain to the patient's family
about the need to confirm brain death and under what authority. The law also fails to address the dignity of
and respect for those who are at the point of death." Id.
130. The public should know about the care that their terminally ill loved ones may receive. Id.
131. For a comparative analysis of informed consent between Japan and the United States, see Robert
B. Leflar, Informed Consent and Patients' Rights in Japan, 33 Hous. L. REv. 1, 45-61. (1996). For a
thorough explanation of informed consent in the United States, see BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW
§§ 6-9 to 6-19, at 265-88 (1995).
132. Informed consent in the United States grew out of a strong deference towards individual
autonomy. See FuRRow, supra note 131, § 6-9 at 265-66. This deference stemmed from the "prevalent
belief that an individual has a right to be free from non-consensual interference with his or her person, and
a basic moral principle that it is wrong to force another to act against his or her will." Id. Japan, however,
adheres to more of a group orientated view, and many times medical information is withheld from the patient.
See Leflar, supra note 131, at 18. Rather than deferring towards individual autonomy, in Japan, there is a
stronger deference towards medical custom. Id at 48-61.
133. The diagnosis of cancer, for instance, is withheld from the patient; but as a substitute, the
patient's physician discusses treatment and a limited prognosis with the patient's family. See Leflar, supra
note 131, at 20-27. Presently, there is an ongoing debate over informed consent, and there have been hints
of a gradually developing trend towards a more western style of informed consent; however, this style is far
away. Id at 110-112.
134. Since the law's approval, two children traveled to the United States for organ transplants, "and
two adults died while preparing to leave for treatment abroad." See JAPAN ECON. NEwswR, Apr. 13, 1998,
supra note 122. One of the parents, when referring to the current age minimum of 15 under the new law said:
"I hope the age limit will be abolished, because going overseas for a transplant is too much for parents to
bear..." Id. One Japanese women who was suffering from cardimyopathy said, "I really wish I could have
it in Japan, but I have no choice [but to do it elsewhere]." Id. One Japanese man died from complications
of his illness one month before he was scheduled to travel to the United States to receive an organ. If he
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religious barriers before Japan will achieve success in its cadaveric organ
program.
IV. SINGAPORE'S LAW: A COMBINATION OF PRESUMED AND
VOLUNTARY CONSENT.
While Japan's method of procuring cadaveric organs is very strict,
Singapore has adopted quite a different approach - presumed/voluntary
consent.'35 Singapore, a small city-state with 2.7 million people, performed its
first kidney transplant in 1970.36 Originally, Singapore used a voluntary
system of organ donation. 37 During its tenure, Singapore enjoyed a good track
record with its renal transplants. Nonetheless, this voluntary system was
producing little, if any, cadaveric kidneys.' In June 1987, in an effort to
remedy its cadaveric kidney shortage, Singapore passed the Human Organ
Transplant Act (HOTA).'39
This section will examine HOTA along with some of the other countries
that have adopted similar laws. Part IV(A) will discuss each of HOTA's
presumed consent provisions. Neit, Part IV(B) will describe the other part of
Singapore's organ procurement law-the voluntary requirement of those whom
HOTA does not presume to consent. Part IV(C) will compare Singapore's
presumed consent provision to some of the other countries' versions of
presumed consent. Finally, Part IV(D) will consider the viability of adopting
presumed consent in the United States.
A. Presumed consent
Singapore's HOTA, commonly referred to as a system of presumed/
voluntary consent, presumes one group of its citizens consent to donate their
organs, but presumes another group does not. 40 Under HOTA, the law
"presumes that all mentally competent citizens or permanent residents between
the ages of twenty-one and sixty who are victims of fatal accidents are kidney
would have lasted another month, the trip to Utah would have cost him 40 million yen. Id Another Japanese
women traveled to Australia for a lung. See NIKKEI WKLY., Nov. 24, 1997, supra note 122.
135. See Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 16, at 24-25.
136. In 1990, it performed its first heart and liver transplant. See Bernard Teo, Organs for
Transplantation: The Singapore Experience, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov. 1991, at 10.
137. Id.
138. Between 1970 and 1976, Singapore averaged only three kidneys per year. Id. "None were
available for 1977, 1979,1980, and 1981; two for 1978, six for 1982, seven for 1983,14 for 1984, and only
one for 1985." Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.; see also Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 16, at 25.
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donors unless they have registered prior dissent. Next-of-kin do not have to
consent."'' What puts teeth into the law and makes HOTA a law of presumed
consent is the language, "... unless registered prior dissent." [Emphasis
added]. 42 HOTA's presumed consent provision, however, relates only to
kidneys and not to any other organs. 143 In addition, HOTA limits the age to
consent, and it also limits the manner in which a would-be donor has died-by
fatal accident.'" Finally, consent from next-of-kin is unnecessary. 45
When first adopted, HOTA enjoyed an early success. Recently, however,
this trend has regrettably reversed. Singapore was the first Asian country to
adopt presumed consent with respect to cadaveric organ procurement. 4 6 When
Singapore adopted HOTA, it did not impose presumed consent status
immediately, but rather implemented the presumed consent provision smoothly
over time. 47 After Singapore adopted HOTA, the average number of kidneys
procured per year jumped from 4.7 before HOTA to 31.3.'48 More recently,
however, one article reported that the number is closer to twenty per year -
eight kidneys per million people. 49 The early success of HOTA, therefore, has
not stabilized, but rather it has reversed. One doctor believes the reversing
trend is due to the reliance on HOTA's presumed consent provision. 5 If this





146. See Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 16, at 25.
147. See Teo, supra note 136, at 10. For example, dissenters were given six months in which to
register their dissent by completing an Objection-to-Kidney-Removal card, which was made readily available.
Also, widespread media attention was directed at informing Singaporean citizens about the new law. Id.
Presently, Singapore notifies its citizens, and just prior to turning 21, the government mails them a letter
"informing them of their duty to opt-out if they so desire." Melissa N. Kurnit, Note, Organ Donation in the
United States: Can We Learn from Success Abroad? 17 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 405, 425 (1994).
148. See Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 16, at 25. "Of those organs procured, 58.5% were
attributed to HOTA and 41.5% to voluntary donation." Id. at 25, n.203.
149. See Indrani Nadarajah, No Donors, So ListforKidney Transplants Grows, STRAITS TIMES, May
12, 1997, § News Focus, at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library, A-WLD File. During the two-year period
from 1994 to 1996, the number of kidneys procured dropped from 84 in 1994 to 44 in 1996-nearly a 50%
drop. Id. In 1995, 53 kidneys were procured. Id. Singapore's average of eight million cadaveric donors per
year was actually less than half ofthe average ofthe United States' figures in 1995. See United Networkfor
Organ Sharing (visited Sep. 19, 1998) <http://traders.co.uk/insulintrst/unos.htm> [hereinafter UNOS
Report]. The average cadaveric donor per million persons in the United States was 20.9 per million. Id
150. See Public Education Drive to Get More Organ Donors, STRAIrs TIMES, Nov. 20, 1995, §
Home, at 33, available in LEXIS, News Library, A-WLD File.
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reliance were true, Singapore would ignore a large population of its potential
donors - those exempt under the presumed consent provision.'
B. Voluntary Consent
Along with HOTA's strong presumed consent provision, its success also
depends on individuals who have not consented under the law.'52 Indeed, one
doctor pointed out that "[t]he bulk of organs available for transplant, however,
come from donors who have opted to donate their organs upon death ..."" But
in the past, only a fraction of those available to opt-in actually carried donor
cards.'54 Under HOTA, Muslim Singaporea - a large part of Singapore's
population - "are automatically considered objectors to HOTA on religious
grounds.""' Consequently, Singapore's sole reliance on HOTA's presumed
consent provision excluded nearly half of its potential supply of cadaveric
organs.
156
To realize its potential supply, Singapore was required to address the
factors that hindered voluntary consent. A significant factor, precluding most
Muslims from donating their organs, was the belief that Islamic law forbade
organ donation."' Such a belief led to a Singaporean education drive directed
at Muslims, in which Islamic leaders acknowledged that organ donation was not
illegal so long as the parts saved lives."'
151. See, eg., Teo, supra note 136, at 10.
152. Id.
153. STRAITS TIMEs, Nov. 20, 1995, supra note 150, at 33.
154. Id. In 1995, "only 29,000 out of 1.5 million Singaporeans above the age of 18 [held] the donor
card." Id
155. Id
156. See Teo, supra note 136, at 10.
157. See Christina Williams, Note, Combatting the Problems of Human Abuses and Inadequate
Organ Supply through Presumed Consent, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 315, 339 (1994). Also, fears
concerning medical and legal safeguards, similar to those realized in the United States, were among other
influential factors that hindered voluntary consent. See Organ Donors Less Wary "If They Knew
Safeguards," STRAITS TIMES, June, 21, 1992, § Home at 16, available in LEXIS, News Library, A-WLD File;
STRAITS TIMES, Nov. 20, 1995, supra note 150, at 33. And for similar fears in the United States, see infra
Part II(D). Most of these fears, however, could be lessened with a program designed to educate the public.
See also STRAITS TIMES, June, 21, 1992, supra.
158. Id. at 339-40, nn.155-56. "The object of transplanting a kidney from the body of a deceased
Muslim to that of a donee is primarily and exclusively to save lives. On no account can a kidney be allowed
to be removed from the body of a Muslim for other purposes... " Id. at n. 155 (citing HUMAN ORGAN
TRANSPLANT ACT, 1987, pt. IV, S14 (Sing.), reprinted in REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE
HUMAN ORGAN TRANSPLANT BILL (Bill No. 26/86)). For an article discussing a new Bioethics course in
which Singaporean law students learn about the intricacies of organ donation, see Serena Toh, Law Students
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Another helpful practice, although not required by HOTA, is that many
hospitals notify transplant coordinators about those patients "who are dying
from causes other than fatal trauma and who have not made voluntary
pledges."' This practice is similar to the Referral and Request regulation in
the United States. 60 Another similarity to the United States' recent regulation
is that once a transplant coordinator is notified, "[t]he next of kin are then
tactfully approached for consent to post mortem removal of their loved one's
organs."'
16 1
C. How does HOTA stack up to other presumed consent laws?
All presumed consent laws have one thing in common - without an
expressed statement to the contrary, one is presumed to consent to donate his
or her organs. But some of these laws are more stringent than others. 62
Austria, for instance, strictly adheres to its presumed consent law.' 6a In Austria,
so long as a decedent previously did not object to organ procurement, the
procurement of the decedent's organs will be permitted without considering the
decedent's next-of-kin's wishes.' 6" This is called "pure presumed consent.' ' 65
in HUS to Have New Course on Bio-ethics, STRAITS TIMES, May 18, 1992, § News Focus, at 3, available in
LEXIS, News Library, A-WLD File.
159. See Too, supra note 136, at 10.
160. See PUBLIC HEALTH, 42 C.F.R. pt. 482.45 (LEXIS through Aug. 18, 1998 Reg. Sess.).
161. Teo, supra note 136, at 10. Since this practice is not unanimous, HOTA should be amended
to mandate either routine inquiry by the hospitals or notification to a transplant coordinator and required
request Id. For another problem where the author suggests HOTA's priority principle and incentive
provisions undermine its humanitarian purpose, see PUBLIC HEALTH, 42 C.F.R. § 482.45.
162. For example, two economists defined both ends of the presumed consent spectrum as follows:
the most stringent form ofpresumed consent includes conscription or organ draft, which when applied, organs
are procured without obtaining consent from anyone; at the other end of the spectrum are those presumed
consent laws that give a right to object to organ procurement by the would-be donor and the surviving next-
of-kin. See A.H. Barnett & David L. Kaserman, The Shortage of Organs for Transplantation: Exploring
the Alternatives, 9 IssuEs L. & MED. 117, 123 (1993). The less stringent method includes personnel
informing the would-be donor or the surviving next-of-kin of their right to object. Actually, the less stringent
end of the spectrum appears to more accurately reflect the classic opt-in system. Id.
163. See Kurnit, supra note 147, at 423.
164. See Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 16, at 22. The objection must be in writing and it must
accompany the body. See id.; and see Kumit, supra note 147, at 423.
165. For a more in-depth discussion about Austria's pure presumed consent law, see Gorsline &
Johnson, supra note 16, at 22; Kumit, supra note 147, at 423; and Williams, supra note 157, at 340-44.
Austria does not discriminate when it comes to procuring one's organs-it includes foreigners as well. See
Dr. James Le Fanu, Review: Gifts of Life Cannot be Left to Chance Dr. James Le Fanu Considers the
Options for Doctors Facing a Shortage of Donors, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, July 19, 1992, at 108, available
in LEXIS, News Library, A-WLD File. The article suggested the following warning to those who plan a
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Despite Austria's somewhat barbaric approach to cadaveric organ procurement,
its method enjoys more success than its European counterparts, as well as the
United States.'"
Austria is not the only European country with a presumed consent law. In
fact, thirteen European counties have such a law in effect, though not as strict
as Austria's.'67 France, for instance, practices a less stringent method of
presumed consent. 68 It allows an objection to organ donation made in any
manner, which is then registered in a hospital.'69 In practice, the strength one
would expect to find under the auspices of presumed consent is missing. For
example, next-of-kin cannot prevent the organ procurement of their deceased
loved one if their loved one failed to object to organ donation; however, it is not
practiced by France's physicians.' Instead, "physicians rarely remove organs
if the family objects."'' Also, the presumed consent law bears even less bite
when one considers the requirement that - prior to organ procurement - any
physician participating in the procurement process must make reasonable
efforts to locate a decedent's possible objection.'72 This requirement is similar
to the 1987 UAGA, which requires that a coroner or a medical examiner must
conduct a reasonable search for a decedent's next-of-kin to request their
consent to procure the decedent's organs.'73
skiing holiday in Austria: "[I]f you fall over a precipice and end up in the intensive care unit of the nearest
hospital with irreversible brain damage, by the time your corpse is flown home it will be sans kidneys, sans
heart, sans lung-indeed, sans virtually everything." Id.; see also Graham Lees & Peter Hoffer, Dead
Climber's Organs Taken for Transplants, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 7, 1991, § International, at 9, available
in LEXIS, News Library, A-WLD File. This article reported that Austrian hospitals may "remove organs from
any foreigner who dies in an accident unless the dead person is carrying a letter forbidding such action ... '"
Id.
166. See Williams supra note 157, at 341. In a more recent list provided by the United Network for
Organ Sharing, however, the difference in the average cadaveric donors per million persons between Austria
and the United States was about three donors per million persons. See UNOS Report, supra note 149.
167. Id. at 338, n.146. Some of the countries that have adopted presumed consent and their
respective cadaveric donors per million persons are as follows: *Spain-27.0, Austria-24.0, Belgium--19.0,
*Portugal-20.0, Finland- 19.4, France-I5.5, *Italy---10. 1, *Luxembourg-l 0.0, and *Greece--5.6. See
UNOS Report, supra note 149. * Those countries with presumed consent laws that do not practice "pure
presumed consent."
168. See Kumit, supra note 147, at 421-22.
169. Id. at421.
170. Id. at 422.
171. Id.
172. Id. A hospital register, for instance, would be one place to search. See id. It does not require
reasonable efforts to obtain consent from next-of-kin. See id.
173. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL Gir ACT (1987) §§ 4(a)-(b), 8A U.L.A. 19 (1993 & Supp. 1998).
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D. Is presumed consent a viable option in the United States?
Although the numbers mildly suggest that adoption of a presumed consent
law will increase the supply of cadaveric organs, most states in this country will
not rely merely on numbers.'74 Rather, they are forced to deal with the
prevalent views that support the current voluntary system.' Both the 1968 and
the 1987 UAGAs respect personal autonomy over one's body.7 6 Indeed, it is
personal autonomy's attractiveness that may drive the stake through the heart
of presumed consent in the United States. Personal autonomy stems from the
encouragement of voluntary altruism and benevolence."n Encouraging altruism
and benevolence will likely foster generosity among others, promoting a "better
human community in which giving and receiving is the rule."' 5 A system such
as presumed consent clearly will not foster an individual's generosity. Thus,
the ideal spirit of a civilized community may indeed dwindle to callousness. 79
The altruism and benevolence of America's public with respect to giving
their organs after death seemed clear after a recent survey in which the majority
said they would consent to donate their organs.' ° In reality, however, quite the
contrary exists.' So many people support organ donation, yet because so few
actually consent when it really counts, some commentators have argued that
adopting a presumed consent law in the United States will simply coerce where
174. Actually many of the countries, which have adopted presumed consent laws, are experiencing
a success rate at or even less than the success rate in the United States. See UNOS Report, supra note 149.
175. For commentaries on the possibility of adopting presumed consent in the United States, see
Gorsiline & Johnson, supra note 16; Kurmit, supra note 147; Naylor, supra note 16; Silver, supra note 16;
and Williams, supra note 157.
176. See generally, UNIF. ANATOmCcAL GIFTACT (1987); and UNIF. ANATOMICALGIFrACT (1968)
§§ 1-7, 8A U.L.A. 63 (1993 & Supp. 1998).
177. See Kurnit, supra note 147, at 426.
178. See Silver, supra note 16, at 696.
179. Id. at 696-97.
180. See 1993 Gallup Poll: Majority of Americans Support Organ Donation,
<http://www.transweb.org/partnership> [hereinafter 1993 Gallup Poll] In this recent Gallup poll, 85% of
the Americans surveyed answered that they supported organ donation. See id. Thirty-seven percent were
very likely to consent to donate their own organs after death; 32% were somewhat likely to do the same, and
25% were not likely to donate their organs after death. See id Ninety-three percent indicated that they would
indeed support a family member's request to donate, but less than half-470/---indicated it would not matter
if donation was not discussed beforehand. Id
181. Referring to a 1985 Gallup Poll survey, one author noted, "[tihat 75% say 'yea' to organ
donation from an armchair, while 83% say 'nay' from the deathbed, suggests that most people believe they
should donate their organs post-mortem but cannot bring themselves to do so." Silver, supra note 16, at 697.
Fitzgibbons
voluntary incentive is lacking.' A careful analysis of current law suggests that
the coercion has indeed begun.
The limited presumed consent provision - section four of the 1987
UAGA - has already taken the first step towards presumed consent.'s 3 Of the
states adopting the 1987 UAGA, most adopted this limited presumption and
others either omitted it or further limited it to the procurement of corneas or
pituitary tissue or both.'" All of these states require qualified medical
personnel to make a reasonable search for the decedent's next-of-kin prior to
organ procurement.8 " Some have exempted certain religious groups.8 6
Many of these limited presumptions have been challenged on property and
personal rights grounds."8 Although many courts have not recognized a
complete property right over a loved one's body, courts recognized that a
decedent's next-of-kin possesses a quasi-property right for the purpose of
burial.' Consequently, presumed consent appears to pass any legal or constitu-
tional barriers in the United States. Indeed, ajurisdictional determination that
next-of-kin possess only quasi-property rights may be another step towards
presumed consent. 9
The barrier of autonomy, however, remains. It is a barrier that many
physicians have not crossed even in countries that have adopted presumed
consent laws. Many physicians, for instance, continue to request consent from
the decedent's next-of-kin, even though they are not required to do so. '" Under
182. Id.
183. See UNIF. ANAToMICALGIFTACT(1987) §§ 4(a)-(b), 8AU.L.A. 19 (1993 & Supp. 1998); see
also supra Part II(C).
184. For states that have either omitted section four or modified it, see supra note 66.
185. For the language creating this duty, see UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT (1987) §4(b). Ifthe only
parts that are going to be procured are comeas, California's statute does not impose a duty search. See CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7151.5.
186. Those states that have adopted religious exceptions are Connecticut and Iowa. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 19(a)-281; and IOWA CODE ANN. § 142C.6.
187. See supra Part II(C).
188. See generally, supra notes 33, 60.
189. So long as a decedent's next-of-kin can perform a proper and decent burial for their loved one,
case law suggests that this quasi-property right has been satisfied. See supra note 60.
190. For example, Singaporean doctors request family consent when ever possible, even though the
law does not require it. See Teo, supra note 136, at 10. Other countries where doctors request consent from
next-of-kin are France and Belgium. See Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 16, at 23-24; Kurnit, supra note
147, at 421-23; and Williams, supra note 157, at 340-41. These softer versions of presumed consent appear
to be more in line with the 1968 and 1987 UAGAs concerning personal autonomy; that is, when a decedent's
intention about whether he or she consented to organ donation is unknown, the present law requires
physicians and hospital staffto honor the decedent's autonomy through the decedent's next-of-kin. See UNIF.
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a pure system of presumed consent, the decedent's autonomy, if unexpressed,
is replaced by the government's and public's interests in saving lives.'' In the
United States, the majority of Americans said they would consent to organ
donation. 92 Cloaking the opt-out provision into the form of autonomy assumes,
however, that all who object will take the initiative and register their dissents. 93
But if the various states' legislatures were to consider the viability of presumed
consent in the United States, they must undoubtedly be willing to find that state
and public interests outweigh the interests of personal autonomy. For a
presumed consent system to enjoy appreciable success, all those involved in the
procurement process must presume one consents without consulting with next-
of-kin." Although presumed consent is acceptable in other countries, it will
most likely not be so acceptable in the United States.
V. CHINA'S METHOD OF ORGAN PROCUREMENT: AN INHUMANE HARVEST?
The lack of personal autonomy, even in the purest form of presumed
consent, is merely a brick in the Great Wall compared to the shocking manner
in which China procures/harvests its citizens' organs. This part will expose
China's disturbing practice. Part V(A) will unveil perhaps the most inhumane
method of organ procurement in the world, which is killing for organs. Part
V(B) will disclose what China does with the cadaveric organs once harvested.
And finally, Part V(C) will attempt to shed some light on some of the views in
the United States about the procurement of its own executed criminals' organs.
A. Organ procurement from afreshly executed corpse.
Imagine a loved one is yanked out of bed in the middle of the night by the
ANATOMICALGIFTACT (1968) §2(b), 8A U.L.A. 63 (1993 & Supp. 1998); and UNIF. ANATOMICALGIFTACT
(1987) §3, 8A U.L.A. 19 (1993 & Supp. 1998).
191. This may actually prove emotionally beneficial, because of the added emotional stress that
emerges when deciding whether to consent to the procurement of a loved one's organs. See 1. Kennedy et
al., The Case for "Presumed Consent" in Organ Donation, 351 LANCET 1650, 1651 (1998), available in
1998 WL 14104066.
192. See 1993 Gallup Poll, supra note 168.
193. This seems unlikely in a country where procrastination is so prevalent. Some critics assert:
"that presumed consent will 'lead to a situation where the poor, the uneducated, and the legally
disenfranchised might bear a disadvantageous burden, and only the more advantaged groups would be able
to exercise autonomy,' since only the more advantaged groups would be aware of their right to opt-out."
Williams, supra note 157, at 343.
194. Unless strict penalties were imposed on medical personnel involved in the procurement process,
in the United States-where so many doctors continue to request consent from a would-be donor's next-of-
kin-it seems unlikely that a presumed-consent law would be very successful at all. See supra Part 1(D) and
supra note 74.
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FBI and taken to their headquarters for interrogation. Your loved one is
arrested and charged with tax evasion and then immediately locked up in a dark
cell. A few days later, your loved one is found guilty of tax evasion and
sentenced to death. After the sentence is read, he or she spends the night
handcuffed to a chair. The next day your loved one is shot in the head,
pronounced dead, then instantly carried off in a van to have his or her organs
harvested and sold to the highest bidder. According to many sources, this is
exactly what happens in China.'95
In China each year, about 100,000 Chinese are estimated to need organ
transplantation surgery.' How can China attempt to supply this excessive
demand? Through a program of voluntary consent? Absolutely not. Credible
sources have unveiled that China's program of cadaveric organ procurement
involves the most inhumane practice of all, which is harvesting organs from its
executed prisoners. 97 Presently, China's criminal laws recognize sixty-eight
crimes that are punishable by death, including car theft and tax evasion.'"8
Although a high court perfunctorily reviews capital crimes cases, "the time
between arrest and conviction is often days, and reviews have consistently
195. But ifyour loved one's eyes are needed, he or she will be shot in the heart instead. See Prepared
Testimony by T. Kumar Advocacy Director for Asia and Pacific Amnesty International U.S.A. before the
House International Relations Committee House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, FED. NEWS
SERV., June 16,1998, § In the News, available in LEXIS, News Library, A-WLD File [hereinafter Testimony
by T. Kumar]; Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Shattuck Assistant Secretary of State Democracy
Human Rights and Labor before the House International Relations Committee House Government Reform
and Oversight Committee, FED. NEWS SERv., June 16, 1998, § In the News, available in LEXIS, News
Library, A-WLD File [hereinafter Statement by Hon. John Shattuck]; Prepared Testimony ofTsuyoshi Awaya
Professor of Law and Sociology Tokuyama University before the House International Relations Committee
House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, FED. NEws SERV., June 4, 1998, In the News,
available in LEXIS, News Library, A-WLD File [hereinafter Testimony by T. Awaya]; see also Lynne
O'Donnel, Organs Ripped from Executed Chinese Prisoners Make Money, REUTER LIBR. REP., Nov. 21,
1991, at 110, available in LEXIS, News Library, A-WLD File.
196. See Daniel Kwan, Shortage of Organ Donors, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 21, 1997, at 7,
available in LEXIS, News Library, A-WILD File.
197. See Testimony by T. Kumar, supra note 195; Statement by Hon. John Shattuck, supra note 195;
Testimony by T. Awaya, supra note 195; and see Harry Wu Hongda, A Grim Organ Harvest in China's
Prisons; Kidneys Removed after Executions; Reprintedfrom 'Open Magazine 'January 1995, WORLD PRESS
REV., June 1995, at 22, available in LEXIS, News Library, A-WLD File.
198. Some of the offenses include: "... reselling value added-tax receipts, theft, burglary, hooligan-
ism, seriously disrupting public order, pimping, trafficking of women, taking of bribes, corruption, forgery
and tax evasion." Testimony by T. Kumar, supra note 195. After arrested and charged with a crime, it takes
only days to convict. Id. "Condemned prisoners tend to be paraded at mass rallies or through the streets
before being privately executed." Id. Once sentenced to death, the condemned prisoner is usually handcuffed
to a chair overnight, and watched by others in case the condemned prisoner attempts suicide. The next day,
the condemned is shot either in the back of the head or in the heart. Id.
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resulted in confirmation of sentence.""' In 1997, China carried out 4,367
executions of its citizens who allegedly committed one of the sixty-eight capital
crimes.00
About ninety percent of those executed were used as non-consenting
cadaveric organ donees.2°' China officials vehemently deny this practice,02 and
declare that a China regulation expressly prohibits organ procurement from its
executed prisoners unless one of the following three criteria have been
satisfied: (1) "nobody claims the body or the family refuses to bury it;"920 3 (2)
"the prisoner voluntarily donates the body for use by medical facilities;'0 4 or
(3) "the inmate's family consents to its use after death. 20 5 In regards to the
individual consent requirement, it is difficult to imagine that even if a
condemned prisoner consented to the harvest, such consent was informed and
given freely and voluntarily.2" Nevertheless, China's system of cadaveric
199. See Statement by Hon. John Shattuck, supra note 195. China does not consider its prisoners'
extenuating circumstances ofthe crime when it imposes the death penalty.
200. See Statement by Hon. John Shattuck, supra note 195. Because of the secrecy in China, the
actual number of those who were executed may be up to 10 times the amount reported. See Teresa Poole,
China's Executioners Work Overtime; International Outcry over Organ Transplant Grows as Car Thieves
Join Rising Toll of Those Shot after Summary Trials, INDEPENDENT, Oct. 30, 1994, § World Page, at 16,
available in LEXIS, News Library, A-WLD File.
201. See Testimony by T. Kumar, supra note 195.
202. Officials argue that most of the information or evidence proving this practice is circumstantial
and that the allegations are being made for the sole purpose of interrupting international relations between
China and the United States. See Official Reiterates Denial ofPrisoners' Organs in Transplant Allegations,
BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, July 6, 1998, § Part 3 Asia-Pacific; China; Internal Affairs;
FE/D327 1/G, available in LEXIS, News Library, A-WLD File. Although there appears to be some truth to
this, the circumstantial evidence and hearsay relied upon, some argue, was indeed from credible sources. See
Statement by Hon. John Shattuck, supra note 195. "Credible sources include public statements by patients
who have had transplants in China and testimony by doctors and former Chinese officials who claim to have
witnessed or taken part in such practices or to have seen incriminating evidence." Id. Also, an arrest in the
United States in which two Chinese nationals allegedly offered to sell organs that were removed from Chinese
executed criminals helps bolster the evidence that this practice indeed exists. Id. Another credible source
supporting the alleged practice came from the statement of a Chinese delegate, Sin Yongjin, when he
admitted that China harvested its executed prisoners' organs. See Awaya, supra note 195.
203. Statement by Hon. John Shattuck, supra note 195. Lack of notice to a family about the
imminent execution of their loved one sometimes precludes this category from stopping the harvest process.
Another obstacle is the long distances a family must travel to get the body. Id Also, generally the executed
are cremated. See Testimony by T. Kumar, supra note 195. But when a family requests that their loved one's
body be returned intact, their requests are met with a bill for the expenses incurred for the upkeep while their
loved one was in prison. Id Thus, many families cannot afford these bills and must accept the cremated
remains of their loved one. Id.
204. See Statement by Hon. John Shattuck, supra note 195.
205. Id.
206. Id. According to the Amnesty International report, however, consent is rarely requested. Id.
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organ procurement truly lies at the most inhumane end of the spectrum
killing for organs.
B. Chinese organs for sale.
Once the organs have been harvested, foreigners pay a lot of money and
travel to China in order to undergo organ transplantation surgery. According
to a Japanese law professor, at least twenty-six Japanese travel to China for the
purpose of transplantation surgery.27 Some patients have paid as much as
$70,000 to Chinese hospitals.28 Sales of China's executed prisoners' organs
have not been limited to Asia. In 1998, two Chinese citizens were arrested in
New York on charges of conspiring to sell human organs.2" 9 They allegedly
offered to arrange for kidney transplants inside of China and to export corneas
and other body parts to the United States.2' 0 In regards to that incident, a
Chinese spokesman stated that if the allegations were true, "the relevant
departments will punish [them] according to the law."211
Condemned Chinese prisoners do have the right to voice their objections to organ donation in the form of a
written will. However, the chances of the will surviving the censoring process, the handling by prison guards
and officials, and finally arriving to the condemned family's residence before the condemned is executed, are
very low. Id. Extensive and invasive medical examinations are given to those condemned prisoners whom
doctors subsequently prepare for harvest, even prior to execution. Id. The condemned prisoners are not told
the true reasons for these examinations. Id. For a more in-depth analysis about the inability of the Chinese
condemned prisoner to consent, see Statement by Hon. John Shattuck, supra note 195.
207. See Testimony by T. Awaya, supra note 195. For an in-depth comment on China's practice,
see generally, Kelly M. Brown, Comment, Execution for Profit? A Constitutional Analysis of China's
Practice of Harvesting Executed Prisoners'Organs, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L. 1029,1061-78 (1996). For
China's official response to these allegations, id. at 1073-78.
208. See Testimony by T. Awaya, supra note 195. Japanese brokers stated that the money paid to
Chinese hospitals is distributed to "the related police, military, court, etc.... " Id. In 1991, one Hong Kong
citizen paid $20,000 for a kidney from an executed Chinese prisoner. See O'Donnel, supra note 195. A
former Chinese police officer was quoted as saying, "[i]f you have the right connections you can arrange to
obtain organs for transplant from executed prisoners." Id. And the money paid to Chinese hospitals is just
part of the money paid for these operations. Patients must pay travel expenses, broker fees, and if they want
their own physician to perform the surgery, they must pay his or her expenses and fees. Id.
209. See Erik Eckholm, Arrest Puts Focus on Human Organs from China, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 25,
1998, at B4. Allegedly one of the Chinese detainees used to work in China as a criminal prosecutor. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id Evidently, in 1997, the Chinese government passed a law that banned the sale of organs.
Id Hypothetically, if the United States concedes to a probable extradition request, because of the number
of relatively minor crimes that are punishable by death, it is at least conceivable that the two prisoners may
soon be executed and have their organs harvested and sold to the highest bidder.
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C. The viability of China's method in the United States.
Presently, an executed prisoner can only donate an organ while alive and
the donee must be a family member. Organ procurement at death is prohibited
by the Federal Bureau of Prisons. 212  Some commentators, however, have
suggested that condemned prisoners ought to be given the chance to consent to
donate their organs before they are executed. 1 3 Just recently, one Missouri
state representative proposed a bill that would effectively commute a
condemned prisoner's death sentence to life without parole, provided the
prisoner consents to donate either a kidney or bone marrow; the proposed bill
is called "Life for Life. ,2 4 Before the various states are able to adopt such a
law, they will most likely have to create valid safeguards to ensure that a
condemned prisoner's consent is informed and freely given. But even if these
safeguards were in place, the National Organ Transplant Law - which
prohibits the sale of organs - may prove fatal to any such acts, especially if
states offer their condemned life sentences in consideration for organs. 25
212. See Statement by Hon. John Shattuck, supra note 195. This prohibition appears to be practiced
in other countries as well.
213. See Laura-Hill M. Patton, Note, A Call For Common Sense: Organ Donation and the Executed
Prisoner, 3 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 387 (1996). The author suggests that donation would not ensue unless
the ill-fated prisoner fully consents. In support of her recommendation, the author chronicles the history of
how unidentified bodies and executed prisoners were used as basic anatomical models to the most advanced
forms of transplantation. Id. Because the current methods of carrying out death penalties across the United
States do not foster healthy organs for transplant, the author suggests an alternative method of carrying out
these sentences. Id. Her proposed method is called the "anesthesia-induced brain death." Id.; see also
Phyllis Coleman, "Brother, Can You Spare A Liver?" Five Ways to Increase Organ Donation, 31 VAL. U.
L. REV. 1, 26-38 (1996). Dr. Jack Kervorkian added his own sort ofspin-offfrom this idea. See Kervorkian
Riles Transplant Community by Offering Kidney ofAssisted Suicide Clientfor Transplantation, TRANSPLANT
NEWS, June 15, 1998 available in LEXIS, News Library. As the title suggests, Dr. Kervorkian offered a
kidney of a 45-year old male who was a quadriplegic. Id. Despite his offer, no physician wanted to use the
kidney. Id.
214. See Missouri Legislature Considers Organ Donationfrom Death Row Inmates, CORRECTIONS
PROF., Apr. 17, 1998, at 1. Available in LEXIS, News Library. Any person sentenced may request to
participate in the program between one and two years after the person has been sentenced. In addition, the
prisoner must voluntarily give up all rights to appeal. Id. Health concerns of an inmate donor are among the
noted problems; however, in order to be accepted as a donor, each inmate requesting to participate must pass
a thorough physical. Other more significant considerations are, "the difficulty of acceptance of non-family
donations, security issues for moving dangerous inmates, and ethical concerns that organs are not for sale."
Id. Also, the article noted one benefit would be that "possible savings could occur by reducing the number
of death sentence appeals." Id. For the actual text of the proposed bill, see LIFE FOR LiFE, 1998 Mo. House
Bill No. 1670 (SN) (West, WESTLAW through 1998 Mo. 89th General Assembly) (Proposed Official Draft
1998).
215. See CORRECTIONS PROF., Apr. 17, 1998, supra note 214; and see generally, National Organ
Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 274(e) (West 1991).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The United States and the various states have passed many laws and
regulations to try to increase the supply of cadaveric organs. Unfortunately,
thousands continue to die while waiting for suitable life saving organs. Many
experts look abroad for help. Japan's law, which is the most stringent, is of no
real help. China's practice of killing prisoners and harvesting their organs
without informed and voluntary consent is clearly no option. Singapore's and
the other countries' presumed consent laws may indeed prove useful. The
various states, however, will have to declare that the interests of saving lives
outweigh personal autonomy. Although this may be conceived of at least
legally, lack of public support may caution those holding public office to back
off of their constituents' personal autonomy.
The United States should let the new Referral and Request regulation run
its course, as it is directed at solving the many problems that currently hinder
cadaveric organ supply.2"6 A significant problem is that many times the
decedent's next-of-kin are either not requested to consent, or when they are
questioned, they refuse to consent.2 7 Those refusals are sometimes based on
common -fears that their loved one's doctors will hasten death in order to
procure desperately needed organs to save another's life.2t Other refusals stem
from the way in which they were asked to consent or the quality of care their
loved one received before the pronouncement of death.219 The new Referral
and Request regulation will provide well-trained and experienced organ
procurement staff who will help to alleviate many of these fears.220 The staff
will alleviate these fears by educating and counseling the decedent's next-of-kin
in order to obtain consent. Also, the Referral and Request regulation was just
one of four elements of a joint initiative to increase the supply of cadaveric
organs.22' Once the other elements are implemented, other problems related to
the public's fears and misunderstandings may also be resolved.222 Sticking to
this initiative will help facilitate an increase in cadaveric organs without
trammeling personal autonomy.
216. See supra Part II(E).
217. See supra Part II(D).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See supra Part II(E).
221. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Following the breakup of the Soviet Union and resulting decline in fear of
nuclear war, attention has shifted to other threats that remained in the
background during the superpower confrontation. Fear of biological warfare
uniquely fits the new evolving world. International instability characterizes the
post-Cold War world. Additionally, the demise of the Soviet Union created a
vacuum in American policy perceptions. With no great power threat, American
attention has focused on rogue states and international terrorist organizations.
Furthermore, unlike nuclear weapons, biological weapons are relatively
inexpensive and easy to conceal. States unable to afford an atomic weapons
program can still develop this "poor man's atom bomb." Non-state actors such
as international terrorist organizations, domestic hate groups, and millennial
cults can procure ingredients necessary to create homemade biological
weapons. With Boris Yeltsin's 1992 revelation of the existence of a Soviet
offensive biological weapons program in the 1970s and 1980s, and the 1995
Tokyo subway sarin nerve gas attack, concerns increased over the threat of
biological war.
* The author is a 1999 graduate of the University of Tulsa College of Law and Graduate School.
He earned a Juris Doctorate Degree as well as a Master of Arts Degree in History from the University of Tulsa
where he concentrated on international law and diplomatic history. He earned his Bachelor of Arts Degree
in History from Central Missouri State University in 1995. He is presently a member of the Virginia State
Bar and resides in Falls Church, Virginia.
1. Joshua Lederberg, Foreward, in STRENGTHENING THE BiOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION:
KEY POINTS FORTHE FOURTH REviEW CONFERENCE 1 (Graham S. Pearson & Malcolm R. Dando, ed., 1996)
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Faced with the growing risk posed by these weapons of mass destruction,
various proposals have emerged to counter biological warfare. Debate focuses
on the relative cost and value of preventive measures. These measures range
from increased criminalization of acts preceding the use of biological weapons
to curative measures such as biological disaster training for first response
medical personnel and stockpiling of antibiotics. Due to the high cost of
curative measures and the uncertainty of their efficacy, some commentators
liken these measures to the 1950s movement to provide bomb shelters as a
solution to the menace of nuclear war.2 The alternative to developing curative
measures requires strengthening of international norms regarding the
development and use of biological weapons.
The United States has led an initiative to strengthen the Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 through creation
of a Protocol The proposed Protocol, slated for completion by the end of
1998, would create stronger mechanisms to monitor state enforcement of
existing treaty obligations.4 The new Protocol may eventually borrow
verification and inspection features from those contained in the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC).5
However, the BWC intentionally lacked specific provisions for
verification and inspection in its initial form. Differences in the history of
chemical and biological warfare and in the development, production and
deployment of the two types of weapons may have led to the evolution of
different legal norms. For any BWC Protocol to prove effective, measures
should specifically counter biological weapons programs, not merely echo
general international verification and inspection standards contained in other
weapons control regimes.
This paper will analyze the prospects for successful strengthening of the
biological weapons control regime. The first section of this paper will explain
in The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) Database, (visited Oct. 1, 1999) <
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/key4rev/forward.html >. See also, Robert P. Kadlec et al., Biological
Weapons Control: Prospects and Implications for the Future, 278 JAMA 351,351 (1997).
2. Ehud Sprinzak, The Great Superterrorism Scare, FOREIGN POL'Y, (1998), at 110, 122-23.
3. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583,
[hereinafter Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention].
4. John D. Holum, Remarks to the Fourth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons
Convention (visited Oct. 1, 1999) <http'/www.acdagov/speeches/holum/bwcrev.htm>. See also President
William Clinton, Remarks at the United States Naval Academy Commencement (May 22, 1998) (visited
Oct.23, 1999) <http:l/www.usia.govltopical/pollterror/98052201.htm>.
5. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY DOc. No. 21,103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993), [hereinafter Chemical Weapons Convention].
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the current international threat of biological warfare, detailing the types of
biological weapons that pose a threat and the possible users of these weapons.
The second section will trace the history of biological warfare. Next, the paper
will outline early developments of international law to meet the threat of
biological warfare and then detail the current international legal standard
contained in the BWC. After describing the existing biological weapons
control regime, this paper will examine the ongoing debate concerning stricter
international standards and will analyze elements required to strengthen the
BWC. This debate generally concerns equitable North-South power
distribution within the international community, as well as potentially invasive
verification procedures. The development of international law since entry into
force of the BWC will provide a backdrop to the current drafting of the BWC
Protocol. This paper will then examine the proposed Protocol and the legal
standard currently being negotiated. The development of international law of
war reflects the interplay of technology, conflicting national interests and moral
standards. In order to succeed in influencing behavior, legal norms must
address these factors.
II. THE CURRENT THREAT OF BIOLOGICAL WAR
The current threat of biological warfare is twofold. State use of biological
weapons is the first threat. Use of weapons by non-state actors, including
international terrorist organizations, constitutes the second threat of biological
warfare. Each threat requires distinct counter-measures. A millennial cult like
Aum Shinrikyo, already anticipating an apocalypse, might not be dissuaded,6
while a state may respond to the counter-threat of massive retaliation. In
addition, in order to punish an international terrorist organization by linking it
to a state, a government must accumulate proof, which is time consuming and
often inconclusive.7
6. Richard Danzig & Pamela B. Berkowsky, Why Should We Be Concerned About Biological
Warfare?, 278 JAMA 431, 431 (1997). See also Robert P. Kadlec, supra note 1, at 355. Aum Shinrikyo,
a Japanese cult intent on bringing the end of the world, developed chemical weapons like those it used in a
crowded Tokyo subway as well as anthrax and botulism toxin for mass attacks on civilians to cause chaos.
Id. at 354.
7. Id. See also George W. Christopher, Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective, 278 JAMA
412, 416 (1997). In addition to the problem of proof required to connect an act of biological terrorism to a
state actor, the interval of time may create difficulties for retaliatory action by reducing the legal justification
of self-defense. The international standard for self-defense was recognized by Great Britain and the United
States following a British attack on an American vessel, the "Caroline," Destruction of the "Caroline,"
MOORE, 2 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409-414, in BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1293 (2d ed. 1995). The Caroline dictum states the international standard of self-
defense: "[W]hile it is admitted that exceptions growing out of the great law of self-defense do exist, those
exceptions should be confined to cases in which the 'necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming,
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In addition to a distinction between possible weapons users, distinctions
exist among the weapons potential of biological agents. An army might employ
biological weapons for battlefield use against an enemy army or against a large
civilian population. The slow, uncontrollable nature of some biological
weapons limits potential battlefield use, creating an uncertainty regarding
possible infection and the length of time required to debilitate an army.' The
types of biological agents vary in lethality, incubation period, and in the ability
to spread.' Possible agents include viruses such as ebola, marburg, yellow
fever, equine morbillivirus, and bacteria such as anthracis, brucella, clostridium
botulinum, francisella tularensis and yersinia pestis, as well as rickettsiae, fungi
and toxins derived from biological agents.' ° Some diseases caused by
and leaving no means, and no moment for deliberation."' Id. The passage of time between the act of
terrorism and collection of sufficient proof may be great enough to negate the necessity to respond with force
in self-defense. The alternative to self-defense, the doctrine of reprisals, would be limited to acts directed
against the military since international law outlaws reprisals against civilian populations, thereby prohibiting
massive retaliation. Protocol Additional (No. I) to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 51(6), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. See
generally, PAUL CHRISTOPHER, THE ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL AND MORAL
IssuEs 189-200 (1994). But see, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 l.C.J. 95 (July 8),
92-97 (visited Nov. 2, 1998) <http://www.law.comell.edu/ic/icjl/unan5afin.htm>. Despite the inability
to distinguish between civilians and combatants as well as between neutrals and hostile parties when using
comparable weapons of mass destruction, "the Court is led to observe that it cannot reach a definitive
conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance
of self-defense, in which its very survival would be at stake." Id. at 97.
8. John D. Steinbruner, Biological Weapons: A Plague Upon All Houses, 109 FOREIGN POL'Y,
85, 87-88 (1997-98). An important distinction between biological weapons and other weapons is that
biological agents are alive, increasing the difficulty of controlling them. Id. at 87. See also Danzig, supra
note 6, at 43 1.
9. David R. Franz, Clinical Recognition and Management of Patients Exposed to Biological
Warfare Agents, 278 JAMA 399, (1997). For instance, while anthrax is very deadly, it is not spread by
person to person contact. The only known instance of person to person spread of anthrax occurred after two
people shared a loofa sponge. Meryl Nass, Biological Warfare, 352 LANCET 491 (1998) available in LEXIS,
Genmed Library, Alljnl File. However, the durability of anthrax after delivered to a battlefield could allow
it to be used in a similar manner to landmines. Id.
10. See James R. Ferguson, Biological Weapons and US. Law, 278 JAMA 357,359(1997). The
effects of these agents differ greatly. Many symptoms result from the inhalation of biological agents. See
generally, Franz, supra note 9. Anthrax has an incubation period of one to five days after being inhaled,
followed by fever, malaise and severe respiratory distress and death resulting in several days. Id. at 401.
Brucellosis has an incubation period of five to sixty days, followed by the spread of parasites in organs such
as the spleen, liver, or central nervous symptom, causing varied symptoms, yet the disease is usually not fatal.
Id. at 402. Plague has an incubation period of two to three days, and is followed by acute pneumonia
progressing rapidly to respiratory failure, shock, and death. Id. Smallpox has an incubation period of seven
to seventeen days, followed by spread from the respiratory tract to lymph nodes, and causes an onset of pox
lesions, fever, vomiting, and occasionally delirium; death resulting among 3% of treated and 30% of untreated
patients. Id. at 404. Botulinum toxins have an incubation period of one to five days, followed by palsies,
blurred vision, skeletal muscle paralysis, respiratory failure, and often death. Id. at 407-08. Botulinum toxins
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biological agents such as staphylococcal enterotoxin B have an incubation
period of only one to six hours, while others like brucellosis and Q fever may
take over a month to develop."
Several devices, including bombs, missiles, and aerosols, may deliver
biological agents. An examination of Iraqi delivery systems shows
development of 250-400 pound bombs capable of carrying sixty to eighty-five
liters of botulinum toxin, anthrax or aflatoxin.' By 1990, Iraq had prepared
approximately 150 of these weapons. 3 Iraq also armed twenty-five SCUD
missiles with biological agents prior to the Gulf War of 1991.'4 However,
exploding warheads ineffectively deliver biological agents as explosion
generally does not deliver the aerosolized particles more than several meters
and can infect few people. 5
Aerosol delivery systems deliver biological agents more effectively, by
delivering biological agents to a wider area, and by delivering biological agents
in smaller particles more capable of being carried by the wind. 6 The aerosol
weapons' drawbacks include the need for sophisticated airplanes with dispersal
systems, air superiority over the target, as well as accurate meteorology to
determine favorable wind and weather conditions." Terrorists.could attack
using crop dusting aircraft or trucks equipped with spray tanks, by placing
aerosol canisters in air-conditioning systems of major buildings, or by directly
contaminating bulk food supplies.'
The United States believes several nations are developing offensive
biological warfare programs similar to that developed by Iraq before the 1991
are the most toxic compounds known to man, 100,000 times more toxic than sarin by weight. Id. at 407.
Patients that survive from botulism toxin usually do not develop resistance due to the very small amount of
toxin needed to cause symptoms. Id. at 408. Staphylococcal enterotoxin B causes fever, headache, chills,
and myalgia after an incubation period of one to six hours, but is seldom fatal and patients can return to their
normal routines after one to two weeks. Id. at 408-09. Q fever has an incubation period often to forty days,
and is followed by various symptoms including fever, chills, headache, and weight loss, but is rarely fatal.
Id. at 403.
11. Franz, supra note 9, at 400-01.
12. Raymond A. Zilinskas,lraq 'sBiological Weapons: The Past as Future?, 278 JAMA 418,420
(1997). Interestingly, while being easy to produce, aflatoxin has no known biological weapon value and may
have been produced by Iraqi scientists for long-term carcinogenic value or merely in order to meet production
quotas for biological agents. Id. at 421.
13. Id
14. Id. In the Persian Gulf War, Iraq launched 39 SCUD missiles at Israel, but none were armed
with biological warheads. Id. at 421.
15. Zilinskas, supra note 12, at 421.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 421.
18. Jeffrey D. Simon, Biological Terrorism: Preparing to Meet the Threat, 278 JAMA 428,429
(1997).
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Gulf War. The West doubted Russian compliance with the BWC following
Russian revelations in 1992 of prior violations of the BWC despite being a
signatory and one of three depository states of the BWC. 19 These doubts
increased with the decline in the Russian economy, raising questions about the
government's ability to pay personnel, thus preventing them from selling their
services to the highest bidder.20 Despite the presence of United Nation's
inspectors, Iraq could still revitalize its biological weapons program on short
notice.2 In addition, the United States suspects China, Syria, Iran, Egypt, Libya
and Taiwan of developing some biological weapons program.22 Besides these
countries, India, Pakistan and North Korea either have the domestic
biotechnology industry capable of developing biological weapons or could
develop them within the next ten years.23 The United States currently believes
the threat of a state sponsored biological terrorist attack is low; although, the
possibility of non-state extremist groups, similar to the Japanese Aum
Shinrikyo, acquiring weapons of mass destruction is greater.24 Ironically,
American superiority in conventional weapons may lead poorer nations and
non-state actors to develop biological weapons as a means of redressing the
imbalance.25
III. HISTORY OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
The use of biological weapons in war extends back to the beginning of
history, before modem understanding of the weapons. Early uses revolved
around the spread of infection from corpses, animal carcasses, and filth as well
as the use of biotoxins. 26 The ancient Athenians used biological warfare as
19. 1997 ANNUAL REPORT: ADHERENCE TOAND COMPLIANCE w1THARMS CONTROLAGREEMENTS
9 (visited Oct. 1, 1999) <http://www.acda.gov/reports/arnual/comp97.htm>.
20. Id.
21. Id. See also Zilinskas, supra note 12, at 422-23.
22. 1997 ANNUALREPORT: ADHERENCE TOAND COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS,
supra note 19, at 10-11. It is interesting to note that accusations of violations of the BWC are not always
made by the United States against rogue states: In June of 1997, Cuba alleged that the United States violated
the BWC by dispensing a crop-destroying insect over Cuba, leading to formal and informal consultations.
Id.
23. See generally, PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE 1997 1 (visited Oct. 23, 1999)
<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97.html>.
24. PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE 1997 1 (visited Oct. 1, 1999) <http://www.
defenselink.milpubs/prolii97/trans.html>.
25. Message of the Secretary of Defense, PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE 1997 1 (visited
Oct. 23, 1999) <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/message.html>.
26. George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 412. Often armies placed carcasses in wells and other
water sources to prevent the use of water supply by enemy armies and civilians during extended sieges or
campaigns. Id.
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early as 600 BC, contaminating a stream with "helleborous roots," a poisonous
type of lily root, causing illness when the opposing city drank the water.27
Hannibal catapulted pots containing poisonous snakes against enemy ships, and
Carthaginian generals poisoned wine before retreating to debilitate advancing
foes who then looted the camp and drank the wine.28
Disastrous use of biological weapons occurred in the early and middle
modem ages, when armies released highly infectious diseases without hope of
containment. In the 1346 siege of Caffa, on the coast of the Crimea, a besieging
Mongol army catapulted corpses infected with plague into the city.29 As the
city fell and the citizens fled to Italy, they carried the plague throughout Europe,
eventually killing one quarter of Europe's population.30 In 1763, British troops
traded smallpox infected blankets to Native Americans under the orders, "[y]ou
will do well to try to inoculate the Indians by means of the blankets, as well as
to try every other method that can serve to extirpate this execrable race.
Apparently, the blankets proved effective, as smallpox epidemics hit Mingoe,
Delaware and Shawanoe tribes the following year.32
There have been other less sophisticated uses of biological warfare in
recent history. In the American Civil War, retreating Confederate forces drove
farm animals into ponds and shot them to contaminate water supplies an
advancing army would use.33 In the Vietnam War, Viet Cong troops smeared
feces on pungi sticks in the early 1960s to infect any unwary soldier who
stepped on a stick.34 Many states make claims of "poisoning the well" in the
course of conflicts.33
Highly sophisticated uses of biological weapons are new to this century.
In the First World War, Germany used anthrax and glanders, an infectious horse
bacterium, to infect livestock of Allied and neutral nations.36 German agents
27. PAUL CHRISTOPHER, supra note 7, at 202.
28. Id. at 202-03.
29. Id. at.204.
30. Steinbruner, supra note 8, at 86. See also George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 412. This
account of the use of infected corpses may oversimplify the spread of the plague in Europe, as other carriers
may have been at work. Id.
31. FRANCIS PARKMAN, THE CONSPIRACY OF PONTIAC 648 (1991), cited in PAUL CHRISTOPHER,
supra note 7, at 204.
32. PAUL CHRISTOPHER, supra note 7, at 204. Again, other contacts between Native Americans
and settlers may have also spread the disease, and the blankets would have proved inefficient sources of
contagion. George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 412.
33. PAUL CHRISTOPHER, supra note 7, at 205.
34. George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 412.
35. See generally, I. Milek, Biological Weapons, in CBW: CHEMICALAND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
48, 48-49 (Steven Rose ed., 1968).
36. George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 413.
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targeted Romania, Argentina and United States livestock to prevent their sale
to the Allies, as well as French cavalry horses and mules in the Mesopotamian
theater of war." Unlike other instances of biological warfare, German use in
the First World War targeted animals, not humans.
Between the World Wars, various nations conducted experiments with
biological weapons, including Belgium, Canada, France, Great Britain, Italy,
the Netherlands, Poland and the Soviet Union.3 Japanese military went the
next step during the Second World War, developing and using modem
biological weapons against Chinese civilians.39 Japan centered its biological
weapons research in Unit 731, developing plague, cholera and typhoid agents,
and experimenting on prisoners of war and Chinese civilians.4' The Japanese
prepared several devices for delivering biological agents, including a bacterial
bomb, a defoliation bacilli bomb, weather balloons able to cross the Pacific, and
submarine launched weapons.4' Japan also developed plans for germ-infected
suicide troops to rush out among advancing American troops, spreading
contagion.42
The Allies also conducted experiments with offensive biological weapons
during the Second World War, although no deployment of the weapons
occurred. Great Britain tested anthrax on sheep on the Scottish island of
Gruinard.43  The United States experimented with biological weapons for
possible use against Japanese troops, civilians, and crops." The United States
37. Id.
38. Id
39. PAUL CHRISTOPHER, supra note 7, at 205. The Japanese attacks apparently had mixed success:
An attack on China in 1941 caused 10,000 casualties among Japanese troops, including 1,700 deaths from
cholera, George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 413. Recently Chinese survivors of Japanese biological
warfare attacks have brought suit against the Japanese government in a Japanese court, claiming bubonic
plague killed as many as 94,000 people between 1937 and 1945. Jonathan Watts, Japan Taken to Court Over
Germ Warfare Allegations, 351 LANCET 657 (1998) available in LEXIS, Genmed Library, Alljnl File.
40. THOMAS B. ALLEN & NORMAN POLMARt, CODE-NAME DOWNFALL: THE SECRET PLAN TO
INVADE JAPAN-AND WHY TRUMAN DROPPED THE BOMB 185-87 (1995).
41. Id. at 187-89,257. The Japanese had planned on carrying out attacks, successfully sending test
balloons as far as South Dakota and setting a tentative target date of September 22, 1945, for submarine
launched biological agents. Id.
42. Id. at 256-57.
43. Robin Clarke & J. Perry Robinson, Research Policy: United Kingdom, in CBW: CHEMICAL
AND BIOLOGICAL WAIRFARE 105, 108-09 (Steven Rose ed., 1968). British experiments also highlighted the
dangers of the biological agents: as the anthracis bacillus is very stable and may remain dormant for up to
one hundred years, the island of Grninard was uninhabitable following the experiments. Id. British efforts
to decontaminate the islands with formaldehyde and seawater only occurred in 1986. Christopher, supra note
7, at 413. The danger that would result after widespread use of anthrax in war would dwarf the landmine
problem, as contagion could potentially remain decades after the end of a conflicL
44. ALLEN, supra note 40, at 178-83. The United States planned production of anthrax bombs at
Keefer
did not rule out the first-use of chemical weapons, and there is little reason to
believe moral compulsion would prevent American use of biological weapons.45
During the 1944 Normandy invasion, the American army provided its troops
with antidotes to potential German biological weapons.46
Since the Second World War, the United States' position has evolved from
experimenting with biological weapons to rejecting them. By the time the
United States renounced the use of biological weapons in 1969, the American
military had developed numerous biological agents for use in war, including the
highly lethal anthrax and botulism.47 Throughout this period, the United States
conducted secret experiments on American cities to test the spread of
aerosolized particles." Although the Soviet Union and several communist
nations leveled accusations of biological warfare against the United States, the
charges were unsubstantiated.49
By 1969, the American military recognized both the limited battlefield
value of biological weapons, and the potential for other nations to use these
weapons for purposes of mass destruction. 0 By ending development of
biological weapons and forbidding their use even in retaliation of biological
warfare, the United States helped to develop an international standard against
any use of biological weapons. The outlawing of biological warfare would
preserve the American strategic position as a nuclear power, as cheaper, easy
to build biological weapons could give poorer nations a leveler to the nuclear
bomb.5
Russia did not hold the same opinion of biological weapons as the United
States and continued to develop biological weapons for both battlefield and
the rate of 500,000 per month, and experimented with biotoxins to be used on Japanese rice, cereal, and sweet
potato crops. Id.
45. Id. at 177-78.
46. Id at 181-82. Hitler reportedly forbid the development of biological weapons, but research
was conducted by the Germans, including testing on prisoners in concentration camps. George W.
Christopher, supra note 7, at 413.
47. George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 414. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency had
prepared its own biotoxin weapons, including a stockpile of cobra venom, possibly for use as an assassination
weapon. Id
48. LEONARD A. COLE, THE ELEVENTH PLAGuE: THE POLMCS OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL
WARFARE 18 (1997). The Pentagon admitted conducting general tests between 1949 and 1968 over San
Francisco, Minneapolis, St. Louis, Key West, and Panama City, Florida, as well as conducting more focused
experiments in the New York City subway, the Washington, D.C. National Airport, and the Pennsylvania
Turnpike. Id. Simulants designed to replicate the spread of biological agents were delivered by aerosol
dispersal. George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 414. The covert experiments in San Francisco resulted
in an outbreak of urinary tract infections at Stanford University Hospital, causing one death. Id.
49. George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 415.
50. Steinbruner, supra note 8, at 89.
51. George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 415-16.
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strategic use.52 Russia admitted in 1992 to continuing an offensive biological
weapons program, even following ratification of the BWC.53 The 19.79 anthrax
outbreak near a Soviet facility in Sverdlovsk provided an early indication of a
continued Soviet biological weapons program.54 No confirmation of Russian
battlefield use of biological weapons exists, but Russia did develop biotoxins
as assassination weapons.55
South Africa also developed biological agents as assassination weapons
before ratifying the BWC.16  The South African Truth and Reconciliation
52. Steinbruner, supra note 8, at 89. Strategic use of weapons refers to the non-battlefield actions
designed to eliminate a nation's ability to wage war, such as the destruction of factories necessary for
producing weapons.
53. See Joint U.SU.Ki.Russian Statement on Biological Weapons, Sep. 14, 1992, in Biological
Weapons, I (visited Oct. 23, 1999) <http://www.acda.gov/factsheelwmd/bw/joint.hm>. Russia agreed to
dismantle its weapons program, although the program is believed to employ 25,000 to 30,000 technicians,
down from a high level of 55,000. George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 416. Suspicion over Russian
intentions remain even today, despite greater transparency within Russia. See Frontline: Plague War:
Interviews: William S. Cohen, 5-7 (visited Oct. 13, 1999) <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ pages/fron...shows/
plaguedinterviews/cohen.html>. The United States government believes that despite good intentions of
Russian President Boris Yeltsin, political factors in Russia prevent the total dismantling of the biological
weapons program. Id.
54. George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 416. The outbreak was believed to be responsible for
64 deaths over a six week period. Frontline: Plague War: The 1979 Anthrax Leak, I (visited Oct. 13, 1999)
<http:/lwww.pbs.orglwgbhlpageslfrontline/showslplaguesverdlovsk>. Dr. Kanatjan Alibekov, former
Deputy Director of Biopreparat, the Soviet biological weapons program, stated that the accident resulted
from the failure to replace an exhaust filter at the facility, and that if the wind had been blowing in the other
direction, toward Sverdlovsk, the death toll could have been as high as hundreds of thousands. Dr. Kanatjan
Alibekov, Frontline: Plague War: The 1979Anthrax Leak: 1 (visited Oct. 13, 1999) <http://www.pbs.org
wgbh/pages/fron...ws/plaguelsverdlovsklalibekov.html>.
55. George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 416. The Bulgarian secret service assassinated Georgi
Markov, a Bulgarian emigrd living in London, stabbing him with an umbrella infected with ricin. Jeffrey D.
Simon, supra note 18, at 429. Certain easily developed biological agents, like ricin, are more effective for
individual attacks than mass attacks, as they have little infectious qualities. Id. Iraq easily developed ricin
in the late 1980s and early 1990s as it is a naturally occurring toxin from the castor bean plant. Zilinskas,
supra note 12, at 419-20.
56. Frontline: Plague War: What Happened in South Africa?, I (visited Nov. 1, 1998)
<http'J/www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plaguesa/>. Interestingly, the managing director ofa South
African biological weapons facility asserted that the siege mentality of the apartheid government in South
Africa created conditions where researchers felt justified in developing weapons. Dr. Daan Goosen,
Frontline: Plague War: Interviews: 6-7 (visited Nov. 1, 1998) <http://www.pbs.orgwgbh/pages/frontline
shows/plague/sa/goosen.html>. Similar justifications could be made by other isolated and threatened
regimes, such as Sadam Hussein's Iraq. Even after considering the ethical ramifications ofbiological warfare,
South African developers reached the conclusion that "It]here isn't much of a difference if you use a gun to
kill someone or if you use a more refined product to do that." Id. at 2. Francisco de Vitoria described a
situation known as "invincible ignorance" in which a party to a dispute is not capable of discerning the
objective morality of his position and assumes his position to be just. See PAUL CHRISTOPHER, supra note
7, at 62-63. Soldiers are presumed to be shielded from the guilt of an unjust war by invincible ignorance, but
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Commission is currently investigating allegations relating to past biological
weapons programs that may have included development of weapons used in the
Rhodesian civil war in the late 1970s." Except for possible intervention into
the Rhodesian civil war, South Africa designed its weapons program against its
own population to secure white minority rule. The South African program
apparently targeted black political leaders and may have included infertility
toxins aimed at reducing the black population.58
In the recent Persian Gulf War, Iraq deployed anthrax, but did not use it
in battle.59 Although Iraq possessed SCUD missiles armed with biological
agents, they did not arm any of the thirty-nine SCUD missiles fired on Israeli
cities during the war with biological weapons." The use of weapons of mass
destruction in the conflict would probably have triggered a response with
nuclear weapons by the United States. 61 The United States currently applies
deterrence, the Cold War policy used to prevent nuclear war, against potential
biological warfare aggressors, which possibly influenced Iraqi behavior during
the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
an issue arises to what extent a scientist or doctor may be shielded from guilt for participating in an unjust
war such as one to sustain an apartheid government. Id.
57. Frontline: Plague War: What Happened in South Africa?, supra note 56, at 1. The world's
largest outbreak of anthrax occurred in Rhodesia in 1979, with 82 people killed and thousands infected. Id.
Dr. Timothy Stamps, Zimbabwe Minister of Health is currently investigating the use of biological weapons
in the civil war of the former Rhodesia, noting annual occurrence of around two dozen cases of anthrax over
two decades, followed by 10,000 cases in 1979-1980. Frontline: Plague War: Interviews: Dr. Timothy
Stamps, I (visited Oct. 1, 1999) <http://www.pbs.orglwgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plague/sa/stamps.html>.
58. Frontline: Plague War: What Happened in South Africa?, supra note 56, at 1. See also
Frontline: Plague War: Interviews: Dr. Daan Goosen, supra note 56, at 3. The reported plans to use
biological weapons to target black population would breach international prohibitions of genocide as
"measures intended to prevent births within the group." BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS TODAY 132
(Erhard Geissler ed., 1986), cited in PAUL CHRISTOPHER, supra note 7, at 209-10. See also Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, Art. 2 (d), U.N.T.S. No. 1021.
59. Steinbruner, supra note 8, at 87. It should be noted that the United States and France sold Iraq
anthrax and other biological agents during the 1980s. Zilinskas, supra note 12, at 419. Tighter international
controls on transfers could have prevented these sales.
60. Zilinskas, supra note 12, at 422. Reportedly, Iraq would have used biological weapons had
Baghdad been attacked with nuclear weapons. Gene Warfare-Unless We Keep Our Guard Up, 348 LANCET
1183 (1996) available in LEXIS, Genmed Library, AllJnI File. This position regarding the use of weapons
of mass destruction would not differ from the American position regarding nuclear weapons. See also
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 7, at 97.
61. Frontline: Plague War: Interviews: William S. Cohen, supra note 53, at 3-4. We have always
taken the position that should we be attacked by any power with a nuclear weapon, certainly we have the
capacity to respond accordingly. We have also indicated to any country who would threaten our forces or
our people with chemical or biological weapons that they would be met with a devastating response that
would be quite swift and overwhelming. There is no designation of what that might entail, but it is very clear
that it would be a very destructive force that they would be met with. Id.
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Non-state actors have also used biological warfare in the past and could
present a great challenge for future control of biological weapons. Terrorist
organizations, cults, and hate groups provide the largest risk of non-state use of
biological weapons. For unclear reasons, in 1984, the Rajneeshee cult poisoned
salad bars in Oregon with salmonella in 1984, causing 751 cases of enteritis and
forty-five hospitalizations.62 At the time of its discovery in 1995, the Japanese
cult Aum Shinrikyo developed a biological weapons program including anthrax
and botulism to the testing stage,63 also in 1995, American authorities caught
and convicted two members of a Minnesota militia group planning an attack on
government officials with ricin, a lethal toxin used in assassinations. 64 In 1996,
an Ohio man connected with hate groups was able to obtain samples of the
plague through the mail, by ordering it from a laboratory.61
IV. ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Legal controls on biological weapons evolved contemporaneously with
modern development of the weapons. Early prohibitions of biological weapons
in war forbid the use of poisons for ethical reasons.6 Modern sources of
62. George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 416.
63. Kadlec, supra note 1, at 354.
64. Danzig, supra note 6, at 432. See also George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 416.
65. Id. Frontline interviewed the Ohio man, Larry Wayne Harris, for a program that aired Oct. 13,
1998. In the interview, Harris describes the ease of obtaining plague and anthrax from natural sources.
Frontline: Plague War: Transcript, 4 (visited Oct. 1, 1999) <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontlinel
shows/plague/tc/script.htnl>. Also interviewed was an individual calling himself "Uncle Fester" who
provides recipes for ricin and other biological agents on the Internet. Id. at 3-4.
66. The customary law regarding poison was spelled out in Lieber's Code in 1863. Lieber's Code
was an American army field manual and not an international treaty, but reflected the international rules of
war. "The use of poison in any manner, be it to poison wells, or food, or arms, is wholly excluded from
modem warfare. He who uses it puts himself out of the pale of the law and usages of war." RICHARD SHELLY
HARTIGAN, LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 48, 58 (1983), cited in PAUL CHRISTOPHER, supra note
7, at 205-06. See also Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the
Field, Art. 16, cited in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS
AND OTHER DocuMENTs 6 (Dietrich Schindler & Ji Toman eds., 1973). "When he fights with his foes in
battle, let him not strike with weapons concealed (in wood), nor with (such as are) barbed, poisoned or the
points of which are blazing with fire." THE LAWS OF MANU (G. Bohler, trans. 1886), reprinted in 25 THE
SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST 230, 251-2 (1975) cited in Chemical and Biological Weapons Historical
Documents: The Manu Smrti (visited Oct. 23, 1999) <http://www.sipri.se/cbw/docs/cbw-hist-manu.html>.
The Manu Smrti is an early code adopted by ancient Aryan tribes in the Indian subcontinent.... and most
of all, they shall not construct any poisoned globes, nor other sorts ofpyrobolic inventions, in which he shall
introduce no poison whatsoever, besides which, they shall never employ them for the ruin and destruction
of men, because the first inventors of our art thought such actions as unjust among themselves as unworthy
of a man of heart and a real soldier. C. SiEMIENOwcz, GRAND ART D'ARTILLERIE 234 (1650) cited in
Chemical and Biological Weapons Historical Documents: Pledge (visited Oct. 23, 1999)
http://www.sipri.se/cbw/docs/cbw-hist-pledge.html>. This was a late medieval pledge by German gunners.
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international law place the obligation not to use biological weapons on the state,
rather than on the individual.6 A shift from ancient codes of moral obligation
to modern notions of reciprocal obligations made the legal standard relative to
the circumstances of war. However, the many instances of crude biological
warfare exemplified a counter-trend of moral relativity in pre-modern times, as
often troops felt justified in using any weapon at their disposal to defeat an
enemy. The British justification and use of smallpox against Native Americans
is an example of this willingness to use any means necessary to defeat an
enemy.68
Modern controls on biological warfare evolved from controls on chemical
warfare. Before the twentieth century, states had not yet developed modern
biological and chemical weapons, and diplomats could only guess the form of
use of such weapons.69 In 1899, delegates to the Hague Conference prepared
Note these three prohibitions set down obligations for soldiers, not merely leaders. The moral duty of soldiers
in warjus in bellum, creates a stronger prohibition of biological warfare.
67. Considering... That this end would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly
aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable; [t]hat the employment of such arms
would therefore be contrary to the laws of humanity; [t]he contracting Parties engage mutually to renounce,
in case of war among themselves, the employment... of any projectile... which is either explosive or
charged with fulminating or inflammable substances .... [t]his engagement is obligatory only upon the
contracting or acceding parties thereto,... it is not applicable with regard to non-contracting powers.... [I]t
will also cease to be obligatory from the moment when, in a war between contracting or acceding parties, a
non-contracting party... shall join one of the belligerents.
68. Declaration ofSt. Petersburg of1868 to the Effect ofProhibiting the Use of Certain Projectiles
in Wartime, Nov. 29, (Dec. 11) 1868, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 95 (Supp. 1907). See also Chemical and Biological
Weapons Historical Documents: St. Petersburg, (visited Oct. 1, 1999) <http./www.sipri.se/cbw/docs/cbw-
hist-petersburg.html>. The obligation contained in this Declaration specifically prohibited the use of
"fulminating" substances, referring to chemical weapons, but the obligation regarding the use of chemical
weapons gives insight into biological weapon control, as both modem chemical and biological weaponry were
in an infant state at this point and can be considered together. Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868. The
Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 only refers to the obligations states have regarding these weapons, not
of soldiers. Id. While the Preamble reflects an older belief that these weapons are "contrary to the laws of
humanity," the obligation contained in the Declaration only extends to states contracting to the Declaration.
Id. This Declaration gives an early example of the "no first use" principle, which forbids the use of certain
weapons unless another nation uses them first. See PAUL CHRISTOPHER, supra note 7, at 205-08. States are
not absolutely forbidden from using prohibited weapons, and in certain situations may even use them against
other contracting parties to the Declaration. Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868. See also Brussels
Conference of 1874, Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War, Aug.
27, 1874, art. 13(a), cited in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 66, at 29; The Laws of War on
Land, (Oxford Manual) Sep. 9, 1880, arts. 8(a) & 9(a), citedin THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note
66, at 38. See supra note 31.
69. Diplomats and military leaders at the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conferences, vaguely glimpsing
the future of war, defined limits on air power in terms of prohibitions of "discharge of projectiles and
explosives from balloons" and limited naval warfare in a manner only barely discerning the potential of
weapons like the submarine. Hague Declaration (IV) -Projectiles From Balloons, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat.
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a Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating Gas (Hague Declaration (IV) of 1899).
It limited the use of projectiles, "the object of which is the diffusion of
asphyxiating or deleterious gases," but it did not outlaw the use of chemical
agents themselves."0 Diplomats could expand the term "deleterious gases" to
include biological agents, despite lack of specific mention of biological
weapons.7' The Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land of 1907 (Hague Convention (IV) of 1907) expanded on the obligations
from the earlier Hague Declaration (IV) of 1899 by specifically forbidding the
employment of poisoned weapons. 72 However, since this obligation still only
applied to parties to the Convention, states formed no general rule of
international law before World War I.
Following the First World War, a flu epidemic struck the war-weary
world, causing more deaths than the Great War.7a  The great destruction
wrought by disease exemplified the danger of illness, leading statesmen to
include biological weapons specifically by reference in the Protocol for the
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (the Geneva Protocol of 1925)."' The
Geneva Protocol of 1925 forbid the use of biological weapons by extending the
prohibition on "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases" to "bacteriological
1839, Hague Convention (VIII) -Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, Oct. 10,
1907,36 Stat. 2332,2343-44, Art. I-VI. The Declaration concerning asphyxiating gases was similarly vague
on account of the lack of experience with new weapons. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779, 187 Consol. T.S. 410. Hague Declaration (IV) -
Concerning Asphyxiating Gas, July 29, 1899, 1 AM J. INT'L L. 157 (Supp. 1907). See also CALVIN
DEARMOND DAVIS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE FIRST HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE 119 (1962).
70. Hague Declaration (IV) - Concerning Asphyxiating Gas, supra note 69. Like the Declaration
of St. Petersburg, the Hague Declaration (IV) only applied in cases of war between two parties to the
Declaration, and was not effective ifa non-contracting state was involved in a war. Thus, no absolute ban
on the weapons was created by 1899.
71. A United States delegate to the Hague, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, opposed controls on
poisonous gas as there was no experience to show whether gas might be more humane than existing weapons.
DAVIS, supra note 69, at 119. Ultimately, the United States did not sign this Declaration. Id. at 196. See
also PAUL CHRISTOPHER supra note 7, at 206. Apparently, Admiral Mahan'thought that asphyxiation by gas
was no more inherently cruel than asphyxiation by water, a fate suffered by sailors in sunken ships. DAVIS,
supra note 69, at 119.
72. Hague Convention (IV) - Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, With Annex of
Regulations, Jan. 26, 1910, Sec. II, Hostilities, art. 23(a), 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539.
73. 8,000,000 soldiers died in the First World War, with approximately 8,000,000 additional
civilian casualties, while 20,000,000 died from the influenza epidemic of 1918. Steinbruner, supra note 8,
at 85.
74. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925,26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061 [hereinafter Geneva
Protocol of 1925].
methods of warfare."" The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibited the use of
biological weapons, but did not outlaw their development. This either reflects
a belief that states could not legitimately develop outlawed biological weapons,
or implicitly states a no first-use policy, which allows nations to develop
biological weapons in response to acts of biological war.
The United Kingdom, Soviet Union and France announced reservations to
the Geneva Protocol of 1925, specifically stating a no first-use policy regarding
chemical and biological weapons.76 While these reservations reflected
experience with chemical weapons in the First World War, and the expectation
of the future use of chemical weapons, the reservations also watered down
obligations regarding biological weapons." In addition, two major nations did
not ratify the Protocol--the United States and Japan.7" This also weakened the
Geneva Protocol of 1925, as contracting parties would more likely confront a
major power with far-flung military commitments than a smaller nation unlikely
to intervene in world affairs. However, despite development of biological
weapons, widespread use did not occur during the Second World War, the
significant exception being Japanese use of plague against Chinese villagers.79
The lack of biological warfare, combined with the legal proscription in the
Geneva Protocol of 1925, might have developed a customary principle of
international law. 0 A sufficient number of nations ratified the Protocol to make
observance widespread and the absence of biological warfare in the Second
World War is evidence of opinio juris, showing states believed they were
bound by custom. Thus by the 1960s, widespread evidence of a customary
norm existed.8 However, even if a customary rule existed, the reservations to
75. Id.
76. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, cited in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note
66, at 116, 119. See also Kadlec, supra note 1, at 352.
77. As over 120 nations signed the Geneva Protocol of 1925, a prohibition on first-use would in
most cases create a general prohibition, unless a contracting party met one of the few nations that failed to
ratify the Protocol. PAUL CHRISTOPHER, supra note 7, at 207.
78. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, cited in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLIC, supra note
66, at 111-14. See also Kadlec, supra note 1, at 352.
79. See supra note 39.
80. The Preamble to the BWC reaffirms "adherence to the principles and objectives" of the Geneva
Protocol of 1925 and expresses a norm created by the Protocol. Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins
Weapons Convention, supra note 3, at Preamble. However, Article VIII states "[n]othing in this Convention
shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the
Protocol," implying that any obligation created by the Protocol had to be actively assumed by the contracting
party and did not exist as a rule of law outside such assumption of obligations. Id. at art. VIII.
81. 120 nations ratified the Geneva Protocol of 1925. See supra note 77. I. Brownlie finds a
statement of customary law in a General Assembly Resolution stating "[t]he General Assembly 1. Calls
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the Geneva Protocol of 1925 expressed by several states would constitute
exceptions by these states to the customary rule of law. The reservations of
three major world powers in particular significantly weakened the power of the
custom.
The American decision in 1969 to end development of biological weapons,
and the United States unilateral statement renouncing all use of the weapons,
opened the door to negotiations of a stronger rule of international law. 2
Initially, Russia blocked separate proceedings for biological and chemical
weapons, but eventually agreed to negotiate separate conventions.8 3
Negotiations led to the BWC in 1972, which contained strong prohibitions on.
the development and stockpiling of biological weapons." Unlike the-earlier
Geneva Protocol of 1925, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom,
the three major world powers essential for the success of the Convention,
ratified the BWC. The BWC is currently the primary legal instrument
controlling biological weapons, ratified by 141 nations.8 5
Due to the uncontrollable nature of the weapons and resulting potential for
injury to civilians and neutral states, other sources of international law regulate
the use of biological weapons. International environmental law may also prove
effective in limiting the use of biological weapons.86 In particular, recent
developments in biotechnology, allowing scientists to alter microorganisms
for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol."Question of Chemical and
Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, G.A. Res. 2603A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 11, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966), cited in I. BROWNLIE, LegalAspects, in CBW: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE,
supra note 34, at 145-46. It is interesting to note that even at this point the United States still opposed any
international regulation of biological weapons: The United States was one of three nations voting in
opposition to this measure. Question of Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, G.A. Res.
2603A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 11, U.N. Doc. A16316 (1966), cited in THE LAWS OF
ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 66, at 125-27.
82. Kadlec, supra note 1, at 352. The United States also ratified the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on
January 25, 1975, subject to a reservation allowing retaliatory use of chemical weapons. Geneva Protocol
of 1925, supra note 74.
83. SIPRI, SIPRI: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 1966-1996,49-63 (1996), cited in Continuity and
Change: Chemical and Biological Warfare, History of the SIPRI CBW Project, 5 (visited Oct. 1, 1999)
<http://www.sipri.se/cbw/research/cbw-continuity.html>. Evidently, Russia believed in a military use of
biological weapons after the United States determined they were of no battlefield value, leading Russia to
continue its offensive biological weapons program even after ratification of the BWC. Steinbruner, supra
note 8, at 89.
84. Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, supra note 3, at art. I.
85. For an updated list of ratifications to the BWC, see Ratifications to the BTWC, (visited Oct. 1,
1999) <http://www.brad.ac.uklacad/sbtwc/keytext/okrats.htm>.
86. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 24, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 1511/26
(vol. 1) (1992), Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Principle 26, June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. I at 3, (1973), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 at 2-
65, and Corr. 1 (1972).
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genetically, may create hazards to biodiversity and pose conventional risks to
the environment.8" As the Convention provides channels for resolving conflicts
and allegations of biological weapon use or development, these sources of legal
controls should be considered in the context of the regime established by the
BWC.88 The next section will detail the provisions of the BWC and the proper
application of other international legal standards to. the biological weapons
regime.
V. THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION OF 1972
The BWC regulated the production, development and stockpiling of
biological weapons, but did not specifically regulate the use of these weapons.
Implicitly, nations agreeing notto produce or possess biological weapons would
be unable to use them. The BWC meshed with the Geneva Protocol of 1925,
as the former regulated production of biological weapons but not their use and
the latter prohibited their use but not their development.8 9 The BWC created
a stronger legal standard by virtue of ratification by all five permanent Security
Council members, contrasting the lack of great power adherence to the earlier
legal standard.9° Unlike any prior regulatory system, the regime created by the
BWC explicitly outlawed biological weapons as a class of weapons.9'
The BWC specifically mentions the Geneva Protocol of 1925, reaffirming
the principles previously developed regarding biological weapons.92 In
addition, the BWC placed further control of chemical weapons on the
international agenda by listing effective prohibition of chemical weapons as an
87. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, Dec. 10, 1976, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151, 31 T.S. 333, T.I.A.S. No. 9614.
"Environmental modification techniques" is defined as "any technique for changing-through deliberate
manipulation of natural processes-the dynamics, composition or structure of the earth, including its biota.
.. " Id. at art. I1. The genetic modification of biological agents may be considered modification of biota. See
also Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818.
88. Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, supra note 3, at art. V, VI and
VII.
89. However, several nations had declared reservations to the Geneva Protocol allowing retaliatory
use of biological weapons and could slip through the regulations of both treaties. See supra notes 76 and 77.
See also Graham S. Pearson, The Complementary Role of Environmental and Security Biological Control
Regimes in the 21st Century, 278 JAMA 369, 369 (1997).
90. Representatives of 97 nations signed the BWC in 1972, placing the new standard well on its
way to meeting widespread state acceptance necessary for development of customary international law.
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, supra note 3. However, notably absent from
the list was China, a non-party to the BWC until the 1980s. Id.
91. Kadlec, supra note 1, at 351.
92. Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, supra note 3, at Preamble, art.
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objective.93 Parties also included provisions in the BWC to allow for
amendments to the Convention and Conference of State Parties to consider
technological changes and to negotiate controls on chemical weapons.'
Clearly, the Parties intended control over biological and chemical weapons to
be an ongoing process, heavily influenced by scientific developments and
requiring an integrated legal framework.
The BWC contains general legal controls, with all the substantive
regulations being contained in the first ten articles of the Convention. 5 Parties
agree not to "develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain"
biological agents for other than peaceful or defensive purposes.' Whereas the
Hague Declaration of 1899 only banned possession of weapons capable of
delivering chemical agents, the BWC banned possession of both the agent and
means of delivery, creating a stronger control.97 States must divert existing
reserves of biological weapons to peaceful purposes or destroy them.9
Article IH of the Convention prohibits the Parties from transferring any
element of biological weapons to any recipient, and Parties must refrain from
encouraging or aiding any state or international organization in developing
biological weapons.9 Additionally, Article IV mandates that Parties prevent
93. Id. at Preamble, art. IX. The inclusion of a chemical weapons agreement in the text of the
BWC, not merely in the preamble, showed an increased desire to negotiate such an agreement, although the
CWC was not completed for another 20 years. Id. at Preamble. Arms control of biological and chemical
weapons are often linked, and it may have been necessary to agree to future discussion on chemical weapons
to get an agreement on biological weapons. The interlinkage of arms control has played a role in the
discussion of other agreements; for instance, Egypt held back approval of the CWC until Israel ratified the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as Israel had developed the capacity to build nuclear weapons, and Egypt
had only chemical weapons to counter the Israeli nuclear weapons. See United Nations, Centre for
Disarmament Affairs, 1996 U.N. DIsARMAMENT Y.B. 87.
94. Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, supra note 3, at arts. XI and XII.
95. Id. at arts. I-X.
96. Id. at art. I. The article prohibits possession of agents "of types and in quantities that have no
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes," without specifically listing which agents
or what levels would not be justified. Id. The vagueness in the wording allows arguments to be made
justifying acquisition of biological agents with potential military value. A state attempting to begin an
offensive weapons program would need only show the potential weapon also could be used for peaceful
purposes to counter accusations of non-compliance.
97. Id. at art. I. The Hague Declaration (IV) of 1899 stated: "It]he Contracting Powers agree to
abstain from the use of projectiles the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases."
Hague Declaration (IV) -Concerning Asphyxiating Gas, supra note 69. In the First World War, Germany
initially attempted to skirt the provisions of the Hague Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating Gas by
providing different means of delivering chemical weapons besides projectiles designed solely for gas,
including opening 5,000 containers filled with chlorine upwind ofenemy troops. PAUL CHRISTOPHER, supra
note 7, at 206-07.
98. Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, supra note 3, at art. I1.
99. Id. at art. III.
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development of any element of biological weapons within their jurisdiction.' 0
Together, Articles III and IV require national controls to prevent non-state
actors from acquiring the means to carry out biological warfare and prohibits
international development of biological weapons. The BWC promotes non-
proliferation as well as disarmament. However, the Convention stresses
implementation of these measures in a manner to allow economic development
and cooperation in preventing disease.' Parties may exchange scientific
information and equipment for peaceful purposes. 2
In case of an accusation of non-compliance, Parties may lodge a complaint
with the United Nations Security Council, which may then conduct an
investigation.' 3 Parties have the obligation to consult and cooperate in solving
a problem relating to the BWC, including a specific obligation to cooperate in
an investigation undertaken by the Security Council.' After the Security
Council determines a violation of the Convention endangers a Party, all Parties
must either "provide or support assistance" to the endangered Party if
requested. 5 These provisions of the BWC create a basic mechanism for any
needed verification and inspection provisions, as well as sanctions and other
collective action required by circumstances.
The BWC contains elements allowing the evolution of more defined
regulation of biological weapons. The BWC forbids the possession of elements
of biological weapons for other than "prophylactic, protective or other peaceful
purposes," which is sufficiently flexible to permit defensive development of
antibiotics and other biological warfare counter-measures."0 This language is
also broad enough for creating standards defining specific biological agents
with no justification for peaceful purposes. Parties could amend provisions of
the BWC requiring cooperation with any Security Council investigation to
allow stronger verification and inspection standards ensuring compliance with
Convention obligations. Finally, the regular conferences required by the BWC
and the provisions allowing amendment of the Convention would provide
nations with the framework for upgrading existing biological weapons controls.
Given proper motivation of the international community, Parties could streng-
then the provisions of the BWC to further prevent the risk of biological warfare.
100. Id. at art. IV.
101. Id. at art X (1).
102. ld. at art. X (2).
103. Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, supra note 3, at art. VI.
104. Id. at arts. V and VI. Any permanent member of the Security Council, (the United States,
China, Russia, Great Britain or France) could veto any investigation in accordance with United Nations
provisions. U.N. CHARTER, art. 27, 3. See Kadlec, supra note 1, at 353.
105. Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, supra note 3, at art. VII.
106. Id. at art. I.
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VI. DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS
Following entry into force of the BWC in 1975, the Parties have held four
review conferences in 1980, 1986, 1991, and 1996."7 After the end of the Cold
War, momentum to strengthen weapons control increased. The Persian Gulf
War of 1991 and attendant risks of biological warfare increased attention on the
need to prevent states from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. At the
review conference in 1991, Parties established an Ad Hoc Group of
Governmental Experts (VEREX) to study verification measures to strengthen
the BWC.0 8 VEREX issued a report analyzing various verification measures
in 1994, and the Parties held a Special Conference to discuss further action.'0 9
The Parties created an Ad Hoc Group to consider binding verification measures
to the BWC." °
The Parties to the BWC held the Fourth Review Conference in November
and December of 1996."' Among the issues considered at the Fourth Review
Conference, the Parties discussed the work of the Ad Hoc Group as well as a
proposal put forward by Iran." 2 The Parties stated that effective verification
measures as discussed by the Ad Hoc Group could reinforce the BWC." 3 At
the Fourth Review Conference, Iran noted the BWC does not explicitly prohibit
the use of biological weapons and proposed an amendment providing a direct
ban on all use of biological weapons." 4
In the Final Declaration, the Parties agreed that use of biological weapons
would violate Article I." The Parties also discussed the ban on use of
biological weapons concerning Articles IV and VIII. 6 As several states retain
107. UNITED NATIONS, CENTRE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, supra note 93, at 70.
108. Id.
109. Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Final Documents, at 28-29, U.N. Doc. BWC/CONF.IV/9 (1996), [hereinafter Fourth Review
Conference] (visited Oct. 13, 1999) <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/revconfl4final2.htm>. Alexander
V. Vorobiev, Working on the Compliance Regime for the BWC, CBW CONVENTIONS BULL. Mar. 1998, at
2, (visited Oct. 13, 1999) <httpi/www.fas.harvard.edu/-hsp/>.
110. Vorobiev, supra note 109, at 2.
111. Fourth Review Conference, supra note 109, at 1.
112. Id. atl.
113. Id. at 14.
114. Id. at 11.
115. Id. at 15. The Parties also noted the changes in technology since the Third Review Conference
including advances in microbiology, biotechnology and genetic engineering, and stated that art. I of the BWC
applied to these developments. Id.
116. Id. at l8,22.
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reservations to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 allowing retaliatory use of
biological weapons, the Conference noted that these were "totally incompatible
with the absolute and universal prohibition" of biological weapons and called
for withdrawal of reservations." 7 The Parties considered the direct statement
in the Final Declaration banning all use of biological weapons as signifying the
state of international law, and as an alternative to amending the BWC. "
The delegations also discussed control of non-state possession of
biological weapons at the Fourth Review Conference." 9 The Parties held
Article III of the BWC prevented transfer of agents or weapons to any recipient,
including transnational terrorists and subnational groups like millennial cults. 2°
The Conference also stressed that under Article IV each Party should adopt
penal legislation to apply within the jurisdiction of the state. 2'
Among other issues discussed by the Parties in the Fourth Review
Conference was international environmental law. The Conference noted the
importance of the Rio Declaration and Convention on Biological Diversity to
controls on biological warfare, in particular to implementation of Article X.'
The interlinking of technology transfers, biodiversity and international
development creates an area of overlap that may influence further development
117. Id. at 22-23. See also supra note 76.
118. Some delegations to the Fourth Review Conference stated the ninth paragraph of the Preamble
of the BWC prohibited use. Fourth Review Conference, supra note 109, at 38. This paragraph reads:
"[d]etermined, for the sake ofall mankind, to exclude completely the possibility ofbacteriological (biological)
agents and toxins being used as weapons." Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention,
supra note 3, at Preamble. Other delegations believed amending the BWC would open it to further
amendments, thereby weakening the regime. Fourth Review Conference, supra note 109, at 39. Any
amendment would require ratification by individual states, opening the BWC to the possibility of becoming
a two-tier system in which only some of the states explicitly banned the use of biological weapons. Id.
119. Fourth Review Conference, supra note 109, at 16-18.
120. Id. at 16-17.
121. Id. at 17-18. The Final Declaration stated explicitly that states had an obligation under the
BWC to prevent use of biological weapons in terrorist or criminal activity. Id. at 17. The use of Article IV
to require penal legislation had been questioned previously. Criminalizing BW, CHEMICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTiON BULL. Mar. 1996, at 1, (visited Oct. 13, 1999) <httpJwww.fas.harvard.edu/-hsp>.
International criminal liability for acts of biological warfare or terrorism would return ethical responsibility
to individuals, similar to premodern regulation of the use of poisons. Id. See generally, supra note 66.
122. Fourth Review Conference, supra note 109, at 24-25, 36. The Rio Declaration stated that
"[w]arfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall therefore respect international
law providing protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and cooperate in its further develop-
ment, as necessary." Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 86, at Principle 24. The
Convention on Biological Diversity requires states to "facilitate access for.., technologies that.., make
use of genetic resources and do not cause significant damage to the environment." Convention on Biological
Diversity, June 5, 1992, art. 16 (1), 31 I.L.M. 818. These two documents preserve access to biotechnology
while Article X of the BWC similarly guarantees the right to transfer biological agents and technology for
peaceful purposes. Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, supra note 3, art. X.
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of biological weapons controls. In addition, differences of opinion between
developed and developing nations produced different negotiation positions, the
developing nations desiring freer access to recent medical technology.'23 The
Parties also disagreed on the BWC provision for United Nations Security
Council control over investigations, as the great powers would have a potential
veto over investigations of their own conduct.124
Finally, the Parties discussed enhanced verification mechanisms at the
Fourth Review Conference. The Parties noted that the Ad Hoc Group was
preparing the basic framework for a legally binding mechanism to strengthen
the BWC. 2 1 The Parties also noted the problem of time constraints when
setting a new goal of completion of Ad Hoc Group work by the Fifth Review
Conference of 2001.126
The Ad Hoc Group has held sessions since January 1995 to consider a new
Protocol to strengthen the BWC. 27 Many nations, including the United States,
have placed goals for completion of the Protocol by the end of 1998.128
123. See UNITED NATIONS, CENTRE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, supra note 93, at 79.
124. Id. at 78.
125. Fourth Review Conference, supra note 109, at 29. Arguments had been made that the mandate
of the Ad Hoc Group did not allow a protocol to be the outcome ofdiscussions. Vorobiev, supra note 109.
126. Fourth Review Conference, supra note 109. Problems posed by time constraints have surfaced
numerous times during the negotiation of the BWC Protocol and may offset current deadlines. The Ad Hoc
Group was unable to complete negotiations during 1995, in part due to time constraints, delegates spending
time in negotiations with other international organizations. See UNITED NATIONS, CENTRE FOR
DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, supra note 93, at 72. During early 1996, negotiators were busy preparing the
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, preventing negotiation on the Protocol to the BWC. Vorobiev, supra
note 109, at 3. In 1998, Parties to the January meeting of the Ad Hoc Group worried about a scheduling clash
between Ad Hoc Group meetings and human rights meetings in March. Graham S. Pearson, Progress at the
Ad Hoc Group in Geneva Quarterly, Review No. 2, at 2, (visited Oct. 13, 1999) <http://www.brad.ac.uk/
acad/sbtwc/prgenevaprgen2.htm>. At the Ad Hoc Group session in June and July 1998, a scheduling
problem with United Nations General Assembly sessions required rearranging meetings to be held in October.
Procedural Report: AdHoc Group 11th Session, at2 U.N. Doc. BWC/AD HOC GROUP/41 (1998), (visited
Nov. 1, 1998) <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/ahg41/procrp4l.htm>. Any future goal for completion
of the Protocol must be considered highly tentative.
127. Vorobiev, supra note 109.
128. In his 1998 State of the Union Address, President Clinton spoke on the BWC Protocol:
"Last year, the Senate ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention to protect our
soldiers and citizens from poison gas. Now we must act to prevent the use of disease
as a weapon of war and terror. The Biological Weapons Convention has been in effect
for twenty -three years now. The rules are good, but the enforcement is weak. We
must strengthen it with a new international inspection system to detect and deter
cheating ......
President William Clinton, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 1998) in President Clinton
Statements, DISARMAmENT DIPLOMACY, Jan. 1998, (visited Nov. 2, 1998) <http://www.gn.apc.org/
acronym/dd22.htm>. By September, an informal ministerial meeting reflected the realization that the
Currently, the Parties have held four sessions of the Ad Hoc Group in 1998.29
In all likelihood, the Parties should complete a Protocol to the BWC within the
next year. The new Protocol will radically alter the biological weapons control
regime. The new Protocol will aid resolution of situations involving violations
of the BWC, like the ongoing struggle by United Nations inspectors to detect
Iraqi transgressions. Given the horror of biological weapons, the current
international trend will be to ratify the Protocol. 30 States refusing to ratify may
focus attention on their position and be likely targets for heightened
international scrutiny. These non-parties to a Protocol may also find quarantine
placed around them, preventing the sale of dual-use technology necessary for
development of health standards. This will also prove an incentive for states
to ratify the Protocol.
Several essential issues effect negotiations on the Protocol to the BWC.
The standard of verification measures, including declarations and visits involve
aspects of national security, trade secrets and power disparities between strong
and weak nations. Nations are also debating strict or loose definitions of
biological agents, facilities and allowable quantities of agents.
The primary means of verifying compliance with the BWC are
declarations and visits. Parties would declare facilities, agents and activities
effecting the subject of the BWC and would authorize inspection visits,
including random routine visits of declared facilities and challenge visits to
resolve accusations of non-compliance. A "loose" regime of verification
measures would provide ad hoc decision-making, fitted to the circumstances of
each case, while a "strict" regime would require greater political negotiation to
reach agreement on Protocol provisions. In addition, in a "loose" regime,
nations that are more powerful would have greater political influence than
smaller, weaker nations, creating a biased regime disproportionately reflecting
the interests of the large states.' 3'
Protocol would not be completed until 1999 at the earliest. Declaration of the Informal Ministerial Meeting
on the Negotiation Towards Conclusion of the Protocol to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention,
Sep. 23, 1998, (visited Oct. 19, 1999) <http:l/www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/other/meetingl.htm>. See also
Meeting on BWC Protocol, DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY Oct. 1998, (visited Nov. 2, 1998)
<http://www.gn.apc.org/acronym/dd30.htm>.
129. See Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (B7WC) Database, AdHoc Group Documents,
(visited Oct. 19, 1999) <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/adhocgrp/bw-adhocgrp.htn>;ProceduralReport
Ad Hoc Group I 1th Session, supra note 126, at 3.
130. A draft resolution introduced in the United Nations General Assembly calls for the completion
of the protocol and universal adherence to the BWC. Status of the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, (Draft resolution), Oct. 22, 1998 cited in DISARMAMENT TIMES, (visited Oct. 19, 1999)
<http://www.igc.org/disarm/lc53cnv2.html >.
131. Vorobiev, supra note 109, at3.
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However, creation of a "strict" regime codifying all banned agents,
weapon systems, and maximum allowable agent levels may defeat the purposes
of the Protocol by failing to list all possible agents that exist or may be
discovered in the future. For instance, the United States and the United
Kingdom disagree with Russia over the value of threshold quantities for
biological agents. The Western nations claim maximum levels are deceptive,
as other nations can quickly develop small amounts of biological agents into
large quantities.' "Strict" definitions of agents may not advance the interest
of security and disarmament.
The United States has also raised concerns about the expectations of
security that would arise from completion of the Protocol. A nation could hide
violations by developing dual-use facilities using biological agents for peaceful
purposes as a cover for a weapons program, as Russia did after ratifying the
BWC.'33 However, states can use the issue of verification as a cover for
political issues, as mistrust underlies political differences.'34 In addition, on site
verification would prove a great obstacle for a potential violator to overcome.
For a Party to conduct weapons research at a declared facility, where random
visits may occur, the Party must know what to hide. They also must know that
the risk of personnel engaged in legitimate activities at the facility leaking
information will make dual-use facilities hard to conceal.'35 For a Party to
conceal a weapons program at an undeclared facility would require absolute
secrecy, posing more difficulties than a dual-use facility. 36
In addition to the issue of verification, states with advanced biotechnology
industries worry about the confidentiality of visits and the possibility of leaks
of trade secrets. Parties could misuse routine inspections of declared facilities
to uncover corporate secrets improperly. 37 The Protocol needs safeguards to
132. UNITED NATIONS, CENTRE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, supra note 93, at 73.
133. Douglas J. MacEachin, Routine and Challenge: Two Pillars of Verification, CBW
CONVENTION BULL. Mar. 1998, at 1, (visited Oct. 19, 1999) <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/-hspl>.
134. President Reagan stated the issue as "[trust but verify" when beginning START negotiations
with the former Soviet Union; verification requires trust and simultaneously increases trust, allowing greater
control of arms. FREDERIC S. PEARSON, THE GLOBAL SPREAD OF ARMS: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 81 (1994). In addition, nations armed with nuclear weapons would retain a
favorable balance of military strength over the covert biological weapon producing state. MacEachin, supra
note 133, at 1.
135. MacEachin, supra note 133, at 2. See also THE PROBLEMS OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
WARFARE at 49-63, (1975) cited in SIPRI, SIPRI: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 1966-1996, supra note 83, at
5. In an experiment conducted by SIPRI to determine the ability of microbiologists to hide an offensive
biological program in a dual-use facility, scientists rated the chances of a team familiar with the facility
uncovering the program: The average response was 50%, with the percentage stated by scientists involved
in the inspection 20% higher than the response by scientists not directly involved. Id.
136. MacEachin, supra note 133, at 2.
137. Id.
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protect sensitive information before it will gain the support of nations with
large biotechnology industries. States with less developed biotechnology
industries fear lower representation on inspection teams and technical support
staff. These states want employment of staff based on geographical
representation of all states, while the need for the highest trained employees
may prevent an equitable distribution. 3
VII. PROTOCOL TO THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
The current rolling text of the BWC Protocol reflects the concerns of the
parties to the BWC. The Protocol has a sufficiently "strict" text to prevent
political manipulation of standards by large powers and enough flexibility to
address evolving circumstances. The Rolling Text of the Protocol currently
contains twenty-three articles, covering 119 pages, as well as 138 pages of
annexes, appendices and attachments providing detailed provisions. This large
text contrasts sharply with the ten pages of articles in the BWC.'39 The
Protocol, as currently drafted, reflects the "strict" approach to verification with
specific lists of agents, weapons, and quantities of agents and inspection
standards. However, the Protocol retains flexibility, as the text has not
definitively determined levels of agents and parties can amend these and add
other agents.
The Protocol includes several general areas. Article- HI provides the
primary verification rules. Article 1II, Parts (A) through (D) covers lists of
agents, toxins, equipment, threshold levels and necessary declarations of these
items and related activities. 4  Article HII, Parts (E) and (F) address visits,
investigations, and procedures for resolving issues arising from activities
138. Graham S. Pearson, Progress at the AdHoc Group in Geneva Quarterly, Review No. 1, at 8-9,
(visited Oct. 19, 1999) <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/prgeneva/prgenl.htm>.
139. Rolling Text of a .Protocol to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
at 7-10 U.N. Doc. BWC/AD HOC GROUP/41 (1998) [hereinafter Protocol], (visited Oct. 19, 1999)
<http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwclahg41/cont41.htm>; Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
Convention, supra note 3.
140. Protocol, supra note 139, at 25-42, art. IUI, Parts (A)-(D). Annex A, section If lists agents to
be declared by the Parties, including viruses like ebola, marburg, and smallpox virus; bacteria including
bacillus anthracis, brucella, tularemia, and yersinia pestis; rickettsiae; fungi; and toxins such as botulinum
toxins, enterotoxin B and ricin. Rolling Test of a Protocol to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, at 117-19, U.N. Doc. BWC/AD HOC GROUP/39 (1998), Annex A, Part I, [hereinafterAnnex],
(visited Oct 19, 1999) <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/ahg39/art-x.htm>. Factors for inclusion on list
include prior development as biological weapons, high level of contagiousness, high morbidity, infection
through respiratory route and lack of existing countermeasures. Id. at 120.
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related to the BWC.' 4' Article IX establishes an international organization
designed to carry out the diplomatic and technical tasks related to the
Protocol. 42 Article IV protects the security of information obtained in visits
and inspections. 43  Articles V, VI and XII provide procedures for settling
disputes, ensuring compliance and protecting against biological weapons
attacks.' 4
Other articles consider definitions ofterms, the relationship of the Protocol
to international law, exchange of technical information for peaceful purposes,
national implementation of the Protocol and procedural aspects.1 4 Absent from
the current draft of the Protocol is text for Article I, concerned with general
provisions, and Article'VIII, stating confidence-building measures.'
41
The Protocol establishes an international organization. 14' The Organiza-
tion includes three main bodies: the Conference of States Parties, the Executive
Council and the Technical Body. 14  The Conference of States Parties serves
as the primary organ of the organization, the Executive Council makes
decisions regarding compliance matters and the Technical Body conducts the
actual inspections and visits. All Parties to the Protocol are eligible to occupy
any office of the organization, and the organization cannot deprive any Party
of membership. 4
9
The Conference of States Parties consists of representatives of each Party.
This Conference determines the budget for the organization, elects members to
the Executive Council, appoints a Director-General to the Technical Body,
takes measures to ensure compliance with the Protocol and adopts rules of
procedure submitted by the Executive Council.5 ° The Conference of States
141. Protocol, supra note 139, at 43-7 1, art. III (E), (F).
142. Id. at 90, art. IX.
143. Id. at 72, art. IV.
144. Id. at 75, 76, and 107, arts. V, VI, XII.
145. Id. at 16, 79, 105, 106, 108-119, arts. II, VII, X, XI, XIII-XXII.
146. Protocol, supra note 139, at 15, 89, arts. 1, VIII.
147. Id. at 90, art. IX (A) 1. The organization is simply titled the Organization for the Prohibition
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, [hereinafter the Organization]. Id.
148. Id. at 90, art. IX (A) 4. The exact names have not been determined. The proposed text
contains several alternatives in brackets. The provision in Article IX lists the bodies as "the Conference of
the States Parties, the [Executive] [Consultative] [Council] and the Technical [Secretariat] [Body]." Id. For
ease this paper will refer to them by the simplified names Conference ofStates Parties, the Executive Council,
and the Technical Body.
149. Protocol, supra note 139 at 90, 91, 94, art. IX (A)-(C) 2, 10, 25.
150. Id. at 93-94, art. IX (B) 24. In addition, the Conference of the States Parties appoints
independent experts to a Scientific Advisory Board. The text contains two proposed versions; in one experts
will be selected based on expertise, in the other on the basis of geographic representation of the Parties. Id.
at 94, art. IX (B) 24 (f).
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Parties will meet in regular annual sessions, as well as special sessions when
convened.' Each Party receives one vote, and the Conference of States Parties
makes decisions by a majority of members present for procedural matters and
consensus on substantive issues. If the Conference of States Parties cannot
attain consensus after a special twenty-four hour recess, the Protocol only
requires a vote of two-thirds of the members present.15 2
The Executive Council consists of an undetermined number of members,
serving a term of two years, some elected and some selected by rotation, paying
regard to geographic distribution. I"3 Executive Council members select their
own chair and vote similarly to the Conference of the States Parties. 54 The
members of the Executive Council are responsible to the Organization, not to
member states; thus, the Council will serve a less political role than the
Conference of States Parties.'55 The Executive Council supervises the
Technical Body; coordinates cooperation, consultation, and clarification among
the Parties; addresses non-compliance by Parties; determines requests for visits;
conducts relations with the Parties; and submits operational manuals to the
Conference of States Parties for approval.'56 The Executive Council may also
bring issues to the attention of the United Nations Security Council for further
action.15
7
The Technical Body includes a Director-General and other scientific,
technical and administrative personnel required by the body. 5 The Technical
Body will carry out verification measures as well as other functions assigned
by the other bodies of the Organization. 59 These tasks include processing
151. Protocol, supra note 139, at 91, art. IX (B) 12, 13.
152. Id. at 92, art. IX (B) 9918-20.
153. Id. at 94, art. IX (C) 25. Proposed text might also include importance of biotechnology
industry and political and security interests as factors for determining members. Id. Members shall be
distributed among five geographic regions: Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Western Europe
and other states. Id. at 94-95, art. IX (C) 25-26. Distribution on this basis will equitably represent the
nations of the world as a whole but may not adequately represent states with developed biotechnology
industries, as many of these nations are concentrated in Western Europe and the "Other States" region. A
bracketed proposal would restore balance by making the significance of the national biotechnology industry
a factor in determining members from each region. In this proposal, one-third of the seats of each region will
be occupied by the states with the largest biotechnology industries. Protocol, supra note 139, at 96, art. IX
(C) 28. These states could enjoy a similar status as permanent Security Council members, reflecting the
position of the largest states.
154. Id. at 97, art. IX (C) 32-35.
155. Id. at97, art. IX (C) 36.
156. Protocol, supra note 139, at 97-98, art. IX (C) 37.
157. Id. at 99, art. IX (C) 39bis (a).
158. Id. at 102, art. IX (D) 947.
159. Id. at 99, art. IX (D) 40.
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declarations by Parties, analyzing data on disease outbreaks, developing
operation manuals and assisting in visits. 6" Like the Executive Council, the
Technical Body is responsible to the Organization, not the Parties, allowing
greater neutrality in visits and verification tasks.' 6'
Under the verification regime, Parties must declare various facilities,
agents, and work conducted on biological agents to the Organization to promote
full knowledge of state activities and ensure compliance. Parties must declare
agents, equipment, and threshold levels of agents to the Organization upon
ratifying the Protocol, and yearly following the initial declaration. 62 In
addition, Parties must declare all past offensive or defensive programs after
ratifying the Protocol and declare all present defensive programs yearly,
including the results of research. 63 Parties must declare certain other facilities
yearly, including vaccine production facilities, maximum biological
containment laboratories, and high biological containment facilities.'" The
Protocol even requires Parties to declare non-vaccine facilities engaged in
producing medicines or chemicals having the capacity to grow agents above a
specified rate. 6  Thus, any facility capable of rapidly developing biological
agents must be declared.
In addition, Parties must declare various actions that could develop
biological weapons capability or assist in proliferation of biological weapons.
Parties must declare certain work with listed agents, including the capacity for
handling large quantities of agents, any work with certain highly dangerous
agents, application of genetic modification, or aerobiology. 66 Parties must
make yearly declarations of international transfers of listed agents. 6 Parties
must also declare suspicious disease outbreaks even if they are only similar to
diseases caused by listed agents but are undiagnosed. 168
160. Id. at 99-101, art. IX (D) 41-42.
161. Protocol, supra note 139, at 103, art, IX (D) 50-51.
162. Id. at 25-28, art. II (A) 1, (B) 1, (C) IN1-4, & (D) i-2.
163. Id. at 28-30, art. [] (D), Subparts (A) & (B) 3, 4, 7, 8.
164. Id. at 30-35, art. III (D), Subparts (C)-(E) 9, 12.
165. Id. at 39-41, art. m (D), Subpart (G) M15-16.
166. Protocol, supra note 139, at 36-39, art. Ill (D), Subpart (F) 13-14. "Work with listed
[biological] agents and toxins" includes "research, development, production and diagnosis using listed
[biological] agents ... including the study of properties of biological agents ... detection and identification
methods, genetic modification, aerobiology, prophylaxis, treatment methods and maintenance of[registered]
culture collections." Id. at 36, art. [I (D), Subpart (F), n. 23. Aerobiology is defined as "[t]he study of
aerosols comprising particles of biological origin." Id. at 37, art. III (D), Subpart (F), n. 25.
167. Id. at 4 1, art. 111 (D), Subpart (H) 18. This would prevent future sales ofagents similar to sales
by the United States and France to Iraq in the 1980s. See supra note 59.
168. Protocol, supra note 139, at 41, art. IM (D), Subpart (I) 20. This could not only help identify
acts of biological warfare but also allow detection of leaks from declared or undeclared facilities like the
Exceptions do apply to declarations, including exceptions for vaccine fac-
ilities devoted solely to animal consumption on premises; non-vaccine facilities
devoted solely to waste treatment or manufacture of soaps; and fertilizer or food
products facilities working with listed agents for the purpose of diagnosis of
disease or hygiene testing.'69 These exceptions do not provide significant.
loopholes for hiding offensive biological weapons programs. The Protocol still
requires declarations of high containment and maximum containment facilities.
Any lower level facility would pose risks to the local environment if
development of weapons occurred, allowing attention to be focused on them.
In addition to other declarations, states must submit titles of national legislation
regulating access to pathogen storage buildings and access to areas in which an
outbreak of infectious disease occurs. 7° These declarations set legal ground
work for any needed visits and allow effective verification.
The Protocol sets out four types of visits, including random, clarification,
request, and voluntary. '' A set number of randomly selected visits to declared
sites will occur each year distributed evenly among the five geographic groups
of states. 72 Parties will have only a limited number of hours' notice before the
visit, discouraging attempts at hiding non-compliance.' Clarification visits
will remove ambiguity in declarations of Parties and promote thoroughness and
honesty in declarations.'74 In addition, a state may request a voluntary visit to
build confidence in the regime or to resolve any concern related to biological
weapons.'
The Protocol specifies that inspection teams will carry out all visits in the
least intrusive manner. 76 In addition, Article IV of the Protocol specifically
requires the organization to take every precaution to protect the confidentiality
of information gathered in visits." Within limited privileges and immunities,
Parties can hold employees of the organization civilly liable for harm caused by
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information.'78 These provisions allow
Russian anthrax leak of 1979, preventing violations of BWC obligations.
169. Id. at 31-32, 38-39, 40, art. III (D), Subparts (C), (F), (G) 10, 14, 16.
170. Id. at 42, art. I1 (D), Subpart (K) 24.
171. Id. at 46, art. III (F) 11.
172. Id. at 46-47, art. Ill (F), Subpart (A) 2, 4.
173. Protocol, supra note 139, at 47, art. IllI (F), Subpart (A) 7.
174. Id. at 47-48, art. III (F), Subpart (B) 8.
175. Id. at 49, 50, art. Ill (F), Subparts (C), (D) 18, 23.
176. Id. at 47, 49, 50, art. I1 (F), Subparts (A)-(C) 3, 9, 22, 31.
177. Id. at 72, art. IV 71.
178. Protocol, supra note 139, at 73, art. IV 6. The Organization shall maintain the privileges and
immunities necessary for the exercise of its functions, but agreements between the individual Parties and the
Organization shall define the extent of these privileges and immunities. Id. at 103-104, art. IX (E) 753-57.
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a strong verification regime to exist without compromising the security required
for business interests. These measures can achieve greater compliance, as fear
of damage to biotechnology industries will not dissuade Parties from ratifying
the Protocol.
In addition to the visits authorized under the Protocol, provisions
specifically address investigations of non-compliance concerns. Parties may
request field investigations for alleged use of biological weapons or facility
investigations for other breaches of the BWC.'79 A Party may request
investigation regardless of the ownership of the facility, allowing investigation
of private companies as well as non-state actors. 80 Parties can request a non-
compliance inspection for conduct involving a non-party to either the Protocol
or the BWC, although in the latter case, the Organization shall cooperate with
the United Nations Secretary General.' To request an investigation, a State
Party must first attempt to resolve the issue through direct consultation and
cooperation; if this does not resolve the conflict, the Party must provide
information substantiating a claim of non-compliance." 2
The Director-General determines that if the request for investigation has
met the requirements to proceed further, the Executive Council will vote to
initiate action. ' Ifthe Executive Council decides to begin an investigation, the
Director-General shall issue a mandate to an investigation team for the conduct
of the investigation.' The Party being investigated shall provide access to
determine non-compliance, subject to its constitutional limitations regarding
proprietary rights and searches and seizures. 5 The investigated Party shall
have the right to limit access to sensitive areas unrelated to the investigation.
8 6
179. Id. at 56, art. III (F), Subpart (A) "4. In addition, language has been proposed to allow
investigations of transfers of biological agents or weapons. Id.
180. Id. at 57, art. I[ (F), Subpart (A) 6.
181. Protocol, supra note 139, at 57, art. m] (F), Subpart (A) 7-9. Proposed language would also
require cooperation with the United Nations Security Council, reflecting tension between large and small
states over the proper body to address non-compliance concerns. Id.
182. Id. at 58, art. III (F), Subpart (C) 1 1, 13. States should include any information on the non-
complying Party, circumstances surrounding the alleged event, location of any relevant facilities and evidence
of an outbreak of disease. Id. at 59-61, art. III (F), Subpart (C) t16-19.
183. Protocol, supra note 139, at 62-63, art III (F), Subpart (E) 21-26. The Protocol has two
proposals for voting, one of which requires either a two-thirds or three-fourths majority vote to begin an
investigation, the other requiring a three-fourths majority vote to halt an investigation. Id. at 63, art. [] (F),
Subpart (E) 26. The former type is known as a "green light" procedure, the latter as a "red light" procedure.
Pearson, supra note 138, at 5. The ultimate type of voting procedure adopted in the Protocol will have a
major impact on completion of investigations.
184. Protocol, supra note 139, at 63, art. [] (F), Subpart (F) 29.
185. Id. at 64, art. III (F), Subpart (G) 32.
186. Id. at 64, 65, art. III (F), Subpart (G) 34, 35. However, proposed language concerning
investigation of biological weapon use would require an investigated Party to allow members of an
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The investigation team will issue a Final Report, which the Executive Council
shall consider when deciding whether non-compliance has occurred.187
If the Executive Council determines that non-compliance has occurred, it
shall "take measures to redress the situation and to ensure compliance"
including recommending action to the Conference of States Parties.'88 The
Conference of States Parties shall take measures to redress the situation,
including restricting or suspending the non-complying Party's rights under the
Protocol, recommending collective measures to other Parties or bringing the
matter to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly or Security
Council."8 9 A Party subject to attack by biological weapons or threatened by
acts of non-compliance may request assistance from the other Parties, who must
provide assistance."9°
Several aspects of the Protocol to the BWC are noteworthy. First, the
Protocol would provide rapid response to any threat of biological warfare. The
various bodies of the Organization must respond to requests for investigation
within hours of receiving them.'9' In addition, the Protocol reflects
investigation team access to the restricted site if an investigation mandate could not be carried out otherwise.
Id. at 68, art. III (F), Subpart (G) 155. An investigated Party can also take measures to protect sensitive
facilities being investigated for other breaches of the BWC, including limiting inspection through the use of
random selection of buildings to be inspected or shrouding of sensitive pieces of equipment. Id. at 68-69,
art. III (F), Subpart (G) 57. Access may be limited by the investigated state, but the investigated Party has
the obligation to demonstrate that the areas of limited access were not related to non-compliance concerns.
Protocol, supra note 139, at 69, art. m (F), Subpart (G) 58.
187. Id. at 69, 70, art. III (F), Subparts (H), (J) 60, 62-63. The Executive Council also may
determine if the request for investigation had been abused, and may consider further action under applicable
international law, including sanctions, if it is determined the process was abused. Id. at 70-71, art. III (F),
Subpart (J) 163-64, 66. While the investigated State Party and the requesting State Party may participate
in the review process, they shall have no vote. Id. at 71, art. Il (F), Subpart (J) 67.
188. Id. at 71, art. III (F), Subpart (J) 67.
189. Protocol, supra note 139, at 75, art. V IN1-4.
190. Id. at 77-78, art. VI 7-10. "Assistance" includes "coordination and delivery.., of protection
against biological and toxin weapons." Id. at 76, art. VI 1.
191. The Director General must acknowledge receipt of a request to investigate within two hours,
communicate the request to the Party to be investigated within six hours and communicate to all other Parties
within twenty-four hours. Id. at 62, art. IlI (F), Subpart (E) 21. The Executive Council must decide on
whether to conduct an investigation within twelve hours of receipt, and if an investigation is decided upon,
the Party being investigated must provide access within an unspecified number of hours after receiving the
request. Id. at 62, 65, art. III (F), Subparts (E), (G) 25, 38. There is no time limit for the Executive Council
to adopt a decision, but it must review the Final Report of the investigation team "as soon as it is presented."
Protocol, supra note 139, at 70, art. IMl (F), Subpart (J) 63. If a Party requests assistance after the use of
biological weapons, the Director-General shall forward the request to the other Parties within twelve hours,
and shall begin an examination of the request within twenty-four hours to determine what further action by
the Organization is needed, delivering a report on further action to the Executive Council within seventy-two
hours. Id. at 77, art. VI 8, 9. The Executive Council must meet to review the report within twenty-four
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international politics, particularly reflecting desires of large and poor nations
differently than the CWC.' 9 Many features of the Protocol require greater
representation of developing nations than other treaties. Finally, the Protocol
recognizes other sources of international regulation, including international
environmental law, and accepts goals beyond non-proliferation and
disarmament, including development.'93
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Parties may complete the current rolling text to the BWC Protocol
within the next year. A move from a "loose" regime under the BWC to a
"strict" regime will be the likely result of the new Protocol. A new
international regime shall create disincentives to continue covert biological
weapons programs. Non-complying states would likely find themselves
quarantined from the rest of the international community, preventing the flow
of needed technology and scientific information. The regime will use the
United Nations Security Council to prevent states and non-state actors from
building effective weapons programs.
Concerns about a strengthened verification regime should not prevent the
United States from ratifying the Protocol. America's healthy biotechnology
industry would receive greater protection under the Protocol than under the
current BWC. In addition, the United States would gain greater security
through tougher compliance verification. Other states would have greater
representation in the organization established by the Protocol than they would
under the current regime, which places much of the decision making power
with the United Nations Security Council. Provisions reaffirming the necessity
of technology transfers will prevent the Protocol from interrupting the growth
of developing states. The Protocol must retain flexibility to adapt to changes
in the biotechnology field as they occur. In that respect, the Protocol lists of
biological agents and weapons must be capable of quick amendment. Overall,
hours and determine, by simple majority, on taking further action within twenty-four hours of receiving the
report. Id. at 78, art. VI 10. The vote by simple majority further simplifies the process, allowing decisions
to be reached with greater ease and preventing politics from hampering a response.
192. Cf. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 5, art. VIII (D) 45 with Protocol, supra note
139, at 102, art. IX (D) 148, requiring geographic distribution of the technical staff to be a factor in hiring.
In many respects, the Protocol mirrors the Chemical Weapons Convention. See also Pearson, supra note 138,
at 8-9.
193. Article VII states the Protocol will not be used to impede trade and development, and Parties
must endeavor to promote the peaceful advancement of science internationally. Protocol, supra note 139,
at 80-81, 83, art. VIII (B), (C) 3, 6. The Organization shall maintain a relationship with agencies engaged
in implementing Agenda 21 and the Convention on Biological Diversity, including sharing information on
biological agents, genetically modified organisms, and biosafety practices. Id. at 86, art. VIII (E) 11. See
also Agenda 21, June 13, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26 (1992).
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the prospects for biological weapons control will improve greatly with the
completion of the new Protocol while addressing a variety of other state
interests, including development and protection of property rights.
There are other reasons to favor international regulation of biological
weapons as a first line of defense. Some commentators believe large countries
need not fear verification as they have nuclear weapons to deter attackers,
while, the smallest and weakest countries have little to lose, as verification will
not change their strategic position. Only the medium states would see potential
diminution of their position."9 However, there are distinctions between nuclear
weapons and biological weapons that reduce the value of nuclear deterrence.
Deterrence is effective when it assures an opposing state an attack will result
in retaliation. A state can detect a nuclear attack before detonation of any
weapons; in addition, the attacker, the time of attack, and the potential targets
can be determined very quickly allowing immediate response. With a
biological weapon attack, the exact time of attack and target can be determined
only by investigating backward following an outbreak of disease. Unless an
attacker admits launching an attack, the victim and international community
must determine the identity of the aggressor. In the midst of a major epidemic,
preservation of forensic evidence might not be a high priority for medical
responders.' 95 Faced with the uncertainty of a response, a potential attacker
might not be deterred. Any retaliation using nuclear weapons would probably
occur months after the initial biological weapon attack, as the victim would
need to build a case against the aggressor to justify massive retaliation. An
immediate, unreasoned response would risk international condemnation if a
state could not present convincing evidence. Thus, nuclear deterrence probably
cannot adequately prevent biological warfare.
The issue of proof arises with spurious claims of biological warfare
alleged for propaganda value. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and
Soviet Union accused one another of biological weapons use, although neither
state gathered sufficient evidence to prove or disprove allegations." The
verification regime created by the Protocol could provide objective proof,
discouraging biased investigations and false claims while determining actual
194. SIPRI: COrrNUTY AND CHANGE 1966-1996, supra note 83, at 6.
195. George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 416; Harry C. Holloway, The Threat of Biological
Weapons: Prophylaxis and Mitigation of Psychological and Social Consequences, 278 JAMA 425, 425
(1997). See also Jonathan B. Tucker, National Health and Medical Services Response to Incidents of
Chemical and Biological Terrorism, 278 JAMA 362,364-65 (1997).
196. George W. Christopher, supra note7, at415. For instance, the United States accused the Soviet
armed forces of using "yellow rain," an aerosolized form of a biological agent, in Laos, Cambodia, and
Afghanistan, but could not prove allegations because of the inability to investigate adequately in remote
regions; ultimately the natural occurrence of bee feces was found to be a more likely cause of the "yellow
rain." Id.
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uses of weapons.'" Furthermore, the verification body established by the
Protocol could employ former Soviet researchers; utilizing scientists
experienced in biological weapons programs while preventing these
impoverished scientists from selling their skills to the highest bidder.'98
Finally, the political will to control biological weapons exceeds the desire
to control other weapons of mass destruction. International custom forbids the
use of biological weapons in war, while the status of nuclear weapons remains
unclear.' 99 Nations retain large nuclear arsenals and the political value of
attaining nuclear power status remains. The nuclear weapons tests exchanged
between India and Pakistan in the spring of 1998 highlight the attractiveness of
nuclear power status to some states.2" Biological weapons lack the prestige
value of nuclear weapons; biological weapons have no image comparable to a
nuclear test for populations to consider. No commensurate domestic political
gains would result from a nation admitting to perfecting a biological arsenal.
Given the limited utility of biological weapons for battlefield use, biological
weapons would not be worth the international condemnation that would follow
discovery of a biological weapons program. The only major use of biological
weapons would be as weapons of terror and mass destruction. Because of the
peculiar status of biological weapons and the lack of political or military
incentive to acquire them, most nations would be more likely to accept
international regulation.
197. Id. at414-15. North Korea and China accused the United States of using biological weapons
during the Korean War, but would not allow investigation by neutral organizations such as the Red Cross or
World Health Organization; when the United States introduced a resolution in the U.N. requesting an
investigation, the Soviet Union vetoed it, preventing the United States from clearing itself and resulting in
a loss of good will. Id.
198. While many Russian scientists are uncomfortable with significant career changes, particularly
those scientists who have devoted their lives to research, creative attempts have been made to convert
facilities to peaceful technologies, including the transformation of a research facility in Obelisk to a brewery.
Anne M. Harrington, Redirecting Biological Weapons Expertise: Realities and Opportunities in the Former
Soviet Union, 29 CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL. Sept. 1995, at 3-4, (visited Oct. 19, 1999)
<http://www.fas.harvard.edu/-hsp/>. Private investment may be insufficient to convert the former Soviet
program since many Western companies will not invest in old Russian facilities with poor safety standards.
Id. at 4. There is historic precedent for employing biological weapons scientists; upon being offered a
biological weapon by an Italian chemist, Louis IV of France gave him a pension on the condition he never
reveal his discovery. PAUL CHRISTOPHER, supra note 7, at 205.
199. See, generally Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 7.
200. Like the dreadnought battleship that created rivalry among European and Latin American
powers early in the century, prestige weapons like nuclear bombs often serve little security purpose. India
and Pakistan evidently felt the domestic political benefits of the tests outweighed the international
repercussions in the form of economic sanctions. Often the drive to acquire nuclear weapons is based on
these domestic political factors, not actual security interests: For instance, some claim French nuclear policy
only serves the purpose of preserving the French seat on the United Nation Security Council rather than any
real security interest. George Perkovich, Nuclear Proliferation, FOREIGN POL'Y, Fall 1998, at 12, 16.
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These circumstances should help momentum continue on strengthening
international regulation of biological weapons. The Parties should complete the
Protocol within the next few years, and if they carefully tailor verification
measures to promote compliance while protecting privately owned technology,
the new regime should enjoy widespread support. If the provisions of the
Protocol include protections of valid national interests, states will register few
objections to the Protocol. The unique international factors surrounding
biological weapons control will allow nations to support greater international
control.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As more and more foreign nationals attempt entry into the United States
by sea, legal scholars and lay persons have become interested in issues related
to alien rights. This topic has also created much controversy because litigants
are challenged with issues of first impression and the courts are pressed to
interpret a very complicated immigration statute. This paper seeks to address
the complexities of the recently enacted Immigration Reform and Immigration
Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA") as it relates to the interdiction of aliens
on the high seas.
Candidate for Juris Doctor, May 2000, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad College
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II. UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS' INTERDICTED IN UNITED STATES INTERNAL
WATERS: 2 Do SUCH ALIENS HAVE RIGHTS UNDER THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT?
Whether an alien interdicted in United States waters has an entitlement
under the United States immigration laws depends on whether the alien
qualifies as an "applicant for admission" under Section 235(a)(1) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), as amended by IIRIRA.3
IIRIRA, sometimes also referred to as The Reform Act, has created the
new category of "Aliens Treated as Applicants for Admission" under section
235 of the INA.4 An alien's classification within that category determines
whether such alien has a right to be heard, or whether he may be summarily re-
pulsed, or returned without any procedural requirements attendant to the INA.5
In determining whether an alien qualifies as an applicant for admission, it
is necessary to examine section 235(a)(1) of the INA which provides as
follows:
(1) Aliens Treated as Applicants for Admission -
An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or
who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port
of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States
after having been interdicted in international or United States waters)
shall be deemed for purposes of this Act an applicant for admission.6
Based on the clear language of section 235(a)(l) of the INA, it appears that
1. The term "Undocumented Aliens" refers to those aliens lacking a visa or other authorization
for lawful entry into the United States.
2. The term "Internal Waters" is defined for purposes of domestic law under 33 U.S.C. § 2003 as
"[t]he navigable waters of the United States shoreward ofthe navigational demarcation lines dividing the high
seas from harbors, rivers, and other inland waters of the United States and the waters of the Great Lakes on
the United States side of the International Boundary." This could include, for example, such locations as the
straits between the Florida Keys, portions of the Chesapeake Bay, or even the upper reaches of the Potomac
River.
3. It is significant to note that the amendments to the INA enacted by the Reform Act have
supplanted the technical term "entry" for "applicant for admission" as a legal threshold for such procedural
entitlements. Therefore, prior to IIRIRA, this issue would consider whether such an alien effected an "entry"
within the meaning of the INA and is thus entitled to deportation proceedings. Before'enactment of the
Reform Act, an alien's "entry" into the United States was generally regarded as a prerequisite to his
entitlement to deportation. Yang v. Maugans, 68 F.3d 1540, 1547 (3d Cir. 1995).
4. IIRIRA § 302(a).
5. This includes a removal proceeding under INA section 240, in the case of certain applicants for
admission whom the inspection officer determines are "not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted." See INA § 240.
6. INA § 235(a)(1).
aliens who are "present in," or have "arrived in" the United States, are deemed
applicants for admission.7 Upon a finding that an alien is an applicant for
admission, subject to the INA, the result is either admission to the United States
or removalfrom the United States. "
This conclusion raises the question whether an alien interdicted on a vessel
in the internal waters of the United States, before he has disembarked on dry
land, shall be deemed present in the United States or to have arrived in the
United States. It is conclusive that the wording of section 235 yields a negative
answer to that question.
Section 235 considers certain circumstances where an alien is "brought to
the United States after having been interdicted in United States internal
waters."9 If an unlanded alien interdicted in United States waters still must be
brought to United States soil, it follows that Congress did not deem that an
alien to be present or to have physically arrived in the United States at that
time.'0 Rather, Congress provides that the unlanded alien interdicted in United
States waters must be taken ashore to dry land before actual arrival. As a
result, this arrival must occur before he acquires the right for treatment as an
applicant for admission.
This offers the conclusion that unlanded aliens interdicted in internal
waters do not constitute applicants for admission, and therefore do not require
inspection or screening pursuant to section 235(b). It necessarily follows that
such aliens are not entitled to removal proceedings" under section 240. If the
examining officer determines that the interdicted alien qualifies as an applicant
for admission and is not "[c]learly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,"
the next step is removal proceedings. 2 In contrast, those aliens who do not land
on United States soil do not constitute applicants for admission and do not
7. Under the law, once an alien has legally entered the United States, that individual has certain
rights adjudicated only pursuant to a full removal hearing. However, if the individual is found in the United
States but never legally entered within the meaning of section 101 of the INA, the alien can be excluded
through the summary process of a removal hearing.
8. Removal Proceedings will be discussed in length in Part VI.
9. INA § 235(a)(1).
10. The definition of"United States" currently followed does not include waters or airspace subject
to thejurisdiction of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(38). Furthermore, as emphasized in a recent Third
Circuit Court of Appeals opinion, it cannot be said that the current definition implicitly includes territorial
waters. Yang, 68 F.3d at 1548. The court in Yang noted that the definition of United States prior to the 1952
enactment of the INA did include "waters ... subject to United States jurisdiction." This ascribed
considerable significance to the absence of waters from the current definition concluding that the "physical
presence" requirement of the former "entry" test is satisfied "only when an alien reaches dry land." Id. at
1548-49.
11. The amended INA's substitute for deportation proceedings.
12. JIRIRA § 302(a), INA § 235(b)(2)(A).
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require inspection or screening by an immigration officer. 3
The conclusion on this issue is a reflection of numerous Court decisions
which interpret the ambiguous concept of "physical presence in the United
States" in deciding whether aliens had effected an "entry" under the pre-Reform
Act provisions of the INA. These judicial decisions demonstrate that an
arriving alien's mere presence in United States waters does not establish the
requisite physical presence in the States unless and until the alien has physically
"landed" on United States soil. 4
The text of the amended section 235 of the INA is consistent with this
holding in that it declines to associate presence in United States waters with
presence in the United States. Accordingly, both the text of the amended INA
and pertinent judicial precedents confirm the view that an unlanded alien is not
entitled to removal proceedings, or any other proceedings under the INA,
merely because he is apprehended in the internal waters of the United States.
Only when such an alien has reached the United States or physically "brought
to the United States"" does he attain the status of an "applicant for admission"
and initiate the procedural requirements linked to that status.' 6
III. THE APPREHENSION AND TEMPORARY CUSTODY OF UNLANDED
ALIENS IN UNITED STATES INTERNAL WATERS: DOES
THIS CONSTITUTE AN ARREST?
Section 287 of the INA empowers any officer or employee of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") to make a warrantless arrest of
"[a]ny alien who, in his presence or view, is entering or attempting to enter the
United States in violation of any law or regulation made in pursuance of any
law regulating the admission, exclusion, or expulsion of aliens." 7 This
possibly suggests that if INS officers apprehend aliens within internal waters
who are entering or attempting to enter the United States, they are obligated to
bring them to a port of entry for the initiation of administrative proceedings.
However, pursuant to the following analysis, section 287(a)(2) does not entail
that; merely by interdicting aliens within internal waters, the INS is required to
initiate administrative proceedings against those aliens.
13. Section 235(a)(3) of the amended INA provides, "All aliens (including alien crewmen) who are
applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission or readmission to or transit through the United
States shall be inspected by immigration officers."
14. Yangv. Maugans, 68 F.3d at 1546-49; Zhangv. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732,754 (2d Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S.Ct. 1271 (1996) ("an alien attempting to enter the United States by sea has not satisfied the
physical presence element ... until he has landed").
15. The reference "brought to the United States" refers to dry land.
16. IRIRA § 302(a), INA § 235(a)(1).
17. INA § 287(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2).
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Pivotal for this analysis is the concept of an arrest. To aid in construing
the application of the immigration statute, concepts and procedures drawn from
the criminal law can provide helpful analogies. One view may hold that an
interdiction at sea will constitute an arrest under section 287(a)(2), at least
when an INS officer takes the occupants of a vessel into custody or subjects
them to actual restraints."8 Using case law as precedent to apply this view,
aliens would be afforded, at a minimum, the inspection procedure called for by
INS regulations."' Additionally, as a practical matter, this entitled such aliens
to a removal hearing."
While conceding that such an argument is plausible, it is not necessarily
persuasive. In the criminal context, an arrest normally "eventuates in a trip to
the station house and prosecution for the commission of a crime."'" More
generally, an "arrest" is not simply any deprivation of liberty under color of
law; rather, it is a seizure and subsequent detention of the person arrested for
the purpose of instituting some form of legal process against that person. 22 It
further "[r]equires an intent on the part of the arresting officer to bring a person
into custody to answer for a crime charged. ',2' As will be discussed below, INS
interdictions of aliens within the territorial waters of the United States do not
involve taking aliens into custody and holding them for further legal
proceedings. Further it is not considered an "arrest" as the traditional
understanding of the term.
Unfortunately, several of the most common techniques of statutory
construction are not instrumental in interpreting INA § 287(a)(2). Neither the
statutory text nor the regulations under it provide significant guidance. Case
law, at best, provides marginal guidance. Ultimately, this analysis will turn on
an account of the purposes of the section 287, and on harmonizing it with other
INA provisions.
18. Certain criminal cases reflect such a contention. See, e.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98,
103 (1959) (on facts of case, arrest took place when federal agents stopped car); Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S.
430, 431-32 (1973) (under State law, "arrest: required either taking into custody or actual restraint.").
19. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (1993).
20. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 provides that if the examining officer is satisfied that there is prima facie
evidence that the arrested alien entered or attempted to enter the country illegally, that officer "Is]hall refer
the case to an immigration judge for further inquiry in accordance with Parts 235 and 236 of this chapter or
take whatever other action may be appropriate or required under the laws or regulations applicable to the
particular case."
21. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16(1968).
22. United States v. Seslar, 996 F.2d 1058, 1060 (10th Cir. 1993) (arrests "are seizures
characterized by highly intrusive or lengthy detention").
23. United States ex rel. Spero v. McKendrick, 266 F. Supp. 718,724 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 409
F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1969).
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The definitional section of the INA, section 10124 does not include a
definition of "arrest," nor do the INS regulations in the Code of Federal
Regulations.25 Case law fails to clarify, through definition or illustration,
whether the interdiction of aliens within the territorial waters constitutes an
arrest. Two cases in a related area provide help in answering this question.
In the first case, a district court held that the seizure of a vessel is not an arrest
of the vessel's crew.26 Even if one assumes that a seizure of the JOSE
GREGORIO vessel occurred on March 21, that seizure did not constitute an
arrest of the defendants.27 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York found the three essential elements to evidence an arrest
were lacking. These elements include the fact that the Coast Guard officers did
not restrain them physically, curtail their liberty while aboard the ship, or
conduct a search of their persons.2 No arrest of the defendants occurred on
March 21 29 In the court's view, an arrest didoccur the following day, when the
Coast Guard boarded the vessel and placed two of the defendants under guard
after finding bales of marijuana.3°
In the second case, the United States District Court for the District of
Maine ruled that no arrest of an individual occurred when Coast Guard officers
approached a vessel and informed crew members on deck that they intended to31
inspect the vessel for compliance with all United States laws. The court noted
24. INA§ 101, U.S.C. § 1101.
25. 8 C.F.R. § 287 (1993). The regulations do, however, define the meaning by the reference in
Section 287(d)(1) to "an alien who is arrested by Federal, State, or local law enforcement official for a
violation of any law relating to controlled substances." "The term 'arrested,' as used in section 287(d)...
means that an alien has been - (1) Physically taken into custody for a criminal violation of the controlled
substance laws; and (2) Subsequently booked, charged or otherwise officially processed; or (3) Provided an
initial appearance before a judicial officer where the alien has been informed of the charges and the right to
counsel." 8 C.F.R. § 287(g).
26. United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1268 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
27. The Coast Guard patrol boat CAPE STRAIT was on routine patrol off Sandy Hook on March
20, 1980. Following instructions from the Coast Guard's Station, the officers were on alert for a vessel, the
JOSE GREGORIO, suspected of smuggling. On the morning of March 21, the CAPE STRAIT sighted the
vessel. Defendant's argued that JOSE GREGORIO was seized on the afternoon of March 21, upon the arrival
of another Coast Guard cutter and that the seizure resulted in an arrest of their persons. The court found to
the contrary that the seizure of the vessel did not result in an arrest. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1274.
31. United States v. Whitmore, 536 F. Supp. 1284, 1284 (D. Me. 1982). On Sunday, July 12,1981,
the Coast Guard cutter POINT HANNON was on a routine law-enforcement and search-and-rescue patrol
near the coast of Maine. The Commander noticed a sailboat (RELENTLESS) outside United States territorial
waters approaching. Finding it unusual for a sailing vessel to be approaching the coast of Maine from the
open sea, the Coast Guard paid special attention to their direction. Within two miles of POINT HANNON,
the Coast Guard decided to investigate. As they neared RELENTLESS, the Commander could smell what
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that "[w]hen a stop ends and an arrest begins has been the subject of numerous
judicial decisions."32 Here, even when the Coast Guard boarded the vessel with
a display of fire arms and drug kits, the stop did not convert into an arrest.33
"Utilization of force in making a stop will not convert the stop into an arrest if
precipitated by the conduct of the individual being detained."34 The arrest
occurred only after the discovery of the suspect behind a curtain below decks,
standing in front of numerous bales of marijuana. That scenario created
probable cause for the defendant's arrest.35
The Coast Guard cases suggest that law enforcement officials may stop a
vessel, board it with fire arms, and even search it, without ultimately placing
those aboard under arrest. As discussed above, case law does not draw a
definitive line on this issue. Each situation is unique and involves the
weighing and measuring of contrary indicators.
IV. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,807 - A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT INTERDICTIONS
IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS
The background and purposes of Executive Order 12,807 ("Order") are
described in the landmark Supreme Court decision Sale v. Haitian Cr. Council,
Inc.36 Although the Order, frequently referred to as the "Kennebunkport
Order, 37 is not limited to a specific nationality of aliens, it did respond to the
mass exodus from Haiti caused by the September 1991 military coup against the
Aristide government.3" Many of these Haitians fled their country to escape
severe political persecution by military and paramilitary forces.3 9 Within a
month, the number of refugees fleeing Haiti by boat dramatically increased,
outstripping the ability of the Coast Guard to process and safely accommodate
them collectively." The terms of the Order provided for the repatriation of
he believed from prior experiences and training to be marijuana. After a confrontation with defendant, the
Coast Guard boarded RELENTLESS. The trail of a strong odor of marijuana led to bales of the substance.
The Commander ordered the seizure of RELENTLESS and the arrest of its crew.
32. Id. at 1299, quoted in United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
33. Id.
34. Id. quoted in United States v. Beck, 598 F.2d 497, 501 (9th Cir. 1979).
35. Id. at 1300.
36. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 U.S. 2549 (1993).
37. President Bush issued the Order from his vacation home in Kennebunkport, Maine.
38. Id. at 2554-56.
39. Id.
40. During the six months after October 1991, the Coast Guard interdicted over 34,000 Haitians.
Because of the increase in crossings, the Coast Guard established temporary facilities at the United States
Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to process the Haitians. The temporary facilities, however, had a
capacity of only about 12,500 persons. In May 1992, the Coast Guard intercepted 127 vessels with 10,497
undocumented aliens. The United States Navy determined that no additional migrants could safely be
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undocumented aliens without the benefit of any screening process. The Order
reads in pertinent part as follows:
The President has authority to suspend the entry of aliens coming by
sea to the United States without necessary documentation, to
establish -reasonable rules and regulations regarding, and other
limitations on, the entry or attempted entry of aliens into the United
States, and to repatriate aliens interdicted beyond the territorial sea
of the United States.4'
President Bush's promulgation of Executive Order 12,807 precipitated
another round of legal challenges. The Supreme Court resolved those
challenges by holding that repatriating migrants to Haiti without first
determining whether they qualified as refugees42 was not prohibited by either
section 243 of the INA or Article 33 of the United Nations Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees.43 In an eight-to-one decision delivered by Justice
Stevens, the Court found that since neither of those provisions contained extra-
territorial applications, migrants interdicted at sea were not entitled to
deportation or exclusion proceedings." Both Section 243 and Article 33 apply
only to actions taken by the United States within its own territorial waters.
Therefore, nothing in domestic or international law prevents the President or
the Attorney General from involuntarily repatriating undocumented aliens
interdicted at sea even though some may have valid claims for political
asylum.43
accommodated at Guantanamo. Sharon E. Jacks, Bound by Past Policy: The Scope of Executive Discretion
in PoliticalAsylum Determinations, 15 HAMLINE L.REv. 389, 403 (1992).
41. The Order further reads in relevant part as follows:
(2) The international legal obligations of the United States under the United Nations Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees (citations omitted) to apply Article 33 of the United Nations Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees do not extend to persons located outside the territory of the United States; (3)
Proclamation No. 4865 suspends the entry of all undocumented aliens into the United States by the high seas;
and (4) there continues to be a serious problem attempting to come to the United States by sea without
necessary documentation and otherwise illegally. Exec. Order 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992).
42. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42)(A) defines a "refugee" as "any person who is outside any country of
such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which
such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling
to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country.because of persecution or a well founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion."
43. Sale, 113 U.S. at 2558.
44. As of April 1, 1996, "exclusion and deportation proceedings" were replaced with one
consolidated proceeding known as "removal proceedings."
45. See also Haitian RefugeeCtr., Inc. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1431, 1433 (1 th Cir. 1995) (finding
no statutory provision under the law of the Eleventh Circuit to prevent repatriation).
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The instructions to the Coast Guard included directives to "return the
vessel and its passengers to the country from which it came, or to another
country ... provided, however, that the Attorney General, in his unreviewable
discretion, may decide that a person who is a refugee will not be returned
without his consent."46 This language strongly suggests that the Coast Guard
is assigned the lead role in enforcing the Order, and in particular, delegates to
that agency the President's power to repatriate the aliens interdicted under the
Order. Coast Guard officers acting pursuant to their general law enforcement
authority are deemed agents of those executive agencies charged with
administration of a particular law.47 When the Coast Guard interdicts aliens at
sea, in order to assist in the enforcement of the INA, it is acting solely as the
agent of the INS.4
The primary difference between international sea interdictions and United
States internal water interdictions is that undocumented aliens are not afforded
any rights under the INA upon an international sea interdiction. They are
deprived of any screening process and the Coast Guard, upon their discretion,
can return the alien to the country from which they came.
V. THE INTERDICTION OF OUTBOUND CONVEYANCES WITHIN
UNITED STATES JURISDICTION
The principle purpose of interdicting aliens on the high seas is to prevent
illegal immigration and criminal alien smuggling.49 The traditional approach
involves the apprehension of aliens headed to the United States. Another
approach involves the apprehension of outbound vessels; vessels suspected of
departing the United States for purposes of illegal alien smuggling. The
question is whether the Coast Guard has the authority to stop a vessel departing
the United States upon grounds to believe crew members are about to engage
in illegal alien smuggling. Case law does not specifically address the issue of
outbound interdictions. This is an issue of first impression. Courts, however,
have addressed the issue of whether vessels engaged in illegal acts5" in
international waters are within United States jurisdiction giving the Coast
Guard authorization to search the vessel. Such illegal acts provide a direct
analogy to illegal alien smuggling which has become more popular. An
analysis of such case law follows.
46. Exec. Order No. 12,807 § 2(a).
47. 14 U.S.C. §§ 2, 89(b).
48. Id. See also United States v. One (1) 43 Foot Sailing Vessel, 405 F. Supp. 879, 882 (S.D. Fla.
1975). (The powers of the Coast Guard boarding officers as agents of other agencies under 14 U.S.C. § 89
"are in addition to and not a limitation on their powers to enforce laws as Coast Guard Officers.").
49. United States v. Padilla-Martinez, 762 F.2d 942, 945 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
50. For example, drug smuggling.
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When the Coast Guard attempts to seize a foreign vessel, they must fully
comply with certain standards set forth in 14 U.S.C. §89(a) which reads as
follows:51
The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections,
searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over
which the United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention,
detection, and suppression of violations of laws of the United States.
For such purposes, commissioned, warrant, and petty officers may at
any time go on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to
the operation of any law, of the United States, address inquiries to
those on board examine the ship's documents and papers, and
examine, inspect, and search the vessel and use all necessary force to
compel compliance. When from such inquiries, examination,
inspection, or search it appears that a breach of the laws of the United
States rendering a person liable to arrest is being, or has been
committed, by any person, such person shall be arrested or, if
escaping to shore, shall be immediately pursued and arrested on
shore, or other lawful and appropriate action shall be taken.
Section 89(a) empowers the Coast Guard to "search and seize any vessel on the
high seas that is subject to the jurisdiction or operation of any law of the United
States."52 In effect, the Coast Guard is not limited solely to the search of
domestic vessels, but rather to those over which the United States has
jurisdiction." Thus, merely because a vessel is of foreign registry or beyond
United States territorial waters, does not mean that the vessel is also beyond
United States jurisdiction.54 The United States has marked its position that its
jurisdiction extends to persons whose extraterritorial acts are intended to have
an effect within the sovereign territory.55 Consequently, if the members upon
a vessel commit illegal acts that will subsequently effect the United States, the
Coast Guard is within its jurisdiction to stop and seize the vessel.
Case law supports the notion that the Coast Guard may stop and board a
foreign vessel in international waters under 14 U.S.C. §89(a) if it has
"reasonable suspicion" that the vessel is engaged in criminal activity or any
other non-criminal activity which will affect the United States negatively.
5 6
Whether the Coast Guard has reasonable suspicion must depend on the "totality
51. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (West 1999).
52. Padilla-Martinez, 762 F.2d at 949.
53. Id. at 950.
54. Id.
55. Id., quoting United States v. Loalza-Vasquez, 735 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1984).
56. United States v. Pearson, 791 F.2d 867, 870 (1 th Cir. 1986).
of the circumstances."" If suspicion remains after the initial boarding and
document check, reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify the search of the
common areas of a foreign vessel on the high seas. 8 In United States v.
Pearson, the Coast Guard stopped and seized a vessel in international waters
whose intentions were to off-load its cargo of marijuana onto smaller vessels
bound for the United States.59 Likewise, in United States v. Meadows, the
Coast Guard had reasonable suspicion to board a vessel and investigate criminal
activity in the Caribbean for marijuana cargo bound for the United States.60
These types of scenarios require a case-by-case analysis and serve as a
direct analogy to illegal alien smuggling. A generous amount of case law
supports the Coast Guard and grants them, in the abundance of caution, the
power to stop, search, and seize vessels conducting activity which will have a
negative impact on the United States.6 Criminal activity in international waters
has the specific intention to facilitate such unlawful activities in the United
States. The effect of such crimes committed outside United States territory
takes place in the United States for jurisdiction purposes, and, in terms of the
regulation of immigration, it is unimportant where acts constituting the crime
occur.
VI. REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
IIRIRA was implemented last September and took effect on April 1, 1997,
and it represents one of the most significant changes to United States
immigration law in decades. 62 Congress extended its plenary power to affect
almost all immigrants and non-immigrants, whether in the United States legally
57. Id., quoting United States v. Reeh, 780 F.2d 1541 (1lth Cir. 1986).
58. Id., quoting United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1089 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
59. Id. at 871. While patrolling the waters of the Yucatan Peninsula, the Coast Guard received an
intelligence report of a large vessel dead in the water with only a mast light on. Approaching with its lights
out, the Coast Guard observed a rendezvous with a smaller vessel. The Coast Guard reasonably suspected
drug interactions. Upon such actions, the overwhelming smell of marijuana necessitated a search. After a
search, they discovered 17,500 pounds of marijuana. There was sufficient evidence to affirm that the smaller
vessels were bound for the United States.
60. United States v. Meadows, 839 F.2d 1489, 1490 (11th Cir. 1988). The Coast Guard observed
a vessel sitting very low in the waters of the Caribbean indicating the transportation of a heavy cargo. When
in contact with the captain, he claimed that their purpose was fishing, contrary to the conspicuous lack of any
fishing gear on board. The Coast guard officials also noticed apparently fresh damage to the vessel of the
kind found when two ships meet on the high seas and bump, as frequently occurs when marijuana is off-
loaded from a mother ship onto smaller ships for importation.
61. See also, United States v. Lopez, 761 F.2d 632 (1 th Cir. 1985), United States v. Padilla-
Martinez, 762 F.2d 942 (1 Ith Cir. 1985); Brulayv. United States, 383 F.2d 345 (9thCir. 1967); United States
v. Williams, 464 F.2d 599 (2nd Cir. 1972).
62. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
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or not.63 IIRIRA substantially amended the INA of 1952 and established a new
summary removal process for the adjudication of aliens claims who arrive in
the United States without proper documentation. The new rule reflected
Congress's conclusion that thousands of immigrants venture to enter the United
States illegally without the proper documentation each year.
6 4
The purpose of the new removal procedures serves to expedite the removal
of aliens who clearly had no authorization for admission into the United States.
These new rules separate removal proceedings into two distinct categories.
Section 235 of the INA provides the qualifications for aliens subject to
expedited removal in which an immigration inspector can order these aliens
removed without a formal hearing before an immigrationjudge. 6' On the other
hand, describes the procedures for aliens subject to "regular," non-expedited
removal proceedings which entitles them to a "full blown" hearing conducted
by an immigration judge.
A. Section 235 - Expedited Removal
Evidence of fraud, misrepresentation," or the lack of valid entry
documents67 will automatically subject an alien to expedited removal and an
order out of the country by the immigration inspector without further hearing
61or review. If the alien indicates an intention to apply for asylum or expresses
a fear of persecution from their home country, the alien will be referred to an
asylum officer6 9 for a "credible fear of persecution" determination followed by
expeditious review by an Immigration Judge ("IJ"), if requested by the alien.7"
The asylum officer will evaluate whether "[t]here is a significant possibility,
taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in
support of the alien's claim and such other facts as are known to the officer,
that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum."'" A person who
63. INA §§ 212,237 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1227 (1994 & Supp.II 1996).
64. H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1 at 158 (1996).
65. Under the regulations, any removal order by an inspecting officer "must be reviewed and
approved by the appropriate supervisor before the order is considered final." 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(7).
66. INA § 212(a)(6)(C).
67. INA § 212(a)(7).
68. INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(I). An applicant may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, be per-
mitted to withdraw his or her application and depart immediately from the United States. Id. § 235(a)(4).
69. For purposes of expedited removal, an "asylum officer" is an immigration officer with
professional training in country conditions, asylum law, and interviewing techniques comparable to the
training the INS provides to its full-time asylum officers, and supervised by someone who has had such
training as well as "substantial experience" adjudicating asylum claims. Id. at § 235(b)(1)(E).
70. Id. § 235(b)(1)(A)(ii).
71. Id. § 235(b)(1)(B)(v).
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demonstrates a credible fear shall be "[d]etained for further consideration ofthe
application for asylum." The failure to demonstrate a credible fear renders an
automatic order of removal and detention until removed.'
A removal order issued by either an IJ or an immigration officer is equally
effective. These expedited removal orders are generally not subject tojudicial
review. The only situation that necessitates review is through habeas corpus
proceedings and those types limited to determinations of whether the petitioner
is a foreign person; whether the petitioner was ordered removed under
expedited procedures; and whether the petitioner can prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that he or she is a lawful, permanent resident, refugee or
asylee." Therefore, it is crucial that the process be subject to strict scrutiny by
the public, advocate groups, and Congress. This ensures that the basic rights
of all foreign nationals are preserved and that persons who face removal from
the United States are given every opportunity to express any concerns at any
point during the expedited removal process.
The consequence of an expedited removal order is that the alien is
precluded from returning to the United States for a period of five years. If the
alien is subject to a second or subsequent removal, the preclusion period is
twenty years. Applicants for admission who have been removed and convicted
of an aggravated felony74 will be permanently barred from entry into the United
States." IRIRA significantly amended the definition of "aggravated felony"
to include any crime for which the term of imprisonment exceeds one year.76
Furthermore, this new definition of aggravated felony provides for retroactivity
to varying degrees." Therefore, an alien may find an aggravated felony on his
or her record even if the conviction was entered before the enactment of the
statute.
B. Section 240 - Non-Expedited Removal
Aliens who cannot establish that their admissibility does not fall within the
72. Id. §§ 235(b)(1)(B)(ii), (B)(iii).
73. INA. § 242(e)(2).
74. This bar applies even if the alien is not charged and removed as an aggravated felon.
75. Id. at § 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(c) (Supp. 1 1996).
76. An aggravated felony now includes certain crimes of violence, theft, burglary, racketeering,
gambling offenses, counterfeiting, document fraud, commercial bribery, forgery or trafficking in vehicles with
altered identification numbers, obstruction ofjustice, perjury, and bribery of a witness. Also included are
crimes involving rape and sexual abuse of a minor and violations of laws relating to protecting the identity
of an undercover agent See IIRIRA, § 321 (1996).
77. For a more detailed discussion of the retroactivity issue, See, Sara Candioto, The Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: Implications Arising from the Abolition of Judicial Review of
Deportation Orders, 23 J. Legis. 159 (1997) and Anjali Parekh Prakash, Changing the Rules: Arguing
Against Retroactive Application of Deportation Statutes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1420 (1997).
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scope of the expedited removal procedures of section 235(B)(1) are placed into
regular removal proceedings under section 240. g The statute gives the Attorney
General the discretion, however, to apply expedited removal procedures to
persons already present, but without having previous admission, and who would
otherwise be subject to regular removal proceedings, unless they can establish
continuous presence in the United States for the last two years.79
Once the INS chooses to charge an alien with removability under section
240, the INS initiates an administrative hearing before an IJ by filing a Notice
to Appear ("NTA") for removal proceedings.80 The INS must decide after
filing the NTA whether the alien will remain in detention until the hearing or
released on bond."'
At the initial removal hearing before the IJ, the alien and the INS have the
opportunity to present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses.8 2 The alien
will generally testify and plead to the allegations if he or she has not already
pled. 3 The burden of proof is initially on the alien to demonstrate lawful
residence in the United States." The burden then shifts to the INS to prove
deportability grounds.8 5 At the conclusion of the administrative hearing, the IJ
must decide whether to issue an order of removal or to grant relief from
removal.8 6 Either party maintains the option to appeal an adverse decision by
the IJ to the Board of Immigration Appeals by either party. 7
VII. CONCLUSION
It appears that the Congress is moving toward stricter immigration
practices as evidenced by the enactment of IIRIRA. It will be interesting to see
what direction the INS will take to enforce the provisions of IIRIRA. It appears
that the Congress has given the INS the tools to deter illegal immigration, and
whether these tools will be utilized remains to be seen.
78. An exception exists for crewman and stowaways, who are not eligible for such proceedings.
See INA § 235 (b)(2). Stowaways may apply for asylum but cannot apply for admission. See id. § 235 (a)(2).
In addition, a provision in the statute exempts Cubans who arrive by air. Expedited removal procedures may
not apply to "an alien who is a native or citizen of a country in the Western Hemisphere with whose
government the United States does not have full diplomatic relations and who arrives by aircraft at a port of
entry." Id. § 235 (b)(l)(F). Such persons would be placed into regular removal proceedings.
79. See INA § 235(b)(l)(A)(iii).
80. INA § 239(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (Supp. II 1996).
81. Id. at § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (Supp. II 1996).
82. Id. at § 240(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (Supp. II 1996).
83. 8 C.F.R. § 242.16(b) (1997).
84. INA § 240(c)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(B).
85. Id. at § 240(c)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A).
86. Id. at § 240(c)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(l)(A).
87. 8 C.F.R. § 242.2 1(a) (1997).
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I. INTRODUCTION
A grand jury report issued in the spring of 1998 provided that the children
of Broward County, Florida, placed in the protection of the Department of
Children and Families ("DCF"), are in peril.' This report gives great insight
into the workings of an agency on the brink of collapse. This is not the first
grand jury report issued on the well-being of Broward County's children.
Grand juries were called in 1981, 1984, and 1986 to investigate issues such as
abuse at detention centers, children in the court systems, and services provided
for dependent children.2 All three reports found significant problems, yet the
system has not improved.' Although Broward County ranks among the worst
counties in Florida for providing adequate services for abused, neglected, or
abandoned children, this is a statewide problem.4 As a result, the Florida
* Candidate for Juris Doctor May 2001, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad College
of Law and a staff member of the lISA Journal of International and Comparative Law.
1. Broward County, Fla. Grand Jury, Interim Report (Spring 1998) unpublished report on file with
the lISA Journal of International and Comparative Law.
2. Id. at2.
3. Id. at 15.
4. According to § 1, abandonment is when no provisions for a child's support are made and no
effort to communicate with the child is made sufficient to evince a willful rejection of parental obligations.
FLA. STAT. § 39.01(1) (1999). According to § 2, abuse is any willful act or threat that results in physical,
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Legislature mandated a statewide initiative to improve the system.' The State
Attorney, DCF, the Broward County Sheriff's Office, children's rights
advocates, and various volunteer organizations are in search of alternative
methods to guarantee the health and safety of every child in the state's custody.
An analysis of international children's services reveals that the United
States is not alone in dealing with the difficulties of addressing the problems of
inadequate foster care. Child social services, such as foster care and protective
services, are in crisis on a global scale. Investigating various international child
welfare systems enables one to identify problems common to many countries.
Logic tells us that it is impossible to create an effective solution without
correctly identifying the problem. Looking at implemented solutions of Canada
and the United Kingdom will bring a global perspective into the arena of
childcare.
This article will begin with an overview of a typical United State's
children's social services system. Broward County represents an example of
a system in distress because of the adversity it faces and the massive
restructuring that is currently being implemented. The reader will learn how a
child progresses through the system to ultimately end up in a flawed foster care
system. Next, a discussion about efforts employed by the United Kingdom and
Canada to address these problems is presented.
H. HOW A CHILD ENDS UP IN FOSTER CARE AND THE PROBLEMS
ASSOCIATED WITH THE PROCESS.
Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes governs all legal proceedings relating
to children. The legislative purpose of the chapter is "[t]o provide for the care,
safety, and protection of children in an environment that fosters healthy, social,
emotional, intellectual, and physical development; to ensure secure and safe
custody; and to promote the health and well being of all children under the
state's care."6 The purpose of the statute is broad and difficult to implement.
The problems facing Broward County demonstrate the complexity involved
with attempts at designing a system to handle the complex needs of children in
foster care.
mental, or sexual injury that causes or is likely to cause a the impairment of a child's physical, mental, or
emotional health. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(2) (1999). According to § 46, neglect occurs when a child is deprived
of necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment; or when a child is allowed to live in an environment
where his physical, mental, or emotional health is in danger of being impaired. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(46)
(1999).
5. Broward County, Fla. Grand Jury, supra note 2, at 25.
6. FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1)(a) (1999).
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This Florida statute gives DCF jurisdiction in all matters where a child has
been abused, abandoned, or neglected.7 DCF's failure to effectively perform
its delegated duty is the source of the problem in Broward County. An
overview of the steps used by DCF to move a child through the system will help
illustrate this problem.
A. Cycle of Neglect
This cycle begins with the reporting and investigation process. Suspected
or known cases of abuse, neglect, or abandonment are reported to the state's
Child Abuse Hotline.8 The hotline then reports the cases to the appropriate
DCF District.9 Through its protective services division, DCF investigates the
reports and issues a determination of either unfounded, valid, or required court
intervention.'0 If the complaint is deemed valid, DCF will first provide the
family in-home social services, such as counseling and education to avoid
removing the child or children from the home." In cases where the risk of harm
to a child is high, the investigator will require court intervention.' 2 Two types
of petitions can be made to the court at this juncture. 13
First, Florida law requires DCF to file a petition for shelter.'4 This is done
in emergency situations when a child needs alternative housing immediately.'5
Pursuant to Florida law, this must be done within twenty-four hours of the
child's removal. 6 The court can order the child to return home in order to
preserve the family unit. Alternatively, the court can order the child to remain
in state custody to prevent the child from enduring further abuse or neglect.'
Second, a dependency petition can be filed. DCF files a dependency
petition to obtain "... a permanent, judicial resolution of the alleged abuse or
neglect problem."' 8 This is commonly referred to as a child becoming a
"dependent" of the state.
7. FLA. STAT. § 39 (1999).
8. Broward County, Fla. Grand Jury, supra note 2, at 4.
'9. Id.
10. Id at 5.
11. Id
12. Id.
13. Broward County, Fla. Grand Jury, supra note 2, at 4.
14. FL.A. STAT. § 39.402(2) (1999).
15. Id at § 39.402(1)(a).
16. Id. at § 39.402(8)(a).
17. Broward County, Fla Grand Jury, supra note 2, at 5.
18. Id at 6.
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In extreme instances of child neglect or abuse, DCF will initiate
proceedings for the termination of parental rights. In such cases, "the issue is
whether the child will be permanently taken away from custody of the parent
or parents and placed for adoption in the custody of DCF."' 9 A child ordered
dependent will remain dependent until the court relinquishes custody or until
the child turns eighteen.20 Upon finalization of the termination of parental
rights, DCF automatically places the child for adoption.'
DCF places children who are in their physical custody into two distinct
types of housing: shelter and foster care. A child is sent to "shelter" upon
removal from his or her home. Shelters resemble foster care homes; however,
they exist to provide a removed child a temporary residence until a more
permanent placement can be secured. DCF places the child in foster care when
he or she needs out-of-home care for an extended period of time or becomes
eligible for adoption. Foster homes intend to serve as a surrogate family for the
child. DCF's goal, achieved through appropriately placing a child, is to provide
the child with stability and permanency in one setting. Unfortunately, children
are often bounced from one foster home to another, directly undermining the
goal of stability. This bouncing effect is attributable to the difficulty DCF faces
trying to place a child in a home that serves his or her best interests.
Furthermore, the lack of well-trained foster parents, combined with a high
number of physically, emotionally, or mentally-handicapped children, increase
the chances of a failed placement.
Although the 1998 grand jury cited problems throughout Broward
County's children's social services, it found particular danger in the foster care
system." Having worked for a children's rights advocate, I had the opportunity
to witness these problems first hand. 3  The lack of organization and
communication within DCF was immediately apparent.
One instance of institutional neglect by DCF was so severe that the child
had over 30 placements in four years.24 Because of his severe emotional
handicap, DCF contended they could not find an appropriate setting for the




22. Broward County, Fla. Grand Jury, supra note 2, at 17.
23. I had the opportunity to work for Andrea Moore, Esq, a children's rights advocate, during the
summer of 1999. She represents physically, mentally, and emotionally disabled foster care children on a pro
bono basis to ensure their statutory rights are protected. I helped her advocate for appropriate foster care
placements and appropriate educational resources.
24. Due to the sensitive nature of the case and to protect the identity of the child the name of the
child, the case number, and any other identifying characteristics have been purposely omitted.
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between foster homes. He lived in family homes, group homes, residential
treatment facilities, hospitals, and even juvenile justice centers. Because of the
child's constant movement, he never received the psychological treatment or
basic education he required. As a result, the child is functionally illiterate and
has few personal or social skills, and may continue to be a danger to himself
and others once discharged from foster care.
Similar situations have been documented. The 1998 grand jury report
discusses many instances of children being abused and neglected while in the
custody of DCF.
One foster care mother allowed her child to miss nearly half a school
year.25 Instead of forcing the child to attend school or reporting the problem to
his caseworker, she allowed him to pay her a quarter a day as an alternative to
attending classes.26 As a result of this lack of supervision and prior abuse, the
child can barely read or write.27 Additionally, the same foster care mother
frequently had other children run away from her home.2 However, because of
the large number of children she cared for combined with a shortage of
placements, DCF never reprimanded her for her behavior nor prevented her
from being a foster care provider.29
Another foster care mother gave her foster child a whistle to blow in case
an older child living in the house sexually attacked him. Obviously, a better
solution would have been to notify the caseworker so that the children could be
separated before such an incident arose.
There are also problems with abuse of children in residential treatment
facilities. Most treatment facilities are privately owned, but are under contract
with the state to provide shelter and treatment for children in the state's
custody.3" At one facility, the grand jury found mentally handicapped children
being ridiculed by other children at the facility.3 They also found instances of
employees beating children and even dragging them across the floor by their
hair.32 Once secluded, they punched them repeatedly.33 Remarkably, there
were more than twelve reports of abuse that remained unreported to the courts
until weeks following the incidents. 4





30. FLA. STAT. § 39.001(2) (1999).
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In another case, a DCF caseworker allowed an abandoned child to live
with his or her aunt." In most instances, leaving the child with a family
member is beneficial to both the child and the parent, but in this case it was
potentially fatal, for the aunt's husband was a convicted sex offender.36 Even
so, the child lived with the couple for years."
The grand jury not only accused caseworkers of leaving children in
dangerous homes, but also found evidence of falsifying records, and misleading
judges.3" More astonishing was the number of cases where protective services
(a division of DCF) determined a child was at high risk for abuse, neglect, or
abandonment, but did nothing to help cure the problem.
Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes provides certain general protections for
children of the state.39 Most notably, it provides for protection from abuse,
neglect, and abandonment." Unfortunately, most children under physical
custody of the state are not afforded these statutory protections. The situations
described above are all too common.
The Department of Children and Families, along with the private agencies
whom DCF contracts with to provide emergency shelter and foster care, aspire
to provide the statutory protections. However, lack of financial support
undermines their efforts. Over the past two years the number of foster care
35. Sally Kestin, Children's Safety Net Collapsing; Grand Jury Finds Cash Strapped System Fails
Kids Again and Again Series: Kids in Crisis, A Continuing Investigation, Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel,




39. FLA. STAT. § 39.001(3) (1999), provides General protections for children as follows:
(a) Protection from abuse, abandonment, neglect, and exploitation.
(b) A permanent and stable home;
(c) A safe and nurturing environment which will preserve a sense of personal dignity and
integrity;
(d) Adequate nutrition, shelter, and clothing;
(e) Effective treatment to address physical, social, and emotional needs, regardless of
geographical location;
(f) Equal opportunity and access to quality and effective education, which will meet the
individual needs ofeach child, and to recreation and other community resources to
develop individual abilities;
(g) Access to preventative services;
(h) An independent, trained advocate, when intervention is necessary and a skillful
guardian or caregiver in a safe environment when alternative placement is necessary.
40. FLA. STAT. § 39.001(3)(a) (1999).
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children in Broward County has increased by twenty percent.4' Twelve
percent42 of Broward County's children live in out-of-home care. 43 Logically,
it would seem that Broward County should receive twelve percent of the state
budget to fund these programs to correspond to the number of children who
receive that type of care. However, in reality Broward County only receives
eight and one half percent of the state budget allocated to out-of-home care."
Due to this shortage in funds, foster care homes have become overcrowded and
understaffed.
The critical funding shortage also created a system of overworked,
underpaid social workers, resulting in a high employee turnover rate. For
example, every foster care worker in Broward County handles on average
between forty and fifty cases.45 State law mandates that caseworkers visit their
foster children on a monthly basis." Most caseworkers are forced to work
approximately fifty-seven hours a week to manage their caseloads.47 With a
low salary averaging $25,000 each year and no overtime pay, it is easy to see
why many caseworkers seek employment elsewhere. The State cannot afford
to lose valuable social workers due to severely inadequate pay and bad working
conditions. The state of disaster that Broward County's foster care system is
in makes this loss even harder felt.
I. MOVING TOWARDS PRIVATIZATION
One of the proposed solutions to Florida's foster care crisis is
privatization. 4' The Florida Legislature gave DCF two years to make the
transition towards privatization in 1998. 4" The 1998 grand jury was not
convinced that this change will solve the problems of a system on the verge of
collapse. 0 First, the allegations of abuse by workers at private facilities are
numerous enough to indicate that private care is not better than public care.5 '
Second, there is no guarantee that additional funding will be provided to
41. Broward County, Fla. Grand Jury, supra note 2, at 18.
42. Id
43. Id Out of home care includes children in foster homes, residential group care, and children in
the Independent Living Program.
44. Broward County, Fla. Grand Jury, supra note 2, at 18.
45. Id
46. Id. at 17.
47. Id. at i8.
48. Money, Accountability Will Ease Problems in Child Welfare System, Fort Lauderdale Sun
Sentinel, November 27, 1998 at 22A.
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support the switch from the public to the private sector. 2 Third, child
advocates fear that agencies will simply turn away special needs children.
Additional concerns, such as the state's ability to monitor these programs and
lack of incentive for the organizations to report abuse, have also been cited. 3
During the summer of 1999, the State Attorney's Office sponsored a
Foster Care Summit to address Broward County's near state of emergency.
Privatization ranked among the top issues addressed at this summit. While
many concerns were identified, few feasible solutions were provided. Many
observers in attendance at this summit believe that an increase in funding, with
proper allocation, may assist in resolving these problems.
Unfortunately, money cannot solve the faults of the entire system.
Accountability is needed in addition to increased funding. Regular reviews
should be conducted on all agencies involved in child welfare. 4 For example,
"[e]mployees should never be allowed to keep theirjobs after falsifying records
or reports to the court."" Unfortunately, even though several caseworkers were
accused of practicing such heinous behavior, most of them still retained their
jobs.56
IV. A LOOK AT THE UNrrED KINGDOM'S AND CANADA'S
FOSTER CARE SYSTEM
A. United Kingdom
The Children's Act of 1989 governs the removal and accommodation of
children by police in cases of emergency in the United Kingdom."
Surprisingly, this statute gives the police great discretion in removing children
and caring for them during the interim of removal and emergency shelter. The
statute uses language such as "reasonable" and "practicable" to describe the
requirements of removal and care.5" It provides that when there is reasonable
cause to believe that the child will suffer significant harm, the police may
remove the child from his or her home. It goes on to require the constable to
inform local authorities and the child's guardians of the removal as soon as
"reasonably practicable."59 The Act allows for visitation or contact from the
parents when the officer believes that it is "reasonable" and in the "best
52. Id
53. Id
54. Money, Accountability Will Ease Problems in Child Welfare System, supra note 49.
55. Id
56. Id.
57. Children's Act of 1989 Ch. 46 (1989) (Eng.).
58. Id
59. Id. at Ch. 46(3) (Eng.)
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interests" of the child.6" Clearly, from the language of the statute, the United
Kingdom provides its police very little guidance for the removal and care of
these children in emergency situations.
Section 31(2) of the Children's Act of 1989 lays out the criteria the court
uses when deciding whether to issue a care order.6' Two separate elements
must be proven in order for the court to grant the order. First, the child must be
suffering or likely to suffer significant harm.62 Second, the harm must be
attributable to either the care given to the child or to the care likely given if the
order is not granted.63 It is clear to see how the language of this statute can be
confusing. Because of its vague nature, the courts have experienced great
difficulty with interpreting this statute.
The case of Lancashire County Council v. A; Lancashire Council v. B
clarifies the standard the British court uses for granting a care order in the face
of neglect or abuse of a child.6" In this case, applications were made on behalf
of two children for care orders.65 The children were not related, and the child's
mother cared for them.66 Medical records and testimony by the children's
guardians could not establish the original cause of abuse.67 As a result of
insufficient factual evidence, the judge dismissed the application as to the
second child.6' The judge remarked, "[a] conclusion that the child is suffering
or is likely to suffer harm must be based on facts, not just on suspicion." '69 At
this point, with both elements met, courts may grant an order placing the child
in foster care until a determination for family reunification or adoption occurs.
60. Id. at Ch. 46(10) (Eng.).
61. IM at Ch. 31(2) (Eng.).
62. Children's Act of 1989 Ch. 31(2) (1989) (Eng.).
63. Id.





69. Lancashire Council v. A; Lancashire Council v B., 3 FCR 241, 1999 WL 809460 (C.A. 1999).
The entire paragraph may be helpful since this is merely the conclusion:
"These are among the difficulties and considerations Parliament addressed in the Children Act of 1989 when
deciding how, to use the fashionable terminology, the balance should be struck between the various interests."
As I read the Act Parliament decided that the threshold for a care order should be that the child is suffering
significant harm, or there is a real possibility that he will do so. In the latter regard the threshold is
comparatively low. Therein lies the protection for children. But, as I read the Act, Parliament also decided
that proof ofthe relevant facts is needed if this threshold is to be surmounted. Before the section 1 welfare
test and the welfare 'checklist' can be applied, the threshold has to be crossed. Therein lies the protection
for parents. They are not at risk of having their children taken from them and removed into the care of the
local authority on the basis only of suspicions, whether of the judge or of the local authority or anyone else.
A conclusion that the child is suffering or is likely to suffer harm must be based on facts, not just suspicion.
1999]
166 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 6:157
In the United States, if the care order is granted the child will be placed
into foster care. While every country aspires to have them receive better care
by the government than the care they received at home, that is not the case. The
following case illustrates similar problems the United Kingdom is experiencing
with her foster care system.
In Barrett v. Enfield London Borough Council, the court was given the
daunting task of deciding whether to allow an appeal from a dismissal. In usual
circumstances, this task is not so daunting. However, in this case the plaintiff
was a child suing the local authorities for negligently caring for him while in
their custody.0 The plaintiff filed suit after leaving the custody of the local
authorities at the age of eighteen.' Plaintiff had been in their custody since the
age often months.' During his childhood, he was placed in nine different set-
tings ranging from foster homes to group therapy homes." Additionally, he had
five different social care workers and in one year, he had no social worker.'4
Plaintiff alleged that the local authorities breached their duty to act as a
parent." In particular, he alleged:
... [they] negligently failed to safeguard his welfare, negligently
made two placements with foster parents, moved him six times to
different residential homes between 1976 and 1988, failed to make
arrangements for his adoption, failed to provide him with proper
social workers, failed to provide appropriate psychiatric advice and
failed to make proper arrangements to reunite him with his mother.7
The plaintiff claimed that these alleged breaches of duty are the cause of
his severe psychiatric problems, which caused him to injure himself and led to
his abuse of alcohol." Furthermore, the plaintiff claimed that both a statutory
and common law breach of duty occurred. The district court judge dismissed
the case. In deciding whether to allow the appeal, the House of Lords con-
sidered the impact that holding public officials liable for institutional neglect
would have on public policy.78 Ultimately, the court granted the appeal.79
70. Barrett v. Enfield London Borough Council, 3 All ER 193 (H.L. 1999).
71. d at 193.
72. Id
73. Id. at 201.
74. Id.
75. Barrett, 3 AlI ER 193 at 201.
76. Id. at 196.
77. Id
78. Id
79. Barrett, 3 AlI ER 193 at 196.
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Citing to Lord Woolf in X and ors (minors) v. Bedforshire CC the court
noted:
[T]hat to hold a local authority or its agents liable in cases such as the
present would be to encourage a 'safety first' approach by social
workers which would be detrimental to children in care as a whole,
i.e. it would be bad public policy."
This statement, provides great insight into the policy ideas behind the United
Kingdom's child protection laws.
The statement made by Lord Woolf implies that the court's first concern
is to keep family units intact. If the United Kingdom held state officials liable
for negligence in the care of their dependent children, it would likely lead to a
transition in policy. Rather than concentrating on keeping family units intact,
case workers would remove more children for fear of being liable if these
children were subsequently harmed. Alternatively, the goal of Florida's
children's social services statute"1 changed to "safety first" after numerous
allegations of children being left in abusive or neglectful homes.82 This switch
in policy represents one of the causes of Florida's overcrowded foster care
system. Deciding which of the two evils is the lesser is a futile endeavor. The
problems with leaving a child in an abusive home, and hoping that counseling
and rehabilitative services will help are obvious. Many times those services are
rejected by the parents or are simply ineffective. However, removing a child
and submitting him to state care could be equally traumatic. As illustrated by
the above case law, the United Kingdom experienced similar shortcomings with
their children's social services.
To alleviate some of the child social services problems prevalent in the
United Kingdom, Parliament instituted its first national standards for foster
care.83 The impetus for setting the standards was the murder of a thirteen-year-
old child by her foster father.U These new standards strive to provide the best
quality care possible to the United Kingdom's foster children. 5 For example,
these standards aim to match children with the most appropriate foster family,
improve education for foster care children, provide better training for foster
80. Id.
81. FLA. STAT. §39.001(I)(b)(1) (1999).
82. Broward County, Fla. Grand Jury, supra note 2, at 10.
83. UK Government: First National Standards for Foster Care, M2 Presswire, June 22, 1999.
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care workers, provide support and supervision, and accept only the most
qualified candidates to work in the foster care system. 6
To ensure meeting these goals, the United Kingdom included in its
national standards a law requiring local authorities to run police checks on all
potential foster care workers."7 This applies to any member of a foster family
who is over the age often. By the year 2001, "[a]dults should have to account
for all time since leaving school, including paid employment, voluntary and
leisure activities, and should provide a chronological record of all places of
residence." ' If the applicant cannot provide the information, he or she will be
precluded from being a foster care provider.
The United Kingdom's enactment of national foster care standards
represents a step in the right direction. Implementing stricter standards for
foster care will ensure a more qualified population of foster care providers.
While these stricter standards seek to protect the best interests of the child,
problems such as the overcrowding of approved foster homes may result. To
counter this problem, efforts should be made to increase recruitment of
competent foster care providers.
B. Canada
Inadequate child social services epitomize a global problem. Like the
United Kingdom, Canada suffers from its own problems with its foster care
system. Alberta, Canada, represents another area which felt the effects of a
poorly funded foster care system. 9 Due to the lack of economic support from
the government, Alberta was forced to send its most vulnerable children to live
with families not equipped to handle them.9
Many children benefiting from social services have severe psychological
problems and desperately need rehabilitative services. This holds true in the
United States as well as in Alberta, Canada. Often foster parents are unable to
handle these types of problems, due to the lack of adequate training provided
to them. Ultimately, children coping with serious psychological trauma are
branded as trouble kids merely because they did not receive the appropriate
social services, such as early intervention. By the time they are placed into
foster care, these problems are difficult to overcome by their inexperienced, or
86. Id
87. David Brindle, Councils Urged To Ver Foster Families, The Guardian (England), June 22,
1999.
88. Id.
89. Doug Beazley, Report Says Kids Placed In Marginal Foster Homes, The Edmonton Sun
(Canada) at 8, August 7, 1999.
90. Id.
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improperly trained foster parents. Geoff Sherrott gives an apt description of a
typical foster child's experience:
A child placed in a foster home enters into a setting that on its face
appears to be intended to replace her family. This natural assumption
is reinforced by the lack of any other apparent role for the foster
parents; clearly they are not intended to help her deal with the
original abuse or its long-term effect, as foster parents are neither
expected nor required to have any specialized education or training.
Yet, if any problems arise between the child and her foster family, a
scenario not difficult to imagine, given both the harm that has been
inflicted on her and the foster parents' lack of training she is moved
to another foster home.9
Alberta experienced such problems. Government officials, foster parents,
and children's rights advocates blamed the system's restricted budget for social
service inadequacies. Trish Brady, President of the Edmonton and District
Foster Family Association, stated that "very often these kids suffer mental
illness, drug abuse, [and] memories of child abuse. It takes training to deal with
these children, and a lot of foster parents are covering the cost of training
themselves."92
Alberta recognized its faults and began implementing new programs that
address the systems shortcomings. On April 22, 1999 the Sun Country Child
and Family Services Regional Authority took over the role of Alberta Family
and Social Services.93 It took two years of planning to insure a smooth
transition.94  The major change is theoretical. Sun Country will use a
"grassroots approach to service delivery."9 ' This agency will provide such
services as screening and investigation, foster care, residential resources,
adoption, disabled children's services, childcare services, family violence
services, and education. Additionally, it will provide family court intervention,
prevention, and early intervention programs.' Alberta hopes that its
community-based approach will resolve some of the important issues currently
affecting child social services.
91. Geoff Sherrott, Foster CareforAbused Children: An Unacceptable Solution, 57 Sask. L. Rev.
479 (1993).
92. Id.
93. Janine Ecklund, If You're Calling Alberta Family AndSocial Services And The Voice On The
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V. CONCLUSION
As Florida, particularly Broward County, prepares to alter the agency that
handles children's social welfare, it is important that local officials examine the
successes from other parts of the world. While the problems in the United
States' are not identical to those identified in the United Kingdom and in
Canada; many similarities exist. Like Alberta, Canada, we are suffering with
the effects of an under-funded foster care program. Similar to the United
Kingdom, we are experiencing problems with the quality of our foster care
providers. A closer examination of the programs implemented by these
countries may provide the legal practitioner with valuable knowledge as to
improving the Untied State's system. For example, we should examine whether
a set of statewide foster care standards, similar to the type employed in the
United Kingdom (which include setting high standards for foster care
providers) would address the problems currently affecting our system.
Additionally, we should look to the Canadian system of privatization, which
uses a grassroots approach to see if that would adequately fulfill the United
State's needs. Another important issue to address when designing a new system
relates to adopting an approach that will utilize caseworkers most efficiently.
Perhaps curing the current low pay scale, and insuring that no employee feels
overworked represents two essential steps that must be taken to provide foster
children with the care they need and deserve.
The nurturing of the world's children cannot be left to an under-funded,
over-stressed bureaucracy. It is essential that we take a stand and insist on the
implementation of more effective programs that are designed to provide
children with optimum care.
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
II. Questions Presented to the Court
III. SUMMARY OF THE PLEADINGS
IV. STATEMENTS OF THE FACTS
V. PLEADINGS
1. Declare Civil Law No. 51 illegal under international law, and order Pagonia to
compensate Bretoria for the losses suffered by its citizens as a result of this act
1.1. Civil Law is illegal under international law
1.1.1. Civil Law No. 51 constitutes an expropriation of alien
property




2. Declare the Acts taken in implementing Civil Law No. 51 illegal under
international law, and Order Pagonia to compensate Bretorian citizens for the
losses suffered as a result of these Acts
2.1. The Acts taken in implementing Civil Law No. 51 are contrary to
international law, insofar as they create a preference for goods and services
produced and sold in Pagonia
2.2. The Acts taken in implementing Civil Law No. 51 violate the Principle
of Free Flow of Information
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2.3. The Cultural Argument is not a valid exception to free trade and the
national treatment requirement, nor a justification for violating the
principle of free flow of information
2.4. The PCC Regulation constitutes an unlawful expropriation
2.5. The breach of contracts is not justified by force majeure
2.6. Compensation
3. Declare the protection afforded to copyright owners by the Kingdom of Pagonia
insufficient under international law, and Order Pagonia to compensate Bretoria for the
losses suffered by its citizens as a result of copyright infringements in Pagonia
3.1. Pagonia does not provide the minimum protection to copyright owners
3.2. Alternatively, the protection of copyrights by Pagonia is
discriminatory
3.3. Compensation
4. Conclusion and Prayer for Relief
VI. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
VII. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
1. Treaties and Other International Instruments
2. UN Resolutions and Documents
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1. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Government of the Republic of Bretoria and the Kingdom of Pagonia have agreed to
submit by Special Agreement the present controversy for final solution to the International
Court of Justice pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice, in relation to Article 40, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court. In accordance
with Article 36, the jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it.
Neither party has entered any reservation.
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II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED TO THE COURT
1. Whether Civil Law No. 51 constitutes an expropriation.
2. Whether customary international law requires a minimum standard for the treatment of
aliens when the State expropriates their property.
3. Whether Civil Law No. 51 lacks a public purpose or is discriminatory, and therefore
constitutes an unlawful expropriation.
4. Whether appropriate compensation as the equivalent of full compensation should be
regarded as customary international law.
5. Whether the fair market value method is required as the most recommendable standard
under international law.
6. Whether the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of national origin, translated in
economic terms as national treatment, has been crystallized into customary international
law, or should at least be seen as a recently emerged principle of international law.
7. Whether, the Acts taken in implementing Civil Law No. 51 violate the Principle of Free
Flow of Information.
8. Whether free trade should allow a cultural exception.
9. Whether a lack of development may be invoked to justify the abridgment of
internationally recognized human rights.
10. Whether the PCC Regulation constitutes an expropriation.
11. Whether The PCC is competent to enact the PCC Regulation.
12. Whether a mere regulation without a sanction can be the invoked as force majeure.
13. Whether international law requires a minimum standard of copyright protection.
14. Whether the afforded protection to copyright owners by Pagonia is sufficient under
international law.
15. Whether the protection of intellectual property rights by Pagonia is discriminatory.
Distinguished Brief
III. SUMMARY OF THE PLEADINGS
Applicant respectfully holds that Pagonian Civil Law No. 51 and its implementing Acts: the
Regulation of the Pagonian Communication Commission and the Resolution of the Minister
of Culture, are illegal under international law. Furthermore, the protection afforded to
copyright owners by Pagonia is insufficient under international law. Applicant requests
compensation for the losses suffered by its citizens as a result of these Acts and the copyright
infringements.
Although Pagonia is not a member of the GATT, the WTO, WIPO, the Berne Convention,
and other international agreements or treaties, except for the UN Charter and the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Applicant submits that many issues in the present case
are in the realm of customary international law. The customary rules governing this dispute
are binding upon Pagonia in accordance with article 38 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties.
As to the first claim, Civil Law No. 51 stipulates that "foreign ownership of a
regulated entity shall be prohibited". Expropriation of alien property is allowed under
international customary law if a minimum standard is fulfilled. The requirements for the
minimum standard are not met in the present case. First, Civil Law No. 51 lacks a public
purpose. Second, there is discrimination between foreigners and nationals, as only foreigners
are prohibited to hold a majority interest in the Pagonian cultural industries. In addition, the
law creates a discrimination amongst foreigners, as overseas Pagonians are not citizens, but
are excluded from the strict regime of Civil Law No.51. Third, the compensation for
expropriation is not appropriate. The only appropriate compensation in accordance with
customary international law is full compensation. Full compensation is to be calculated
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according to the fair market value of a going concern. Therefore, Bretoria argues that Civil
Law No.51 is an unlawful expropriation under international law, and that compensation is
accordingly payable to Bretoria.
As to the second claim, the Regulation of the Pagonian Communication Commission
and the Resolution of the Minister of Culture are contrary to international law, since they
create a preference for goods and services produced and sold in Pagonia. The Acts run
counter to the principle of non-discrimination between nationals and aliens, translated in
economic terms as national treatment. In addition, the Acts are in violation of the Principle
of Free Flow of Information, which is considered a basic human right and a rule of
customary international law. These violations of international law cannot be justified by the
cultural argument, invoked by Pagonia. On the contrary, the Acts seem to be inspired by
economic rather than cultural purposes. The Acts are indeed not effective in preserving
Pagonian Culture, and Bretoria submits that free trade is one of the best ways to foster a
nation's cultural identity. At any rate, the protection of cultural identity cannot be invoked to
deny fundamental human rights. Finally the PCC Regulation constitutes an unlawful
expropriation and does not provide for any sanction. Therefore, force majeure cannot be
invoked to justify the breach of contracts For all these reasons compensation is due to
Bretoria.
As to the third claim, the Kingdom of Pagonia does not provide effective copyright
protection to foreign copyright owners, as required by the customary standards existing in
international law. Additionally, in one third of Pagonia's regions there is a clear violation of
the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality by the judicial entities.
Therefore, Applicant requests compensation as well as assurances and guarantees of non-
repetition of the copyright infringements in Pagonia's underground markets.
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IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Applicant, the Republic of Bretoria ("Bretoria") is a developed nation with the largest
entertainment industry in the world. Bretoria has furthermore demonstrated an interest in
foreign investment, particularly in the cultural sector of Pagonia.
Respondent, the Kingdom of Pagonia ("Pagonia") can be characterized as a developing
country. The vast majority of its population is rural and uneducated. Until 1975 Pagonia was
ruled by a totalitarian regime. The 1975 revolution overthrew this regime and established a
new government by democratic elections. The political change had great effect in the social
and economic field: society moved rapidly towards an overall liberalization of the country.
The negative side-effects of this evolution were, amongst others, the creation of an
underground market for unlicensed copies of foreign language audio and videocassettes. A
WIPO Panel concluded that this resulted in a $100 million losses in revenue a year, of which
30% would have gone to Bretorians. These copyright infringements lack specific sanctioning
in Pagonian law.
After the revolution, Bretorian companies began to invest substantially in Pagonian
cultural industries. In fact, many Bretorian media distributors concluded contracts with the
four Pagonian television networks for the airing of television programs and films, and
Bretorian publishers started selling Bretorian periodicals directly to retail establishments in
Pagonia.
In 1988 Ms. Crispell, a native-born Pagonian citizen founded the Pagonian Cultural
Watch Group in order to promote the "glorious culture of Pagonia". She acquired a majority
interest in a publishing company, engaged solely in the publication of Pagonian language
literature. Finally, she became a member of the Pagonian Parliament and under her initiative,
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Civil Law No. 51 was adopted by the Pagonian Parliament. It is precisely this law which has
considerable consequences for Bretorian companies. The law provides that non-Pagonians
shall not have a majority interest in commercial entities providing goods and/or services in
the cultural sector of the Pagonian economy. Non-Pagonians who do must divest themselves
of that interest within 90 days upon the effective date of the law. After that 90-day period the
Government of Pagonia acquired the majority interests remaining in the hands of foreign
investors and auctioned those interests off to bidders of Pagonian nationality.
Shortly after the Law came into force, the Pagonian Communication Commission
adopted a regulation pursuant to Civil Law No. 51 which provided for a minimum Pagonian
content of 75 % in radio and television broadcasts. As a result, the contracts between the
Pagonian TV networks and the Bretorian media distributors were canceled without any
compensation for the Bretorians on the grounds of the doctrine offorce majeure.
Finally, the Minister of Culture adopted a resolution requiring that foreign language
periodicals only be sold in bilingual versions. This Resolution applies only to foreign
publishers. Benjamin Publications, a large Bretorian publisher of periodicals affected by the
resolution, approached the Bretorian Government and requested an official protest against
this policy. At the same time the Bretorian Association of Copyright Owners complained to
the government about the uncontrolled copyright infringements occurring in Pagonia. At this
point the Republic of Bretoria decided to contact the Government of Pagonia with a view to
solving the problems facing Bretorian citizens in their dealings with Pagonians.
In order to resolve the dispute in a neutral manner, both States have decided to submit
the dispute to the International Court of Justice.
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V. PLEADINGS
Applicant respectfully requests that this Honourable Court
1. Declare Civil Law No. 51 illegal under international law, and order Pagonia to
compensate Bretoria for the losses suffered by its citizens as a result of this act
1.1. Civil Law No. 51 is illegal under international law
1. 1.1. Civil Law No. 51 constitutes an expropriation of alien property
Expropriation of alien property is described as the compulsory taking of property of
foreign private persons by a State.' Civil Law No. 51 constitutes such a taking. Indeed, an
individual may be deprived of his property by the transfer of the title directly to the state
(article 2e), but also by a forced sale (article 2d).' Moreover, an expropriation may extend to
any right which can be the object of a commercial transaction, i.e., freely sold and bought,
and thus having a commercial value.3 This includes shares in companies.4
Customary international law has laid down a minimum standard for the treatment of
aliens' which allows the expropriation of alien property only if it is for a public purpose, if it
is non-discriminatory and if an appropriate compensation is paid.' None of these
' R.WALLACE, International Law, 1997, p. 184
2 R.HIGGINS, 'The taking of property by the State', III RdC (1982), p.3 26
3 Amoco case, 15 Iran- USCTR, p. 189(1987)
4 Phelps Dodge Corporation case, 10 Iran-USCTR, p.130(1986); M.N.SHAW, International
Law, 1997, p.516; article 10(7) Harvard Draft Convention on the International
Responsibility of States for the Injuries to Aliens, 55 AJIL(1961), p.54 8
SI.BROWNLIE, Principles of Public International law, 1991, p.533; P.MALANCZUK,
Akehurt's Modern Introduction to International Law, 1997, p.23 5 ; O.SCHACHTER,
International Law in Theory and Practice, 1991, p.178; E.RIEDEL, 'Standards and Sources.
Farewell to the exclusivity of the sources triad in international law?', 2 EJIL(1991), p. 7 9.
6 Chorz6w Factory, 1926 PCIJ Publ., Series A. No. 7 (1926), p. 22; Chilean Copper Case,
12 ILM, p. 275-277 (1973)
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requirements are satisfied by Civil Law No. 51.
1.1.2. Lack of public purpose
Expropriations in which foreign assets are taken for anything else than a public
purpose are unlawful under international law.7 In the present case, the motive behind the Act
is one of commercial interest and not one of "preservation of culture". The financial self-
interest of Miss Crispell seems to have had a firm hand in the drafting of Civil Law No. 51.
A valid public purpose cannot consist of purely financial motives Besides, it is extremely
hard -to define culture,9 let alone to preserve or promote it. Regardless of. this difficulty,
Applicant questions to what extent Pagonian owned businesses will want to abandon the
laws of supply and demand for the sake of their culture.
1.1.3. Discrimination
Civil Law No. 51 prohibits solely non-Pagonian natural or legal persons from holding
a majority interest in the Pagonian cultural sector. If alien property is expropriated, while the
property of nationals remains unaffected, then that act is discriminatory.' Moreover, there is
a discrimination between foreigners since overseas Pagonians, as non citizens and thus
foreigners, still have the right to acquire a majority interest in the cultural sector under Civil
Chorz6w Factory, PCIJ Pub., Series A No. 7, p. 22 (1922); Amoco case, 15 Iran-USCTR,
p.55(19 85); I.BROWNLIE, o.c., p.537; R.HIGGINS, 'The taking of property by the State',
III RdC(1982), p.292; G.A. Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, GA OR, 17' Sess.,
Suppl. 17, (1962), p. 15
' Aminoil case, 21 ILM 976, p.1025(1982); BP case, 53 ILR, p.297(1974)
9 W.MING SHAO, 'Is There No Business Like Show Business. Free Trade and Cultural
Protectionism', 20 YJIL (1995), p. 14 5 .
10 V.WHITE, The nationalisation offoreign property, 1961, p.1 19; G.FITZMAURICE, 'The
juridical clauses of the peace treaties', 11 RdC(1948), p.349; W.McKEAN, Equality and
Discrimination under International Law, 1985, pp. 196-197; J.H.HERZ, 'Expropriation of
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Law No.51. However, it is a well settled rule of customary international law that
discrimination in the field of expropriation is unlawful." If this Honourable Court would
nonetheless not consider non-discrimination to be an absolute requirement, Applicant
submits that differentiation should at least be reasonably related to the public purpose." As
outlined above, Applicant contests Respondent's public purpose.
1.1.4. Inappropriate compensation
The only appropriate compensation for the present expropriation is full compensation,
i.e. the full value of the property taken. Applicant asserts that this compensation standard is
part of international customary law.
State practice. United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 1803 of 1962 declares that
in case of expropriation of foreign property an appropriate compensation shall be paid in
accordance with international law.1 According to extensive judicial and arbitral practice'
and legal scholars, 5 appropriate compensation as defined in this GA Resolution is the
equivalent of full compensation, at least as a starting point. General Msembly Resolutions
Foreign Property', 35 AJIL (1941), p.249.
" BP case, 53 ILR 297, p.32 9 (1973); INA Corporation case, 8 Iran-USCTR, p.3 78 (1985);
J.H.HERZ, Lc., p.249; R.HIGGINS, Lc., p.298.
'
2Amoco case, 15 Iran-USCTR, p. 18 9 (1987); O.SCHACHTER, o.c., p.319.
13 Art. 4 GA Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, GAOR, 17 Sess., Suppl. 17,
(1962), p. 15; A.MOURI, The International Law of Expropriation as reflected in the Work of
the Iran-US. Claims Tribunal, 1994, p.3 60
'4 Sedco case, 9 Iran-USCTR, p.2 04 (1987); AIG case, 4 Iran-USCTR p.96, 105 (1983)
" M.HERDEGEN, Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht, 1993, p.161; P.MALANCZUK, o.c.
p.235; P.M.NORTON, 'Modem Tribunals and the Law of Expropriation', 85 AJIL (1991),
p.503; O.SCHACHTER, o.c., p.322; WORLD BANK, Report to the Development
Committee and Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, 34 ILM (1992),
p.1376
1999]
184 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 6:171
that are adopted with a near unanimous vote are considered part of state practice. 6 GA
Resolution No. 1803 had the full support of both developed and developing countries. It was
overwhelmingly adopted by 87 votes to 2, with 12 abstentions. 7 The general practice is
emphasized by the fact that a considerable number of recipients of foreign capital are willing
to enter into treaties for the protection of investments which commonly contain a provision
for the payment of full'compensation.8
The adoption of GA Resolution No. 3281 of 1974"' has in no way disturbed this uniform and
long0 practice since it can only be regarded as a de lege ferenda formulation." The view
expressed by GA Resolution No.3281 cannot at all be accepted as an expression of opinio
iuris since it runs counter both to the interpretation given by some leading supporters of this
Resolution' and to the position taken by many of the developed countries.23 Moreover,
16 M.E.VILLIGER, Customary International Law and Treaties, A manual on the Theory and
Practice of the Interrelation of Sources, 1997, pp.18 1-182; Advisory Opinion on Nuclear
Weapons, 35 ILM, p. 809 § 70 (1997)
'" D.J.HARRIS, Cases and Materials on International Law, 1998, p.549; A.MOURI, o.c.,
1994, p.360.
"' I.BROWNLIE, o.c., p.545; B.M.CLAGETT, 'Just Compensation in International law: The
issues before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal', 4 Valuation (1987), pp.7 1-7 3
'9 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, General Assembly Resolution No. 3281
(XXIX) of 12 December 1974, 14 ILM(1975), p.251
20 Chorz6w Factory case, PCIJ Publ, Series A, (1928) No 13, p.47; Hull Formula (U.S.
Secretary Cordell Hull), in G. HACKWORTH, Digest of International Law, Vol. 3, 1942,
pp.6 55-665
"1 Texaco case, 17 ILM, p.389 (1977); Sedco case, 9 Iran-USCTR., p. 18 6 (1987);
C.TOMUSCHAT, 'Die Charta der wirtschaftlichen Rechte und Pflichten der Staaten', Vol.
36 Za6RV(1976), p.470
22 J.CASTANEDA, 'La Charte des droits et devoirs dconomiques des Etats', Ann. fr. de droit
int. (1974), p.54
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judicial and arbitral decisions have continued to rely on the standard as set out in Resolution
No. 1803 of 1962.2
Opinio iuris. The corpus of international decisions involving expropriation is much greater
than that involving any other issue of international economic law. By expressly agreeing to
have these disputes determined by law, states have shown a persuasive evidence of a genuine
opinio iuris.25 The judicial and arbitral decisions relied on herein reflect the very great
confidence of States in the rule of full compensation. 6 Furthermore, Third World countries
have increasingly recognized foreign investment as vital to their economic development. A
partial compensation could only be expected to deter such investment.2 '
One may argue that large-scale expropriations might create some problems for a
State's ability to pay full compensation, by causing "an overwhelming financial burden".
This is not so in the case at hand. The burden of full compensation will not be borne in its
entirety by the Pagonian State alone. The Pagonian buyers of the expropriated interests will
automatically pay a part of the total sum. The Pagonian State only has to provide the surplus
in order to grant Bretorian owners a full compensation. Arbitrators indeed are not likely to
23 O. SCHACHTER, o.c., p.322
24 P.B.GANN, 'Compensation Standard for expropriation', 23 CTL (1985), pp.64 8 -64 9 .
25 P.M.NORTON, i.c., pp.503-505; D.J.HARRIS, o.c., p.60.
26 Texaco case, 17 ILM, p. 389 (1977); Judge Lagergren's opinion in INA Corporation case
,USCTR, p.386 (1985); Sedco case, 9 Iran-USCTR., p.186 (1987)
27 B.M.CLAGETT, I.c., p.31; R.DOLZER, 'Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property', Vol.
I ICSID Review (1986), p.42; Aminoil case, 21 ILM, p.9 76 (1982).
28 L.SOHN & R.BAXTER, 'Responsibilities of States for injuries to the economic interests
of aliens', Vol. 55 AJIL (1961), pp. 56 6 -56 7
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reduce the amount of an award because of the economic effects on the expropriating State.2 9
Valuation. The fair market value method is recognized as the most recommendable
standard.30 This valuation method can best be defined as the price that a willing buyer and a
willing seller would reasonably have agreed on as fair, at the time of the taking, and absent
any coercion of either party." Applied to the instant case, this would be the amount which a
willing buyer would have paid a willing seller for the shares of a going concern. 32 A business
enterprise is a "going concern" when, before the expropriation, it has reached a certain ability
to earn revenues, and when it has the prospect of continuing that status by keeping such an
ability in the future. 3 The entertainment industry is a typical "booming sector" in Pagonia.
Furthermore, it is beyond dispute that there was a fair market until the day of the taking.
Besides, this fair market does not have to exist in reality, but might also be purely
hypothetical.'
The value of a going concern encompasses not only the physical and financial assets of
the undertaking, but also intangible valuables which contribute to its earning power, such as
contractual rights, goodwill and commercial prospects.35 Therefore, Bretoria cannot possibly
accept the offered compensation, which was calculated on the basis of the net book value
29P.M.NORTON, Lc., p.490
30 C.BROWER & J.BRUESCHKE, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 1998, p.539
31 Sedco case, 9 Iran-USCTR, p.182
32 INA Corporation case, 8 Iran-US CTR, p.38 0 (1985)
33Amoco case, 15 Iran-USCTR, pp.250 & 270 (1987)
34 Ebrahimi case, Vol.7 No. 4 WTAM (1995), pp.205-299 (1994)
35 Amoco case, 15 Iran-USCTR, p.264 (1987)
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method. Many scholars36 and judicial and arbitral decisions3' have rejected the use of this
method to value expropriated enterprises. Therefore, the value of the expropriated shares
equals the fair market value of the "regulated entities" valuated as a going concern in
proportion to the percentage of the expropriated shares in the going concern.
1.2. Compensation
Summarizing, an expropriation is unlawful if it is not for a public purpose and if it is
discriminatory. As these conditions are fulfilled in the present case Applicant claims" the
restitution in kind or if impossible the fair market value of the undertaking plus the profits
that would have been made had the taking not occurred, until the date of the judgment. 9
Subsidiary, if this Honourable Court were to consider the taking to be lawful,
Applicant maintains that still an appropriate compensation i.e. the fair market value of the
undertaking at the time of the dispossession, is due.40 Since Bretorian citizens were only
accorded the net book value or a lower price during the first 90 days, Applicant respectfully
submits that the remainder is still to be paid.
36 W. LIEBLICH, 'Determining the economic value of expropriated Income-producing
Property in international Arbitrations', 8 J. Int'l Arb., pp.66-69; B.M.CLAGGETT, Lc., p.94;
WORLD BANK, Report to the Development Committee and Guidelines on the Treatment of
Foreign Direct Investment', 34 ILM (1992), p.1377; R.SMITH, 'The United States
Government Perspective on Expropriation and Investment in Developing Countries', 9
Vand. J. T. L. (1996), pp.519-520
37Liamco Case, 20 ILM, p.1 (1980); Aminoil, 21 ILM, p.9 76 (1982); AIG Case 4 Iran-
USCTR, p. 96 (1983)
38 D.J.HARRIS, o.c.,1998, pp.568-572; C.BROWER & J.BRUESCHKE, o.c., 1998,pp.507-
513
39 Amoco Case, 15 Iran-USCTR, p.189§193 (1987)
'0 Amoco Case, 15 Iran-USCTR, p. 189§197 (1987)
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2. Declare the Acts taken in implementing Civil Law No. 51 illegal under international
law, and Order Pagonia to compensate Bretorian citizens for the losses suffered as a
result of these Acts
2.1 The Acts taken in implementing Civil Law No. 51 are contrary to international law,
insofar as they create a preference for goods and services produced and sold in Pagonia
Recent decades have shown an enormous liberalization of international trade. The
primary multilateral trade agreement governing more than 80 per cent of world trade is the
GATT.41 This agreement has been incorporated in the WTO in 1995 in order to help trade
flow as freely as possible.42 As of December 20, 1998, 133 countries were members of the
WTO, 31 countries have applied for membership, and among these (potential) members
many developing countries. 3 Also, Pagonia itself is taking a stand on the international scene
in favor of free trade, since it is making efforts to become a member of the Regional
Association of Trading States (RATS), a union of countries moving towards the
establishment of a free-trade area. Indeed, many free trade agreements have been and are
being entered into between nations and international organizations." This state practice has
41 J.E.HARDERS, Lc., p.426.
42 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, 33 ILM (1994)., p. 1144;
http://www.wto.org/wto/about/facts0.htm; J.H.JACKSON, The World Trade Organization.
Constitution and Jurisprudence, 1998, p. 10.
43 http://www.wto.org/about/organsn6.htm.
4 M. BLAKENEY, 'The Role of Intellectual Property Law in Regional Commercial
Unions', 4 JWIP (1998), p.6 9 3 .
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been strongly supported by the UN, stating that multilateral trade liberalization and regional
economic integration processes are important prerequisites for economic growth and
development for all countries." It is widely agreed today that liberalizing trade enhances
welfare, attracts foreign investment, brings new jobs and that self-interested national
economic policies often result in instability and conflict in international relations.'
The principle of non-discrimination based on national origin is one of the basic pillars
of the international economic order. 7 This principle is confirmed by the UN Charter.
Although it only mentions the non-discrimination principle as to race, sex, language and
religion, these grounds do not form an exhaustive list."' This is supported by the addition of
other grounds, such as national origin in article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) and in other human rights instruments. 9 Moreover, article 26 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which both Bretoria and Pagonia are parties, stipulates
that every treaty has to be performed in good faith, i.e. not only according to its letter, but
GA Resolutions A/Res/48/55 of 10 December 1993 and A/Res/49/99 of 19 December
1994 on international trade and development.
' OECD Report, The benefits of trade and investment liberalization, 1998,
http://www.oecd.org; J.H.JACKSON, The World Trading System. Law and Policy of
International Economic Relations, 1997, pp.1 1-13.
47 J.E.HARDERS, i.c., p.424; M.M. HART, 'The Mercantilist's Lament: National Treatment
and Modem Trade Negotiations', 2JWTL (1987), p.37; http://www.wto.org/
wto/about/facts0.htm.
48 Artt. 1(3), 13(l)(b), 55(c), 56, 62(2) and 76(c) UN Charter; M.S. McDOUGAL,
H.D.LASSWELL, and L.C.CHEN, Human Rights and World Public Order, 1980, p. 766;
J.DELBRUCK, 'Disrimination' in R.WOLFRUM, and C.PHILIPP, United Nations: law,
policies and practice, 1995, p. 420.
49 Artt. 2 and 26 ICCPR; Art. 2(2) ICESCR; Art. 14 ECHR; Art. 2 African Charter; Art. 1.1
American Convention.
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also according to its spirit.50 As this Honourable Court has recognized in its Namibia
Advisory Opinion a distinction based on grounds of national origin which constitutes a
denial of fundamental human rights, is a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of
the Charter.5 Universal human rights are accorded to everyone, including to foreigners,
except when they are explicitly excluded.52 It is widely agreed that the protection against
discrimination, granted under the UDHR has become part of international customary law. 3
Since the principle of non-discrimination is applicable to every sector of human
interaction,' Applicant submits that this includes the sector of international trade. Trade
discrimination disturbs the development of international trade and economic growth and
injures the friendly relations between States."s This principle of non-discrimination between
nationals and aliens, translated in economic terms as national treatment, has been repeated in
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements throughout the world.56 Therefore, it has been
crystallized into customary international law, or should at least be seen as a recently emerged
50 B.SIMMA (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations - a commentary, 1994, p. 74.
"South West Africa! Namibia (advisory opinion), ICJ, ICJ reports, p.45 § 131 (1971)
3 2M.S.McDOUGAL, H.D.LASSWELL, and L.C.CHEN, I.c., pp.744-745 and pp.767-773.
'3 J.DELBROCK, l.c., p.420; W.McKEAN., o.c., p.2 7 6 .
'4 M.S.McDOUGAL, H.D.LASSWELL, and L.C.CHEN, o.c., 1980, p. 77 8 .
" K.HYDER, Equality of Treatment and Trade Discrimination in International Law, 1968,
pp.4- 7 .
56 H.VAN HOUTTE, The Law of International Trade, 1995, p.6; Art.3 GATT; Art. 1703
NAFTA; Art.7 MERCOSUR, Art. 17 CEFTA, Art.4 AFTA; See also OECD, Declaration by
the Governments of the OECD Member Countries of 21 June 1976 on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises, http://www.oecd.org.
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principle of international law."
Acts such as the PCC Regulation have the effect of a quantitative restriction." The
quota also affects the offering for sale, the sale and the purchase of foreign television
programming in comparison with domestic programming. This is apparent from the fact that
Pagonian television networks have terminated en masse the existing television contracts with
Bretorians.
Since the Minister's Resolution is not applicable to domestic publishers, these persons
have strictly speaking the opportunity to publish in the Bretorian language only, which could
be an economic advantage. The demand of foreign language material in Pagonia is indeed
quite high, and due to the bilingual requirement, the costs of foreign publishers will increase
dramatically in comparison with those of the Pagonian publishers.
2.2. In addition, the Acts taken in implementing Civil Law No. 51 violate the Principle
of Free Flow of Information
The Acts are in conflict with the principle of the free flow of information, because they
violate the freedom of expression and the right to receive information.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was the first international instrument to
recognize the freedom of expression. This right is deemed to include the "freedom to hold
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through
any media and regardless of frontiers" and is generally accepted to cover the press and
17 I.SHIHATA, 'The Role of Business Development', 20 FILJ(1997), p.1577; J.D.NOLAN,
'A Comparative Analysis of the Laotian Law on Foreign Investment. The World Bank
guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, and Normative Rules of
International Law on Foreign Direct Investment', ArizJICL(1998), p.667.
5 J.D.DONALDSON, '"Television without Frontiers": the Continuing Tension between
Liberal Free Trade and European Cultural Integrity', 20 FILJ (1996), pp.119-120.
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broadcasting." The Declaration was enacted by the General Assembly of the UN on
December 10, 1948. Of the 57 members, 48 voted in favor, none voted against, seven
abstained, two were absent. At the time of adoption of the UDHR only few developing
countries were members of the UN, but those countries did not vote against or abstain from
voting on the Declaration. Quite a number of them even participated in the drafting process.'
Although it is widely recognized that the Declaration originally did not intend to create
binding obligations for member-states,6' the Declaration may today be regarded as reflecting
international customary law.62
The UN General Assembly reaffirmed its commitment to the free exchange of
information and ideas by enacting the ICESCR and the ICCPR.63 This principle was further
repeated by the ECHR, the CCSE (Helsinki Accords, Copenhagen Document, Charter of
Paris), the African Charter and the American Convention.' Many scholars and judges have
furthermore shown an unqualified commitment to the idea of an unregulated "market place
'9 E.M. BARENDT, Broadcasting Law, 1995, pp. 32 and 221; T.G. KRATTENMAKER.
and L.A. POWE Jr., 'Converging First Amendment Principles for Converging
Communications Media', Vol. 104 YLJ(1995), p. 1740.
6 B.SIMMA (ed.), o.c., p.782.
61 ibidem, p. 783.
62 B.CONFORTI, The Law and Practice of the United Nations, 1996, pp.282-285; M.
COGEN, Handboek Internationaal Recht, 1998, pp. 315-316; M.N.SHAW, o.c., 1997,
p.207; J.GREENBERG, 'Race, Sex and Religious Discrimination in International Law' in T.
MERON, (ed.), Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy Issues, 1984, pp. 313-
317; L.B.SOHN, 'The New International Law: protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather
than States', 32 Am. U.L.Rev. (1982), p. 17.
63 Article 15 ICESC; Article 19 ICCPR.
6' Article 10 ECHR" Article 9 African Charter; Article 13 American Convention.
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of ideas".65 The principle of free flow of information has thus achieved the status of a
universally recognized human right, and may be enforceable and binding as customary
international law.' Customary law is always applicable to non-signatory states pursuant to
Article 38 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Regulations such as the PCC, on its face, violate the free flow of information.67
Restrictions of this principle generally require a lawful act of the State and must be
necessary, implying a rational relationship between the restriction and the purported reason
for the same." Applicant first of all maintains that the Regulation should have been adopted
by the Minister of Culture, who is the competent power to promote Pagonian culture in the
cultural sector of the Pagonian economy. Furthermore, the Regulation is not necessary to
protect Pagonian culture, as will be established below. Conversely, there are other means
which would protect Pagonian cultural identity more effectively. Finally, it is highly
questionable whether the quotas constitute a proportionate exception. Bretoria maintains that
a lower quota, applied not just during prime time, but during the 24-hour day would have a
6'5 Abrams vs. US (1919) 250 US 616, 630, dissenting opinion of Holmes J.; E.BARENDT,
The First Amendment and the Media, in I.LOVELAND, (ed.), Importing the First
Amendment, Freedom of Speech and Expression in Britain, Europe and the USA., 1998,
p.29; J.B.PROWDA, 'U.S. Dominance in the "Market Place of Culture" and the French
"Cultural Exception"', 29 N. Y U J. Int'l L. &Pol. (1996-97), p. 208.
" L.DHOOGE, 'No place for Melrose: channelsurfing, human rights, and the European
Union "Television without Frontiers" Directive', 16 NYL. Sch.J~lnt'l &Comp. L. (1996),
pp.283, 313 and 316.
67 A.VON BOGDANDY, 'Europaischer Protektionismus im Medienbereich, zu Inhalt und
Rechtmssigkeit der Quotenregelungen in der Femsehrichtlinie', Heft I EuZW (1992), p. 17;
S.MAGIERA, 'Direct Broadcasting by Satellite and a New International Information Order'
24 GYIL (1981), p. 3 04 .
68 Article 29(2) UDHR; Article 19(3) CP Covenant; Article 10(2) ECHR.
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better chance of meeting the standard of proportionality.
69
The Resolution of the Minister of Culture clearly violates the freedom of the press.
This view is supported by the French Constitutional Court, which ruled that an identical
French law70 violated the freedom of expression." Furthermore, the Resolution infringes
upon the freedom to receive information: Bretorian publishers will have to balance the costs
of translating their magazines into Pagonian, and the revenues they will earn from selling
those magazines in Pagonia. As Pagonia is a small country with an estimated population of
10 million, and relatively few educated people, it is highly likely that the majority of
Bretorian publishers will not undertake the difficulties of publishing bilingual magazines, but
will simply eliminate Pagonia as an exporting partner.
2.3 The Cultural Argument is not a valid exception to free trade and the national
treatment requirement, nor a justification for violating the principle of free flow of
information
Applicant submits that, notwithstanding the general importance of culture, its
preservation and development, these factors do not in the present case justify the conduct of
Pagonia. The Acts seem to be inspired by economic rather than cultural motivations.
First, the Acts are not effective in encouraging and safeguarding Pagonian culture.
National culture and the cultural content of audiovisual goods and services are so difficult to
69 K.L.KESSLER, 'Protecting Free Trade in Audiovisual Entertainment: A Proposal for
counteracting the european union's trade barriers to the U.S. Entertainment Industry's
Exports', 26 Law &Pol'y Int ' Bus. (1995), p. 57 8 .
70 Loi n°94-665 du 4 aofit 1994 relative i l'emploi de la langue franqaise, J.O., August 5,
1994. See also Dcret n'95-240 pris pour l'application de la loi n°94-665, JO., March 5,
1995; H.J.ALBERS and C.SWAAK, 'The Trouble With Toubon: Language Requirements
for Slogans and Messages in the Light of Article 30 EC', ELR (1996), p. 78; N.McCARTHY
and H.MERCER, 'Language as a Barrier to Trade: the Loi Toubon', 5 ECLR (1996), p. 3 14 .
"' Conseil Constitutionnel, 94-345, July 29, 1994.
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measure, that regulations restricting the content based on the national origin of audiovisual
material, provide only dubious cultural benefits. The PCC Regulation requires 75% of the
content of programming aired by Pagonian broadcasters during prime time listening and
viewing hours to be Pagonian in origin. Hence, the quota targets the origin of the program
and not the cultural merit or social acceptability.72 Moreover, piracy73 and new technologies
such as satellites"' are likely to undermine the alleged cultural effect of the PCC Regulation.
With respect to the Resolution of the Minister of Culture, the "preservation of the Pagonian
language" is not the rationale behind the law. This is obvious from the fact that Pagonian
publishers still have the opportunity to publish solely in a foreign language, thus rendering
the purpose of the Act meaningless.
Second, Applicant asserts that free trade in cultural products may be considered one of
the best ways to foster a nation's cultural identity. Governments have at times viewed free
trade as a necessary condition of cultural development."' It is even arguable that such trends
will build stronger bridges for mutual understanding and world peace." Investment is
' W.MING SHAO, l.c., 20 YJIL (1995), p.140; P.PRESBURGER and M.R.TYLER,
'Television without Frontiers: Opportunity and Debate Created by the New European
Community Directive', Vol. 13 HICLR(1989-90), p.505.
" M.JUSSAWALLA, 'Media Threat to Cultural Identity: Myth or Reality', The Third
Channel, (1986), p.383; T.A.LARREA, 'Eliminate the cultural industries exemption from
NAFTA', 37 Santa Clara L. Rev.(1997), p.1 127.
74 R.L.VAN HARPEN, 'Mamas, don't let your babies grow up to be cowboys: reconciling
trade and cultural independence', 4 Minn. J. Global Trade (1995), p.181; C.
UYTTENDAELE and J. DUMORTIER, 'Free speech on the information superhighway:
European perspectives', Vol. 16 JMJCIL(1 998),p.907.
" UNESCO Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural Material
("Florence Agreement"), UNTS 1734.
76 M.JUSSAWALLA, Lc., p.387.
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another means through which a country's cultural and economic development is stimulated.
Many governments therefore encourage a policy of foreign investment, by creating a climate
of stability where contractual obligations are honored.77 Pagonian legislation has precisely
the adverse effect.
Finally, even if the Court were persuaded by the Pagonian cultural argument, Bretoria
strongly maintains that the protection of cultural identity in the name of sovereignty does not
justify a denial of human rights, in casu the violation of the free flow of information.78 The
UN World Conference on Human Rights in 1993 decided by consensus that "the lack of
development may not be invoked to justify the abridgment of internationally recognized
human rights".
79
2.4 The PCC Regulation constitutes an unlawful expropriation
There is a virtual consensus that property encompasses contractual rights. This is
confirmed 'by general principles of law," arbitral and judicial decisions81, leading text
7 I.SHIHATA, 'The Role of Business Development', 20 FILJ(1997), p.1577.
78 A.EIDE, 'Equality, Nationalism and the Protection of Minorities: a Dilemma in
Democratization', in G.ALFREDSSON and P.MACALESTER-SMITH, (eds.), The Living
Law of Nations, 1996, p. 158; L.HENKIN, 'The Mythology of Sovereignty', American
Society of International Law Newsletter, March-May 1993 at httpJ/www.asil.org/pres.htm.
9 World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 1993,
para 1/10, 32 ILM (1993), p. 1663; A.ROSAS, 'The Right to Development' in A.EIDE,
C.KRAUSE and A.ROSAS, eds., Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1995, p.2 4 9 .
" H.LAWSON and B.RUDDEN, The law of property, 2nd edition, 1982, pp. 110-1 13;
R.DOLZER, 'Indirect expropriation of alien property', 1 ICSID Review (1986), p.5 8.
81 Chorz6w Factory, PCIJ Publ. Series A, No. 7, p. 307 (1926); Flexi Van-leasing, Inc. v.
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 54-36-1, 13 Iran-US. CTR,
p.324.
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books,s2 and investment treaties. Consequently, an expropriation may consist of the taking
of contractual rights. It is generally accepted that interference with property, while still
falling short of nationalization, may amount to a taking even if no such intention is asserted
or is denied." The intent of the Government is less important than the effect of the measures
on the owner, and the form of the measures of control or interference is less important than
the reality of the impact." The issue is fairly clear: interference which significantly deprives
the owner of (the use of) his property amounts to a taking of that property. In casu the
Pagonian Government interferes to the extent that Bretorian contractors have lost their
contractual rights to performance by the opposite party. The PCIJ has ruled in Chorz6w
factory that a governmental decision, causing a breach of contract between private parties
was considered to be an expropriation of contractual rights.'
Furthermore, the scope of expropriation evolves in time and follows the new
developments in commercial transactions. The ICSID Convention pr9tects investments
which cover not only the traditional forms but also the more novel methods of investments
' R.HIGGINS, 'The taking of property by the State', III RdC (1982), p.26 8; H.J.HERZ,
'Expropriation of foreign property', 35 AJIL (1941), p.2 4 3
3 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, 8 U.S.T. 899, 284, UNTS No.
4132, p.3 11; ICSID Convention, 17 UST 1270,575 UNTS 159 (1965)
' Chorz6w Factory, PCIJ Publ Series A, No. 7 (1926); Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American
Oil Company, 27 ILM, p. 11 7, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, ICJ, ICJ
Reports, p.106 (1970); R.DOLZER, 'Indirect expropriation of alien property', 1 ICSID
Review (1986), p.56
8s Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton, Award No. 141-7-2, Iran-USCTR, pp.225-226
(1984)
6Chorz6w Factory, PCIJ Publ. Series A, No.7 (1926)
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such as service contracts. Indeed, expropriated contractual rights need not necessarily be
connected to the expropriation of tangible property."
Finally, Applicant stresses that this expropriation, in analogy with Civil Law No. 51,
has no public purpose and that it is discriminatory. Even more, the appropriateness of the
compensation does not even come into question, since not one Pagonian Shuttle of
compensation has been paid.
2.5. The breach of contracts is not justified by force majeure
Force Majeure is a general principle of law recognized by most peace loving countries
and confirmed by judicial and arbitral decisions." It is well settled that force majeure can be
invoked only if the party breaching the contract cannot reasonably be required to expose
himself to the risk of incurring the sanction provided for the compulsory regulation," here
the PCC Regulation. A mere Regulation without sanction does not release the contract party
of his contractual performance.9' The PCC regulation does not provide for a sanction.
Therefore, the decisions of Pagonian courts, are unlawful under international law.
" ICSID Convention, 17 UST 1270, 575 UNTS 159 (1965); C.LAMM, 'Jurisdiction of the
ICSID', Vol.6 ICSID Review (1991), p.462; H. VAN HOUTTIE, The Law of International
Trade, 1995, p.24 7 .
"Amoco Case, 15 Iran-USCTR, p.15 9 (1987)
" P.KINSCH, Le Fait du Prince Etranger, 1994, p.56; Y.DERAINS, Les normes
d'application immidiate dans la jurisprudence arbitrale internationale, 1982, p. 38;
J.CROOK, 'Applicable Law in International Arbitration', 83 AJIL (1989), pp. 281-299;
Y.DERAINS, 'Introduction i la chronique des sentences arbitrales', JDI (1975), p.917;
Ananconda-Iran, Inc. v. Iran, Iran-USCTR, pp.211-212; Blount Brothers Corp. v. Iran and
Iran Housing Co., pp.74 -7 5 (1986)
" P.KINSCH, Le Fait du Prince Etranger, 1994, p.159; H.VAN HOUTTE, 'The impact of
Trade Prohibitions on Transnational Contracts', RDAI (1988), p. 147.
9' L 'Office National du Thi et du Sucre v. Philippine Sugar Trading, Ltd., I Lloyd's Rep.,
p.89 (1983); In re Japanese Electronic Products, 723 F.2d, p.345 (3d Cir.) (1983)
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2.6. Compensation
Applicant claims the restitution of the cancelled contracts. Subsidiary, Applicant claims the
full compensation of the losses suffered by its citizens, i.e. the price agreed upon for the
broadcasting contracts and the lost profits and additional costs for the bilingual requirement.
3. Declare the protection afforded to copyright owners by the Kingdom of Pagonia
insufficient under international law, and Order Pagonia to compensate Bretoria for the
losses suffered by its citizens as a result of copyright infringements in Pagonia
3.1. Pagonia does not provide the minimum protection to copyright owners
The unauthorized copying of copyright materials for commercial purposes, in short piracy,92
is a common phenomenon in Pagonia. Under the general rules of international law every
state has the obligation to provide proper administration of civil and criminal justice with
regard to aliens,93 including apprehending and prosecuting those wrongfully causing injury to
aliens.94 It is widely accepted that a state's international responsibility is in issue if an alien's
property is looted.9" Denial of justice exists when a reasonable and impartial man would
readily recognize the insufficiency of the activity of judicial entities.' Although Pagonia is
not a party to any copyright convention, Applicant submits that every state is required by
92 WIPO (ed.), o.c., 1997, p.166.
93 B.VITANY, 'International Responsibility of States for their administration of Justice',
NILR (1975), p.147; D.VAGTS, 'Minimum Standard', EPIL (1994), p.40 8 .
94 Art.9 Harvard Research draft 'The Law of Responsibility of States for the Damage Done in
Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners', 23 AJIL (1929) Spec Suppl., p.173;
I.BROWNLIE, o.c., p. 529; M.N. SHAW, o.c., p.571.
9 P.MALANCZUK, o.c., pp.2 60- 2 6 1.
96 Neer Claim,United States-Mexican Claims Commission, RIAA, iv., p.6 1 §4 (1926); Janes
Claim, United States-Mexican Claims Commission, 3 ILR, p.2 1 8 (1926); R.Y.JENNINGS,
'General Course of International Law', II RdC (1967), p.487.
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international customary law to provide effective legal protection for foreign copyright
owners.
State Practice Numerous international copyright conventions show that an international
framework of copyright protection has steadily developed. These conventions all contain
provisions pursuant to which States are directly or indirectly obliged to provide adequate
enforcement measures to protect copyrights.97 Furthermore, the provisions on sanctions for
violations of copyrights should be implemented properly by the enforcement authorities.98
Intellectual property rights stimulate economic growth, increase revenues from international
trade and promote private investment." They are an essential tool for underwriting a
democratic culture."° A majority of developed and developing States, have become party to
one or more copyright conventions."'° More than half of the States party to the Rome
Convention are developing countries, which is not surprising since it is in their interest to
ensure protection and promotion for their rich cultural heritage. 2
9' Artt. 15, 16, 36 Berne Convention; Artt. I and X Universal Copyright Convention, Art. 14
WIPO Copyright Treaty; Art. 23 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty; Artt. 41-61
TRIPs. See also Artt. 1701, 1702 and 1714-1720 NAFTA.
98 WIPO (ed.), o.c., pp.334-335.
99 E. CHIEN-HALE, 'Asserting U.S. intellectual property rights in China: Expansion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction?', 44 Copyright Society of the US.A. (1996), pp. 201, 225-226;
S.I. STRONG, 'Banning the cultural exclusion: Free Trade and Copyrighted Goods' 4 Duke
. Comp. &Int ' L (1993), pp.9 6-9 7 .
'0 N.W.NETANEL, 'Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in the Global Arena',
Vand L. R.(1998), p.220.
"01 WIPO (ed.), o.c., pp. 394, 445 and 452.
102 S.I. STRONG, Lc., p.97; WIPO (ed.), o.c., pp. 444-445; F.EMMERT, 'Intellectual
Property in the Uruguay round - negociating strategies of the Western Industrialized
Countries', MJIL (1990), pp. 1366-1367.
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Applicant submits that the fact that piracy may occur in some countries, is not
detrimental to this general and uniform practice. As this Court ruled in the Nicaragua Case
"it is sufficient that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally
have been treated as breaches of that rule"."3 Undoubtedly, the international framework of




Opinio luris Applicant maintains that the state practice of adequate copyright protection is
supported by the opinio iuris necessary to constitute a rule of customary international law.
First and foremost, copyright has been accorded the status of a human right in article 27 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.' 5 This principle is repeated in article 15(c) of
the ICESCR. Furthermore, according to article 8 of the UDHR everyone is entitled to
protection by an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating
fundamental rights. As set out above, the UDI-R is now widely accepted as a 'Magna Charta
of humankind' and as customary international law. Moreover, the opinio iuris appears from
the constant practice of UN organs'" such as UNESCO and WIPO. In addition, the Berne
safeguard clause, laid down in the UCC in order to prohibit an exodus from the Berne
Convention to the lower standard of protection of the UCC,'0 7 is not applicable to developing
countries. They are consequently allowed to choose between the Berne Convention and the
103 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua Case), ICJ, ICJReports 1986, p.9 8 § 186 (1986)
'0 WIPO (ed.), o.c., pp. 328-336 and pp. 485-487.
'05 G.MELANDER, 'Article 27' in A. EIDE, e.a. (eds.), The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights: A Commentary, 1992, p.4 3 1.
'06 B.SIMMA, (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations - a commentary, 1994, p.784.
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UCC. Nevertheless, none of the developing countries has opted to withdraw from the Berne
Convention in favor of the UCC.'0' Bretoria maintains that this proves the recognition of
these countries that the state practice of copyright protection reflects a legal obligation.
Bretoria asserts that the provisions of the Pagonian Criminal Code and their
implementation do not meet the standard of an adequate protection of foreign copyright
owners as required by this rule of customary international law. Assuming the lack of a
functioning unit for alleged thefts of an intangible property as well as of any records of such
prosecutions, and taking into account the huge piracy problem and the complexity of piracy
prosecutions, Applicant questions the effective enforcement by the judicial organs.
Moreover, in one third of Pagonia's regions there is no enforcement in favor of foreign
copyright owners at all. Finally, Bretoria questions the effective possibilities to obtain
compensation for piracy, which is at least equally important from the point of view of the
copyright owners."n
3.2. Alternatively, the protection of copyrights by Pagonia is discriminatory
Applicant maintains that in one third of Pagonia's regions, the provisions of the
Pagonian Criminal Code for theft are effectively enforced with regard to intangible property
only to protect Pagonian authors and composers. Applicant asserts that the conduct of the
judicial entities in these regions violates the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of
nationality. The principle of national treatment, according to which works originating in one
country are to be accorded the same copyright protection abroad as granted to nationals, is
107 Article XVII of the UCC and the Appendix Declaration Relation to Articles XVII.
"' D.LANGE, M.LAFRANCE, G.MYERS, Intelllectual Property, Cases and Materials,
1998, p. 106 6 .
"9 WIPO (ed.), o.c., p. 333.
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one of the basic principles of the numerous copyright conventions,"' thus, supported by a
general and uniform state practice. Furthermore, it is generally recognized that aliens should
be entitled to equal protection of the law and equal protection against any discrimination in
violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."' As outlined above, copyright is
recognized as fundamental right in Article 27(2) UDHR." Indeed, the principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of national origin is violated indeed if a distinction is made on
such grounds, thereby constituting a denial of fundamental rights."' The applicability of the
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality related to copyrights has recently
been explicitly confirmed by the European Court of Justice."'
The non-discrimination principle demands both equality in law and equality in fact." 5
Although the latter can be excluded if different treatment is necessary, this exception has to
"0 Art. 5(1) Berne Convention; Art. II UCC; Art. 3 WIPO Copyright Treaty; Art. 4 WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Art. 3 TRIPs; M.M.HART, 'The Mercantilist's
Lament: National Treatment and Modem Trade Negociations', 21 JWTL (1987), p.58; WIPO
(ed.), Introduction to Intellectual Property, 1997, p.3 86 .
"1 Preamble and Art. 5.c GA Resolution A/Res/40/144 of 13 December 1985, Declaration on
the Human Rights of Individuals who are not Nationals of the Country in which they Live; J.
DELBROCK, 1995, p.42 0
112 G.MELANDER, 'Article 27' in A.EIDE e.a. (eds.), The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights: A Commentary, Scandinavian University Press, 1992, p.4 3 1.
'"South West Africa/ Namibia (advisory opinion), ICJ, ICJ rep., p.45 §131 (1971)
"4 ECJ, 20 October 1993, Joined Cases C-92/92 and C-326/92 Phil Collins v. Imrat
Handelsgesellschaft mbH and Patricia Im- und Export Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH and
Leif Emanuel Kraul v. EMI Electrola GmbH, I ECR, p. 5145 (1993); H.J.COHEM, 'Het Phil
Collins-arrest: een aardverschuiving in het (inter-) nationale auteursrecht', Info Recht (1994),
pp. 83-87 and pp. 91-93.
"' M.N.SHAW, o.c., p.214.
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be objectively and reasonably justified.' 16 There is no reasonable justification why Pagonia
should in reality solely protect Pagonian authors and composers, the more so since Bretorian
authors and composers primarily have to seek relief in the Pagonian Courts, thereby
recognizing the exclusive jurisdiction of Pagonia within Pagonian territory.""
3.3 Compensation for the losses suffered by Bretorian citizens as a result of copyright
infringements
Every internationally wrongful act of a State, including a violation of customary law,
entails the international responsibility of a State.' Although Respondent will certainly claim
that the Pagonian Criminal Code provides adequate protection, the lack of effective legal
protection"9 of foreign copyright owners and the discriminatory conduct of the judiciary
entails Pagonia's responsibility.
The reparation must as far as possible wipe out all the consequences of the illegal
act. 2 First and foremost, Applicant claims a compensation to the amount of the revenue lost
by Bretorian copyright owners the past three years, an estimated amount of $100 million.
In addition, Applicant requests assurances and guarantees of non-repetition by the set up of
special enforcement units in all Pagonian regions, as well as by an non-discriminatory
conduct of the prosecutors.
16 Minority Schools in Albania, PCIJPubl., Series A/B, No. 64, p. 19 (1935); American Law
Institute's Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 1987, section 722 (2), comment c); 0.
SCHACHTER, o.c., p.316; M.N.SHAW, o.c., pp.205-206.
,17 J.COMBACAU et S.SUR, Droit International Public, 1997, p. 37 3 .
"s ILC, Artt. I and 3 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 37 ILM (1998), p.440;
B.VITANY, 'International Responsibility of States for their administration of Justice' NILR
(1975), p. 132 - 135 .
9 Art 9 Harvard Research Draft 'The Law of Responsibility of States for Damage Done in
Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, Vol. 23 AJIL (1929), Spec. Suppl., p.
173; 1. BROWNLIE, o.c., p.529.
20 Chorz61v Factory case, PCI Publ, Series A, (1928) No 13, p. 47.
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4. Conclusion and Prayer for Relief
Applicant, the Republic of Bretoria, respectfully requests this Honourable Court:
1. to declare the acts of the Kingdom of Pagonia assertedly taken to protect Pagonian cultural
identity illegal under international law, and to order Pagonia to compensate Bretoria for the
losses suffered by its citizens as a result of such acts; and
2. to declare that the protection afforded to copyright owners by the Kingdom of Pagonia is
insufficient under international law, and to order Pagonia to compensate Bretoria for the
losses suffered by its citizens as a result of copyright infringements in Pagonia.
3. to order the payment of a simple interest and to determine the rate and the date from which
it should be awarded.
Respectfully submitted,
Agents for the Applicant
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pagonia and Bretoria have submitted the settlement of their dispute by special agreement to
this Court, and both parties have accepted the jurisdiction of this Court. Accordingly, this Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to art. 36(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Kingdom of Pagonia is a small, developing nation with a rich cultural, linguistic, and
religious heritage. [Clarifications No. 1, 3; Compromis at 10, 2.] Prior to 1975, Pagonia was almost
entirely isolated from the outside world. In 1975, Pagonia overthrew its totalitarian regime and took
the first steps toward democratic government and a privatized market economy. [Compromis at 3-4.]
Other than joining the United Nations in 1965 and expressing interest in membership in a regional
trade association in recent years, Pagonia has steadfastly followed its own path - outside the agenda
of international organizations. [Clarification No. 3, Compromis at 27, 29.]
Pagonia's cultural sector was not prepared for the foreign invasion that followed the
overthrow of the old regime. After the revolution, foreign language and literature courses have
become the most popular courses at Pagonian universities, while enrollment in Pagonian language
and literature classes has fallen by half. [Compromis at 5.] There was a substantial influx of foreign
language books, audio materials, and videocassettes, with significant sales through an underground
market. [Compromis at 5-6.] And the cultural sector, especially in publishing and television
broadcasting, came more and more under foreign domination. By 1991, a majority of the annual net
income of Pagonia's cultural sector was from the sale of imported foreign language material, and
soon thereafter, every Pagonian firm in the cultural sector but one had foreign owners. [Compromis
at 10, 14.]
In 1988, Pagonians concerned with the threat to their culture and heritage formed the
Pagonian Cultural Watch Group. This group aimed to prevent the dilution of Pagonian culture by
the foreign invasion. [Compromis at 11.] Such concerns were apparently widespread among the
Pagonian people - democratic elections in 1994 propelled the group's founder, Madeleine Crispell,
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to Parliament with a mandate of preventing the pollution of Pagonian culture. [Compromis at 15.]
Ms. Crispell proposed a number of bills directed at the Pagonian cultural sector. [Compromis at 16.]
Although Ms. Crispell had inherited a majority interest in an entirely Pagonian-owned publishing
company that devoted itself to the production of Pagonian language literature two years after
founding the Pagonian Cultural Watch Group, her continued ownership interest in this company after
her election to Parliament presented no problem under Pagonian law. [Compromis at 12, 14;
Clarification No. 4.]
In 1997, other democratically elected members of the Pagonian Parliament joined with Ms.
Crispell in passing a bill that became Civil Law No. 51. [Compromis at 16.] This law responded to
the foreign invasion of Pagonia's cultural sector by prohibiting foreign majority ownership of
companies operating in the cultural sector and by authorizing Pagonia's Ministry of Culture and
regulatory agencies to take other steps to protect Pagonian culture. [Compromis at 16.]
With respect to foreign majority ownership, the law provided for voluntary sale by foreign
majority owners within a given period, after which the Ministry of Culture could acquire remaining
foreign majority interests for "book value" as shown on the companies' balance sheets and then
auction these interests to Pagonian nationals with a proven commitment to Pagonian culture.
[Compromis at 16; Clarification No. 12.] Some foreign investors arranged sales immediately after
the law passed. Others waited out the prescribed period and received compensation as determined
by Pagonian courts based on independent expert valuation reports. [Compromis at 17-19.]
With respect to the other provisions of the law, the Ministry of Culture enacted a regulation
to ensure that imported periodicals could not publish exclusively in foreign languages. [Compromis
at 23.] In addition, the Pagonian Communications Commission adopted regulations providing for
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minimum Pagonian content in radio and television broadcasts based on a complicated formula to
quantify content. [Compromis at 20.] In this new regulatory framework, the four Pagonian television
networks, all privately owned, cancelled contracts for foreign television programs and films that they
felt were no longer needed. [Compromis at 21; Clarification No. 6.]
The Republic of Bretoria, a developed nation of 46 million people, has the largest
entertainment industry in the entire world. [Clarifications No. 1, 3; Compromis at 13.] Bretoria has
made a number of complaints to Pagonia on behalf of Bretorian corporations operating in Pagonia's
cultural industry. Bretorian investment had constituted roughly one quarter of the foreign investment
in the Pagonian cultural sector. [Compromis at 13.] Bretoria has alleged "expropriation" of this
investment. [Compromis at 25.] Forty-two per cent of television programs broadcast in Pagonia in
the last seven years have been Bretorian. [Clarification No. 17.] Bretoria has alleged "expropriation"
of rights under television contracts. [Compromis at 25.] And a particular Bretorian publisher,
Benjamin Publications, had taken exception to the requirement of selling bilingual products in
Pagonia. [Compromis at 24.] Bretoria has alleged breaches of supposed international trade
principles. [Compromis at 25.]
In addition, Bretoria has complained that some of its nationals have allegedly had unlicenced
copies of their copyrighted materials sold on Pagonia's underground market. [Compromis at 25.]
Despite its circumstances as a developing country, Pagonia has taken steps against the underground
market. Pagonian criminal law provides for the prosecution of those who commit a theft of
intangible property, and there have been many successful prosecutions of copyright pirates under this
law. [Compromis at 9, Clarification No. 7.] Moreover, Pagonian civil law provides a possible
remedy for copyright infringement via an action akin to "conversion". [Clarification No. 15.)
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Nonetheless, Bretoria has also taken it upon itself to claim compensation for Bretorian copyright
holders. (Compromis at 28.]
To settle the dispute by neutral adjudication, Pagonia consented to Bretoria's demand that
the dispute be submitted to the International Court of Justice. [Compromis at 27-28.] The parties
submitted ajoint compromis pursuant to art. 40(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
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OUESTIONS PRESENTED
Pagonia asks the Court:
1. Whether Pagonia's cultural policy was legal under international law;
2. Whether Pagonia's limitation of foreign ownership in its cultural sector was lawful;
3. Whether Pagonia is obligated to compensate Bretorian production companies whose
contracts were cancelled by Pagonian television companies;
4. Whether Pagonia's actions violated any applicable standard of national treatment;
5. Whether Pagonia's copyright protection is consistent with international law.
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SUMMARY OF THE PLEADINGS
Pagonia has the right to have a cultural policy. Pagonia's sovereignty and the Pagonian
people's right of self-determination include the right to pursue cultural development. Pagona's
specific policies are consistent with the practice of numerous states that have developed similar or
identical policies.
Pagonia's limitation of foreign ownership in its cultural sector is consistent with international
law. Pagonia has an inherent right to expropriate or nationalize, and the Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States identifies a principle of deference to an expropriating state's domestic law. In
the alternative, because it acted lawfully by expropriating for a valid public purpose and without
unacceptable discrimination, Pagonia did not have to provide a restitutio level of compensation.
Rather, it had only to provide compensation that was appropriate considering all relevant
circumstances. Pagonia's payment of book value met this standard and higher standards as well.
Pagonia is not obligated to compensate the Bretorian television companies whose contracts
were cancelled. Contractual rights not tied to tangible assets have not been and are not now
recognized as property for the purposes of the law of expropriation.
Pagonia is not liable for a breach of any applicable "national treatment" standard. Pagonia
has not signed any treaty committing to this standard. There cannot be a customary norm of national
treatment, because trade is about special economic relationships that do not give rise to custom.
Further, even if custom could apply, Bretoria has failed to prove the opinio juris for national
treatment being custom.
Even if there is a national treatment requirement, Pagonia's cultural policy is not subject to
it. Pagonia is a persistent objector and thus outside any custom that exists. Further, there is no
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consensus that national treatment applies to the cultural sector, so it is effectively outside any custom
that exists. Moreover, when Pagonia protected its cultural sector, it protected an industry under
grave threat, thus qualifying for a valid exception to national treatment.
Finally, Pagonia's protection of copyright complies with international law. First, Bretoria's
complaint to this Court is inadmissible because Bretorian nationals have not exhausted their local
remedies. Second, because it is bound neither by treaty nor by custom to a minimum standard of
copyright protection, Pagonia is free to determine its own standard. Third, even if Pagonia is subject
to international norms, it meets the most stringent standards. Pagonia has effective criminal and civil
remedies that are available to nationals and non-nationals alike.
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I. Pagonia has a right under international law to develop its own cultural policies to protect
its cultural identity.
Pagonia is a sovereign state, and the people of Pagonia have a right to self-determination.'
The International Court of Justice has recently strongly affirmed the principle of self-determination.'
The special significance and universal acceptance of the right of self-determination have led to its
recognition as a norm of customary international law andjus cogens.3
The Pagonian people's right of self-determination includes their right to "pursue their
economic, social and cultural development."4 The Pagonian people acted through the democratic
process to pursue the cultural development flowing directly from their right of self-determination.
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has interpreted art. 15 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as implying that a state has both a right and a
duty to promote and protect its culture from foreign cultural influences.5 Pagonia's cultural policy
promotes and protects Pagonian cultural identity by implementing changes in three areas. First, the
policy brings Pagonia's cultural industry under the control of Pagonians who have committed
themselves to promoting Pagonian culture in the operation of their businesses by mandating majority
Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, art. 1, para. 2.
2 Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), [1995] I.C.J. Rep. 90 at 102.
3 M. Nowak, UN. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (Kehl am Rhein,
Germany: N.P. Engel, 1993) at 7.
4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
art. 1, para. 1 [hereinafter I. C.C.P.R.]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 1, para. I [hereinafter/. C. E S. C. R. ]; Declaration
on the Right to Development, GA Res. 128, UN GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc.
A/41/925 (1986), pmbl., para. 6.
' See R. O'Keefe, "The 'Right to Take Part in Cultural Life' Under Article 15 of the ICESCR"
* (1998) 47 I.C.L.Q. 904 at 919-921.
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Pagonian ownership of firms in Pagonia's cultural sector. Second, the policy takes back control of
Pagonian airwaves by introducing cultural content requirements on radio and television broadcasts.
Third, the policy ensures that Pagonians can read in their own language by requiring that foreign
magazines be bilingual in format, with Pagonian as the dominant language.6
Pagonia's measures under Civil Law No. 51 are consistent with the practice of many states
which have exercised their sovereign rights to protect their cultural identities. For example, with
respect to foreign ownership, the United States, like Pagonia, has recognized the perils of foreigi
influences on the cultural sector and restricts foreign ownership of media corporations.7 The United
Kingdom's latest version of its BroadcastingAct maintains similar restrictions. Many other OECD
countries also have limits on foreign ownership in their cultural sectors.' South Africa has recently
implemented restrictions on foreign ownership of television licensees. Further, numerous states
have enacted content requirements or other measures of cultural protectionism." These specific
examples of state practice show that Pagonia's acts, flowing directly from Pagonia's status as a
sovereign state and the Pagonian people's right of self-determination, are legitimate.
6 Compromis at 16; Clarification No. 12; Compromis at 20, 23.
7 47 U.S.C. s. 310(b) (1994).
Broadcasting Act 1996 (U.K.), 1996, c. 55, s. 5(l)(a).
9Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, National Treatment for Foreign-
Controlled Enterprises (Paris: OECD, 1993) at 63-64 (Australia), 74 (Canada), 87-88 (France),
91 (Greece), 111 (Portugal).
'0 Independent Broadcasting Authority Act, 1993 (Act 153 of 1993), as amended by IBA
Amendment Act, 1995 (Act 36 of 1995).
" T.W. Chao, "GATT's Cultural Exemption of Audiovisual Trade: The United States May Have
Lost the Battle But Not the War" (1996) 17 U. Pa. J. Int'l. Econ. L. 1127 at 1148.
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II. Pagonia has lawfully limited foreign ownership in its cultural sector.
A. Pa-onia had a right to alter the ownership in its cultural sector based on its sovereignty
and rieht to cultural self-determination.
Pagonia's sovereignty and the Pagonian people's right of self-determination imply a right to
alter the ownership in Pagonia's cultural sector. Highly qualified legal publicists have stated that
nationalization or expropriation measures are lawful exercises of state sovereignty." International
tribunal decisions have held that a state's right to nationalize or expropriate is both unquestionable
and universally accepted and have asserted that this right is derived from a state's national
sovereignty. 3 The right of states to expropriate or nationalize has been recognized in United Nations
General Assembly Resolutions,"' which provide persuasive evidence ofinternational law." Pagonia
is entitled to expropriate foreign interests in its cultural sector.
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 has been advocated by developed
countries as a statement of the customary international law standard for a lawful expropriation,
requiring a valid public purpose, non-discrimination, and a minimum standard of compensation,
" E. Jim6nez de Ardchaga, "State Responsibility for the Nationalization of Foreign Owned
Property" (1978) 11 N.Y.U.J. Int'l L. & Pol. 179 at 180; I. Brownlie, Principles of Public
International Law, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) at 532.
1 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. and California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Libya (Texaco v. Libya)
(1977),17 I.L.M. I at para. 59; Amoco International Finance Corp. v. Iran (US. v. Iran) (1987),
15 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 189 at para. 22.
"' Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, GA Res. 1803 (XVII), UN
GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, UN Doc. A/$217 (1962), 17; Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States, GA Res. 3281 (XXIX), UN GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31. U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1974), 50.
" Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. The United
States), (1986] I.C.J. Rep. 14; B. Sloan, "General Assembly Resolutions Revisited (Forty Years
After)" (1987) 58 B.Y.1.L. 39.
Distinguished Brief
referred to as "appropriate compensation".16 Although this standard was once representative of
customary international law on expropriation 7 , this is no longer the case. These principles have
been explicitly challenged and rejected by developing states.'s There can be no custom where a
substantial number of states do not accept the provisions and do not feel themselves bound by
them.' Since Resolution 1803 has the support of only developed states with similar types of
economic systems, it can no longer represent a statement of customary international law.
Extensive support among developing countries for the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States demonstrates a rejection of Resolution 1803's standards. 20 The Charter "is regarded
by many states as an emergent principle, applicable ex nunc."2' It asserts that every state has the
right "[t]o nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property" while paying
"appropriate compensation that takes into account all circumstances that the State considers
pertinent."2' It does not include any requirements for a valid public purpose or non-discrimination,
16 GA Res. 1803, supra note 14; Texaco Case, supra note 13; Aminoil Case (Kuwait v.
American Independent Oil Co.) (1982), 21 I.L.M. 976; Amoco Case, supra note 13; SEDCO
Case (1986), 25 I.L.M. 629.
17 Texaco Case, supra note 13; Aminoil Case, supra note 16; Amoco Case, supra note 13;
SEDCO Case, supra note 16.
's GA Res. 3281, supra note 14; GA Res. 3171 (XXVIII) (1973), 68 A.J.I.L. 381 (1974);
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, GA Res. 3201 (S-VI)
6th Sess., UN Doc. A/9956 (1974), 13 I.L.M. 715 (1974); R. Wallace, International Law, 3rd ed.
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) at 187.
"9 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal
Republic ofGermany v. Netherlands), [1969] I.C.J. Rep. 3.
20 Wallace, supra note 18 at 187.
21 Brownlie, supra note 12 at 542.
GA Res. 3281, supra note 14, art. 2, para. 2(c).
4
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and it provides that any controversy over the amount of compensation payable for a nationalization
should be resolved under the domestic law of the nationalizing state.'
As a sovereign state and a developing cauntry, Pagonia claims the deference granted by the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. Pagonia acted to regain control over its cultural
sector by ensuring that its owners were committed to Pagonian culture.24 Pagonia developed a
compensation standard for cultural firms, and its courts carefully administered this standard, even
to the extent of using independent valuations.2" Pagonia acted within its sovereign rights.
B. In the alternative, Paeonia met strineent standards in alterin the foreien ownership of its
cultural sector.
1. Paeonia has altered the ownership in its cultural sector for a valid Dublic purpose.
Some international judicial and arbitral decisions assert that for expropriation to be lawful,
it must have a valid public purpose.2" However, it has been held that:
A precise definition of "public purpose" for which an expropriation may be lawfully
decided has neither been agreed upon in international law nor even suggested. It is
clear that, as a result of the modem acceptance of the right to nationalize, this term
is broadly interpreted, and that states, in practice, are granted extensive discretion."
Invalid public purposes include purely financial purposes (although financial considerations will not
GA Res. 3281, supra note 14.
24 Clarification No. 12
25 Compromis at 16, 19.
26 Amoco Case, supra note 13; INA Case (1985), 8 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 373; Certain German
Interests In Polish Upper Silesia Case (1929), P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 7; Aminoil Case, supra note
16; BP Case (1974), 53 I.L.R. 297.
27 Amoco Case, supra note 13 at para. 145.
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always be sufficient to negate a valid public purpose) and purely extraneous political purposes.28
Even if a valid public purpose is necessary for a lawful expropriation, the test is easily satisfied."
Pagonia has a valid public purpose: the critical need to protect and promote its distinctive
cultural identity in the face of the serious threat posed by foreign cultural influences. The
circumstances in Pagonia support this public purpose." In the years since Pagonia has allowed
foreign cultural products, demand for Pagonian cultural products has been displaced by an immense
demand for foreign cultural products: by 1991, a majority of the annual net income of Pagonia's
cultural sector was generated by sales of imported foreign language material. While foreign
language and literature courses have become the most popular at Pagonian universities, enrollment
in Pagonian language and literature classes has fallen to one-half of pre-revolution levels. Since
1991, massive foreign investment in Pagonia's cultural sector has resulted in increased foreign
control over Pagonian culture. Pagonia's goal in altering this foreign ownership is to ensure that
those controlling the companies are committed to the promotion of Pagonian culture."3
When assessing whether a state has a valid public purpose, it is not necessary to search for
the "real" purpose or "some subjective purpose motivating the state or the persons who have
supreme power in a state."'32 The facts reasonably support Pagonia's stated public purpose, making
28 Amoco Case, supra note 13 at para. 145; BP Case, supra note 26.
29 Amoco Case, supra note 13 at para. 146.
30 Compromis at 7, 10, 5, 13.
31 Clarification No. 12.
32 G. Christie, "What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under International Law?" (1962) 38
B.Y.I.L. 307 at 332.
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a search for some other "real" reason unnecessary. Any consideration ofwhether Ms. Crispell stands
to gain personally from Pagonia's regulation of its cultural sector is irrelevant and unnecessary.
2. Paonia's cultural Dolicy does not violate any non-discrimination requirement.
Although non-discrimination has been accepted as a requirement for a lawful expropriation",
arguments on discrimination have not been predominant in expropriation cases.' Some degree of
discrimination is acceptable if it relates to the public purpose." In the Amoco Case, nationalization
did not offend the non-discrimination requirement even though the policy was aimed at foreign
owners in Iran's petroleum industry, because the discrimination fit closely with Iran's valid public
purpose of preserving natural resource revenue for its own development.3 In the Liamco Case, the
arbitrator held that although Libya's policy discriminated against foreign owners, this was necessary
for it to preserve ownership of its own petroleum resources." To be unlawfully discriminatory, a
measure must be a "purely discriminatory measure". The non-discrimination requirement allows
states the freedom to enact policies that have an element of discrimination.
Pagonia's policy does not discriminate against foreign owners in an unacceptable way.
Under Pagonia's ownership policy, foreigners are prohibited only from holding majority interests
"' Amoco Case, supra note 13; BP Case, supra note 26; Liamco Case (Libyan American Oil
Company v. Libya) (1981), 20 I.L.M. I; Aminoil Case, supra note 16.
Wallace, supra note 18 at 187.
" Amoco Case, supra note 13 at para. 145.
16 Ibid.
"' Liamco Case, supra note 33.
38 Ibid at 59.
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in companies in the cultural sector." Although this draws a distinction between nationals and non-
nationals, it does not offend international law since it is inextricably linked with Pagonia's valid
public purpose. At no point do the Pagonian measures target a specific group of foreigners, such as
Bretorian nationals."' Pagonia's restrictions are simply necessary for Pagonia to ensure that those
owning majority interests in cultural industries are committed to promoting Pagonian culture.4'
C. Pagonia provided foreign owners who gave un their interests in Pagonia's cultural sector
with appropriate compensation with regard to all circumstances,
1. The standard of comensation reuired under customary international law is
approvriate comnensation with regard to all circumstances.
Because it meets public purpose and non-discrimination requirements, Pagonia's alteration
of ownership in its foreign sector was a lawful expropriation. The distinction between lawful and
unlawful expropriation is important as "the rules applicable to the compensation to be paid by the
expropriating state differ according to the legal characterization of the taking."'2 This follows the
approach taken in the Chorzdw Factory Case, and has been recently reaffirmed."'
For a lawful expropriation, a state need only provide compensation that equals the value of
the undertaking at the time of the taking rather than restitutio in integrum (the value of the
39 Compromis at 16.
40 Compromis at 16.
41 Clarification No. 12.
42 Amoco Case, supra note 13 at para. 192.
43 Chorz6w Factory Case (Indemnity) (Merits) (Germany v. Poland) (1928) P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No.
17, 46; Aminoil Case, supra note 16.
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undertaking plus a margin for lost profits)." The distinction between lawful and unlawful
expropriations has been used when determining the standard of compensation required: "all awards
which adopted the standard of restitutio relate to expropriation found unlawful." 5
For a lawful expropriation, the traditional standard of "appropriate compensation" without
regard to circumstances has been rejected.' The standard of appropriate compensation considering
the circurnstances "peculiar to the particular case" has been accepted even where tribunals have
stated that "appropriate compensation" is the standard. 7 Highly qualified legal publicists
acknowledge the general shift in the standard to this middle path, approaching the standard
advocated by developing countries that maintains that equitable considerations must be taken into
account."' The expropriating state may consider factors like an inequality of power between the
expropriating country and foreign investors, the economic situation in the expropriating country, or
past profits of the foreign investors.4 9 Because Pagonia's expropriation of foreign interests in its
cultural sector was lawful, Pagonia is only obligated to provide appropriate compensation
considering all circumstances and does not have to include a measure for lost profits.
4 Amoco Case, supra note 13 at para. 197.
4' Amoco Case, supra note 13 at para. 206, referring to: Lighthouses Arbitration (1956), 23
I.L.R. 299; Sapphire Int. Petroleums v. NIOC (1967), 35 I.L.R. 136; BP Case, supra note 26;
Texaco Case, supra note 13; AGIP Case (1982), 21 I.L.M. 726.
' See supra note 18.
47 Aminoil Case, supra note 16 at para. 144.
48 Wallace, supra note 18 at 188; Brownlie, supra note 12; Jimdnez de Ardchaga, supra note 12.
49 B. Claggett, "Just Compensation in International Law: The Issues Before the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal" in R. Lillich, ed., The Valuation of Nationalized Property in
International Law, vol. 4 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1987) 31.
9
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2. Pagonia's payment of book value met the standard of appropriate compensation in
all circumstances.
Pagonia compensated Bretorian nationals who gave up their interests in cultural sector
industries according to the standard of "book value", or the value of assets carried on the company's
balance sheet - cost less accumulated depreciation - which is consistent with the definition of book
value according to the World Bank. Book value is the standard of compensation advocated by
developing countries such as Pagonia.5 It represents an appropriate standard considering the
circumstances such as Pagonia's critical need to protect its culture. A standard of compensation like
book value is justifiable based on principles of sovereignty and self-determination and particularly
where a state acts for legitimate aims of public interest.
52
Book value does not include a margin for lost profits. Industrialized countries advocate the
Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method, which takes into account future profitability.5 3 Book value
has an advantage over DCF in that it is "easily and objectively assessed".' Further, compensation
for a lawful expropriation does not require compensation for future profits."
A recent economic study has shown that the net book value advocated by developing
o Clarification No. 13; World Bank: Report to the Development Committee and Guidelines on
the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment (1992), 31 I.L.M. 1363 at 1383.
sI T. Stauffer, "Valuation Of Assets In International Takings" (1996) 17 Energy L. J. 459.
52 Brownlie, supra note 12 at 536-37; James v. United Kingdom (1986), 8 E.H.R.R. 123 at 147
(Eur. Ct. H.R.).
13 Stauffer, supra note 51.
Amoco Case, supra note 13 at para. 249.
5 Amoco Case, supra note 13; Chorz6w Factory Case, supra note 43; Aminoil Case, supra note
16.
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countries and the discounted cash flow method advocated by developed countries are equivalent
except in circumstances where profits are either exceptionally low or exceptionally high.S Bretorian
investors in Pagonia did not face such extreme situations, so book value unequivocally met the
standard of appropriate compensation considering all circumstances.
11, Pagonia is not obligated to comnensate Bretorian television companies whose contracts
were cancelled by Paeonian television firms.
Pagonia's content regulation of television and radio broadcasts has not resulted in an
unlawful expropriation. The cancellation of contracts with Bretorian television companies did not
result in a loss of property. Under the traditional definition of property for the purposes of
expropriation, contractual rights that are not tied to tangible assets are not recognized. 7 Although
there has been a move to recognize certain contractual rights as property rights," this recognition has
been only in special circumstances and is not part of customary international law.
A long line of authority considers contractual rights expropriated only if they are "so closely
related to the physical assets seized as to be useless without the physical assets themselves."' The
cancelled television contracts relate only to a right to provide a service and are not connected with
any physical property. Because expropriation law does not consider the cancellation of contracts a
taking of property, Pagonia is not obligated to compensate the Bretorian television companies.
56 Stauffer, supra note 51.
57 Wallace, supra note 18 at 185.
5 Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran (Interlocutory Award) (U.S. v. Iran) (1984), 23 I.L.M. 1090.
5 Texaco Case, supra note 13; Aminoil Case, supra note 16.
'o G. Christie, supra note 32 at 316; Chorz6w Factory Case, supra note 43; Norwegian Claims
Case (Norway v. US.) (1922), 1 R.I.A.A. 307; Starrett Housing Case, supra note 58 at 1117.
11
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IV. Pagonia's acts did not violate any aDlicable norm of "national treatment."
A. Pagonia is not subiect to any international norm of "national treatment".
I. Paeonia has exercised its sovereign right not to sign any, international treaty
committing it to national treatment.
Although there exist international treaties that impose national treatment obligations, these
treaties create no obligations for non-signatories.6' Pagonia's sovereign equality includes the right
to choose its own path,6 including the right not to be bound by treaties it has not signed.
2. No custom applies to Pagonia's snecial economic relations.
Pagonia, as a sovereign state, chooses whether and to what extent it wishes to trade with
other states. Legal obligations on trade come from treaties rather than from custom.63 National
treatment applied to trade is an operational standard that Pagonia can choose whether or not to
implement." These are standards "referring to differential economic relationships." ' Pagonia need
not trade on particular terms or at all simply because it has done so in the past, as a choice not to
trade is not subject to any customary legal rule." Even a leading authority supporting the derivation
6Z Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 34.
62 Charter of the United Nations, supra note 1, art. 2, para. 1.
63 B. Colas, "Acteurs, sources formelles et hidrarchie des normes en droit international
donomique" (1991) 22 R.G.D. 385 at 389.
64 Z.A. Kronfol, Protection of Foreign Investment (Leiden, Netherlands: A.W. Sitjhoff
International, 1972) at 16.
65 A.A. D'Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1971) at 131.
66 Ibid, at 105.
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of custom from treaties acknowledges for these reasons that "[a] treaty such as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that institutionalizes trade is...incapable of giving rise to rules of
customary law binding upon nonparties."' 7 Pagonia's cultural policies are not subject to customary
international norms on trade because trade is about special economic relationships.
3. Even if custom could anDly to Pagonia's special economic relations, there is no
customary norm of national treatment.
Pagonia cannot be subject to a customary norm of national treatment because no such norm
exists. To establish a customary norm, Bretoria must conclusively prove both widespread state
practice and opiniojuris: a subjective acceptance of the practice as legally obligatory.' Even if
treaties including national treatment establish practice, there must be an "argument...from which it
could be deduced that States recognize themselves to be under an obligation towards each other...".."
In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,70 the International Court of Justice held against the
formation of custom in the context of a norm enshrined in a multilateral treaty. The mere presence
of a provision in a multilateral treaty does not show opiniojuris - there must be solid evidence from
outside the treaty.7 For example, in the Nicaragua Case,' the International Court of Justice could
find customary international law equivalent to the principles contained in treaties only by finding,
67 Ibid. at 105-106.
The Steamship Lotus (France v. Turkey) (1927), P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 9 at 26, 28; North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 19 at 44.
The Steamship Lotus, supra note 68 at 23.
o Supra note 19.
71 Ibid. at 43-44.
' Supra note 15.
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in United Nations resolutions, formal statements of opiniojuris. This principle applies analogously
in the present context. Bretoria has failed to put forward any such evidence.
B. If Pasonia is subject to a national treatment requirement, then Pagonia's acts taken to
protect its cultural identity are not subject to this requirement.
1. Pagonia has acquired the status of a persistent objector to national treatment.
This Court must not assume that Pagonia has acquiesced to any custom of national
treatment.' Pagonia's choice not to sign any treaty requiring national treatment is a clear sign of its
objection to the national treatment principle.' Although Pagonia has expressed interest in joining
the Regional Association of Trading States, this does not indicate support for national treatment in
general, as there is no evidence that this is a principle of the association at all, and even if it were,
it would be a special privilege within the region."
The objection of a single state matters precisely because international law rests on consensual
foundations: "It results from (the perfect equality of nations] that no one can rightfully impose a rule
on another." 76 A state that dissents from a developing custom is not bound by the customary rule."
7 Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. Rep. 3 at 58 (sep. op.
Dillard); D'Amato, supra note 65 at 98-102.
' Affirmed in Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 266 at 277-78.; M.E.
Villiger, Customary International Law and Treaties (Dodrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
1985) at 15.
"' Compromis at 27.
76 The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66 at 122 (1825) (Marshall C.J.); See M. Akehurst, "Custom as a
Source of International Law" (1974-75) 47 B.Y.I.L. I at 26; Villiger, supra note 74 at 17; D.A.
Colson, "How Persistent Must the Persistent Objector Be?" (1986) 61 Wash. L. Rev. 957 at 957-
58.
' Restatement of the Law (Third): Foreign Relations Law of the United States, s. 102, comm. d
(1987); Brownlie, supra note 12 at 10; T.L. Stein, "The Approach of the Different Drummer: The
14
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The International Court of Justice has affirmed that a customary rule does not apply to a state that
has always opposed the rule."' Since Pagonia, as a sovereign state, has objected to the national
treatment principle, any custom of national treatment would not apply to Pagonia.
2. Pagonia's cultural protection measures are not subject to national treatment.
Pagonia remains acutely aware of the connection between national memory and national
independence.' When the cultural sector that preserves national memory had only one fully
Pagonian firm left,8u when 42% of Pagonian television programming came from a single foreign
country,8 and when even the Pagonian power to read Pagonian language and Pagonian memories
was threatened by a drastic fall in the study of Pagonian literature and an influx of foreign literature
and magazines,u the Pagonian people acted democratically to preserve their national independence.
Pagonia's cultural policy is legitimate in international law because there is no consensus for
requiring national treatment in the cultural sector. Treaties implementing national treatment contain
exceptions for specific cultural products, 3 commitments to the development of programs and
Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law" (1985) 26 Harv. Int'l L.J. 457 at 460.
" Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116. Affirmed in the diss. op.
of Sorensen in North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 19 at 247.
79 L.G.C. Kaplan, "The European Community's 'Television Without Frontiers' Directive:
Stimulating Europe to Regulate Culture" (1994) 8 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 255 at 263.
go Compromis at 14.
s' Clarification No. 17.
2 Compromis at 5-7.
83 Canada - Chile Free Trade Agreement, 5 December 1996, 36 I.L.M. 1067, Annex C-01.3, s.
3(a) (exempting measures in Schedule VII of Customs Tariff, R.S.C. 1985, c. 41 (3d Supp.),
which include measures on cultural products).
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regulations to promote social and cultural development," and general exemptions for the cultural
industry.'5 The idea of incorporating cultural services into the GATT framework has been set aside
due to European Union opposition.' France indicated that it would not sign a GATT that included
the cultural industry.' Numerous other states have also indicated their opposition to trade
commitments without cultural exemptions, including Australia, Canada, Egypt, India, Norway,
Sweden, and most Third World states." A significant portion of the world denies any opiniojuris
for the application of trade rules to cultural industries.
Moreover, Pagonia's cultural policy is specifically grounded in state practice. Article IV of
the original GATT endorsed the notion of screen quotas on cinemas, the dominant mass media of
the time. 9 Since then, states have implemented the same policy of cultural content quotas with
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa: Treaty Establishing, 5 November 1993, 33
I.L.M. 1067, art. 143; Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS): Revised
Treaty, 24 July 1995, 35 I.L.M. 660, art. 62; Organization of African Unity Member States:
Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, 3 June 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1241, art. 69.
s4 Canada - Mexico - United States: North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 December
1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, art. 2106, entrenching art. 2005 of Canada - United States: Free Trade
Agreement, 22 December 1987, 27 I.L.M. 281; Canada - Israel Free Trade Agreement, 31 July
1996, art. 10.5.
g6 See Yves Mamou, "L'Accord Sur Le Commerce International, L'Exclusion du Secteur de la
Culture et ses Consdquences, Les Europens Gardent Leur Libertd Pour l'Audiovisuel" Le
Monde (16 December 1993).
"7 Statement of French Culture Minister Jacques Toubon in David Buchan, "Lights, Camera -
Reaction!" [London] Financial Times (18 September 1993) 7.
"8 M. Braun & L. Parker, "Trade in Culture: Consumable Product or Cherished Articulation of a
Nation's Soul" (1993) 22 Deny. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 155 at 177.
89 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. IV
[hereinafter GATT 1947].
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respect to television. Even such an advocate of cultural commercialization as the United States
requires that cable services carry local content, and the United States Supreme Court has recently
upheld this as inter alia "promoting the widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity
of sources."" Content quotas for television and/or radio exist in numerous states, including Canada,
the European Community as a whole, the United Kingdom, virtually every other European state,
Australia, and South Africa.9' Pagonia claims the same right to defend its airwaves.
Pagonia's magazine regulation serves a related purpose of ensuring that writing is available
to Pagonians in their own language. Foreign publishers flooding Pagonia's magazine market with
their wares are dangerous to Pagonian culture. Moreover, any influence that could affect literacy in
the Pagonian language when Pagonia already struggles with education92 is a particular threat.
Pagonia reacted to this threat to preserve its language, memory, and independence.
Pagonia's policy is based on cultural criteria. Pagonia's radio and television content
requirements use a complex formula to determine cultural content93 that could potentially include
works by overseas Pagonians. Although the magazine regulation draws a distinction between
nationals and non-nationals, Pagonia underlines that the regulation is part of a larger cultural policy
o Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 114 S. Ct. 2445
(1994).
9' Television Broadcasting Regulations, S.O.R.87-49, ss. 2, 4(6) and Radio Regulations,
S.O.R./86-982, s 2.2, as am. by S.O.R./91-517 (Canada); EC, Council Directive 89/552 on
Television Without Frontiers, [1989] O.J. L. 298/23; Television Act, 1954 (U.K.), 2 & 3 Eliz. 2,
c. 55, s. 3(l)(d); Kaplan, supra note 79 at 294-301 (European states), 327 (Australia);
Independent Broadcasting Act, 1993 (South Africa), supra note 10.
92 Compromis at 1.
93 Compromis at 20.
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designed to achieve the objectives of cultural preservation. The European Court of Justice has held,
on an analogous public morality exception, that on matters going to the deepest values of a society,
there must be a margin of appreciation given to restraints on trade; each state must act in the context
of its particular sociocultural situation." Pagonia has acted in the context of a culture under threat.
Its cultural policy fell within an area not subject to national treatment.
3. Pagonia's protection of an industry in *eopard' is not subject to national treatment.
Pagonia's cultural industry as a whole was under grave threat before Pagonia implemented
its cultural policy. Income in the cultural sector came predominantly from sales of foreign language
material, and every fi-m in the cultural sector but one was under foreign ownership." Although
Pagonia's acts might benefit one individual, Ms. Crispell, this does not make Pagonia's acts corrupt,
but illustrates the serious situation in which just one Pagonian was left in control of a cultural sector
firm. Pagonia faced a very real threat of losing this industry entirely to foreign control.
Treaties that include national treatment requirements also include exceptions ranging from
general exceptions for public policy reasons9* to GATT's specific provision allowing the suspension
of a GATT obligation like national treatment where a product is being imported "in such increased
quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers...of
like or directly competitive products."" Bretoria cannot hold Pagonia to national treatment standards
4 R. v. Henn & Darby (1979), [1980] 1 C.M.L.R. 246 (E.C.J.).
" Compromis at 10, 14.
9 Czech Republic - Hungary - Poland- Slovak Republic: Central European Free Trade
Agreement (CEFTA), 21 December 1992, 34 I.L.M. 3.
9 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, 15 April 1994, 33 I.L.M.
18
1999]
258 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 6:221
without letting Pagonia use the exceptions that accompany national treatment. Pagonia's acts to
preserve a threatened industry were justified under a valid exception to national treatment.
V. Pagonia complies with international law on its protection of copyrights.
A. Bretoria's complaint about copyright infringements is inadmissible before this Court since
there has been no exhaustion of local remedies.
A fundamental precept of international law states that "there can be no question of denial of
justice...as long as justice has not been appealed to..."." Local remedies must be exhausted prior to
adjudication of a dispute before an international body." The plaintiff state must prove that there are
no effective local remedies before it takes a claim to the International Court of Justice.'0 Bretoria
has failed to meet this fundamental requirement for the admissibility of a claim.' '
Brownlie notes that "it is not possible to assume that no remedy exists in municipal law"'0 2
where there is any reasonable possibility of a remedy.' The duty to exhaust local remedies extends
even to a duty to advance novel causes of action.' Pagonia's law includes a cause of action similar
1125, Annex IA, adopting GAlr 1947, supra note 89, art. XIX:I(a) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
98 Mexican Union Railway (Limited) (Great Britain) v. United Mexican States (1930), 5 R.I.A.A.
115 at 122 (Br.-Mex. Cl. Comm.).
Interhandel Case (Switzerland v. United States ofAmerica), [1959] I.C.J. Rep. 6.
'o Case of Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway), [1957] I.C.J. Rep. 9 at 39 (sep. op.
Lauterpacht).
10' Interhandel Case, supra note 99 at 26.
102 Brownlie, supra note 12 at 497.
103 Ibid. at 497. Cf the sep. op. of Lauterpacht in Norwegian Loans, supra note 100 at 41
(possibilities "not so absolutely remote as to deserve to be ruled out altogether").
104 Ambatielos Arbitration (Greece v. UK.) (1956), 12 R.I.A.A. 83 at 123.
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to the common law tort of conversion,'05 which provides a remedy for an unlawful dealing with
property. No Bretorian national has used this tort to make a claim for copyright infringement. By
bringing their claims immediately to the International Court of Justice, Bretoria puts its citizens
above the Pagonian rule of law and asserts for them a special privilege of going immediately to the
highest court in the world.'" In international law, however, there is no breach and thus no
admissible claim where there has been no exhaustion of local remedies. 7
B. Pagonia's decisions about copyright protection represent an exercise of its domestic
urisdiction.
1. The lesser developed country exceptions to international norms of copyright
protection imply that no international norm binds Pagonia.
Pagonia qualifies under United Nations definitions as a less developed country. "8 As such,
if it were party to the major international conventions on copyright protection, it would qualify for
substantial exceptions. The Berne Convention exempts states that declare themselves to be
developing countries from duties to provide full copyright protection." Under the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects ofintellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), developing countries and states in
transition from command to free market economies have the right to delay their compliance with
'o' Clarification No.15.
'0 M. Sorensen, Manual of Public International Law (London: Macmillan, 1968) at 584
(rejecting such tactics as "an affront to the independence of the local sovereign and to the
authority of its laws and tribunals over all persons subject to it.")
,07 International Law Commission: Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 1996, 37 I.L.M. 440,
art. 22.
'O' Clarification No. 1.
'09 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, as revised at Paris, 24
July 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 21 and Appendix.
20
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most provisions of the agreement for five years, a period of time that had not even expired for these
states at the time of the complaint against Pagonia, and least developed countries have the right to
delay their compliance by ten years or longer.'
If Pagonia were a signatory to conventions on the protection of intellectual property, it would
have a legal right to make a reservation from requirements to protect intellectual property. The
International Court of Justice has held that an ability to make a reservation from requirements
suggests that these requirements cannot have crystallized into customary law. "' Pagonia asserts that
a state choosing not to sign intellectual property treaties should not be subject to more onerous
obligations than if it had signed these agreements.
2. There is no customary international norm of copyright protection.
The nature of agreements on copyright protection and the circumstances of their negotiation
suggest that there is no customary international norm of copyright protection. The opening article
of the Berne Convention makes clear that its intent is to create a "Union" rather than to enunciate
general norms." 2 The TRIPS Agreement, as part of the Uruguay Round of GATT, embodies only
a set of negotiated mutually beneficial concessions."3
To bind Pagonia by custom, Bretoria must establish widespread practice by states and that
1o Annex 1 C to GATr 1994, supra note 97, arts. 65, 66(1), 66(2) [hereinafter TRIPS].
. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 19 at 39-40, 42.
1I Berne Convention, supra note 109, art. 1.
'" J.S. Thomas & M.A. Meyer, The New Rules of Global Trade: A Guide to the World Trade
Organization (Scarborough: Carswell, 1997) at 258-60, 294-95.
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this practice flows from opiniojuris, a belief that the practice is obligatory." 4 But there is no
widespread opinio juris for copyright protection. Developing countries in general were
unenthusiastic participants in the TRIPS negotiations."' Major states often practice copyright
protection only in response to threats rather from any opiniojuris."' For example, although China
has signed and started implementing memoranda agreeing to protect intellectual property,' '" it agreed
to do so only hours before threatened American trade sanctions"' would otherwise have gone into
effect." 9 Moreover, even after the TRIPS Agreement, Southeast Asian nations have specifically
qualified the implementation of intellectual property arrangements as having to be "in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare. ' "
", North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 19 at 44.
'" Thomas & Meyer, supra note 113 at 259.
116 K. Newby, "The Effectiveness of Special 301 in Creating Long Term Copyright Protection
for U.S. Companies Overseas" (1995) 21 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 29 at 47.
"17 People's Republic of China-United States ofAmerica: Memorandum of Understanding on
the Protection of intellectual Property Rights, 17 January 1992, 34 I.L.M. 676; China-United
States: Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, 26 February 1995, 34 I.L.M. 881.
... Under "Special 301" of the 1974 Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. s. 2411 (1988) as strengthened by the
1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, 19 U.S.C. ss. 2101-2495 (1988).
"9 Intellectual Property Rights Protection Under Special 301: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
International Trade of the Comm. on Finance, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1992) (testimony of
Robert W. Holleyman H, Managing Director, Business Software Alliance).
120 Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property
Cooperation and Framework Agreement on Services, 15 December 1995, 36 I.L.M. 1072, art. 2,
para. 3.
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3. Paionia has the right to make its own determinations on copyright protection.
Sovereign states and self-determining peoples have the right to choose the kind of society
they wish to develop.' 2' International law enunciates the duty to respect a state's sovereign right to
govern its own domestic jurisdiction.'" Pagonia's choices about how to protect intellectual property
and how to treat it as compared to other property reflect Pagonian traditions and values. Developing
nations often have different understandings of private property and visions of how to foster
creativity,"2 as well as different implications for their societies from their recognition of copyright. 2
Countries that are now developed did not have the same intellectual property protections when they
were developing.t"S The duty at international law to respect sovereign states implies a duty to respect
Pagonia's right to make its own determinations on copyright protection.
C. Even if a minimum standard of copvright protection exists. Pagonia has provided adequate
and effective convrieht protection that meets the most stringent norms of international law.
The most stringent international legal norms of copyright protection are embodied in the
TRIPS Agreement,' 2' a convention that Pagonia has not signed. These norms require the protection
12 LC.C.P.R., supra note 4, art. 1, para. 1; LC.E.S.C.R., supra note 4, art. 1, para. 1.
' Charter of the United Nations, supra note 1, art. 2, para. 7.
'2 R.L. Gana, "Has Creativity Died in the Third World? Some Implications of the
Internationalization of Intellectual Property" (1995) Deny. J. Int'l. L. & Pol. 109 at 115-16, 139-
41.
124 N.W. Netanel, "Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in the Global Arena" (1998) 51
Vanderbilt L. Rev. 217.
12' F. Benech, "La place du droit de la propri~td intellectuelle dans le droit international
dconomique" (1991) 22 R.G.D. 423 at 427.
126 TRIPS, supra note 110.
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of authors' rights from copyright infringement in certain ways.
The TRIPS Agreement indicates that there is no obligation to develop a special judicial
system for intellectual property nor is there an obligation concerning the distribution of resources
to intellectual property protection.'" With prosecutorial departments with some specialization in
intellectual property protection in three of its nine regions,' 2 ' Pagonia rises well above international
norms.
The most stringent norms of international law require only that states provide criminal
remedies to provide a deterrent against wilful copyright piracy on a commercial scale, that states'
civil judicial procedures be available to those alleging copyright infringement, and that states treat
non-nationals in a non-discriminatory fashion.'
Pagonia meets the first requirement. Under its theft laws, Pagonia has successfully
prosecuted hundreds of persons guilty of copyright infringement and not necessarily just those
involved on a commercial scale.'" The theft laws provide for both fines and substantial prison terms
as deterrents, and some of those who committed more serious acts of piracy have been imprisoned.'3'
Pagonia meets the second requirement. Pagonia's civil judicial procedures are available to
those alleging copyright infringement. The country's legal system has a private cause of action
127 Ibid., art. 41(5).
I21 Compromis at 9.
12' TRIPS, supra note 110, arts. 61, 42, 3.
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similar to what is called "conversion" in common law regimes,' thus allowing a civil suit where
there has been a misappropriation of someone's intellectual property.
Pagonia meets the third requirement. Pagonia's legal system provides standing to non-
nationals, as the facts show that non-nationals have argued in Pagonian courts." Although there
is little evidence of Pagonian criminal prosecutions for thefts of non-nationals' copyrights, there is
also no evidence of any discrimination against non-nationals.
Pagonia, despite its difficult circumstances as a developing country, meets stringent
requirements of international law that it is not required to meet, providing adequate and effective
copyright protection.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
For the foregoing reasons, the respondent Government of Pagonia asks that this Honourable Court:
I. DECLARE that Pagonia's cultural policy was legal under international law, and in particular
that Pagonia's cultural policy did not unlawfully expropriate and did not breach any
applicable norm of national treatment; and
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